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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1: THE STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
   Succession on death, the subject matter of this study signifies the devolution 
of property to a living person upon the death of its owner. The law of succession 
could thus be criticised for rendering possible the acquisition of wealth by persons 
who did not work for it and for constituting a principal source of economic inequality 
in society. We think, however, that if the law of succession is an evil, then it is a 
necessary evil. It enables the continuity of the estate of the deceased and most 
importantly, provides the only opportunity for the reallocation and continuation of the 
obligations of the deceased towards persons for whose maintenance he was 
responsible in his lifetime. If the rules of succession are a reflection of the deceased’s 
intention, then nothing would have been dearer to him than to have his name 
perpetuated and his family well provided for.  
The criterion for deciding who the beneficiaries of an estate are ought to be 
whether the deceased in his lifetime owed them a legal duty of maintenance. The 
customary and modern laws applicable in Cameroon recognise that a man has the 
obligation to maintain certain members of his family and maintenance here includes 
the provision of necessaries including food, shelter, clothing and medical care. The 
primary obligation is towards the nuclear family which consists of the spouses and 
issue.  This obligation is exemplified in English law by the powers given to the wife 
to pledge the husband’s credit for necessaries,1 and since the duty to maintain the 
issue is placed the spouses, the issue could also take necessary goods on credit and the 
parents would be obliged to pay a reasonable price for them.2  The French position as 
                                                 
1 See generally, Nwogugu, Family Law in Nigeria, Heinemann Educational Books (Nigeria) Plc. 1996, 
283 et seq.  
2 See Nash v. Inman [1908] 2 KB 1 (CA). Normally infant contracts are void in law but an exception is 
made in the case of necessaries.  
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contained in article 214 of the Civil Code reads: “Les charges du mariage incombent 
au mari, à titre principal. Il est obligé de fourmir à la femme tout ce qui est 
néccessaire pour les besoins de la vie selon ses facultés et son état3”, and as is the 
case in English law the responsibility to maintain the issue is shared by both spouses.4    
In customary law the husband has the duty to maintain his wife or wives and 
children and failure in this respect could result in the woman divorcing the man.5 This 
is also a rule of the Muslim Maliki law through the principle of nafqah which requires 
the man to provide the woman with necessaries suitable to their station in life. 6  
The duty of maintenance extends to the needy members of the immediate and 
extended families. It is immaterial in every case that they might have some means of 
their own, as might be the case in England and France where government social 
security schemes provide some form of benefit to all categories of their needy 
citizens.  
These are the persons who in our estimation should qualify as beneficiaries 
given that the duty of maintenance does not cease on the death of a breadwinner and 
that the death instead aggravates their situations. When the intestacy rules fail 
therefore to make a proper inventory of the beneficiaries and leave out some of the 
persons with a legitimate claim to  maintenance, it must only be expected that there 
would be feelings of bitterness giving rise to social problems of different sorts.  This, 
we submit, is what Cameroon’s succession law seems to be suffering from today. 
The number of persons claiming succession rights will generally exceed those 
to whom the deceased owed the duty of maintenance, as is reflected in the long list of 
                                                 
3 As amended by articles 6 and 25 of Law No. 75-617 of 11 July 1975  
4 See article 203 of the Civil Code. 
5 See Ollennu The Law of Testate and Intestate Succession in Ghana, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 
1966, 224. 
6 See Ajijola A. D. Introduction to Islamic Law, New Delhi, International Islamic Publishers, 1989, 
191. 
 2
possible intestate beneficiaries observed in the received systems. The reason is that 
rules of maintenance are always subject to the personal needs of a person and these 
could be substantial, depending on his station of life and lifestyle. His duty of 
maintenance towards his immediate and extended families is therefore generally 
limited, an indication of which is found in article 205 of the French Civil Code, 
according to which, “Les enfants doivent des aliments à leurs père et mère ou autres 
ascendants qui sont dans le besoin.”  A dead person has no personal needs and so the 
extra income could be applied to other things, such for example, as allowing claims to 
succession by persons claming by the proxy of those to whom the duty was owed.7 
The purpose of the extension is however defeated by the institution of a system of 
precedence which favours succession by the persons closest to the deceased to the 
exclusion of all others.  Hence in most cases, other persons, even those to whom the 
duty was personally owed are left destitute and at the mercy of the spouse and issue.   
While only members of the immediate or extended families8 might be 
excluded under the received laws, the situation in customary law, with the exception, 
perhaps of Muslim law is even more preoccupying. The patrilineal system of 
succession excludes women generally from the list of beneficiaries. Widows are 
excluded for not being family members. Matrilineal systems on the other hand profess 
the equality of sexes but are just, to borrow from John Anthony Howard, “patrilineal 
systems with matrilineal emphasis”.9 With few exceptions, women are excluded and 
these include widows. Matrilineal systems further exclude the nuclear family of 
                                                 
7 The inheritance tax is another way of tapping into the extra income. 
8 The terms immediate, extended and nuclear families will be adequately defined in the work, but for 
the present purpose, an immediate family is that generated by the parents of the deceased and consist of 
them, the deceased, the brothers and sisters of the deceased and their descendants; the extended family 
is generated by the grand parents and consists of the grand parents, their brothers and sisters and 
descendants; the nuclear family or the sub-family is that generated by the deceased and consists of him, 
and descendants.  
9 John Anthony Howard on “The Customary Law of Marriage and Succession among the Kom Of 
Cameroon”, Ph. D. Thesis, University of London, 1972, 16. 
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deceased completely, except in the case of a deceased female.10 Now, the duty of 
maintenance in the lifetime of the deceased did not distinguish between the sexes and 
went primarily to his nuclear family. And as if enough is not enough the customary 
law under the apparent influence of the received laws has also adopted the system of 
succession going primarily to persons closest to the deceased. 
The problems confronting succession in Cameroon are not limited to the 
inappropriate identification of the beneficiaries. Problems are current among the 
beneficiaries themselves; due mainly to the discretionary nature of distribution which 
makes administration almost indefinite and gives room to abuse by the persons in 
charge. The rules of distribution themselves are not always very clear, when for 
example in French law the rules give spouses the right of use after distribution, male 
beneficiaries often see no difference between this and customary law and advocate the 
application of the latter instead. 
It is not uncommon that upon the deceased’s death members of his or her 
family go on the rampage to grab the property or dispossess persons considered not to 
be entitled to succession,11 of any lands occupied by them. Where the deceased was 
married this is against his widow and the issue12 and generally any attempts to resist 
results in violence being perpetrated against them. In a good number of cases female 
relatives of the deceased receive similar treatment from their male counterparts who 
believe that women should be in their husbands’ homes and not be around upon their 
father’s death to lay claims to property.13  
                                                 
10 This study will be concerned more with the estate of males for the reason that women generally have 
very little or no property at all to give rise to serious dispute. 
11 See Owen, Margaret, A World of Widows, London, Zed Books, 1996, 59-62.  
12 See Galega v. Galega, Appeal No. BCA/19/93 (unreported) where the brother of the deceased took 
hold of money and many other  items of movable property and threatened to sell off one of the houses 
of the deceased. 
13 See for Peter Chi Charles v. Chonkwo Nde Fidelis & Caroline Chi (2006) Appeal No. BCA/62/ 2003 
(unreported) in which a brother refused to attend a family meeting because he thought that his sisters 
ought to be in their husbands’ houses and not be attending family meetings.  
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Many victims of succession-based violence abstain on their own volition from 
going to court. Women would not want to take their husbands’ relatives or brothers to 
court, as they think that they will need their support in rainy days.14 There is also 
illiteracy and ignorance among the rural populations which make them oblivious of 
the fact that law at least provides some measure of protection for their interests. The 
conception here is that the successor of the deceased, who manages the property on 
behalf of the family, is already known and what is needed is for the new “father” and 
“husband” to continue providing for their subsistence. The fear and threat of 
witchcraft has also been identified as deterring many a meritorious beneficiary from 
seeking legal redress in a court of law. Witchcraft as defined by the Penguin English 
Dictionary consists in “the use of sorcery or magic” and the practitioner of witchcraft 
is said to be “a person who is credited with supernatural powers.”  
Furthermore the High Courts with the competence to administer the more 
favourable received laws are inaccessible to many who would have sought legal 
redress. These courts are said to be located at divisional levels, but the divisions are 
generally large and most of the countryside is without motorable roads, and this 
makes access to them difficult, if not impossible. The rural populations which 
constitute the majority are therefore governed mostly by customary law.15 It is not 
uncommon also for matters arising in the urban areas where the courts are located to 
be governed by customary law as the cost involved in suing in the modern jurisdiction 
                                                 
14 Owen, supra. 66. 
15 It will be shown in the work that even though jurisdiction is shared between the customary and the 
received laws, in Francophone Cameroon for example the parties have the option of jurisdiction and in 
Anglophone Cameroon the high courts have monopoly over letters of administration and on the basis 
of which they entertain matters normally subject to the jurisdiction of the customary courts.  
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often scares people away, and succession is not one of the areas for which legal aid is 
available.16  
 The law of succession thus creates a substantial class of destitute persons 
condemned to a life of poverty and want. Poverty means that a person does not have 
the resources to sustain himself and those dependent on him. This is exactly what the 
law of succession does, since by excluding certain persons from succession, they are 
made to depend on others and in this case the male successor. As will be shown later 
the successor generally ignores his responsibilities and concentrates on his direct 
family and those family members who agree to be subservient and recognise his 
authority; 17 and for widows this might mean accepting to become the wife of the 
successor.18  
Apparently the choice of customary law beneficiaries is influenced more by 
the land tenure system according to which land belongs to the group, which could be 
the tribe, the village or the family, and not the individual member thereof.19 This is 
because a group has a perpetual existence and so at no time would its property be a 
subject of succession. Since the main bone of contention in succession is land, the 
tendency is to assume that customary law believes more in keeping land in the family 
than to continue with the obligations of the deceased towards his family. This is 
largely a misconception of the problem, because it is an accepted rule of the law that 
succession to property cannot occur unless it is regarded as belonging to individuals 
rather than to groups.20 That being the case, denying a person succession rights over 
                                                 
16 Legal aid in Cameroon is available to (1) injured employees; (2) unemployed deserted wives; and (3) 
appellants against a death sentence. In Anyangwe, C., The Cameroonian Judicial System, Yaoundé, 
CEPER, 1987, 197.   
17 See Daniel Njike & 3 Others  v. Zachuis Ehang (1978) Y.U.L.R. 92  
18 See Asane Florence v. Ndeh Thomas Mbonjoh (2006) Suit no.HCK/AE/K.28/98 (unreported) 
19 See Anyangwe, Carlson, “Land Tenure and Interests in Land in Cameroonian Indigenous Law” 
(1984) Cameroon Law Review, 29-41, 33. 
20 See Miller, Gareth, The Machinery of Succession , Portsmouth, Professional Books Limited, 1977, 2.  
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land must not be understood as the desire not to continue with the obligations of the 
deceased.   
Group ownership of land is more of a rule than an exception in customary law. 
The basic reasons for this will be seen in the chapter on intestacy in customary law 
where the different categories of group ownership of land will be given ample 
attention. This is the philosophy which guides the courts in their attitude towards 
widows as far as succession to land is concerned, and not necessarily the desire to 
deprive them their right to maintenance, because as will be seen later, the 
maintenance of widows has always been one of the main preoccupations of customary 
law.  
It does not mean that land is never the subject of succession in customary law. 
The fact is that a number of interests exist over land in customary law and some of 
them are capable of succession. We begin with the premise that ownership of land is 
in the family. Ownership describes a “bundle” of rights which might exist over a 
thing, the amplitude of which is measured in respect of the rights of other persons 
over the same thing. The precise content of “ownership” is unclear and is liable to 
vary from one legal system to the other.21 The rights commonly ascribed to the term 
include use, enjoyment, alteration, disposal and destruction. The last set of powers 
brings the term “ownership” into play, given that it is greatest right that a person 
might have over a thing. The unchecked exercise of this is of course rare because 
legal systems impose different types of limitations to the right of disposal to curb any 
excesses of the “owner” which could result in the disappearance of the thing owned or 
work against the interest of the community.  
                                                 
21 See Dennis Lloyd, The Idea of Law, London, Penguin Books, 1973, 323.  
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It is recognised in English law for example that a person might not put his land 
to such a use as would impair other persons from peacefully enjoying their own lands 
in the vicinity. This is the basis of the law of nuisance, and it is almost axiomatic for 
the use of land to be made subject to the needs of public policy.  In customary law any 
contracts purporting to dispose of the land must receive the consent of the family 
through its branches.22 
It is perhaps necessary to qualify the ownership of the family as absolute 
ownership to distinguish it from the rights of the members of the family over the same 
land. The absolute ownership of the family exists concurrently with the lesser 
interests of its members, which derive from their membership of the family. These 
exist over parcels of land allocated23 to them for such purposes as habitation and 
farming. Apart from the right of disposal which is in the family the members have the 
rights of possession which include use, enjoyment. Possession is part of the “bundle 
of rights” of which ownership is said to consist, meaning that it is a right of 
ownership, though limited in scope.24  
Hence a grant of family land to a member does not give rise to an interest 
equivalent to the English fee simple in possession which is actually a right of 
ownership in the sense that it can be alienated to whomever in the lifetime of the 
person and upon his intestacy, devolves to his general heirs25 including collaterals.26 
It nevertheless gives rise to an interest greater than the usufructuary right in Roman 
                                                 
22 Anyangwe, supra, 39. 
23 In the terminology of customary land tenure the words allocation and allotment signify different 
things. The grant of land by the family head is called an allocation because it does not transfer and an 
absolute title to the grantee whereas a grant by the chief is called an allotment because the title 
transferred to the family is absolute. 
24 See Allott, A. N. “Towards a definition of ‘absolute ownership’”, [1961] J.A.L. 99-102, 100; 
Simpson, M. R. “Towards a definition of ‘absolute ownership’: II” [1961] J.A.L.145-150, 146. 
25 This distinguishes the fee simple from the fee tail which descends at intestacy on special heirs, 
namely, the lineal descendants of the deceased 
26See Charles Harpum et al. Megarry & Wade: The Law of Real Property, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 
39.  
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law. The usufructuary right consists actually of a species of adverse possession in 
which a person has the right to possess and enjoy the fruits of property belonging to 
another; it is thus a burden on the title of the owner. The customary grantee is a 
member of the family and so the grant is not a burden on the family’s title, and while 
the usufructuary right ends in the life time of the person, a customary title is virtually 
perpetual.27  
It is this perpetuity which gives rise to questions of succession as to whether 
the interest of the member could upon his death descend in the same way as a fee 
simple. The position is that such interests last for the life time of the grantee and could 
continue in his lineage as long as there are heirs to succeed him, subject, of course to 
good behaviour.28 Such lands cannot be disposed of by will or gift inter vivos and in 
the absence of descendants, revert to the family as the contingent title-holder, to be 
reallocated among the other members. A non-family member is therefore not qualified 
to succeed to such lands; hence the exclusion of widows, but the rationale for 
excluding female relatives remains elusive. 
 The next premise is that land could be absolutely owned by an individual, 
because acquired with his personal resources. Not even the customary law prevents a 
person, whether male or female from acquiring land through purchase and gifts and 
these, as we will see could be held under customary or registered titles and are the 
subject matter of succession by the persons identified by the law as beneficiaries. The 
problem, however, is in the tendency to presume that even these lands belong to the 
family subject to the same limitation; hence the non-beneficiaries are held not to be 
entitled to their succession.  
                                                 
27 “Virtually,” because in certain cases a family member might be lawfully dispossessed of his interest 
in land, as for example where he is guilty of some gross misconduct entailing the forfeiture thereof.  
28 Anyangwe, supra. 34. This has hardly been used to deprive a member or his beneficiaries of land, 
except in the case of manslaughter, which we could not find any evidence. 
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The weaknesses of the law of succession inhibit harmony in the family. Rather 
than a divisive factor the law of succession should be promoting family stability by 
balancing the conflicting interests of its members, for where there is stability in the 
family as the smallest unit of the community there would be stability in the 
community at large.   
 The resultant poverty or destitution of the affected persons breeds ill-feeling 
against the society at large, when such persons are unable to find something 
honourable to do in order to maintain themselves and their dependants, crime 
becomes the final option. The women are exposed to trafficking and take to such 
hazardous sexual practices as prostitution. Like levirate marriages to which widows 
are constrained, prostitution exposes women more than men to the deadly HIV/AIDS 
epidemic29 and other sexually transmitted deceases. When they are contaminated the 
disease is spread to other men, ensuring the continuity of the spiral of destitute 
women and children. Hence not only does the customary law of succession subject the 
woman to a life of abject poverty, it might also prove fatal.  
The exclusionary nature of the rules of succession could also be a cause for 
underdevelopment. There is no doubt that women are the most affected by the 
exclusion. Customary law expressly excludes them and they could constitute a remote 
category excluded on the basis of the principle of precedence enshrined by the 
received systems. Women alone constitute 52 percent of the population of Cameroon 
and play a very crucial role in the development of society. Yet the law of succession 
prevents them from gaining equal access to land, being the main factor of production. 
The custom inhibits sustainable development as a greater majority of the population is 
denied the possibility of involvement in the production process as will be shown. 
                                                 
29 Statistics show that five hundred thousand people are living with HIV/AIDS in Cameroon, 60% of 
these are women between 15-49 years. Source: UNAIDS Report on Global Aids Epidemic July 2008, 
at http//www.globalhealthreporting.org/countries/cameroon.asp 
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Women only have the right of use over land occupied by them under the customary 
law of succession, meaning that they can only cultivate subsistence seasonal crops, 
and not cash crops such as cocoa, coffee, rubber and oil palm.30  
As a check to all of these, the law, we submit, ought, (1) to ensure the 
continuity of the obligation of maintenance which the deceased had towards his 
nuclear family without distinction of gender; (2) to ensure the maintenance of the 
vulnerable members of the immediate family notably the parents of the deceased and 
in default the members of the extended family among whom the grandparents and 
their descendants; (3) to limit the period of administration by making distribution 
mandatory ; and (4) to lay down clear rules of distribution. 
 
1.2: THE RESEARCH METHODOLGY 
 In-so-far as we are concerned with the study of the effectiveness of the 
current law of succession in Cameroon, we have to rely on primary and textual 
material, with the latter serving mainly to validate our findings based on the former.  
The primary sources consist of material gathered from field work and the 
interpretation of legislation and precedent. The field work was conducted by the 
author and some postgraduate students at the University of Dschang in Cameroon on 
selected tribes known to be representative of the different systems of customary 
succession in Cameroon. The research was based on a questionnaire agreed upon in 
class and administered to officials of the customary courts, traditional authorities and 
elites from the selected tribes. The findings were presented and discussed in classes 
which always included judges of the high courts, court registrars and sometimes even 
traditional chiefs, all of whom are abreast with matters of customary succession.  
                                                 
30 See Jude Awuba and Gloria Macassa “HIV/AIDS in Cameroon: Rising gender issues in policy-
making matters,” at http://www.bioline.org.br/pdf?jh07018  
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We relied on law reports to find relevant decided cases and statutes. This was 
easy for English law as the Harding Law Library is stocked with all of these. What we 
could not find in that rich library had to be sought elsewhere and so we also spent 
time at the libraries of the School of Oriental and African Studies, and the Institute for 
Advanced Legal Studies, in the University of London. The near absence of law 
reporting in Cameroon rendered the task difficult when it came to local decisions and 
statutes. We had to visit the law chambers and courts and in this way were able to 
have direct access to case files in the various courts visited. Priority was given to the 
appellate jurisdictions whose decisions could be said to represent the government’s 
position on the issue of succession.31   
 The confirmation of the findings on customary law was sought from notable 
publications on the subject and other Ph. D research. Our ambition to work 
exclusively on Cameroonian material was thwarted by the dearth of local literature. 
Most of the available local literature proved inadequate because it is by Francophone 
Cameroonians who nevertheless purport to be writing about the whole country. To 
make up for the deficiency we had, for Anglophone Cameroon, to resort to relevant 
literature from other countries with a cultural or colonial affinity with that part of the 
country. Hence we drew extensively from Nigerian and Ghanaian and English 
sources. Not only do Ghana and Nigeria have cultural similarities with Cameroon, 
they also share a common English colonial heritage with Anglophone Cameroon. The 
enabling laws for the administration of the English and customary laws in 
Anglophone Cameroon were first enacted for the Gold Coast colony (Ghana) in 1876. 
Validation was also sought from scholarly works such as the most-quoted Ph. D thesis 
of John Anthony Howard on “The Customary Law of Marriage and Succession 
                                                 
31 This may sound absurd but truly there is no independent judiciary in Cameroon and so on 
controversial issues such as succession by women, Judges endeavour to toe the government’s line. 
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among the Kom Of Cameroon”,32 and the London University sponsored research by 
Rubin entitled “Matrimonial Law Among the Bali of West Cameroon: A 
Restatement.”33 
What is presented in this work as representing the customs in question is 
therefore the result of a consensus of all of these authorities and not merely the 
opinion of this researcher. 
Validation for the English law as applied in Cameroon was sought through 
Standard English textbooks on the law of succession and Nigerian and Ghanaian 
sources as far as the local application of English law is concerned. Our findings 
turned out to be in conformity with these sources.  
Material on French law was drawn from standard text books by French authors 
but anything that concerns customary law and the application of French law in 
Francophone Cameroon comes mainly from local sources. These too agree with our 
findings in the field. 
The thesis is divided into eight chapters. Chapter one, the introductory chapter 
is divided into a number of sections. Section one above discusses the concerns that 
motivated the research and summarises the role of land tenure in the current law. 
Section two treats the research methodology. Section three presents Cameroon in 
terms of the name, location, people and organisation of the customary communities. 
Section four explores the different sources of the law of succession and the chapter 
ends with a section on the definition of some important concepts used in the work. 
Chapter two treats intestacy in English law. It starts by giving the different sources of 
English intestacy law as applied in Cameroon. It also considers the contemporary 
application of these sources, noting the controversy over the application of post 1900 
                                                 
32 The University of London, 1972. 
33 (1970) 14 JAL, 69-97. 
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English statutory laws therein. The substantive provisions of the sources are then 
examined in order to ascertain the extent to which they strike a balance between the 
conflicting interests of persons who depended on the deceased. Chapter three 
considers intestacy in French law, starting with the applicable laws, their 
contemporary application and an analysis of the substantive rules.  Chapter four 
examines intestacy in customary law. This chapter is the longest because unlike the 
received laws different systems of succession are applicable. This means providing an 
account of their respective rules and differences within the systems, their application, 
and analysing their various substantive rules. Chapter five is given to considering the 
conflict of laws in succession matters. Cameroon is a mosaic of laws where not only 
the received laws vie for space with customary law, the different systems of the 
customary law of succession also vie for space inter se. The situation is rendered even 
more complex by the fact that the laws are applied by parallel systems of modern and 
customary law courts. The chapter therefore explains how the various jurisdictions 
grapple with problems where different personal laws are in conflict. Chapters six and 
seven are a result of the realisation that the existing intestacy rules do not provide the 
balance necessary to rid the country of the social problems enunciated above. Hence 
chapter six entitled “Moving forward- Private ordering through the making of wills” 
is concerned with the extent to which wills could be relied upon to ensure the balance 
which our current intestacy rules fail to provide. Chapter seven is entitled “Moving 
forward-Intestacy under the Family Code”. It examines the bill on the family code 
with respect to its scope and status and the extent to which its provisions on intestacy 
constitute an improvement on the existing rules. It should enable the making of 
proposals aimed at preventing the eventual code from falling foul of the matters 
which have so far rendered the current law of succession ineffective as a means of 
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ensuring social harmony. It would keep the legislature on guard against adopting a 
law which merely adopts the position of some existing received laws which are at 
variance with local realities. The thesis ends with chapter eight which consists of a 
general conclusion and proposals for reform.  
 
1.3: THE NAME, LOCATION AND PEOPLE OF CAMEROON. 
The name Cameroon derives from the Portuguese and Spanish word for 
prawns. Portuguese explorers were the first Europeans who in 1472 dared to venture 
out of the Atlantic Ocean, to explore the estuary of the river leading into the territory 
today called Cameroon. Marvelled by the variety of prawns in the river, they decided 
to name it Rio dos Camarões meaning the River of Prawns. Spanish explorers later 
called it Rio Camerones for the same reason. At the time the territory was composed 
of autonomous Sultanates, Lamidates and Fondoms or Paramount chiefdoms.  
The name therefore signified a river and not the territory. This changed with 
the advent of colonialism, with the name taken instead to signify the territory. The 
Germans, the first colonisers of the territory called it Kamerun and the English and 
French coming after the First World War called it Cameroon and Cameroun 
respectively. 
Cameroon is located on the West Coast of Africa, with Nigeria to the west, 
Chad and Central African Republic to the east, and Congo (Brazzaville), Gabon and 
Equatorial Guinea to the south. It is located slightly north of the equator and occupies 
a surface area of 475440 square kilometres. Located between two great river basins, 
namely the Niger and Congo basins the country shares the physical and cultural 
characteristics of both.34  
                                                 
34 John Mukum Mbaku, Culture and Customs of Cameroon, Westport, Connecticut, Greenwood Press, 
2005, p.1 
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The population is a result of several hundred years of migratory movements 
into the country35. Because of its geographical position Cameroon embraces several 
of the cultural groups according to which African peoples have been classed.36 Thus 
the coastal peoples include units of Guinea Coastal, Western Atlantic or Nigritic 
groups. There are also peoples allied to those of the Congo, or with the Bantu or 
Bantoid languages. Those in the north relate to the Chadic Western Sudan or Hamitic 
blocs. In the center there are Bantu Bantoid or semi-Bantu groups and pigmies,37 
hence the thesis of Cameroon as Africa in miniature, advanced by IMBERT:38 “The 
centre of gravity of the African continent- Cameroon can be considered as an Africa 
in miniature and its study is beneficial for whoever wishes to be initiated into the 
problems of Africa.”39  
A similar mixture is present within the country itself due to vast movements of 
population from one part of the country to the other. Much of this migration, 
especially from the Western Highlands of the country towards the coast is occasioned 
by population pressure as a result of a high birth rate not matched by land resources. 
The shortage of land is exacerbated by the inheritance system which favours a single 
male heir for family land, meaning that the other male children are left with no land 
resources until they can acquire some from the chief believed to be the “titular owner” 
of the land.40 Large colonies of Ewondos and Bassas from the centre of the country 
                                                 
35 Tambi Eyongetah and Robert Brain, A History of Cameroon, London, Longman, 1974, pp.22-23 
36 Ibid, pp. 19-20 
37 Neville Rubin, Cameroon. An African Federation, London, Pall Mall Press, 1971, p. 9  
38  IMBERT, Jean,  Le Cameroun, Que Sais-je?, Presse Universitatres de France, 3rd ed. 1982, p. 3  
39 “Centre de gravité du continent noir–, le Cameroon peut être considéré come une Afrique en 
réduction et son étude est particulièrement bénéfique pour qui veut s’initier aux problèmes Africains.”   
40 Tambi Eyongetah and Robert Brain, A History of Cameroon, London, Longman, 1974, pp.44-45;   
Neville Rubin, Cameroon. An African Federation, London, Pall Mall Press, 1971, pp. 16-17.   
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who escaped from the system of forced labour pursued by the French colonial 
administration41 can be found in the Anglophone coast.  
The result is extensive group mixing that has rendered all attempts to classify 
and demarcate the ethnic groups geographically quite difficult. And above all it has 
provided a fertile ground for conflict of laws in Cameroon.   
 
1.4: THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ORGANISATION OF THE 
TRADITIONAL SOCIETIES. 
 
The organizational structure of an African society affects status of the 
members therein. Men make the laws and thus women are the most affected, because 
the structure at all the levels is dominated by men. But the strength of the laws 
depends very much on the degree of attachment of the community to them, hence the 
absence of a uniform pattern in the custom depriving women of succession rights for 
instance.  
Although Cameroonian communities hardly possess the standard 
characteristics of highly centralized and acephalous42 communities advanced by some 
authorities, 43 they could be classified under either on the basis of research showing 
that the identified types of communities could take a variety of forms.44     
  In highly centralised societies, found in the Western Highlands of Cameroon 
and in the North, there is a government in the nature of a centralised authority, 
administrative machinery and judicial institutions. They are organised into Sultanates, 
Lamidates and Fondoms or Paramount chiefdoms.45 The leader wields executive, 
                                                 
41 See Carlson Anyangwe, The Cameroonian judicial System, Yaoundé, CEPER, 1987. pp. 51-52. 
42Anyangwe, Carlson, “Land Tenure and Interests in Land in Cameroonian Indigenous Law” (1984) 
Cameroon Law Review, 29-41 32. 
43 Fortes (M) and Evans-Pritchard (E.E.) African Political Systems, London, Oxford University Press, 
1955, p.5. 
44 See Elias, T.O. The Nature of African Customary Law, Manchester University Press, 1956, p. 14.   
45  These could consist of towns that were never subjugated or could cover more villages headed by 
sub-chiefs who  depend on, and pay allegiance to  some paramount chief, for example, as a result of 
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legislative and judicial power.46 He designates the officials of these organs and his 
subordinates.47   
He is not only a temporal leader; but also the spiritual leader, chief priest; a 
representative of the ancestors who ensures the liaison between the living and the 
dead believed to be masters of the land.48 The chief’s authority is global covering 
persons, goods and land. Land is sacred; it is the medium of communicating with the 
dead,49 one reason why custom frowns on alienation thereof to strangers. Members 
desirous of land must ask for and obtain it from the paramount chief.50 This chief’s 
control over all the land is sometimes erroneously described as a right of ownership.51 
The coastal communities possess characteristics of acephalous societies. They 
have no leaders with an all-embracing authority over persons and property. Nor do 
they have strong centralized authorities, administrative machineries, and constituted 
judicial institutions.52 What obtains is a segmentary pattern of traditional political 
organisation based upon a loose-knit and non-hierarchical clan structure.53  
Political power is exercised by the local chief priest or council of elders, with 
specific roles assigned to each member of the council. Authority is in the person of a 
                                                                                                                                            
conquest or protection provided in time of danger. Tambi Eyongetah and Robert Brain, A History of 
Cameroon, p.44. 
46 See Fisiy, Cyprian F., Power and Privilege in Administration of Law: Land Reforms and Social 
Differentiation in Cameroon, Leiden, African Studies Centre, 1992, pp. 212-213.  
47 C.G. Weeramanting, Justice Without Frontiers: Furthering human Rights, London, Kluwer Law 
International, 1997, p. 14. 
48 Gluckman, Max, “The kingdom of  the Zulu of South Africa,”  Fortes, African Political Systems, pp. 
30-31; Bentsi-Enchill, Kwamena, Ghana Land Law, London, Sweet and Maxwell, 1964, p.46, note 5. 
49 Fisiy, Cyprian F., Power and Privilege in Administration of Law: Land Reforms and Social 
Differentiation in Cameroon, Leiden, African Studies Centre, 1992, p.221. 
50  See Fisiy, Cyprian F., Power and Privilege in Administration of Law: Land Reforms and Social 
Differentiation in Cameroon, Leiden, African Studies Centre, 1992, p.208; Anyangwe, Carlson, “Land 
Tenure and interests in land in Cameroonian indigenous law,” (1984) Cameroon Law Review, pp. 29-
41, 38; Max Gluckman’s account of land holding in one highly centralised society and one acephalous 
society in, The Ideas in Barotse Jurisprudence, Yale University Press, 1965, pp.78-81. 
51 Presbyterian Church Moderator v. D.C. Johnny (1974) BCA/27/74 (unreported). 
52See Fortes (M) and Evans-Pritchard (E.E.) African Political Systems, London, Oxford University 
Press, 1955, p.5. 
53 Neville Rubin, Cameroon: An African Federation, p. 18. 
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ritual functionary and not in the chief who is a political leader.54 Thus governance is 
shared between the spiritual leaders and political heads of the group drawn from 
different categories of the population. None of these alone can exercise absolute 
authority over the population. They have distinct but complementary functions which 
require sanction of the community.55  
Political power does not involve rights over a given territory and its 
inhabitants. Membership of these communities and the rights and duties that go with it 
are acquired as a rule through genealogical ties as against political allegiance to the 
sovereign. The chief only has control over un-appropriated lands which he manages 
in-council. Each minor segment (family) holds and enjoys land in its individual name. 
Chief Endeley of the coastal tribe of Bakweri said as expert witness in Wokoko v. 
Molyko56 that members of the tribe could without prior authorisation appropriate 
parcels of the communal lands.  
  It is the responsibility of the family head in acephalous communities and that 
of the chief in highly centralised communities acting through the family heads to keep 
property in the family by preventing its alienation to strangers.57 Even the Western 
legal systems in their nascent stages prohibited such alienation, said to diminish the 
family patrimony, at a time when land was the principal source of wealth. 
Here lies the root of the restrictions which customary law places on access to 
land, and not only have the customary law courts made it a vocation to ensure this, the 
spill-over effect is equally felt in the English and French laws applicable in 
                                                 
54 T.O Elias, The nature of African Customary Law, p.14. 
55 There will, of course be persons assuming the title of paramount chiefs because of their political 
influence or wealth, or because as a result of government policy they are classified as first class chiefs, 
which to them means taking the title, even though lacking in the actual traditional attributes of the 
office. 
56   (1938) 14 N.L.R. 41, 43 
57 See Fisiy, Cyprian F., Power and Privilege in Administration of Law: Land Reforms and Social 
Differentiation in Cameroon, Leiden, African Studies Centre, 1992, pp.128-129 
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Cameroon. This is true of both the rural and urban communities. However the rural 
population is generally indifferent to these restrictions. Ignorance is one of the reasons 
but the fact is that members of the rural populations, notably the women view land 
more as means of subsistence than economic empowerment. The attitude is different 
in the urban areas where land is viewed more in terms of economic development than 
subsistence. Most changes in the law therefore occur in the urban than in the rural 
areas, be it in the customary or modern law courts. 
Modernism has also reduced the powers of chiefs over land through government 
legislation. As will be shown later most of the land which used to be the common 
property of the community and placed under the authority of the chief is today either 
national lands or state lands. The powers of chiefs to restrict access to such lands are 
thus limited as the restrictions can only operate effectively within the domain of 
family land. Any person with sufficient resources could acquire land from these new 
pools of land which are placed under the authority of administrative officials rather 
than the chiefs. Even if the long arms of family land have eventually to stretch to 
lands thus acquired, what is clear is that they constitute private property and could be 
disposed of by their acquirers, subject only the conditions under which they are 
acquired.   
 
1.5: AN OVERVIEW OF THE DIFFERENT SOURCES OF SUCCESSION 
LAW IN CAMEROON. 
 
A study of the sources of law generally is necessitated by the understanding 
that rules of law do not exist in a vacuum and must originate from somewhere. 
Cameroon’s law of succession is variegated due to the multifarious nature of its 
sources, which are the English, French and customary laws.  
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1.5.1: ENGLISH LAW 
The reception of English law in Anglophone Cameroon is a result of the First 
World War, when a combined British and French military force defeated Germany, 
the country’s colonial master in 1916, and partitioned the territory between them. This 
was confirmed by the League of Nations in 1922, when the territory was formally 
handed to them under the mandate system.  
The status quo was maintained after the Second World War in 1945. The 
preamble of the Nigeria (Protectorate and Cameroons) Order in Council 1946, 
replacing the Cameroons under British Mandate Order in Council 1923, as amended 
by the Cameroons under British Mandate Order 1932, provided: 
 “And whereas the intention has been expressed that, notwithstanding the 
termination of the existence of the League of Nations, the Cameroons shall 
continue to be administered in accordance with the obligations of the said 
Mandate  until other arrangements have been agreed between the Mandatory 
Power and the United Nations...”   
The “obligations of the said Mandate” were set out in article 9 of the League of 
Nations Mandate Agreement drawn up for Cameroon by Great Britain and France and 
approved by the League of Nations in 1922: 
              “The Mandatory shall have full powers of Administration and Legislation 
in the area subject to the mandate. The area shall be administered in 
accordance with the laws of the Mandatory as an integral part of His 
territory… The Mandatory shall therefore be at liberty to apply His laws 
to the territory under the Mandate subject to the modifications required by 
local conditions…, and to constitute the territory into customs, fiscal or 
administrative union or federation with adjacent territories under his 
sovereignty or control…”58 
                                                 
58 My emphasis. Source, Neville Rubin, Cameroon. An African Federation, London, Pall Mall Press, 
1971, p. 202-203. This was adopted by the United Nations, as embodied in article 5 and 4 of the 1945 
British and French Trusteeship Agreements, respectively(same source).  Article 5 of the British 
 21
 In application of the second arm of that article British Cameroons59 was 
attached to, and administered as an integral part of Nigeria. The laws in force in 
Nigeria were thus extended thereto by Proclamation No.1 of 1916,60 pursuant to the 
Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1890 rendering English laws applicable in foreign 
territories. Until the independence of Nigeria in 1961, the name “Nigeria” included 
Cameroons under British mandate and trusteeship. Section 1(1) of the Nigeria Letters 
Patent 1946, amending the Letters Patent of 1922 and 1935 defined “Nigeria” as “the 
colony [Lagos], the protectorate [the rest of Nigeria] and the Cameroons [under 
British mandate]”.61   
The English law extended to Anglophone Cameroon included laws enacted in 
Nigeria. The two territories shared the same court system and laws until independence 
in 1961, and to this day pre-1961 Nigerian statutes62 continue to be received.63 Prior to 
independence the Nigerian constitutional reforms of 1954 had resulted in the 
establishment of a High Court for Southern Cameroon, through the Southern 
Cameroon High Court Law 1955. This marked the beginning of the autonomous 
reception of English law in that part of the country and this is pursuant to section 11 
which stipulates:  
                                                                                                                                            
Trusteeship Agreement read: “For the above-mentioned purposes of this agreement, as may be 
necessary the administering authority: (a) Shall have full powers of administration and jurisdiction in 
the territory and shall administer it in accordance with the Authority’s own laws as an integral part of 
his territory with such modification as may be require by local conditions…” Ibid, 211.   
59 The plural form is explained by the fact that Cameroon under British mandate and trusteeship was 
divided into Southern and Northern Cameroon, with Southern Cameroon attached to Southern Nigeria 
and Northern Cameroon attached to Northern Nigeria. 
60 The Proclamation was made after the partition of the territory on March 4, 1916, but came into force 
retrospectively on January 24th 1916. 
61 See also section 1(1) of the Nigeria (Protectorate and Cameroon) Order in Council, 1946, and section 
3B of the Interpretation Ordinance, cap. 94 of the 1948 Laws 
62 So far the only Nigerian statute that has been repealed by local legislation is the Land and Native 
Rights Ordinance of 1 January 1948, repealed by art. 22 of Ordinance No. 74/1 of 6 July 1974, on Land 
Tenure. 
63 See section 6(1) of the Nigeria (Protectorate and Cameroons) Order in Council, 1946. 
 22
“Subject to the provisions of any written law and in particular of this 
section and of sections, 10, 15, and 22 of this law: - 
a) the common law; 
b) the doctrines of equity; and 
c) the statutes of general application which were in force in England on 
the 1st day of January, 190064, shall in so far as they relate to any matter 
with respect to which the legislature of the Southern Cameroons is for 
the time being competent to make laws, be in force within the 
jurisdiction of the court”. 
 
The expression “common law” stands for the English rules of law developed 
from time immemorial65 by the courts of law,66 as against common law as a system 
of  law, the distinguishing feature of which is the doctrine of binding precedent. If it 
stood for the legal system the inclusion of the “doctrines of equity” would have been 
superfluous, and it would have meant that the laws of any common law jurisdiction 
could be applicable. The “doctrines of equity” mean the technical equity composed 
of equitable maxims, equitable interests, and equitable remedies evolved in the Court 
of Chancery to cure the injustices and shortcomings of the common law.  
What constitutes “statutes of general application” has not been equally easy 
to establish. Much seems to depend on the merits of the particular statute which is 
sought to be enforced, and the acceptance of a statute as being of general application 
in one territory does not necessarily mean that it will be accepted as such in 
another.67  
                                                 
64 The limitation will be considered in detail under intestacy in English law. 
65 The reckoning of the common law starts from the year 1189, being the year when the earliest rolls of 
the King’s Bench became available.  
66 Until the Judicature Acts, the rules were evolved exclusively by the Court of King’s Bench, Court of 
Common Pleas, and the Court of Exchequer.  
67 See  Daniels, W.C. Ekow, The Common Law in West Africa, London, Butterworths, 1964, 319. 
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The generality of a statute is viewed in terms of the subject matter and the 
geographical area of its application. A statute would not be of general application if 
its application is limited to certain persons or categories of persons. In Young v. 
Abina,68 the test for the generality of application to all persons in England was 
established. The current test as established by Osborne C.J. in Att.-Gen. v. John Holt 
& Co69 is:  
(i) By what courts is the statute applied in England? 
(ii) To what classes of the community in England does the Act apply?  
A statute is thus not of general application if its application is limited to a certain 
category of persons, or its administration is exclusively by specific courts.   
 It is clear from the foregoing that the English law applicable in Anglophone 
Cameroon includes the three components of English law, to wit the common law, 
doctrines of equity and statutes of general application and pre-independence Nigerian 
statutes.   
 
1.5.2: FRENCH LAW 
The explanation on the historical background to reception of English law in 
Anglophone Cameroon is equally relevant for the reception of French law in 
Francophone Cameroon.  
The French laws received in Francophone Cameroon are French derived and 
French laws. By French laws is meant laws imported directly from France, and by 
French-derived laws is meant laws made by French colonial administrators for the 
former French Cameroon and those brought in from other French possessions.    
                                                 
68 (1940) 6 W A.C.A. 
69 (1910) 2 N.L.R. 1.   
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The enabling instruments for the introduction of French and French derived 
laws in Francophone Cameroon were the Decrees, signed on 16th April, and 22nd May 
1924 respectively, made pursuant to authority given under article 9 of the League of 
Nations Mandate Agreement of 1922 quoted above. 70 The Decree of 16 April enacted 
as follows: 
“The Commissioner of the Republic shall promulgate statutes, 
decrees, orders and regulations made by the Government of the 
mandatory state, as well as orders and regulations made by the 
Government of the mandated territory. 
Statutes, Decrees and regulations in force in France shall not be 
rendered executory in Cameroon except by Decrees of the French 
Head of State” 71 
A second Decree enacted on May 22 elaborated on the previous and rendered 
executory in Cameroon all the statutes and Decrees promulgated in French Equatorial 
Africa before the first day of January 1924.  The Decree provided: 
“1. Statutes and decrees promulgated in French Equatorial Africa 
before the 1st day of January 1924 are hereby rendered executory in 
the territory of Cameroon placed under French mandate. The 
powers conferred on the Governor-General and on Lieutenant-
Governors by those instruments shall devolve on the Commissioner 
of the Republic. 
2. However, the provisions of the above-mentioned instruments that 
shall apply are those that are not contrary to decrees specifically 
                                                 
70 Like Great Britain, French colonial policy in the territory did not change after the Second World 
War. 
71 “Le Commissaire de la République promulgue les lois, décrets, arrêtés et règlements émanent du 
Gouvernement de l’Etat mandataire, ainsi que les arrêtés et règlements émanent du Gouvernement 
local. Les lois, décrets et règlements en vigeur en France ne peuvent être rendu exécutoire au 
Cameroun que par décret.”   
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passed for Cameroon and to the French mandate of 20th July 1922 
for Cameroon”72 
On the basis of these decrees therefore, French laws promulgated in French 
Equatorial Africa before the 1st day of January 1924 became applicable in Francophone 
Cameroon. Two French decrees of 28th September 1897 and 17th March 1903 had 
extended French Laws already in existence in the colony of Senegal to French 
Equatorial Africa. Thus all the French laws that were in force in the colony of Senegal 
on the 17th of March 1903 were extended to French Cameroon by the combined effect 
of the decree of 17th March 1903 and 22nd May 1924. 
  The content of the received French law therefore consists of: 
- All French laws in force in the colony of Senegal as of 17 March 1903. This 
includes any amendment, in French Equatorial Africa up to January 1924, and 
in French Cameroon since January 1924. The French Civil Code governing 
most succession matters in Francophone Cameroon was promulgated in the 
colony of Senegal by an order of 5th November 1830. 
- All statutes and decrees promulgated in French Equatorial Africa before 1st 
January 1924. 
- All statutes, decrees, orders, and regulations passed by the French Government 
after 1st January 1924 and promulgated in French Cameroon by the local 
colonial administration. 
- Any statute, decree, and regulation in force in France and directly exported to 
French Cameroon by a decree of the French Head of State.73 
                                                 
72 “Art. 1er – Sont rendus executoires dans le territiore du Cameroun place sous le mandat de la France 
les lois décrets prmulgués en Afrique Equatoriale Francaise entérieurement au 1er Janvier 1924. Les 
attributions conférées par ces actes au gouverneur-général et liuetnants-gouverneurs seront dévolues au 
Commissaire de la République. 
    Art. 2- Toutefois, ces texts ne serene applicables que dans celles de leurs dispositions  qui ne sont 
pas contraires aux décret pris spécialement pour le Cameroun et au mandat Francais sur le Cameroun, 
du 20 Juillet 1922”.   
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1.5.3: CUSTOMARY LAW 
The term customary law as used here includes native laws and customs and 
Muslim law, which thanks to the colonial policies pursued by Great Britain and 
France constitute a major source for our law of succession. The English colonial 
policy of indirect rule encouraged customary law as it deemed it more expedient and 
beneficial to administer the colonies through the local chiefs making use of traditional 
institutions.74 The French colonial policy of assimilation on the other hand was a 
complete antithesis of indirect rule. With a bloated conception of the superiority of la 
civilisation Française over all others, the French had nothing but disdain for 
customary law. Natives had to be purged of their customs through education and 
nurtured to reason and act in accordance with the superior French civilisation.75 This 
was to culminate in every native becoming a French citizen, technically referred to as 
évolué or assimilé. Customary law had however to be condoned when it became clear  
that French citizenship could not possibly be granted to everyone and that it would be 
                                                                                                                                            
73 Anyangwe, the Cameroonian Judicial System, pp. 224-227. 
74In a confidential letter to the Secretary of state for Colonies, Cameron, as Governor of Tanganyika in 
1925, a country which like British Cameroon was a former German colony handed to Great Britain 
after the First World War, extolled the virtues of indirect rule as follow:  
 “…I believe that by that (indirect administration) we shall secure, as far as it is humanely possible to 
foresee now, the political and social future of the natives in a manner which will afford them a 
permanent share in administration of the country on lines which they themselves understand, and can 
appreciate, building up at the same time a bulwark against political agitation and averting the social 
chaos of which signs have already manifested themselves in other countries similarly situated.  Quoted 
by H. F. Morris and James S. Read, Indirect Rule and the Search for Justice, Oxford, Clarendon Press 
1972, p. 3.  
75André P. Robert, “Attitude du Legislateur Français en Face du Droit Coutumier d’Afrique Noire”, 
published in L’Avenir Du Droit Coutumier en Afrique, Leiden, Universitaire Pers Leiden, 1956, 
pp.170-185 at 184. In fact even the colonial justice system was designed to achieve this aim. According 
to Ntamark, P. Y. “ The Indigenat [system of justice for natives] deprived the masses of freedom of 
speech, association and movement and also rendered them liable to severe punishment for quite  minor 
offences, It was a symbol of French policy designed and superbly calculated to repress the masses in 
the hope that they would feel the strain and burden of this intrusive ‘code of law” and accept French 
culture and institution for all their worth,” in “Constitutional Development of the Cameroons since 
1914,” Ph. D. Thesis, London University, 1969, 78-79 (unpublished).   
 27
practically impossible to substitute existing customary institutions with French 
institutions.76 
1.5.3.1: Native Law and Custom. 
During one field study by this researcher and some postgraduate students 
some judges argued that the custom which denies women succession rights is a mere 
“practice” and not a rule of law. In other words the custom is a rule of convention and 
not a rule of law. Such opinions derive from initial postulates that customary law was 
not law according to the Austinian theory of law.  
Austin defined law as “a rule laid down for the guidance of an intelligent 
being by an intelligent being having power over him,”77 among which he identified 
the laws of God, positive laws, and metaphorical or figurative laws. Positive law 
consisted of rules of positive morality and rules of positive law proper. The latter 
constituted the province of jurisprudence, and are laws:  
 “Set by a sovereign person or sovereign body of persons, to a member or 
members of the independent political society wherein that person or body 
is sovereign or supreme.”78    
The notions of sovereignty and independent political society are therefore 
cardinal in the existence of law.  
                                                 
76 Georges Hardy, as director of the Ecole Nationale de la France de L’Outre-Mer admits this 
impossibility when he writes: “Notre tort principal n’est pas seulement d’avoir perdu de vue que la 
moindre coutume fait partie d’un corps et qu’une réforme de détail peut ébranler toute la structure; 
c’est aussi et surtout d’avoir méconnu les resources mentales et morales des populations dont nous 
avions la charge; c’est d’avoir, dans notre orgueil de favorisés du destin, refusé d’admettre que leurs 
institutions, tout comme les nôtres étaient les manifestations exterieures d’une conception de l’univers 
et de la vie, d’une table de valeurs,… d’une philosophie,” cited by D. Boisdon in   “Note sur les 
conflits entre le statut civil Français et les statut civils coutumiers dans le pays D’Outre-Mer Dependant 
de la République Française” published in L’Avenir Du Droit Coutumier en Afrique, Leiden, 
Universitaire Pers Leiden, 1956, pp. 130-139 at 134.      
77  Campbell, Robert, Austin on Jurisprudence Vol. I, London, John Murray, 1879, p.88. 
78 Alternatively “it is set by a monarch, or sovereign number, to a person or persons in a state of 
subjection to its author.” 
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Austin’s sovereign is habitually obeyed and habitually obeys no one else. An 
independent political society is that with a considerable and diversified population in 
which the inhabitants pay allegiance to no one else but their sovereign.79 Inherent in 
the definition is the assumption that law can exist only in a society possessing the 
attributes of a modern state, namely, population, territory and government having 
effective law enforcement machinery. As an emanation of a political superior, law is 
“a command which obliges a person or persons to a course of conduct.”80  
The other types of societies referred to as “natural societies,”81 being societies 
“consisting of persons not in a state of subjection”82 do not have laws as such. Law in 
these societies is nothing but customary law, which according to Austin consists 
merely of rules of positive morality “set and endorsed by…the opinions or sentiments 
held or felt by an indeterminate body of men in regard of human conduct,” 83 and 
which only become law proper after legislative or judicial sanction.84  
Elias85 and Gonidec86 argue that highly centralised pre-colonial African 
societies had laws in Austin’s sense. This argument falls to pieces, given that, the real 
question is not whether there existed strong central governments, but whether the 
rulers were sovereign in the sense that they were answerable to no one else and that 
the people were completely subjected to him.87 Such a situation would hardly exist in 
traditional African societies. In Cameroon, even the head of a highly centralised 
society works with a council of elders, which in the Bamileke tribes is a known as a 
                                                 
79 Ibid. 237. 
80  Hart, H.L.A., John Austin: The province of  Jurisprudence Determined and the uses and study of 
Jurisprudence, London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, p. 1968, 24.  
81 Ibid. 237-240. 
82 ibid. 237. 
83 Ibid. 89. 
84 Ibid. 204. 
85 Elias, T.O. The Nature of African Customary Law, Manchester University Press, 1956, p. 13.    
86 Gonidec, P-F, Les Droits Africains: Evolution et Sources, Paris, Librairie Générale de Droit et de 
Jurisprudence, 1976, p.7. 
87 Ibid, 237-238. 
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“Council of Nine Wiseman”88 with a mission to curb any excesses of the chief,89 and 
always the population owes allegiance not to him directly but to their sub-chiefs.  
But to conclude that customary law is not law would entail the abrogation of 
rules that regulated life prior to the advent of the modern state and render null and 
void all the decisions taken under it. Carter, therefore, writes that “custom, therefore, 
is the only law we discover at the beginning of society or of society when first 
exposed to our observation.”90 Savigny defends customary law as constituting the 
external manifestation of the volksgeist or the common consciousness of the people.91 
He suggests the independent existence of customary law called the “political 
element” of law which continues to be shaped and moulded by the common 
consciousness of the people. And the “technical element” consisting of codified law, 
which is the final stage in the development of the law or an indication that the 
common consciousness of the people has attained its ultimate or acceptable stage of 
evolution on that particular point.92 The volksgeist is a variant of the description of 
customary law as “a mirror of accepted usage,”93 both of which consider that 
customary law must be part of the legal system to allow for the necessary evolution of 
the law, before legislative intervention.   
Gonidec qualifies law in the primitive society as pré- Droit and law in the 
modern state as Droit proprement dit, 94 an indication first, that customary law is law, 
and second, that with the advent of the modern state customary law has to function 
                                                 
88 “Le Conseil de neuf notables.” 
89 “L’Organisation Sociale chez les Bamilekes” htt://www.bamileke.com/newfolder/org_sociale.htm, 
consulted on 01-04-2007. 
90 Carter, James Coolidge, Law: Its Growth and Function, London, G. P. Putman’s Sons, 1907, 19. 
91  Stone, Julius, The Province and Function of Law, Sydney, Associated General Publications, 1946, 
431. 
92 Stone, Julius, The Province and Function of Law, 432-434. 
93 Owotoyin v. Onotosho (1961)1 All N.L.R. 304, 309, per Bairamian F.J. 
94 Gonidec, P-F, Les Droits Africains: Evolution et Sources, Paris, Librairie Générale de Droit et de 
Jurisprudence, 1976, p.6.   
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within the state law enforcement machinery.95 This alone would provide it with the 
necessary binding authority vital for any law96 and also bring it in line with the 
modern conceptions of contemporary jurisprudence,97 the essentials of which are the 
predictability of court decisions whenever a rule of law is in issue98 and regularity.99    
That customary law is recognised as law in Cameroon is evident in the 
wording of section 27 of the Southern Cameroon High Court Law 1955, authorising 
the Courts to “observe” and “enforce the observance” of customary law in terms 
which recognise that customary law has a legal validity independent of judicial or 
legislative intervention.100 This same quality was recognised in the customary law by 
the French colonial administration which in decrees of 1921 and 1927 empowered the 
courts to apply customary law per se in certain matters between natives.101   
Elias defines customary law as “the body of rules which are recognised as 
obligatory by its members.”102 Gluckman defines it as: “A set of rules accepted by all 
normal members of the society as defining right and reasonable ways in which 
persons ought to behave in relation to each other and to things, including ways of 
obtaining protection for one’s rights”103 Both definitions highlight the element of 
consent, a point emphasised by the Privy Council in Eshugbayi Eleko v. Government 
of Nigeria:104 “It is the assent of the assent of the native community that gives a 
                                                 
95 See also Allott, Antony,  Essays in African Law: With special reference to the law of Ghana, 
London, Butterworth, 1960, pp.13-14. 
96 Hoebel, Adamson, The law of Primitive Man, Harvard University Press, 1954, p. 26.   
97 Hoebel, Adamson, The law of Primitive Man, Harvard University Press, 1954, p.22.     
98 Cardozo, Benjamin N., The Growth of the Law, London, Humphrey Milford, 1934, 52. 
99 Hoebel, supra, p. 28. 
100 See Woodman, Gordon R., “Legal Pluralism and the search for Justice” [1996] J.A.L., pp.152-167. 
158 
101 See Youego, Christine, “Sources et Evolution du Droit des Successions au Cameroon” Doctoral 
thesis, University of Paris II, 1994. 
102  Elias, T. O., The Nature of African Customary Law, Manchester University Press 1956, p. 55 
103 The Judicial Process among the Barotse of Northern Rhodesia, Manchester University Press, 1955, 
p. xv.   
104   [1931] A.C. 662.   
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custom its validity, and, therefore, barbarous or mild, it must be shown to be 
recognised by the native community whose conduct it is supposed to regulate.” 
Gluckman sets himself apart by limiting the consent to “normal members,”105 
meaning that consent does not need to be unanimous. 
Section 2 of the Customary Courts Ordinance, cap. 142 of the 1948 Laws of 
Nigeria, as amended by the Adaptation of Existing Laws Order, 1963 defines 
customary law as: 
 “ a rule or body of rules regulating rights and imposing correlative duties, 
being a rule or body of rules which obtains and is fortified by established 
usage and which is appropriate and applicable to any particular cause, 
matter, dispute, issue or question.”  
This definition complements those advanced by textbook writers by including 
the phrase “fortified by established usage”. It means that rules of customary law must, 
in addition to the other factors, be of some antiquity. In English law the reckoning of 
time is from 1189, based on the existence of royal court rolls dating from that 
period.106 Such a limit is inappropriate in customary law, firstly because of the 
absence of written records form which the immemoriality of a custom could be 
reckoned, and secondly because customary law has not yet reached a satisfactory state 
                                                 
105 The term “normal members” cannot be taken as a variant of the “reasonable man” or even the 
“right-thinking members of the society”, because this might be giving it too wide an interpretation. 
The “normal members” could only refer to those members with an adequate knowledge of the native 
law and customs of the community in question.  They are those persons whose evidence on particular 
points of customary law would be admissible in a court of law. This excludes members without such 
knowledge and strangers, who nevertheless know or are presumed to know the rules and are bound 
by them. Lord Lugard also employed the term “competent spokesmen”, when he wrote that “[a] 
custom must be admitted as being such [law] by the community and its competent spokesmen” (cited 
by Anderson, J.N.D., Islamic Law in Africa, and P.4). Competent spokespersons are the mouthpiece 
of the normal members, in the sense that they simply enunciate what is held to be custom by the 
normal members, whether or not they believe in the custom themselves. Spokespersons are 
designated not because of their knowledge of the customs and practices of the community but 
because of some other quality, such as oratory or the ability to communicate in the English language. 
It is submitted for these reasons, that the spokesperson cannot be dependable representatives of the 
customary laws of their communities.  
 
106 See Lord Blackburn in Dalton v. Angus (1880-81) 6 A.C. 740, 811.   
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in its evolution to impose such a limitation. In Lewis v Bankole,107 Speed, Ag. C.J. 
said that “…the native law and custom which the court is empowered or directed to 
observe must…be existing native law or custom and not the native law or custom of 
ancient times.”108    Hence it is the current state in the evolution of a rule of customary 
law that must be applied. 
The Roman doctrine of opinio necessitatis adds another condition to the 
definition, for it argues that consent alone cannot transform custom into law since the 
rules of convention also derive legitimacy from the community’s consent. For a 
custom to be law therefore the consent needs to be backed by a general conviction 
that a rule is observed because it is law.109 When a custom assumes the force of law 
and is not repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience it is enforced by 
the courts, as against rules of convention which though supported by consent are 
inferior and lack the binding force of law. Professor Griffith articulates the distinction 
between rules of law and rules of convention: “These domains exist in hierarchical 
relationship to one another, so that the legal rules are not only set apart from social 
rules, but acquire greater authority than and precedence over them. Law according to 
this model is removed from the domain of social life and represents an autonomous 
field with immunity from the kind of considerations that permeate every day 
existence. Through its autonomy and immunity from ordinary social processes, 
reinforced by the creation of specialist sources, institutions and personnel, law claims 
                                                 
107 (1908) 1 N.L.R. 81, 83, 
108 See also Golightly v. Ashrifi (1955) 14 W.A.C.A. 676 at 684. 
 109 See generally, Alan Watson, “An Approach to Customary Law” in Alison Dundes Renteln and 
Alan Dundes, Folk Law; Essays in the theory and practice if lex non-scripta, Vol. 1, the University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1995, pp. 141- 156; Park, The Sources of Nigerian Law, p. 68. 
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to invoke neutrality and equality in its dealings with individuals, unlike the ordinary 
social world from which law studiously maintains its distance.”110  
The custom that a woman cannot be successor has been enforced by the courts 
from time immemorial to qualify as a rule of law rather than a rule of convention as 
argued by “our” Judge. Rules of convention must however not be confused with rules 
of law that are rejected by the courts on grounds of repugnancy or public policy. 
Recognised rules of customary law still retain that quality as far as the population is 
concerned and this probably leads Woodman to describe them as the customary law 
of the sociologist,111 to distinguish them from the customary law of the courts. 
Discarded rules of customary law are enforced by non-judicial instances.112  
As an instrument of continuity the law of succession always follows wherever 
there are human beings. In the Holy Bible the conflict between Esau and Jacob113 was 
a result of succession, and in Numbers chapter 27 Moses is shown laying down the 
rules of inheritance for the children of Israel. Pre-colonial Cameroonian societies had 
rules of succession, the enforcement of which were ensured by the family council or 
the chief-in-council, depending on the nature of the dispute.114  
 
 
 
                                                 
110 Griffith, Anne M.O., In the Shadow of Marriage. Gender and Justice in an African Community, 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1997, 17   
111 Woodman, G. R, “Some realism about customary Law–The West African Experience”, Folk Law: 
Essays in the theory and Practice of Lex Non Scripta, Wisconsin, University of Wisconsin Press, 1995, 
95.  
112See Mikano Emmanuel Kiye, “The Importance of Customary Law  in   Africa:  A Cameroonian case 
study”,  Doctoral Thesis,  VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT BRUSSEL,  June 2007, 85.  
113  See Genesis chapter 25- 27. 
114 Anyangwe, Carlson, The Cameroonian Judicial System, p. 15-16; Roger Cagan, “Contribution à 
l’Histoire de la Justice au Cameroun,” ( 1966) 20 Rev. Jur. Pol. Ind. Coop. 3-18, 5. 
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1.5.3.2: MUSLIM LAW 
The Muslim religion was introduced into Northern Cameroon through 
Northern Nigeria at about 1715,115 as a result of trade contacts and the Jihads. From 
the north it spread down south so that by the time German colonial administrators 
penetrated the country, Muslim law was already installed in some of the areas and 
controlled from Sokoto (Nigeria) the headquarters. Muslim law is a consequence of 
interpreting the Koran not only as embodying religious guides but also rules of law 
binding on those who profess the faith.   
It applies in Anglophone Cameroon as customary law because the 
Interpretation Section of the Southern Cameroon High Court Law 1955 states that 
“native law and custom includes Moslem law.” In Francophone Cameroon it 
maintains its identity as religious law.116 In Dame Dada Balkissou117 the Supreme 
Court emphasised that courts must base their decisions on the customs of the parties 
rather than on their religious beliefs. In some cases, however, religion and custom are 
the same.118 
Muslim law derives from the Quran, Sunna, Ijma and Qiyas. The Quran and 
Sunna are the primary sources. The Quran embodies the revelations of God as recited 
by Prophet Mohammed. The Sunna consists of practices of the Prophet in line with 
                                                 
115  Dame Dada Balkissou v. Abdoul Karim Mohamed, Arrêt No. 2/L du 10 Octobre 1985, Juridis info, 
No.8, 1991, p.53. 
116 In the codification of some aspects of customary law, the French colonial administration 
distinguished between Moslem and non-Moslem law. 
117 Dame Dada Balkissou v. Abdoul Karim Mohamed Arrêt No. 2/L du 10 Octobre 1985, in Juridis 
info. No.8, 1991, p.54. 
118 In Baba Iyayi v. Hadja Aminatou and Hadja Bintou, Arrêt No. 083 of 32 March 2000, the Hausa 
custom which was that of the parties was not different from Moslem law on the supremacy of males 
over females in matters of succession. There are major differences too as exemplified in Ministere 
Public c/ Pangou Bello (1996) 26 Juridis Périodique, 24, a case involving Muslims decided at first 
instance by the Tribunal de Premier Degré of Kaele and then the court of Appeal of Maroua, the 
custom of the deceased provides that when a man dies without an heir his estate devolves to his father 
even if he left a child en ventre sa mere, contrary to Moslem law which recognises succession rights in 
an embryo if it can be shown to have existed the time of the death. 
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the Quran and his verbal interpretations of its provisions.119 The Sunna was compiled 
partly in the lifetime of the Prophet and subsequently by generations of his 
followers.120  
The Ijma and Qiyas are secondary sources based on human analysis of the 
primary sources. The Ijma represents the consensus of scholars and jurists of a given 
generation on a particular legal principle. It involves the application of human 
reasoning to the Quran and the Sunna, with a view to filling any lacunae in these 
principal sources of the law. The Qiyas involves the expansion of the law through 
analogical reasoning. The Ijma is more important than the Qiyas. An established Ijma 
must not be revisited by future generations of scholars, due to the principle of the 
infallibility of the consensus of Muslim scholars.121 A Qiyas of one generation may 
be rejected by another generation based on the recognised principle that a judge might 
err in his judgment.122  
Muslim law consists of the Sunni and Shī’a, branches, each of which is 
crystallised in a number of schools. Cameroonian Muslims are Sunnis of the Maliki 
School123 and this is the focus of our study. The other Sunni Schools are the Hanafi, 
Shafi׳i and the Hanbali. The most common of the Shī’a Schools are the Imamyya, 
Ismailiyya and Zaidiyya.  
The general principles of the Muslim law of succession are drawn from surah 
4, verses 8, 9, 12, 33, 34 and 170, surah 7 and from the traditions of the Prophet as 
recorded in the Sunna, and the consensus of Muslim scholars recorded in the Ijma.124   
                                                 
 119 The divine revelations recognise in him a good example to follow. In this respect  Surah 33 (21) of 
the Holy Quran prescribes “You have indeed in the Messenger of Allah a beautiful pattern (of conduct) 
for anyone whose hope is in Allah and the Final day, and who engages much in the praise of Allah.” 
120 Ajijola, A.D. Introduction to Islamic Law, New Delhi, International Islamic Pictures, 1989, pp. 59-
63. 
121 David Pearl, A Textbook on Muslim Law, London, Groom helm, 1979, p. 69. 
122 Ajijola, A.D. Introduction to Islamic Law, New Delhi, International Islamic Pictures, 1989, pp. 78. 
123 Carlson Anyangwe, The Cameroonian Judicial System, p.249.  
124 Ajijiola, A.D. Introduction to Islamic Law, New Delhi, International Islamic Pictures, 1989, 228. 
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1.5.4: LOCAL STATUTORY LAW 
Currently Cameroon has no statutory law on succession. A draft bill, to be 
seen later, in view of a Family Code is however pending in Parliament.   
 
1.6: DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS. 
1.6.1: TESTACY AND INTESTACY  
Testacy describes the situation when a person dies leaving a will while 
intestacy is used for situations where there is no will or there is one which has failed.  
The distinction between the two seems to be a fine one, as the legal systems assume, 
for different reasons, that intestacy rules reflect the presumed intentions of the 
intestate.  
English law bases the assumption on the studies of the contents of existing 
wills, said to have formed the basis of the scheme of distribution enacted in 
Administration of Estates Act 1925.125   
In French law the assumption is based on a notional presumed affection of the 
deceased towards members of his family. The law presumes that a person’s affection 
goes in priority to the blood as against marital relations. Chabot aptly describes the 
French position when he writes:  
“The law having no other role than to stand in for the wishes of the de 
cujus must regulate the transmission of his property as it is presumable 
that he would have disposed of himself. It must give him as successors 
those who would have been the subject of his choice, and we must 
                                                 
125 Law Commission No. 187 1989, at para. 24 stated “There are a number of principles upon which the 
rules of intestacy may be based and in our working paper we canvassed the respective merits of the 
presumed wishes of the deceased, the needs or deserts of the survivors and the status of the surviving 
spouse. The present law is based upon a combination of these, although the underlying object has been 
to do what the deceased himself or herself might have wished,” culled from Borkowski, Textbook on 
Succession, London, Blackstone Press Limited, 1997, 7.   
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suppose naturally that he would have chosen his relatives when he has 
not manifested a contrary intention, because he must be presumed to 
have had more affection for his relatives than for strangers.”126  
Certainly, customary law will also impute its rules on the presumed intention 
of the deceased intestate. Statements tending to show that rules of customary law 
cannot be altered because the ancestors intended them to be so are current in the 
traditional jurisdictions and a person become an ancestor when he dies. Testacy, we 
will see offers the opportunity to evade hash intestacy rules.  
 
1.6.2: SUCCESSION AND INHERITANCE 
The dictionary defines succession as the “the act or process of becoming 
entitled to a deceased person’s property or title,”127 and inheritance as “the act or an 
instance of inheriting property.”128 Both terms are employed interchangeably in 
textbooks on succession to property, in spite of the differences in their meanings. That 
“succession” includes title and “inheritance” does not, is of no moment in a work 
limited to the study of succession to property. 
 Legally English law conceives succession as a situation whereby “a person 
became beneficially entitled to or interested in property upon the death of another”.129 
Succession, therefore, transfers a beneficial interest, being one which could be used 
                                                 
126 “La loi n’ayant pas d’autre office que supléer a la volonté du de cujus doit régler la transmission de 
ses biens comme il est présumable qu’il en eût disposé lui-meme. Elle doit lui donner pour héritiers 
ceux qui auraient été les sujets de son proper choix,. et l’on doit supposer naturellement  qu’il aurait 
choisi ses propres parents lorsequ’il n’a pas manifesté une volonté contraire, parce qu’il doit être 
présumé avoir eu plus d’affection pour ses parents que pour les étrangers.  Rapport au Tribunat, 
LOCRE. T.V. 107 cited by Youego, Christine, “Sources et Evolution du Droits des Successions aux 
Cameroun.” Doctorat thesis, university of Paris II, 1994, 225 (unpublished). 
127 The Penguin English Dictionary, 1402. 
128 The Penguin English Dictionary also defines inheritance as “the act or an instance of inheriting 
property”, at 721.  
129 John Burke, Jowitt’s Dictionary of English Law, 2nd Edition, London, Sweet and Maxwell, p.1715. 
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freely within the limits of the interest acquired and subject to public policy 
considerations.  
 If succession transfers rights over property it is but normal to imagine that 
some of these could be subject to encumbrances likely to pass with the property. 
Normally before distribution any encumbrances in the form of debts or other 
liabilities on the estate must be ascertained and expunged by the personal 
representative. If this is done the beneficiary obtains unencumbered property. But 
some encumbrances hold over after distribution because the personal representative 
was unable to ascertain them or they crystallised after distribution. These generally 
pass with the property130 and the law devises means to protect owners of such 
encumbrances. Personal representatives could retain property to meet eventual claims, 
or are indemnified by the beneficiaries or insurance. Generally, the courts take a 
practical view of the matter and hold that no protection beyond the personal liability 
of the beneficiaries is needed.131 
        In French law succession signifies the transfer of property and liabilities132 from 
the deceased to one or more living persons.133 There is no intermediate period of 
administration, since pursuant to article 718 of the civil code succession opens 
immediately upon the death of the de cujus and property vests directly in the universal 
heirs jointly. It is then administered jointly pending partition to be decided upon by 
the beneficiaries or a court order.134 Unlike the English law, therefore the liabilities 
attach automatically on the beneficiaries.  
                                                 
130 Kerridge, Roger, Parry and Clark: The Law of Succession, London, sweet and Maxwell, 11th 
edition. 2002, 270.  
131 See Halsbury’s Laws of England : Annual Abridgement, 2007, 495.  
132 Louis Bach, Droit Civil, Paris, Sirey, 1985, p. 133. 
133 Hubrecht, G. Notions Essentiels de Driot Civil, Paris, Sirey, 1960, 21. 
134 See article 815 of the civil code, 1804 
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Customary law, according to Doumbe Moulongo, conceives succession in the 
same way as in French law stated above.135 But succession in customary law, 
excluding Muslim law136 is complicated by the fact that a deceased person often holds 
property as a family member and as an individual. Family property cannot be a subject 
of succession because the family, as a corporation has a perpetual existence. Only the 
management of family property passes from one person to another. And this is where 
there have been misconceptions, as the successor/manager tends to consider himself 
as the absolute owner, whereas as a family member he acquires a qualified title in the 
sense that whatever he does with the property must not negatively affect the interests 
of the other members. He cannot, for example dispose of the property without the 
consent of the other members.137  He nevertheless enjoys an unlimited right of user 
which he could transmit to his heirs and can act independently in the day to day 
management of the property, subject of course to rendering account of such 
management.   
Consequently, there is succession only to the personally acquired property of a 
deceased person, notwithstanding the argument that because the family contributed in 
the training or education of a member, any property acquired by him is family and not 
his private property.        
 
1.6.3: PROPERTY 
Property generally denotes anything tangible or intangible that is capable of 
ownership,138 and which for the purpose of succession is of such permanence that it 
                                                 
135Doumbe-Moulongo, Maurice, « Conséquence de juridictions de Droit Traditionnel Sur l’Evolution 
des coutunes dans le Sud cameroun » (1963) 17 Rev. Jur. Et Pol. d’Outre-Mer, 533-572, 564. 
  
136 As will be seen later the chances of a Muslim holding property in the name of the family are remote 
because generally every person holds property in his or her personal name. 
137 See Stella Munga & 5 others v. Wumnyonga Christiana & 3 others (1984)  CASWP/42/84 
(unreported); Teke Elias Tepi v. Teke David Mbah (1996) BCA/2cc/96 (unreported)  
138 Osborn P.G., A Concise Law Dictionary, 270. 
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continues to exist and be used beyond the death of the owner.139 Property also means 
“ownership” and ownership describes the relationship between persons with respect 
to a thing. So it is possible for different concurrent ownership rights of varying 
magnitudes to subsist over the same property.140 Succession thus gives a right of 
ownership to property, whether a person takes an absolute interest or as a mere 
trustee.   
 English law classifies property under realty and personalty. The classification 
derives from Roman law according to which legal actions were divided into actions in 
rem and actions in personam.141 Actions in rem were against a thing or res in which 
the claimant was not demanding compensation or forbearance from the defendant, but 
the restitution of the thing.  Actions for the recovery of land were classed as actions in 
rem. Because they involved recovering the land itself, such actions became known as 
actions in realty,142 and hence the appellation realty. Actions in personam or against 
the person on the other hand were those which could be made good by the payment of 
damages. They too became known as actions in personalty and hence the appellation 
personalty.  
Leaseholds are classified as personalty because actions concerning them are 
personal actions. Real actions are available only to freeholders, that is, only to tenants 
who were seised of the land. A tenant for years is possessed, not seised of the land 
and if dispossessed, he could bring only a personal action for the recovery of damages 
against the grantor. 143     
                                                 
139 Lawson F. H. and Rudden Bernard, The Law of Property, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2nd edition, 
1982, 14. 
140 Gray K. J. and Symes P .D., Real Property and Real People. Principles of Land Law, London, 
Butterworths, 1981, 8-9. 
141 T. Cyprian Williams, “The Terms Real and Personal in English Law”, (1888) XVI L.Q.R., 394-408, 
401. 
142 Ibid, 398. 
143 Burn and Cartwright, Cheshire and Burn’s Modern Law of Real Property, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 17th edition, 2006, 36. 
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 It is important to note that fixtures are, with a few exceptions part of the land. 
And so except agreement to the contrary, succession to land includes the things 
attached to it, as expressed in the maxim quicquid plantatur solo solo cedit.144 
As for French Law article 516 of the Civil Code divides property into movable 
(meubles) and immovables (immeubles). Immovable property is essentially land but 
because of the importance of agriculture at the time of the distinction,145 various items 
of movables were treated as part of immovable property.146 The assimilation of 
movables into immovables is explained by Beaumanoir: “Immovables are things 
which are everlasting and which produce annual income; perpetuity and the 
production of issues characterise immovables even more than the important fact of 
immobility; it is these two qualities which make up their value, whereas movables are 
perishable and do not bring in anything”.147    
  Property is immovable by its nature, purpose or intended objective.148 Hence 
immovable property includes not only the land and fixtures, but also the plants 
thereon and fruits irrespective of whether they constitute fructus naturales149 or are 
just fructus industriales.150 Beasts of burden used in farms, pipes and hoses used to 
conduct water in houses or farms are also classified as immovables.151 Movable 
property is defined in article 527 to include things which are movable by nature and 
those which are movable by law, having no connection to land. 
                                                 
144 What is attached to land accedes to the land. 
145 This was in the thirteenth century but was adopted by the drafters of the code civil in 1804.  
146 See Atias, Christian, Droit Civil: Les Biens, Paris, Librairie de la Cour de cassation, 1982, 13.  
147Cited by Brissuad, Jean, A History of French Private Law, New Jersey, Rothman Reprints Inc., 
1968, 271.    
148  517 Civil code, 1804. 
149 These are thing that grow on land with little or no human effort and except severed, are part of the 
land. 
150 These consist mainly of seasonal crops  planted on land and which are normally not part of the land.  
151 See articles 518 to 526 
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It is therefore a principle of French law whatever is attached to land and is 
capable of producing an income accedes to the land. This is the basis of the doctrine 
known as la présomption d’accession.152   
At customary law the distinction is between land and movables. There is no 
consensus on the question whether things attached to land accede to it. One view, 
against such accession, divides land into two parts, namely the natural content 
consisting of the soil and the artificial content consisting of the things on it.153 The 
communal nature of customary land tenure justifies this view, given that land is 
generally held by the family head on behalf of its members. If fixtures are to become 
part of the land, it will mean that they come under his authority even if he did not 
contribute to their existence. Not only would such a situation engender strife in the 
family, it will act as a disincentive to hard work and inventiveness by the members.  
The soil generally belongs to the family and the fixtures belong to the persons 
responsible for their existence154 and these could be trespassers, provided that they are 
not intended to defraud the owner of the soil of his title.155 Fixtures could be pledged 
or otherwise disposed of without affecting the title of the group. In Alexander Duru v. 
Haddison Masalo, the South West Court of Appeal held: 
                                                 
152 Article 552 Code Civil 
153 This is also the position in Muslim law as evident in  Ndjobdi v. Gabilla (Ndop Alkali Court, Civil 
Suit No. 3/2002-2003, unreported). The defendant initially permitted to construct a non-permanent 
structure on land went ahead to erect a six roomed concrete structure. He was ordered to remove same 
at his cost. 
154 See Enonchong, Nelson, “Jurisdiction over disputes relating to ‘national lands’ in Cameroon” 
(1999) 11 RADIC, 100-128,117; Anyangwe,  Carlson, “Land Tenure and Interests in Land in 
Cameroonian Indigenous Law,” (1984) Cameroon Law Review, pp. 29-41, 41; Ewang, Andrew, “The 
English Maxim ‘Quicquid Plantatur Solo Solo Cedit’ is not a rule of Customary Law.”(1996) 26 Juridis 
Périodique, 19-23, 21.  
155 In David Ako v.  John Ndumbe (1982) CASWP/CC/54/82 (unreported) the maxim was exceptionally 
applied because it was found that the defendant had the intention to own the land. 
 43
“The concept of customary ownership is that plants and fixtures attached 
to the land are not part of the land, so that a person may who owns the 
land may not per se own the crops.”[Sic]156 
A similar position was stated by the North West Court of Appeal in Malam 
Bello v. The People.157 The case concerned the sale of a house and the court described 
the contract as “a document evidencing the sale of a house under customary law and 
not the sale of land because the English maxim quicquid plantatur solo solo cedit is 
not a rule of customary law.” On this basis it was held Victor Bodylawson v. Hope 
Bodylawson &2 others158 that a house built by a member on family land belongs to 
the member.  It is “a fallacy to say that property built by the applicants deceased’s 
father was jointly owned without proof of financial contributions.”159   
Because fixtures do not pass with the land their fate could be settled in 
different ways. The owner could be directed to remove them at his cost160 or 
alternatively the owner of the land keeps the fixtures subject to the payment of 
compensation to their owner.161 
A second view favours the application of the maxim to customary law. The 
proponents advance such arguments as the gradual erosion of family ownership in 
favour of individual ownership. They also contend that the early disposable huts and 
seasonal crops that posed no threat to the title of the family are today replaced by 
concrete structures and permanent cash crops, liable indubitably to pose serious 
                                                 
156 (1984), CASWP/cc/52/80, per Njamnsi, J. See also Enjema Liote v. Hannah Forty (1984) 
CASWP/CC/15/83 (unreported); Michael Andeh v. Paul Happi (1983) CASWP/CC/52/82 
(unreported); Isange Ekoi Comfort v. Bongolie Ophilia Epupu (2004) HCK?AE/K.92/2002. 
157 (1983) Suit No. BCA/9MS/83 (Unreported). 
158 (2006) HCF/PROB/AE105/04-05/1M/05 (unreported). 
159  Per Justice Mrs. Mpacko 
160 Ngema v. Ebini (1994) HCK/CC/34/91-94 (unreported) 
161This course was adopted by the North West Court of Appeal in Moma v. Moma  (2003) 
BCA/5/2003(unreported), where the respondent having come out victorious in a succession dispute was 
ordered to compensate the appellant for the house built by him on the land. 
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problems of ownership.162 The ownership of the soil and of permanent structures or 
crops is like the concurrent existence of equivalent rights over the same piece of land. 
At one point there must be a fusion of the land and the fixtures.  
This position was adopted In Enyame v. Enyame.163 The parties were cousins 
both of whom had inherited land from their deceased fathers. The defendant applied 
for and obtained letters of administration over property supposed to be his father’s but 
the inventory included a house built on land which belonged to father of the plaintiff. 
In this action the plaintiff demanded a rectification of the letters issued to the 
respondent by excluding the house and including it in his own letters of 
administration as the owner of the land on which it stood. After a visit to the locus in 
quo, it was held that:  
“There was abundant evidence that the premises [land] belonged to the 
first applicant. From this, therefore, it is only logical that, the 
uncompleted building on that premises ought not to be made the 
property of the late Francis Enyame. The parties are agreed on the point 
that, the late Francis Enyame constructed on the estate of his late 
brother, father of the first applicant. Therefore the respondent’s Letters 
of Administration must exclude it.”  
No orders as to the payment of compensation to the owner of the building 
were made, meaning that the court was effectively applying the maxim without 
expressly referring to it. 
    
 
 
                                                 
162   James, R. W. Modern Land Law of Nigeria, Ibadan, Caxton Press (West Africa) Limited, 1973, pp. 
15. 
163Vesenge Enyame & 3 other v. Pauline Enyame & another (2003) HCF/PRO/AE3013/1M/03 
(unreported).  
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CHAPTER TWO: INTESTACY IN ENGLISH LAW 
Introduction 
English law like other systems of law predicates succession on the fact of 
death. Death164 is evidenced by a corpse and burial; however, disappearance might be 
assimilated to death. The need to ensure the continuity of the estate and liberate the 
spouse, if any, necessitates a presumption of death165 in the case of long and 
unexplained disappearance, which is preceded by a presumption of continuance. 166  
Death provides the basis for succession to the estate of the person. It thus 
becomes necessary to determine the beneficiaries and how the estate will be managed 
and liquidated through distribution. These are the matters we will be examining in this 
chapter, after disposing of the no less significant questions of the applicable laws, and 
application thereof.  
 
2.1: THE APPLICABLE LAWS. 
The rules applicable in Anglophone Cameroon are drawn from English and 
Nigerian statutes. The most important English statutes on the subject are the Wills Act 
of 1837, Wills Amendment Act of 1852, and the Administration of Estates Act 1925. 
The latter repealed and consolidated all previous legislation on the subject some of 
which smacked of customary law. It governs administration of estates generally and 
there is also the Non-Contentious Probate Rules of 1954 which are used for the 
                                                 
164 Black’s Law Dictionary defines death as “The cessation of life, the ceasing to exist; defined by 
physicians as a total stoppage of the circulation of the blood and a cessation of the animal and vital 
functions consequent thereon, such as respiration, pulsation, etc 
165 See section 143 (1) of the Evidence Ordinance: “A person shown not to have been heard of for 
seven years by those, if any, who, if he had been alive, would naturally have heard of him, is presumed 
to be dead unless the circumstances of the case are such as to account for his not being heard of 
without assuming his death.”  
166 See section 148 of the Evidence Ordinance, Cap. 62 of the 1958 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria:  
“The court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being 
had to the common course of natural events, human conduct, and public and private business, in their 
relation to the facts of the particular case, and in particular the court may presume… (b) that a thing or 
state of things which has been shown to be in existence within a period shorter than that within which 
such things cease to exist is still in existence.”   
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designation of personal representatives. These are applied together with 
Administrator-General Ordinance, Cap. 4 of the 1948 Laws of Nigeria; Order 48 Rule 
1(1) of the Supreme Court (Civil Procedure) Rules Cap. 211 of the 1948 Laws of 
Nigeria and the Evidence Ordinance Cap. 62 of the 1958 Laws of the Federation of 
Nigeria.  
The status of the estate prior to distribution is governed by the Trust of Land 
and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996. Of no negligible importance is the Inheritance 
(Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 which enables dependants of the 
deceased to apply for reasonable financial provision out of the estate. Other important 
sources are the Intestate Estates Act 1952 which significantly augments the rights of 
the surviving spouse, and the Law Reform (Succession) Act 1995, which adds to the 
category of persons liable to apply for reasonable financial provision under the 1975 
Act and also establishes twenty-eight days as the definite period of survivorship 
between commorientes spouses.  
Statutes such as the Legitimacy Act 1976, Adoption of Children Act 2002, the 
Family Law Reform Act 1987 and the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1973 are also called 
in when the matter involves determining the succession rights of legitimated children, 
adopted children, and illegitimate children respectively, and the determination of what 
amounts to reasonable financial provision for a surviving spouse in application of the 
1975 Act. 
   
2.1.1: Case for the application of post 1900 English statutes. 
The above applicable laws, with the exception of the Wills Acts, are post 
1900 statutes and this appears to be in contradiction with the enabling law. From 
section 11 of the Southern Cameroon High Court Law 1955 it emerges that the 
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applicable English laws must have been in force in England on the 1st day of January 
1900.  
The views diverge as to the scope of the limitation, whether it affects all the 
components of English law or is limited only to a particular component. One view is 
that only the statutory law is affected, based on “the plain meaning of the words”167 
used in the enabling section or from the “inescapable rules of grammar.”168 The use 
of semicolons to separate the three components of the received law could be an 
indication of their independence. But the semicolon is a controversial punctuation 
mark, which not being a comma or full stop169 could be subject to differing 
interpretations. If treated as full stops, the relative clause “which were in force” 
becomes relevant only for the received statutory law. Taken in their literal meanings 
to signify long pauses between the components, the word “and” which precedes 
“statutes of general application” effectively separates the relative clause from the 
first two components.  The use of the verb “were” immediately after “the statutes of 
general application”, which is the plural form of the past tense of the verb “to be”, 
instead of the singular form “was” is yet another indication that common law and 
equity were not intended to be effected by the limitation. Again, the phrase “in so far 
as the legislature of the Southern Cameroons is for the time being competent to make 
laws…” automatically excludes common law and doctrines of equity. The last and 
probably most important indicator lies in the lettering (a), (b), (c), and the inclusion 
of the qualifying date in the paragraph marked (c). 
                                                 
167Park, The Sources of Nigerian Law, 21.  
168 Anyangwe, Carlson, The Cameroonian Judicial System, 222. 
169 The New Penguin English Dictionary at pp. 1269-1270 defines a semicolon as “punctuation mark to 
mark a break or pause between sentence elements such as clauses but is greater than the break or pause 
indicated by a comma and less than that indicated by a full stop. 
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The second view represented by Professor Allott recognises but discards the 
above possibility because “one cannot base one’s interpretation of a statute on its 
punctuation.”170 He submits instead that “by necessary intendment” the date should 
cover the other components of the received English law.171  His position must have 
been influenced by his reading of section 83 of the reception statute of Ghana, where 
the components are separated by commas. In the footnote quoted above he observes 
the variegated nature of the punctuation marks used in similar provisions of other 
countries, makes reference to provisions with no commas, those with only one 
comma, and apparently ignores those that use semi-colons. 
One the basis of its peculiar formulation we subscribe to the view that the 
limitation affects only the statutes of general application. Hence post-1900 
developments in the rules of common law and doctrines of equity in England are 
without more applicable in Anglophone Cameroon.  
The reception of post-1900 statutes is, however, expressly allowed under 
sections 10 and 15. Section 10 relates to procedural law: 
“The jurisdiction vested in the High Court shall, so far as practice and 
procedure are concerned, be exercised in the manner provided by this Law 
or any other written law, or by such rules and orders in court as may be 
made pursuant to this Law or any other written law, and in the absence 
thereof in substantial conformity with the practice and procedure for the 
time being of Her Majesty’s High Court of Justice in England” 
Relevant English procedural laws for the time being in force are therefore admitted 
whenever there is a lacuna in the local laws. Section 15 concerns probate, divorce and 
matrimonial causes: 
                                                 
170 Allott, Antony Essays in African Law: With special reference to the law of Ghana, London, 
Butterworth, 1960, p. 31, note 2. 
171 Ibid. 31. 
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“The jurisdiction of the High Court in probate, divorce and matrimonial 
causes and proceedings may, subject to the provisions of this Law and in 
particular section 27, and to rules of court, be exercised by the court in 
conformity with the law and practice for the time being in force in 
England.”  
This exception is of particular relevance to this study as the tendency has been to 
construe “probate causes and proceedings” as including the administration of estates 
and the distribution of residue. In Godwin v. Crowther,172 the Supreme Court of 
Sierra Leone interpreted a similar phrase in section 6 of the Supreme Court 
Ordinance, 1904, cap 205 of Sierra Leone to include matters “sui generis”173 such as 
testamentary succession, devolution on intestacy and administration, in order to bring 
in the Administration of Estates Act 1925. The interpretation was rejected on appeal 
by the West African Court of Appeal, which held the phrase to be limited to the grant 
or recall of probate or letters of administration. In Taylor v Taylor174  the trial court 
adopted the same interpretation as was done by the trial court in Godwin v. 
Crowther, and again, it was overruled. Kingdon, C. J. then propounded the following 
test to determine whether the phrase bore the meaning attributed to it by the lower 
courts:   
“Admittedly the grant of Letters of Administration is a probate matter, but 
the present matter has nothing to do with the grant, it relates to the disputes 
as to distribution of assets. To my mind the test to be applied is ‘would this 
matter in England be dealt with in the Probate Division or Chancery 
Division’? If in the former, it is a probate matter, if in the latter, it is not a 
probate matter”.   
                                                 
172 Sierra Leone, (1934) 2 W.A.C.A. 109. 
173 Ibid. 110. 
174 (1935) 2 W.A.C.A. 348, 349. 
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It was unanimously agreed that in England the matter would be dealt with in the 
Chancery Division, and so it was held that the distribution of assets did not come 
within the purview of the phrase “probate causes and proceedings”.   
It should not be assumed, we submit, that the lower courts were ignorant of 
what the phrase means, as the Latinism sui generis in Godwin v. Crowther suggests 
that the phrase was only exceptionally interpreted in the circumstances to encompass 
all of the law of succession. In the unanimous judgment of the court, the worry was 
that adopting the interpretation advanced by the lower court would result in the local 
Ordinance being repealed, notwithstanding the argument that only the provision on 
consent would be affected. 175 By implication the Administration of Estates Act 1925 
would have been applicable if there was no local statute on the subject, and this 
precisely is the case of Cameroon. 
The interpretation could also be justified when considered in the light of 
different rules of statutory interpretation: the golden rule, mischief rule and ejusdem 
generis. The golden rule seeks to discover the intention of the legislature by 
interpreting the words of the statute in their ordinary or literal meaning “unless this 
                                                 
175 There were three judges in that case and each of them spoke in defence of the local statute: 
MacQuarrie, J. at 111 “Mr. Boston argued that the phrase in question does include the law as to 
testamentary succession, devolution or intestacy and administration of assets; but that one effect of 
section 6 is, by the application of the Administration of Estates Act, 1925, to repeal section 13 of  the 
Intestate Estates Ordinance, and that section only. I am unable to agree with him; it seems to me that it 
would follow that the whole Ordinance would stand repealed, with the result that section 24 requiring 
the consent of the court to a sale of land would no longer be in force, and the defence to the action 
would disappear.” Butler-Lloyd, J.: “Now whatever may have been the exact intention of the 
legislature in framing paragraph[section] 6 nothing is clearer than that that section is subject to and 
overridden  by section 8 which make all statutes applied by the Ordinance subject to existing 
Ordinances of the colony not thereby repealed. The intestate Estates Ordinance was not repealed and 
must be taken to remain in full force and effect. This disposes of the respondent’s case, but I desire to 
point out that even were the Intestate Estates Ordinance repealed by section 6 the respondent would be 
no better off since she rests her case on paragraph 24 of the Ordinance, and I am certainly not prepared 
to accede to the proposition that paragraph 24 remains in force while paragraph 13 does not.” (at 112). 
Deane, C. J., Gold Coast: “… the Intestate Estates Ordinance has not been repealed by section 6 of the 
Supreme Court Ordinance of 1924…. It is to me almost inconceivable that the legislature, had they 
meant to repeal that Ordinance, would not have said so, instead of living to inference such an important 
result.” (113).          
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stultifies the purpose of the statute, or otherwise produces some injustice, absurdity, 
anomaly or contradiction in which case some secondary ordinary sense may be 
preferred, so as to obviate”176 these effects. If the intention of the legislator cannot be 
found, resort is had to the mischief rule which consists in discovering mischief which 
the law sets out to avoid. If this also fails then the ejusdem generis rule becomes 
applicable. The rule is that when general words in a statute are followed by narrow 
words all of which come within the same genus or category, the meaning of the 
general words is to be limited by the narrow words in the absence of any contrary 
intention.  
Either method would justify the interpretation without the need for the 
Latinism sui generis. Under the golden rule it would be an absurdity to think that the 
legislature would have intended the term “probate” to be so narrowly interpreted so as 
to exclude the administration of estates, being the area where most problems of 
succession are bound to arise. Textbooks on succession today carry such titles as 
“Probate and Practice.” 177  
The mischief rule would produce the same results. There is no doubt that by 
bringing in English law generally, the colonial legislature intended to avoid the 
application of customary law to matters that would otherwise be governed by English 
law.  Conscious of the negative effects of rules of customary law on certain members 
of the family, particularly women it must have been thought that even the pre-1900 
statutes would not provide adequate protection, given the existence in those laws of 
provisions that discriminate against women. The mischief which the legislature set 
out to combat would remain undiminished, if “probate causes and proceeding” does 
not include distribution of the estate. It will mean that while the Administration of 
                                                 
176 Maunsell v. Olins [1975] A.C. 373, 391, per Lord Simon of Glaisdale  
177 For instance Rowe, R. B et al., Tristram and Coote’s Probate Practice, London, Butterworths 1983 
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Estates Act 1925 governs the grant and withdrawal of probate and Letters of 
Administration, distribution will be governed by statutes of distribution of 1670 
which has been repealed by the 1925 Act.  
Applying the ejusdem generis principle might pose some difficulties due to 
pre- condition for the existence of more words and a genus to which they all belong. 
Section 15 uses the word “probate” standing alone. However, ejusdem generis is 
merely an emanation of a general principle of interpretation expressed in the Latin 
maxim Noscitur a sociis (a thing is known by its associates), which means that to 
understand the meaning of words, especially general words in a statute, they have to 
be read in conjunction with other words used in the statute or with which they are 
connected.178 In other words, the meaning of a word can be deduced from the 
company it keeps. 179 “English words derive colour from those which surround 
them.”180 Where an enactment contains a neutral or colourless word, the context 
provides the colouring agent. In Bromley London Borough Council v. Greater 
London Council,181 the question was whether the word “economic” meant financial 
economy or the science of economics. Lord Scarman said: “As a matter of English 
usage, the term economic has… several meanings. They include both that for which 
the appellants contend and that for which Bromley contend. It is a very useful word: 
chameleon-like, taking its colour from its surroundings.” The term probate is neutral 
and is coloured by its association with administration and distribution of the estate.  
Strict adherence to the limitation date would mean that the courts will be 
applying outdated rules which no longer meet the required standard of justice under 
                                                 
178 See Bennion, F.A.R., Bennion on Statute Law, London, 3rd ed., Longman, 1990, 195-198; Bennion, 
F.A.R., Statutory Interpretation, 3rd ed., London, Butterworths, 1997, pp.  195-199;  Bell, John and 
Engle, George,  Cross: Statutory Interpretation, 3rd ed.,  London Butterworths, 1995, 138-139 
179 Anyangwe, Carlson, The Cameroonian Judicial System, Yaoundé, CEPER, 1987, 236-237 
180 Bourne v. Norwich Crematorium, [1967] W.L.R., 691, 696( Per Stamp, J.) 
181[1982] 1 All E.R., 129,174 
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English law. Given that the idea was to institute a system of justice equivalent and not 
inferior to the English standard, the objective would be defeated if, because of the 
tyranny of statutory provisions we are obliged to apply laws long abandoned182 in 
England. Fombad opines that: “Neither reason nor justice, in the absence of a clear 
and comprehensive Cameroonian enacted law on the issues compels such rigid 
interpretation [limitation date] today. The proper approach, it is suggested, must be 
dictated, if not in fact justified, by rational and objective imperatives of justice and 
fairness with due regard to the present level of our socio-economic development and 
situated in the general context of our overall objective legal modernisation.” 183 
Anglophone courts have accordingly not heeded the limitation and 
consistently rely on the exception in section 15 to bring in post-1900 English statutes 
relevant to the law of succession. The dictum of Epuli, J. in Nforba v Nchari,184 is 
commonly cited as authority for this proposition.  
“In the light of section 15 as read with section 9(b) and section 27 of the 
southern Cameroon High Court Law 1955… where the marriage was 
monogamous the rules applicable would be those currently in force in 
England… from the surrounding circumstances, I infer that the marriage 
was intended to be monogamous. Therefore the current law of succession 
applicable in England governs the devolution of the intestate deceased’s 
property.  That law is to be found basically in the Administration of 
Estates Act 1925…” 
It is clear from the foregoing that Anglophone Cameroonian courts have 
refused to be tied down by the limitation date which would have meant applying 
                                                 
182 See Park, A. E. W., Sources of Nigerian Law, London, Sweet and Maxwell, 1963, 23-24. It will be 
paradoxical if England, a champion of human rights would intend the application in its former colonies 
of the Dower Act and Satutes of Distribution for example, not for their bias to women. 
183 Charles Manga Fombad, “The scope of uniformised national laws in Cameroon.” (1990) 3 Revue 
Juridique Africaine, 59-71, 67.   
184 (1999) G.L.R. 59, 63 (Gender Law Report) See also Mbokam Nya Clarice v Tchouinjan Andre & 
Cameroon Development Corporation (1999) G.L.R., 67  
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moribund English statutory law. In succession especially this would have meant 
operating a distinction between male and female descendants with respect to 
succession to real property, and it would have meant, equally that widows are never 
to aspire to succession since they would be entitled to the dower which was one third 
of the real property of the deceased. The application of post-1900 laws makes it 
possible to link the right of succession to the duty of maintenance, which as we said, 
should constitute the basis for succession.  
2.1.2: Adaptation of the applicable English laws to local conditions. 
An applicable rule of English law needs to be adapted to the local 
circumstances. Having been made to meet specific requirements in England, the laws 
would result in hardship if not modified in line with the standards of an African 
environment, where there are significant differences in the general life-style, customs, 
beliefs, social organisations, and patterns of marriage, divorce law, land law and 
above all, the law of succession.  
However this imperative seems not to have been given much thought by the 
colonial legislature, as Cameroon’s enabling statute makes no provision for 
adaptation.  Section 45(3) of the Interpretation Act, cap. 89 of the 1958 Laws of the 
Federation of Nigeria applicable in Cameroon permits “formal verbal alterations” but 
the phrase “not affecting the substance,” greatly limits the extent of the adaptation. It 
is permissible under the provision to make substitutions for names, as for example 
substituting “Cameroon” for “England” or “Nigeria.”  
Park argues that adaptation is not permissible if not contained in a statute. His 
reason is that courts are called upon not to “administer justice, but rather to 
administer the rules of law that they are directed to apply by relevant statutory 
enactments” and adds that “the legislature of the country can always change common 
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law rules that are considered unsuitable.”185 One could easily associate Park’s 
position with the traditional position of English law that law-making is the 
responsibility of parliament. But even the English system, organised as it is has not 
always responded, at least promptly, if at all, to calls for Parliament to change 
“unsuitable rules” of common law. Much can therefore not be expected of Cameroon, 
where even making the most basic laws on matters such as succession is still a 
problem. Park’s fear is that leaving the task of adaptation to the individual courts 
might result in a multiplicity of customary laws on a given subject, which would 
work against the certainty and predictability of the law. But these are matters that 
could be taken care of by the doctrine of precedent. 
Allott supports the view that even in the absence of express provisions, “the 
courts have an inherent power in similar terms by virtue of their general duty to 
administer justice”186 Allott’s position is good for countries like Cameroon where no 
provisions for adaptation exist. The courts will have to draw from their discretionary 
powers to adapt rules of the received law and make them workable in the new 
environment.187  
Given that judicial discretion must be based on some legal provision, the 
courts could rely on the residual clause embedded in section 27(4) of the Southern 
Cameroon High Law 1955. It enacts: “In cases where no express rule is applicable to 
a matter in controversy, the court shall be governed by the principles of justice, equity 
and good conscience.”  
                                                 
185 The Sources of Nigerian Law, supra, p.39. 
186 Essays in African Law, supra, p. 25. 
187 Allott, Antony Essays in African Law: With special reference to the law of Ghana, London, 
Butterworth, 1960, 24. 
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Adaptation could be by broadening the meaning of terms used or by refusing 
to adhere to inconvenient details.188 It is for example accepted that the term 
“marriage” mean not only monogamous but also polygamous marriage provided that 
the laws of the country where it is celebrated recognise such marriages.189 The effect 
of this in succession is that the “wife” or “widow” of a customary marriage and the 
children of the marriage can in certain circumstances succeed under English law.  
In Bamgbose v. Daniel190 it was held that children of a valid customary law 
marriage were entitled to succeed in the same capacity with children of a statutory 
marriage. A similar position had been adopted in the earlier case of Re Adadevoh.191 
But in both cases since no claims were made by the widows the Courts abstained 
from making any concrete pronouncements, apart from intimating that the rights of 
the children to succession were independent of that of their mothers if ever they made 
any claims to that effect.192 In the opinion of the Privy Council as expressed in 
Bamgbose v. Daniel, “if the legitimacy [of the children] be established, the validity of 
his parents’ marriage should not be entertained as a relevant subject of investigation. 
It would be strange in the converse case where a marriage of the parents was 
recognised as valid the children should be deprived of their right of succession 
because of the difficulty in working out the rights of the wife.”193 The position of the 
widow was settled in Coleman v. Shang.194  The plaintiff, an issue of a statutory 
marriage was against the widow by a valid customary marriage being appointed joint 
administrator of the estate with her on the ground that the widow did not come within 
                                                 
188 Allott, supra, p. 24 
189 See Bamgbose v. Daniel (1952) 14  W.A.C.A. 111, 114 
190 Ibid. 
191 Also known under the appellation of In the Matter of the Estate of Herbert Macaulay (1951) 13 
W.A.C.A. 304. 
192 See p. 311 for Re Adedavoh  and p. 121 for Bamgbose v. Daniel 
193  P. 122. 
194 [1961] A.C. 481. 
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the meaning of wife under section 3195 of Statute of Distribution of 1670. The 
contention was rejected on the ground that the woman was a wife under the statute, 
having been lawfully married under the law of Ghana.  
An important question worthy of consideration is whether the courts have 
powers to alter the statutory provisions to make them palatable to local conditions. 
Could the one third share of the deceased estate accorded to the widow of a 
monogamous marriage under the statute of distribution be increased, if the share is 
found to be too small for the number of wives at customary law? From the decision in 
the Nigerian case of Labinjoh v. Abake196 this would seem impossible. In that case, 
the defendant, an unmarried girl under 21 years of age living with her parents was 
sued for the price of goods sold and delivered to her. The action was dismissed on the 
basis of the Infant Relief Act, 1874 on the ground that she was an infant and that 
infant contracts are voidable if avoided within a reasonable time. On appeal to the 
divisional court, it was held that the plaintiff must succeed because the Act was 
applied with necessary modification to the meaning of the term “infant”, held to be 
the age of puberty and not the statutory age. This decision was set aside in the present 
appeal, and Combe, C. J. said: 
“I am of the opinion that the learned judge was wrong in holding that, in 
applying the Act, the court is entitled to alter the Act to suit local conditions. 
The legislature in using the term “infant” in the Act must be assumed to 
have been aware of the legal definition of that term and to have intended 
that the term should be read in accordance with that definition.”           
                                                 
195 “ All ordinaries and every other person who by this Act is enabled to make distribution of the 
surplusage of the estate of any person dying intestate, shall distribute the whole surplussage of such 
estate or estates in manner and form following : that is to say, one third part of the  said surplusage to 
the wife of the intestate.”      
196 (1924)5 N.L.R.32, 35. 
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  Without adaptation the very application of the laws would be impossible, 
given that the English laws of succession are made for a society where monogamy is 
the rule, as against the Cameroonian community where polygamy is the rule. The 
adaptation, it must be said has been mainly responsible to the influence which 
customary law still wields over matters of succession in this country.  
 
2.2: COURTS WITH JURISDICTION TO ADMINISTER ENGLISH LAW 
2.2.1: Original Jurisdiction: The High Courts.   
High Courts have existed in Anglophone Cameroon since the Southern 
Cameroon High Court Law of 1955. Under that Law the courts had both original and 
appellate jurisdiction because having been modelled in line with the High Court of 
England, were under section 7 conferred the same jurisdiction as their English 
counterparts.197 However the appellate jurisdiction was removed by Ordinance No. 
72/4 of 26 August1972 on the Judicial Organisation of the whole country. Although 
differences could still be observed in the manners in which they function, this 
Ordinance effectively harmonised the legal systems of the former British and French 
Cameroon. 
The courts are situated at the level of each administrative division and are 
competent in succession matters arising within their jurisdiction if the deceased had 
property therein.198 Section 16(b) as amended by article 16(c) of Law No. 89/019 of 
29 December 1989 gives the courts original jurisdiction over succession: “The High 
Court shall have jurisdiction…in civil matters to hear suits and proceeding relating to 
                                                 
197 “To the extent that the legislature of the Southern Cameroon is enabled to confer such jurisdiction, 
the High Court shall, in addition to other jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution Order or by this law 
or any other written law, possess and exercise within the limits mentioned in, and subject to the 
provisions of the Constitution Order  and this law, all jurisdiction, power and authorities, other than 
admiralty jurisdiction, which are vested in or capable of being exercised by Her Majesty’s High Court 
of Justice in England.”  
198 See Order 48 Rules 1 and 2 of the Supreme Court (Civil Procedure) Cap. 211 of the 1948 Laws of 
Nigeria; Sam Wandji Christine & anor v. Sam Mbessa Mani Christine (2006) Suit No. 
HCF/105/OS/04-05 (unreported). 
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the status of persons and especially to civil status, marriage, divorce, filliation, 
adoption and succession, subject to the legal provisions applicable to traditional 
courts as regards ratione personae jurisdiction.”    
Hence the courts have jurisdiction over all matters of succession except those 
over which the customary courts are competent. They are primarily competent over 
matters involving foreigners and persons who would otherwise be subject to the 
customary courts, but who contracted monogamous marriages or left wills in English 
form. 
However, because they have exclusive jurisdiction over letters of 
administration,199 they also occasionally exercise jurisdiction over estates in which 
customary law is applicable. Such matters are heard first of all by the customary 
courts, giving rise to next-of-kin declarations which are then presented to the High 
Court in view of the letters.  
This is a curious practice given firstly, that both the Customary and High 
courts are courts of original jurisdiction in which case the decision of one must be 
treated as res judicata by the other. If because of the monopoly over letters of 
administration the High Courts must hear matters relating to the estates of persons 
subject to customary law, it is submitted that their role must be administrative only, 
and not empower them to go into the merits of the case. Secondly, a decision of the 
customary court would be final except where an application is made for letters of 
administration.  
 Even more puzzling, the procedure is not ordained by any law, a fact admitted 
in Njoke v. Njoke, 200 according to which: “A next-of-kin declaratory judgment from 
                                                 
199 See Order 48 Rule 1(1) of the Supreme Court (Civil Procedure) Rules Cap. 211 of the 1948 Law of 
Nigeria. See also Mikano Emmanuel Kiye, “The Importance of Customary Law  in   Africa:  A 
Cameroonian case study”,  Doctoral Thesis,  VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT BRUSSEL,  June , 146.  
200 ((2006) C.A.S.W.P/35/04-05 (unreported).  
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the customary court which is a practice that has evolved through out the years but not 
a legal requirement is only a step to the obtention of letters of administration.”201  
 
2.2.2: Appellate Jurisdiction: Courts of Appeal and the Supreme Court. 
 The judicial reforms of 1972 established Courts of Appeal for each of the 
country’s ten provinces202 and a single Supreme Court situated in the capital of the 
country.203 Appeals against decisions of the High Courts are made to the Court of 
Appeal of the province and dissatisfaction with the outcome could give rise to further 
appeal to the Supreme Court situated in the capital city of Yaoundé.   
 
2.3. DETERMINING THE INTESTATE BENEFICIARIES 
The beneficiaries are persons who survive the deceased, and so like death, 
survivorship is a precondition for succession. Survival might be difficult to determine 
in situations of the simultaneous deaths of persons entitled to each other’s succession 
or one of who is entitled to the succession of the other. Such deaths are described as 
commorientes and the basic rule for determining survivorship in the circumstance, 
with the exception of spouses, is to presume that the youngest person survived. 204  
Sections 21 (1) of the Non-Contentious Probate Rules of 1954 and 46(1) of the 
Administration of Estates Act 1925 provide an outline of potential beneficiaries, 
potential because the principle of precedence might exclude some of the persons on 
the list. These are the surviving spouse, the children of the deceased or the issue of 
                                                 
201 See also Peter Charles v. Chinkwo Ndeh where it was said that “A customary court decision in 
matters of next-of-kin declaration is not a final decision. It is only a process in the granting of letters of 
administration and can at best be regarded as a recommendation to the Administrator-General when he 
is examining an application for the grant of letters of administration.” (2006) Appeal No. BCA/62/2003 
(unreported) 
202 See section 18 of Ordinance No. 72/4 on the Judicial Organisation. 
203 See section 1 of Ordinance No. 72/6 of 26 August 1972 bearing on the organisation of the Supreme 
Court. 
204 See section a commorientes is contained in section 143(2) of the Evidence Ordinance: “For the 
purpose of determining title to property where two or more persons have died in circumstances in 
which it is uncertain which survived the other, they are presumed to have died in order of 
seniority.”   
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any such child who has died during the life time of the deceased. The father or mother 
of the deceased, brothers and sisters of the whole blood, or the issue of any deceased 
brother or sister of the whole blood who has died. The brothers and sisters of the half 
blood, or the issue of any deceased brother or sister of the half blood who has died. 
Grandparents, uncles and aunts of the whole blood, or the issue of any deceased 
uncles or aunt of the whole blood who has died, and uncles and aunts of the half blood 
or the issue of any deceased uncle and aunt of the half blood who has died.  
 The list can go on ad infinitum as long as there are direct descendants or 
ascendants. Marital relationships and kinship are the factors that determine whether or 
not a person qualifies as a beneficiary.  
There is no gender-based discrimination and the surviving spouse even 
occupies the pride of place. Greater attention is thus given to marital relationship. The 
“issue” of the deceased come next and the term signifies the legitimate children of the 
deceased, their descendants and subsequent generations of descendants who are living 
or were en ventre sa mère at the intestate’s death. In the Estate of Bechem Solomon205 
letters of administration were withdrawn from the brother of the deceased who had 
administered the estate for twenty five years and transferred to the only surviving 
child of the deceased who was born one month after her father died. 
 The term “issue” also includes illegitimate206, legitimated207and adopted208 
children of the deceased.  These have the same status as legitimate children and are as 
a result the subject of succession rights, not limited to the actual persons who gave 
them the status. The rights extend in their various categories to the estates of their 
                                                 
205 Suit No. HCK/AE/K.128/2001. 
206 See section 14 Family Law Reform Act 1969. 
207 See section 5 Legitimacy Act 1976. 
208 See section 39(1) Adoption Act 1976.  
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brothers and sisters, grand parents, uncles and aunts ad infinitum, provided they or 
their descendants survive the deceased.  
If the deceased is not survived by any of the relatives listed above, the estate 
goes to the Crown as bona vacantia as it is illegal to go beyond the class of statutory 
relatives. The Crown whose powers in this respect are exercised by the Treasury 
Solicitor may in its discretion and in accordance with the existing practice make 
provision for the dependants of the deceased whether related to him or not, and for 
any other persons for whom the deceased might reasonably have been expected to 
make provision.209  
 The tendency upon looking at the above list would be to conclude that the law 
effectively balances the interest of the family members of the deceased. However as 
will be seen later in this study, this is only a false image which we will not hesitate to 
identify as being partially responsible for the woes of our law of succession. The list 
may be long as it is, but not every person on it would be entitled to succession since 
the existence of a category at the top of the list automatically excludes the others.   
 
2.4: ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES 
Administration is in principle the period during which the estate is supposed to 
be realised and prepared for liquidation. It takes effect from the death of the deceased 
to the time of distribution. But the fact the distribution is not mandatory leads to a 
situation of perpetual administration, which as we will see, is encouraged by the 
courts which generally decline to decree distribution. Administration is ensured by the 
personal representative.  
 
 
                                                 
209 See section 46(1) (vi) Administration of Estates Act 1925. Eventually we shall see that such people 
could apply for reasonable financial provision out of the estate under the Inheritance (Provision for 
Family and Dependants) Act 1975.   
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2.4.1: The Personal Representative. 
The personal representative is the person to whom Letters of Administration 
of an estate are granted. Initially the appellation signified the powers to manage the 
personal property of the deceased but has since been extended to include real 
property.210  
 
2.4.1.1: The designation of personal representatives. 
The personal representative manages the estate on behalf of the beneficiaries, 
who are persons entitled to maintenance by the deceased either directly or by the 
proxy of those in whose favour the right existed.  
Cameroonian courts rely interchangeably on the Administration of Estates Act 
1925 and the Non-Contentious Probate Rules 1954 to designate the personal 
representative. This is wrong because while the former lays down immutable rules of 
distribution the latter enshrines rules for appointing personal representatives, which 
are liable to vary when the circumstances so require.   
   Section 21(1) of the Non-Contentious Probate Rules of 1954 establishes the 
following order:  
a) The surviving spouse; 
b) The children of the deceased or the issue of any such child who has died during 
the life time of the deceased, 
c) The father or mother of the deceased;  
d) Brothers and sisters of the whole blood, or the issue of any deceased brother or 
sister of the whole blood who has died.  
                                                 
210 See section 1(1) of the Land Transfer Act 1897 which assimilated realty to personalty during the 
period of administration. Thereafter the personal representative also became the real representative 
even though the former appellation has for reasons of convenience been maintained.   
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The list stretches to include brother and sisters of the half blood or their issue, grand 
parents, uncles and aunts of the whole their issue and ends with uncles and aunts of 
the half blood or their issue.  
Remote relatives are excluded whenever there are persons closer to the 
deceased211 and if the relatives thus qualified are a category such as the “issue”, the 
court will have decide which of them is more suited for the position in the sense that 
he or she will manage the estate for the benefit of the other members of the category.   
The courts have wide discretionary powers under section 116 of the English 
Supreme Court Act 1981 to pass over the person who would otherwise have been 
entitled to the grant of administration and appoint as administrator any other person 
they deem expedient if, “by reason of any special circumstances” this appears to be 
necessary. The discretion was emphasised in Nanje Fabian v. Meta Edward by 
Mbeng, J.   
“I think that the pivotal factor for the court to consider in determining who 
should administer an estate, especially that of an intestate, is who is 
capable and honest. It is not a matter of relationship and priority as the 
administrator may not necessarily be a beneficiary to the estate.” 212     
 
Situations that come within the meaning of “special circumstances” are many. 
The most common which would justify an objection and a possible passing over of 
the person with prior rights to a grant include unsoundness of mind, minority and the 
bankruptcy of the estate.213 The list could be stretched to include factors such as bad 
character or otherwise unfitness to act, the disappearance or absence of the person 
                                                 
211 In Kekerogun v. Oshodi (1971) All N. L R. 76. the half brothers of the deceased were held to be 
entitled to letters of administration as against his cousin. 
212 (2005) Suit No. C.A.S.W.P/53/2002 (unreported). The contest for letters of administration was 
between the half brother and son of the deceased 
213 See sections 32, 33 of the Non-Contentious Probate Rules 1954. 
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entitled and the death of a sole solicitor.214 Further, an applicant will not be 
designated if he or she has an interest in the estate which conflicts with the proper 
administration of the estate.215  
                                                
When the person entitled is passed over pursuant to a caveat to an initial 
application or a revocation order, it is preferable for another person with a stake in the 
estate to be designated. Such persons would administer the estate expeditiously and 
with care as against a complete stranger who has nothing to lose or gain whether the 
estate is managed dilatorily and haphazardly. Besides, a beneficiary would have every 
reason to maximise the value of the property in the hope that it could increase his 
entitlement upon distribution.  
 In Njonji Godlove v. Esther Njonji216 the plaintiff was the son of the deceased 
from a previous customary marriage which was dissolved by the death of the woman. 
The defendant was the widow of the deceased by a Christian marriage. The plaintiff’s 
mother died when he was only two years old and he was therefore brought up by the 
defendant. Upon the death intestate of the deceased the family council made the 
widow successor to her husband. She obtained a next-of-kin declaration, and was 
granted Letters of Administration. The plaintiff claimed that the letters should be 
revoked and granted to him instead. He gave improper administration of the estate by 
the defendant and the fact that he was the first child of the deceased as reasons. The 
court qualified the conflict between the parties as “a delicate family matter” and 
making use of its discretion held: 
“Notwithstanding section 21(1) of the Non-Contentious Probate Rules 
1954 it will be more just and equitable to appoint someone else to 
administer the estate of the deceased… for the benefit of all the 
 
214 Kerridge, R, & Brierley, A. R. H.  Parry and Clark: The Law of Succession, London, Sweet and 
Maxwell, 11th edition. 2002, 402.. 
215 In in the Goods of Carr (1867)1 P. & D. 291. 
216 Suit No. HCK/AE/K.16/2000 (unreported) 
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beneficiaries. These beneficiaries are the applicant for grant and her four 
children and the caveator and his two children.217 To this end this court 
hereby appoints Rev. Pastor Njonji Isaiah [brother of the deceased] … as 
the Administrator of the Estate of Late Njonji Adolf Same.  ”  
 
The judgment fails to mention the facts on which the accusations of mismanagement 
were based. We think however that the decision to appoint the brother of the 
deceased, albeit a pastor, was a mistake and could be sowing seeds of discord. The 
pastor himself would have been a beneficiary but for the existence of the widow and 
the issue. His appointment indirectly revives his status as beneficiary as the tendency 
would be for him to consider himself in that light. This was the situation in In the 
Estate of Noumbissie,218 where the deceased was survived by two widows and issue 
of both marriages. Animosity between the two branches caused administration to be 
granted to a cousin of the deceased who considering himself as beneficiary connived 
with one of the widows and as a result, cared instead for his own family and the 
widow and her children.  
Decisions such as the above must be many and show the influence of 
customary law on court decisions. The courts certainly buy the customary law rule 
according to which women cannot be successors, for nothing would have prevented 
appointing the contesting parties as joint personal representatives, since this is 
possible under section 114(1) of the Supreme Court 1981 which sets the maximum 
number of personal representatives at four persons.  
Alternatively a completely neutral person could be appointed if the courts are 
to escape the accusation of having been influenced by customary law. This is the 
                                                 
217 The application of the English Non-Contentious Rules might seem to be at variance with granting 
succession rights to the caveator, issue of a customary marriage and his children. The position of the 
law as discussed in chapter two is that a subsequent Christian marriage does not bastardise the children 
of o previous customary marriage provided such marriage is valid under the law of the fori. 
218 (2002) 1 CCLR., 1. 
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import of Order 48 Rule 37 of the Supreme Court (Civil Procedure) Rules of the 1948 
Laws of Nigeria:  
“In a case of intestacy, where the peculiar circumstances of the case 
appear to the court so to require, the court may, if it thinks fit, on the 
application of any person having interest in the estate of the deceased, or 
of its own motion, grant letters of administration to an officer of the court 
or to a person in the service of the Government.”     
 
This officer of the court or Government official is generally the Administrator 
General, who in Cameroon is the President of the High Court. There is none better 
suited to maintain the balance between the parties than the Administrator-General, a 
neutral third party having no beneficial interest, actual or presumed, in the estate. 
 In the Estate of Noumbissie219 the letters were withdrawn from the conniving 
cousin and transferred to the Administrator-General. In Galega v. Galega220 the 
widow had without a next-of-kin declaration applied for letters of administration 
against which the defendant, the brother of the deceased issued a caveat. In spite of 
the animosity between the parties the trial court granted joint administration to the 
parties. The decision was reversed at appeal, and the administration granted to the 
Administrator-General on the ground that neither of the parties could administer the 
estate in the interest of the beneficiaries “without fanning the flames of animosity 
between the two families.” There was of course another ground for which the letters 
would have been revoked. The deceased was survived by a widow and issue and this 
excluded his brother as a beneficiary to have qualified him to be made joint 
administrator with the widow.   
                                                 
219 (2002) 1 CCLR., 1. 
220Appeal No. BCA/19/93 (unreported).  
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Granting administration to either would have been ignoring the rights of the 
persons interested in the estate which normally guides courts in their choices.221 The 
brother of the deceased was hostile to the surviving spouse and issue while the widow 
was opposed to the inclusion of the deceased’s mother and two illegitimate children 
of the deceased as beneficiaries.   
Apart from the above situation the Administrator-General could in his 
discretion apply for Letters of Administration within a period of one month following 
the death.222 This would arise when there is no person immediately available who is 
legally entitled to succession and when the assets of an estate are seen to be at risk of 
appropriation, deterioration and waste.223 The Administrator-General acts under the 
authority of the court and is required to furnish periodic accounts of his 
administration.224 
Grants for estates where no person has a beneficial interest are governed by 
paragraphs 3 and 4, which prescribe grants in those circumstances, to the Treasury 
Solicitor who claims bona vacantia on behalf of the Crown and to the creditors of the 
deceased respectively. 
 The above rules ensure that the persons entitled to succession are not cheated 
out of their rights, and this is so whether the personal representative is a beneficiary or 
a neutral person. 
 
2.4.1.2:  The authority and duties of personal representatives. 
Personal representatives derive their authority from the letters of 
administration. In the interim period between the death and grant of the letters the 
                                                 
221 See Uyanne v. Administrator-General (1973) 3 E.C.S.L.R, 716; Warwick v. Grenville (1809) 1 Phill 
123, 125.    
222 Section 15 Administrator- General Act, cap. 4 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1958.   
223 Section 16, ibid. 
224 Order 48 Rule 38, Supreme Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1948 laws of Nigeria. 
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conservation of the property is ensured by the Probate Registrar whose duty in a 
nutshell is “to preserve the assets, to deal with them properly, and to apply them in a 
due course of administration for the benefit of those interested”.225 Once granted the 
letters of administrations have a retrospective effect as was stated by Park, B. in 
Foster v. Bates.226  
“It is clear that the title of an administrator, though it does not exist until 
the grant of administration, relates back to the time of the death of the 
intestate; and that he may recover against a wrong doer who has seized or 
converted the goods of the intestate after his death, in an action of trespass 
or trover.”          
 
The estate vests in him as owner and not the other beneficiaries. The point was made 
in Chibikom v. Zamcho Florence, where in response to accusations that the 
respondent was registering the family land in her marital name, Bawak J. said: 
 “It is settled law that the effect of the grant of letters of administration is 
to vest the estate of the deceased in the administrator. Thus any 
applications for land certificates on part of the unregistered land owned 
by the deceased at the time of his death is by the administrator in his 
capacity as such administrator.”227  
 
This decision encapsulates one of the dilemmas with which some of our courts 
are confronted-that of applying English law without adaptation. Clearly the decision 
contradicts the customary law by allowing the successor to register family land in her 
name.  
                                                 
225 Commissioner of Stamp Duties (Queensland) v. Livingston [1965] A.C. 694, 707 (Per Lord 
Radcliffe). 
226 (1843) 12 M. & W. 226, 233. 
227 (1997)1 CCLR, 213,219. 
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What the decision signifies is that the beneficiaries have no rights over the 
estate. All they have are equitable rights of ownership which are in “suspense”228 
during this period. These might never ripen into legal ownership if the estate is 
insolvent, but it provides the basis for the beneficiaries to insist on proper 
administration. Due to the fiduciary nature of the relationship between them and the 
personal representative, the latter are entitled to what is known as a chose in action or 
the right to compel the proper administration of the estate whenever the former is 
found wanting in his duties in preserving the estate and managing it in the best 
interest of those entitled.   
Given that their rights are only probable, depending on the solvency of the 
estate, the appropriateness of the term “beneficiaries” has been questioned. The 
alternative term, “next-of-kin”, has been advanced229 on the ground that it does not 
connote any rights to property, but only that the person is closest to the deceased and 
is by law entitled to Letters of Administration in preference to creditors.230  
The initial duty of the personal representative is to realise the estate, sell and 
convert it into money. Part of the money is to be used for the administration, and the 
residue to be distributed to the beneficiaries at the end of the administration. In this 
respect, since the Trust of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996, the estate is 
constituted into a “trust of land” 231 which empowers the personal representative to 
sell both personalty and realty for the purpose of the administration.232  
                                                 
228 J. Sainsbury plc v. O’Connor (Inspector of Taxes) [1991] S.T.C 318 at 326. 
229 See Todd, Paul, Textbook on Trusts, London, Blackstone Press ltd., 4th edition, 1999, 74. 
230 Administrator General’s Ordinance chapter 4 of the 1948 Laws of Nigeria. 
231 The “trust of land” is defined in section 1 of the Act as “any trust of property which consists of or 
includes land” and this means that the trust is not limited to land.  
232 This replaces the “trust for sale” under section 33(1) of the Administration of Estates Act 1925, the 
effect of which was that the personal representative had the duty to sell the estate. The duty brought 
into play the doctrine of conversion based on the maxim that “Equity regards as done that which ought 
to be done,”232 meaning in effect that land devolved as personalty even though no sale had yet 
occurred. The beneficiaries had interests in the proceeds, actual or presumed which were equivalent to 
those which they had in the land.   
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 In fact this is what obtains in Cameroon as in most cases the estate is 
entrusted in the personal representative with instructions to make varying payments to 
the beneficiaries. Sale of the property is only one of the methods by which the money 
could be raised and often this is open to abuse as the tendency, often is for the 
personal representative to sell the land and appropriate the proceeds. 
The next duty of the personal representative consists in paying off the debts of 
the deceased and expenses of the administration out of the net income from the sale 
and conversion of the property.233 The expenses consist of the cost of organising the 
funeral and the cost of the administration generally. He is expected make an inventory 
of the estate, to realise the investments which it is not proper to retain, to keep clear 
and accurate accounts, and to be ready to make such accounts available whenever 
required to do so by the court.234 
The administration of an estate could go on ad infinitum because the law fails 
to fix a period when it must come to an end normally by distribution and effective 
liquidation of the estate. This is one of the problems confronting our law of 
succession, given that prolonged administration leads to abuse, as the personal 
representative generally starts treating the property as belonging to him. In the 
absence of a deadline for administration, distribution is only discretional and we could 
not find any evidence where distribution is decided upon by the personal 
representative without the intervention of the court.   
 
2.5.: DISTRIBUTION OF THE RESIDUE 
 Distribution gives effect to the deceased’s duty of maintenance as it 
effectively enables the beneficiaries to get into their entitlements within the limits of 
                                                 
233 Section 33 (2) Administration of Estates Act 1925. 
234 See Order 48 Rule 43 (1) of the Supreme Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, Cap. 211 of the 1948 Laws 
of Nigeria. 
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the estate. Whether the rules effectively establish parity between the beneficiaries 
remains to be seen.  
 
2.5.1: The content of the residuary estate.  
 The part of the estate which remains after the payment of funeral, 
testamentary, administration expenses and debts what remains of the estate constitutes 
the residuary estate.235 This will normally include real and personal property but since 
the distinction between the two was removed in matters of succession by the 1925 
property laws, divides the residuary estate, for the purpose of distribution, into 
personal chattels, the matrimonial home and the rest of the residuary estate.  
Personal chattels are elaborately defined in section 55(1)(x) of the 
Administration of Estates Act 1925. They include furniture, horses, cars, plates, 
books, jewellery, wines and “articles of household or personal use or ornament” but 
exclude any chattels used at the death of the intestate for business purposes, money 
and securities for money. Roughly speaking the phrase includes everything that goes 
to make a home excluding the home itself, it thus has a meaning quite distinct from 
personalty.  
The matrimonial home consists of the intestate’s interest in a dwelling house 
in which the surviving spouse was resident at the intestate’s death.236 Thus the 
matrimonial home constitutes a distinct item of the estate only in the case of a married 
intestate; otherwise it passes together with the other property excepting the personal 
chattels. The law talks of an “interest in dwelling house” which could be a leasehold 
or freehold but never a tenancy which is determinable by the landlord by notice within 
two years from the intestate’s death. Freehold interests will be the most common in 
                                                 
235 Burn, E. H. & Cartwright, J. Modern Law of Real Property, London, Butterworths, 2006, 988. 
236 See Schedule 2, para. 5(1) of Intestates’ Estates Act 1952.  
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Cameroon given that most people build their own houses, but with real estate 
companies now giving out houses on location-vente terms it will not be unusual to 
find some cases of leaseholds. 
The last category of distributable property will consist of anything which is 
neither part of the personal chattel or the matrimonial home. This will consist mainly 
of land, landed property, investments and money or money’s worth.  
 
2.5.2: Notification of the beneficiaries. 
 Section 27 of the Trustee Act 1925, enjoins personal representatives to give 
notice of the intention to distribute, and require interested persons to send in their 
particulars of claim within a maximum period of two months. When all the claims are 
not made after the advertisement the personal representative could nevertheless the 
obtain leave of court to distribute. The court then issues a “Benjamin Order” giving 
the personal representative leave to distribute on a particular footing set out in the 
order. In re Benjamin,237 Phillip Benjamin, beneficiary under his father’s will had 
disappeared in his father’s lifetime and thus made it difficult for the trustees to know 
whether he had survived the testator. There was no evidence that he was married at 
the time of the disappearance and no person had come forward as his wife or issue 
after the normal advertisements. The trustees applied to the court for an order to 
distribute. An order was made on the footing that Phillip Benjamin had predeceased 
the testator.  
The order is based on an inference and does not constitute a positive 
declaration of rights. It is not to deprive the beneficiary or his issue of their 
entitlement, if after the distribution it turns out that he or his issue survived the 
deceased. The order merely protects the personal representative from liability, given 
                                                 
237 Also known as Neville v Benjamin [1902] 1 Ch. 723.   
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that the beneficiary could institute action aimed at recovering the property from 
whoever it was given.238  Hence in making the order Joyce, J cautioned “I am 
anxious, however, not to say anything which would prevent his personal 
representatives from making any claim if evidence of his death at any other time 
should be subsequently forthcoming.”239  
                                                
An alternative to a Benjamin Order is for the personal representative to take 
out missing beneficiary insurance.240 In Re Evans241 the next-of-kin of the deceased 
intestate were his issue.  He had a son and a daughter but had lost contact with the son 
for almost thirty years before his death. The daughter, assuming that the son was dead 
obtained letters of administration, and three years after the death sought legal advice 
and took out a missing beneficiary insurance to cover the possibility of the son’s 
reappearance before distributing the balance of the residue to herself. Four years later 
the son reappeared. The proceeds of the insurance policy were paid to him but he 
contended that the policy premium had not been a valid administration expense, 
because it had facilitated an excessive distribution to the daughter. His claim was 
dismissed, the premium being held to be a proper and allowable expense of the 
administration even though the policy was taken out to facilitate a distribution in 
favour of the personal representative.  
Personal representatives, particularly of small estates should not be 
discouraged from seeking practical solutions to difficult administration problems 
without the expense of resort to the court. Missing beneficiary insurance may be both 
cheaper and more effective than a Benjamin Order.242     
 
238 See the presumption of death in chapter four for more on this subject. 
239 726, ibid. 
240 Kerridge, R, & Brierley, A. R. H.  Parry and Clark: The Law of Succession, London, Sweet and 
Maxwell, 11th edition. 2002, 576. 
241[1999] 2 All. E. R. 777.  
242 Kerridge, R, & Brierley, A. R. H.  Parry and Clark: The Law of Succession, ibid. 577.  
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 2.5.3: The rules of devolution. 
Distribution is governed by the Administration of Estates Act 1925. Section 46 
spelling out the rules of distribution is too lengthy to be reproduced here in toto. 
However, as would emerge later the manner of devolution will depend on the 
category of surviving relatives. When there is a surviving spouse the entitlement of 
the other beneficiaries will be subject to what she or he gets, and so it is only logical 
to use the surviving spouse as the springboard for the distribution exercise. 
 
2.5.3.1: Devolution to the surviving spouse. 
The surviving spouse is that person who was married to the deceased at the 
time of death. The surviving spouse may well be the widower even if experience 
shows that women are most likely to be in this situation due to the high mortality rate 
for men as a result of factors such as having to worry over maintaining the family and 
the tendency for husbands to be older than their wives. For these reasons the term as 
used in this work if unqualified signifies the widow. 
  In the event of the simultaneous death of the husband and wife the 
presumption of survivorship does not apply. Husbands as noted above are generally 
older than their wives and any unqualified application of the presumption will 
effectively be ordaining the devolution of a man’s property to his wife’s next-of-kin. 
This, it is thought would be inconsistent with the presumed intention of the parties who 
would most probably have favoured their respective next-of-kin.243 The exclusion of 
the presumption is enshrined in section 46(3) of the Intestate Estates Act 1952;244 this 
                                                 
243 See Sherrin, C. H. and Bonehill, R.C., The Law and Practice of Intestate Succession, London, Sweet 
and Maxwell, 1987, 164.  
244 “Where the intestate and the intestate’s husband or wife have died in circumstances rendering it 
uncertain which of them survived the other and the intestate’s husband or wife is by virtue of section 
one hundred and eighty four of the Law of Property Act 1925244 deemed to have survived the intestate, 
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was modified by section 1(1) of the Law Reform (Succession) Act 1995, which now 
makes the presumption applicable, provided that the spouse on whose behalf the claim 
is made, survived by a minimum period of 28 days.245 The reasons for the modification 
are not clear but would it be far from the truth, to assume that it must have been due to 
the realisation that younger men are increasingly getting married to older women?  
As a basic rule the surviving spouse is entitled absolutely to the personal 
chattels.246 Since personal chattels are basically the content of the matrimonial home 
the rule ensures that the spouse continues to live in a familiar environment, enjoys the 
same comfort as if the deceased was still alive and above all, reduces the impact of 
bereavement.  
After the personal chattels whatever the spouse obtains out of the residuary 
estate will be subject to the entitlements of other beneficiaries. So out of the residue 
she gets a statutory legacy represented in a fixed net sum with interest.247 This bears a 
close resemblance to a general pecuniary legacy given to a surviving spouse by will, 
with a direction that it has to be paid immediately after the testator’s death. Finally the 
surviving spouse has a life interest in half of the residue if there are surviving issue. If 
there are no issue but parent or brother or sister of the whole blood or their issue the 
spouse takes half of the residue absolutely. In the absence of the above specified 
relatives the spouse takes the entire residue absolutely.248 
                                                                                                                                            
this section shall, nevertheless, have effect as respects the intestate as if the husband or wife has not 
survived the intestate.” 
245Being an amendment this section is incorporated into and now constitutes section 46 (2A) of the 
Administration of Estates Act 1925:   
“Where the intestate’s husband or wife survived the intestate but died before the end of 28 days 
beginning with the day on which the intestate died, this section shall have effect as respects the 
intestate as if the husband or wife had not survived the intestate.”   
246 See section 46 (1) Administration of Estates Act 1925. 
247 This was set at £1000 by section 46(1) and currently stands at £200.000 under the Family Provision 
(Intestate Succession) Order 1993.  
248 See sections 46(1) (i) and 47(2) and (3) of the Administration of Estates Act 1925. 
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 The Administration of Estates Act 1925 makes no express provision of the 
widow’s entitlement to the matrimonial home. If the home was owned jointly it does 
not form part of the residuary estate since the surviving spouse is entitled to it by 
survivorship. If it was owned by the deceased the spouse could under section 41 of the 
1925 Act demand the interest to be transferred to her in place of its pecuniary 
equivalent. But this was possible only when the interest of the deceased did not 
exceed the entitlement of the surviving spouse in the estate.  
The limitation is offset by the Intestate Estates Act 1952, the second schedule 
of which facilitates the acquisition of the “dwelling house” by the surviving spouse.   
Provided that the surviving spouse was resident therein at the time of death, an 
appropriation will be ordered even if the value of the asset exceeds her interest in the 
estate. The appropriation operates partly in satisfaction of an interest of the surviving 
spouse in the intestate’s estate and partly in return for the payment of money by the 
spouse to cover the difference in value. In Re Phelps249 the Court of Appeal applied 
this provision and held that a widow could appropriate a house which exceeded the 
value of her absolute interests on intestacy by making an equalisation payment.  
  The above rules are intended for monogamous marriages but since Re 
Adadevoh250 we were told that “spouse” could be “spouses” with the effect that the 
applicable English law also covers situations of multiple wives. It has been noticed 
that the courts have adopted the flavour of entertaining matters concerning the estates 
of polygamists on the pretext that customary court decisions only give rise to “next-
of-kin declarations” which must be submitted to the High Courts in view of letters of 
administration. 
                                                 
249 [1980] Ch. 275. 
250 (1951) 13 W.A.C.A. 304. 
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 The point had been made earlier that applicable English statutes would be 
adapted to local conditions. However the adaptation in this case would be that the 
“surviving spouse” could be “surviving spouses”251 but the fundamental question as 
to whether the courts could vary the allotment intended for a single surviving spouse, 
to meet the new definition of that term, would meet with a negative response since 
Labinjoh v. Abake.252 
 
2.5.3.2: Entitlement of Issue. 
The issue253 if any takes what is left of the estate absolutely subject only to the 
life interest of the spouse in half of the residue, that is, if she does not opt for a lump 
sum payment. The estate is held on the “statutory trusts”254 for the issue subject to 
three qualifications. “Statutory trusts” are subject to the principle of representation 
according to which the issue of deceased’s child living at the intestate’s death takes 
that child’s share per stirpes. Secondly the child or issue is not entitled to a vested 
interest until he or she attains 18 years of age or marries before that age.255 If none of 
the children or their issue has attained a vested interest, their contingent interests will 
be held for them on the statutory trust.  If an issue does not attain a vested interest 
because he died before doing so, his contingent interest passes to the other issue and 
where all the contingent interests fail because none of the issue attains the vested 
interest, the estate will be distributed as if the deceased had not been survived by any 
issue.256  
                                                 
251 See Coleman v. Shang [1961] A.C. 481; Adadevoh (Re) (1951)13 W.A.C.A. 304. 
252 (1924) 5 N.L.R.32.   
253 As explained earlier this is a generic expression for the children and descendants of the deceased, 
including illegitimate, legitimated and adopted children.  
254 This type of trust is provided for in section 46 (ii) of the 1925 and all that it means is that because 
the issue has not yet attained a vested interest the property as to be held on his behalf by someone in 
loco parentis until he does so and this is usually the personal representative. 
255 See section 47 (1) (i) ibid. 
256 Section 47 (2), ibid. 
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Finally the “statutory trusts” are subject to the hotchpot principle. Actually the 
principle is no longer part of the English law because it has been abolished by section 
1 (2) of the Law Reform (Succession) Act 1995 as regards persons dying intestate on 
or after January 1996. Its inclusion in this work is because it is still possible to find 
cases of persons who died before that date in which case the 1925 Act still applies. 
The principle is governed by section 47(1)(ii) of the Administration of Estates Act 
1925 and requires certain benefits conferred on an issue by the intestate during his 
lifetime to be brought into the account during distribution. The idea is to achieve 
equality between the children as to the totality of the benefits received from their 
intestate parent, both inter vivos and on death. It must be said that the equality which 
the Act seeks to achieve might not have been intended by the deceased257 and this, 
probably, is the reason for its abolition.258  
 
2.5.3.3: Entitlement of Other Relatives.  
These are divided into specified and unspecified, specified relatives consist of 
the immediate family while unspecified relatives consist of the extended family. 
Specified relatives share with the surviving spouse when there are no issue while 
unspecified relatives only take in the absence of both the surviving spouse and issue. 
Both categories of relatives take only on the statutory trust259 and this implies the 
continuity of the administration since by the trust the beneficiaries are entitled not to 
the property itself but to the net proceeds of sale.    
This is where the most pathetic cases can be encountered as was the case in 
Nforba & another v. Nchari260 where the 82 years old father and mother of the 
                                                 
257 More details are provided in the discussion of intestacy under the proposed Family Code in chapter 
8. 
258 See Borkowski, Textbook on Succession, 1997, supra, 22. 
259 See section 46(1), supra. 
260 1999 G.L.R. 59. (Gender Law Report) 
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deceased were held not to be entitled to anything, as the deceased was survived by a 
widow and issue. The relevant part of the judgment delivered by Epuli J. went thus: 
“In the light of section 46 (1) of the 1925 Act, where a man dies intestate 
and leaves issue then whether he is survived by a parent or brother or 
sister, the sole beneficiaries of his estate shall be the surviving spouse 
and issue. In the case before me, the deceased Nchari died intestate. He 
is survived by his wife, now a widow. He left issue, two boys and a 
girl…. Therefore in pursuance of section 46(1) (i) of the Administration 
of Estates Act 1925… the sole legal beneficiaries of the estate of … are 
the widow… and the three children…. Under these circumstances, the 
parents and siblings of the deceased have no legal claim on his estate; 
whatever they get from it will depend on the goodwill and compassion of 
the beneficiaries and not on any right.261”      
 
The justice of these rules could be defended in English law because the state 
through social security, educational and health-care schemes has taken over the 
responsibility normally incumbent on family members to provide basic services for 
the young and the old. This has reduced the importance of succession as a means for 
providing the family with the necessary assets to sustain its members over 
generational time, to educate its dependent youth and to care for its ill or aged 
members.262 No such amenities exist in Cameroon and so the responsibility lies 
squarely on family members to educate the young, care for the weak and old. It is thus 
legitimate for parents to expect to be cared for in their old age. The children are 
equally expected to ensure the continuity of the family by contributing towards the 
upbringing of other children of the family, in the same way as other family members 
contributed towards theirs.263   
                                                 
261 Italics supplied. 
262  See Sussman, M.B., The Family and Inheritance, New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1970, 2. 
263 This point is discussed in chapter 7(VI) (2). 
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We noticed another trend whereby the courts move away from the rules of 
distribution and go on a frolic of their own, by operating a system of distribution not 
covered by the 1925 Act. In the Estate of Bechem Solomon264 for instance the widow 
applied for the revocation of letters of administration from the brother of the deceased 
in favour of her daughter who was en ventre sa mère at the time of her father’s death.  
Rather than maintain the continuity of administration, the court relied on section 44265 
of the Administration of Estates Act 1925 to partition the estate. Reliance on the Act 
ended with the decision to distribute and what followed had nothing in common with 
the scheme of distribution prescribed by the 1925 Act. Property was given to persons 
not entitled under the Act and family property was created. 266  Also in Galega v. 
Galega267 the mother of the deceased was included as a beneficiary in spite of the 
existence of a surviving spouse and issue. Strict application of English law would 
have excluded the relatives, just as the widows would have been excluded if 
customary law was to be applied.  
There is no doubt that the primary motivation for such decisions is to operate a 
system of distribution which eschews squabbles whenever the distribution of an estate 
excludes certain family members. Laudable, though they might be, the decisions can 
not be defended on any legal grounds. It is agreed that applicable English statutes 
must be adapted to local circumstances, but this is only as far as the adaptation does 
not affect a fundamental alteration of the statute.                                 
                                                 
264 (2006) Suit No.HCK/AE/K.128/2001 (unreported)  
265 This section provides that “subject to the foregoing provisions of this Act, a personal representative 
is not bound to distribute the estate of the deceased before expiration of one year from the death.” 
266 The following order was made: “(1) The house in the village at Tali will remain and be called 
the family house. (2)The house in Mamfe is given and belongs to the wife of the deceased now 
first plaintiff. (3)The compound at Ntoko Street, Kumba is distributed as follows: (i)The six 
rooms permanent building is given to the defendant brother of the deceased.(ii) The two semi-
permanent houses inhabited by tenants are given and belong to the second plaintiff the only 
surviving daughter of the deceased.”  
267 Supra for facts.  
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We must state that even English law recognises that the rules of distribution 
laid down in the 1925 Act do not adequately balance the interest and needs of 
members of the deceased family. It must have been realised that striking a person out 
of the list of potential beneficiaries because of the existence of a widow and issue 
does not mean that the person does not have needs, if those needs were satisfied by 
the deceased, and which must now be met out of the estate. This must have the prime 
motivation behind the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 as 
amended by the Law Reform (Succession) Act 1995.  
 
2.6: CLAIMS UNDER THE INHERITANCE (PROVISION FOR FAMILY 
AND DEPENDANTS) ACT 1975 
 
The Act provides an opportunity for persons with legal or moral claims to 
maintenance by the deceased to apply for reasonable financial provision out of the 
estate. To this effect section 1(1) enacts as follows:  
“Where after the commencement of this Act a person dies domiciled in 
England and Wales and is survived by any of the following persons:-   
(a) wife or husband of the deceased; 
(b) former wife or former husband of the deceased who had not remarried; 
(c) child of the deceased; 
(d) a person (not being a child of the deceased) who in the case of any 
marriage to which the deceased was at any time a party, was treated by the 
deceased as a child of the family in relation to that marriage; 
(e) any person (not being a person included in the foregoing paragraphs) 
who immediately before the death of the deceased was being maintained 
either wholly or partially, by the deceased;  
That person may apply to the court for an order under section 2268 of this 
Act on the ground that the disposition of the deceased estate effected by 
his will or the law relating to intestacy, or the combination of his will and 
                                                 
268 This section outlines the various orders for financial provision that a court might make. 
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that law, is not such as to make reasonable financial provision for the 
applicant.” 
  
An amendment of the Act by the Law Reform (Succession) Act 1995 added 
“cohabitants”, being persons who for a period at least two years before the death of 
the deceased lived together with him in the same household as spouses.269 Unlike the 
“dependant” the “cohabitant” does not need to prove dependence on the deceased.  
Household as used here has the same meaning as it does in matrimonial law, referring 
to a “state of affairs” rather than a place. It could exist as long as there is some 
element of communal living between the parties as husband and wife.270  
The relatives of the deceased who do not come within the ambit of the 
Administration of Estates Act 1925 because Relatives not expressly included in the 
Administration of Estates Act 1925 could apply for provision under (e) as having 
been maintained by the deceased. Maintenance is a situation whereby “the deceased, 
otherwise than for full valuable consideration, was making a substantial contribution 
in money or money’s worth towards the reasonable needs of the person.”271 It is 
therefore an open-ended category which could avail any persons with proof of being 
so maintained even though they had no legally enforceable rights to maintenance 
against the deceased in his lifetime.   
Mistresses can claim under this category and hence the Act is dubbed a 
“mistress-charter.”272 The term mistress covers two categories of women. The first 
category is the “common law wife” 273 or “cohabitant” as per the 1995 amendment.  It 
is argued in favour of this category of women that “although in judicial parlance such 
                                                 
269 See section 2 the Law Reform (Succession) Act 1995. 
270 See Borkowski, Borkowski, Textbook on Succession, 1997, supra, 252.  
271 See section 1(3).     
272 See Miller, Gareth, The Machinery of Succession, Portsmouth, Professional Books Limited, 1977, 
26.  
273 See Sastry Velaider Aronegary v. Sembecutty Vaigalie (1881) 6 App. Cas. 364, 371; Malone v. 
Harrison [1979] 1W.L.R. 1353. 
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a person is frequently referred to as a ‘mistress’ this [it?] is not entirely apt to refer to 
a woman with whom the deceased has lived in a stable relationship for twenty or 
thirty years or more.”274 The second category consists of women with whom the 
deceased did not cohabit but provided for their every need and exercised absolute 
control over their social life.  
In Malone v. Harrison275 the testator entertained multiple relationships outside 
his marital life. The deceased was survived by his wife, two “mistresses” and a 
brother. He was separated from his wife in 1939 and so lived apart from her though 
not divorced. In 1958 he met the first woman who subsequently, with her son moved 
in with the deceased and were maintained by him until his death in 1977. The 
deceased had another relationship since 1965 with another woman (plaintiff) for 
whom he assumed the responsibility for maintenance.  
The deceased in his will provided for his wife, the first woman and her son, 
and his brother (defendant) but not for the plaintiff. The plaintiff applied to the court 
for provision out of the estate and the question whether she qualified under the Act 
was answered in the affirmative. Hollings J succinctly stated her position: 
“She was never a de facto wife [common-law-wife] or a sole mistress at 
any time, but for some twelve years she was a woman who it was the 
deceased’s pleasure to visit and relax with and have occasional sexual 
intercourse with, and who he took abroad with him regularly and 
frequently and there treated as his wife for the time being. She does not 
pretend to have been more than that. She does not claim to have 
rendered him any particular service, but she gave him her affection, even 
love, and he returned it after a fashion.”276  
                                                 
274 See Miller, Gareth, The Machinery of Succession, Portsmouth, Professional Books Limited, 1977, 
26 
275 [1979] 1W.L.R. 1353. 
276 Ibid. 1360.  
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Giving the privilege of widowhood to a woman when she did not assume the 
duties of marriage could be questioned on moral and social grounds. The widow and 
children whose entitlements are liable to diminish as a result of the mistress’s 
application must certainly and justifiably feel a strong sense of grievance. It was 
feared in the years immediately following the Act that this could result in a flurry of 
litigation277 from women who entertained even the most trivial but dependent 
relationship with the deceased. This turned out to have been a false alarm, probably 
due to the cushioning effects of government policy in providing various social 
security schemes. The same fear would be legitimate in Cameroon today should the 
courts decide to apply the Act. The ultimate test, we submit, should be that the 
applicant should come within the meaning of “cohabitant” in the 1995 amendment.    
 
2.6.1: The Meaning of Reasonable Financial Provision. 
  The Act empowers the courts to make reasonable financial provision out of an 
estate in favour of persons negatively affected by provisions in a will or rules of 
intestacy. 
Reasonable financial provision is divided into the “surviving spouse standard” 
applying to applicants of that category, and the “maintenance standard” applying to 
any other applicant. The test whether the provision made for the applicant under the 
will or intestacy is reasonable is in each case an objective one. In making the decision 
the courts are to be guided by the facts as known to them at the date of the hearing 
rather than the knowledge of the testator about the applicant at the time of the will278 
which would make the test subjective. 
                                                 
277  See Samuels, Alec “Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 [1976] 39 M.L.R, 
183-186, 184.   
278 See  section 3 (5) of the 1975 Act  
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 It remains, however, questionable whether the two are mutually exclusive, 
given that the courts are enjoined to take into account such matters as the “financial 
resources and financial needs which the applicant has or is likely to have in the 
foreseeable future.”279 Hence the courts have had to consider factors particular to the 
applicant which could conveniently be termed factors of the subjective standard.  
 Reasonable financial provision at the “surviving spouse standard” means 
“such financial provision as it would be reasonable in all the circumstances of the case 
for a husband or wife to receive, whether or not that provision is required for his or 
her maintenance.”280 This standard applies equally to widows and widowers but we 
shall conduct this discussion from the point of view of the widow.  
 The test is for the provision to be at least equal to that of a divorced spouse.  
The court’s discretion in this respect is therefore as wide as when making orders for 
financial provision on divorce. This means that the Act will be applied in conjunction 
with the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1973.281  The position with regard to property 
adjustment on divorce as represented by the recent decision of the House of Lords in 
White v White282 is that the objective should be to achieve a result which is fair and 
non-discriminatory. There is, however, no presumption of equal distribution of assets, 
but as a general guide, “equality should be departed from only if, and to the extent 
that, there is good reason for doing so.”283   
Caution is therefore necessary in applying the White v White284 guidelines in 
the context of actions for reasonable financial provision under the 1975 Act. In the 
                                                 
279See section 3(1), ibid.   
280 See section 1 (2) (a) of the 1975 Act. 
281 Coming within the exception provided for in section 15 of the Southern Cameroon High Cour Law 
1955, allowing the application of  post 1900 English statutes in relation to probate, divorce and 
matrimonial proceedings. See chapter 2, the section on the received English law for more. 
282 [2001] 1 A. C. 596. 
283 Per Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, 605.  
284 [2001] 1 A. C. 596. 
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case of divorce there are two households to be run and the crucial question therefore 
is how to divide up the property fairly between the two parties. Under the 1975 Act, 
the deceased is dead and has no future earthly needs. He is entitled to bequeath his 
estate to whomever he pleases; his only statutory obligation is to make reasonable 
financial provision for his widow and other dependants. Hence, depending on certain 
factors, the concept of equality may have very little impact on the provision made. 
The absence of division between two households should mean that on death, a spouse 
should expect a greater share than on divorce.285  
In making the order the courts are to consider the age of the appellant, the 
duration of the marriage and the contribution made by the appellant to the welfare of 
the deceased’s family.286 The other factors call for no comment but the duration of the 
marriage does. A woman goes into marriage with the knowledge that her obligations 
to the husband are for an indeterminate duration and could take all manner of forms. 
If he was considerably older she might well be expected to spend a number of years 
nursing an invalid.287 So on marrying the deceased the widow must have, as per 
Singer, J. in Miller v. Miller, “a reasonable expectation that her life as once again a 
single woman need not revert to what it was before her marriage” 288 and she could 
look forward to financial security for the rest of her life.289  
It is suggested in every case that in making the order the courts should 
separate her share in “family property” before determining her proportion in the 
remainder of the estate which would be necessary to provide her with sufficient 
                                                 
285 See Herring, Jonathan, Family Law, London, Pearson Longman, 2007, 690.  
286 Kerridge, R, & Brierley, A. R. H.  Parry and Clark: The Law of Succession, London, Sweet and 
Maxwell, 11th edition. 2002, 159.  
287 See Cunliffe v. Fielden & Others [2006] Ch. 361 (C. A.)  
288 [2005] 2 FCR 713. 
289 Cunliffe v Fielden, supra. 
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support.290 “Family property” as used here signifies property acquired by the joint 
resources of the spouses, unlike in customary law where it is property held on behalf 
of the family. Family property here therefore takes the form of a joint tenancy and the 
doctrine of survivorship operates to transfer the estate to the surviving tenant.  
Where the deceased was in joint tenancy with a third party the spouse would 
be entitled to his own share of the property pursuant to section 9(1)291 of the 
Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, according to which: 
“The proportionate share of the property which would have belonged to the deceased 
if there had been severance of the joint ownership should be treated as the share of the 
property which the court was empowered to treat as part of the estate.”292 
Reasonable financial provision for the maintenance standard is said to 
constitute “such financial provision as it would be reasonable in all the circumstances 
of the case for the applicant to receive for his maintenance.”293 In Re Christie 
deceased294 it was held that the applicant does not need to be in “a state of destitution 
or financial difficulty” to apply for “maintenance”, which “refers to no more than the 
applicant’s way of life and wellbeing, his health and financial security of his 
immediate family for whom he is responsible.”295 A similar position was stated in Re 
                                                 
290 Herring, Jonathan, Family Law, supra, 690. 
291 “Where a deceased person was immediately before his death beneficially entitled to a joint tenancy 
of any property, then, if, before the end of the period of six months from the date on which 
representation with respect to the estate of the deceased was first taken out, an application is made for 
an order under section 2 of this Act the court for purpose of facilitating the making of financial 
provisions for the applicant under this Act may order that the deceased’s severable share of that of that 
property, at the value thereof immediately before his death, shall, to such extent as appears to the court 
to be just in all the circumstances of the case, be treated for the purpose of this Act as part of the estate 
of the deceased.”     
292 In Dingmar v. Dingmar [2007] Ch. 109, (C.A.) the only substantial asset of the deceased was the 
family home, owned not with the widow, but with his son of a previous marriage. Upon the death the 
son became the sole owner by right of survivorship as confirmed by a decision of the county court, 
which rejected claims by the applicant that she had a beneficial interest in the property. The applicant 
nevertheless obtained letters of administration and applied under the 1975 Act and argued successfully 
for the deceased’s severable share of the property to be treated as part of his net estate.  
293 See section (2) (b)  of the 1975 Act. 
294 [1979] 1 Ch. 168. 
295 At 174. 
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Coventry Deceased296 where Buckley L. J. suggested that “maintenance” means 
“such financial provision as would be reasonable in all the circumstances of the case 
to enable the applicant to maintain himself in a manner suitable to those 
circumstances.” Thus the test as stated in Re Christie deceased297  is: 
                                                
 “Whether the disposition of the deceased’s estate effected by his will or 
the law relating to intestacy or the combination of his will and that law  
is not such as would make reasonable financial provision for the 
applicant in the sense of such financial provision as it would be 
reasonable in all the circumstances of the case for the applicant to 
receive for the maintenance of his way of life and wellbeing, health and 
financial security and the wellbeing, health and financial security of his 
immediate family for whom he is responsible.”     
 
Provision for maintenance therefore does not mean merely the provision for 
the bare necessities of life, so as to keep an applicant at subsistence level.298 Nor is it 
also a windfall to the applicant which may be regarded as reasonably desirable for his 
general benefit or welfare.”299 These points were reiterated more recently In re Land 
Deceased300 where financial provision was made in favour of a son found guilty of 
the mother’s manslaughter.301 In the words of Norris, J. “I hold that the claimant’s 
claim (being that of an adult son) can only be a claim for such financial provision as it 
would be reasonable in all the circumstances for him to receive for his maintenance. 
This means provision which will directly or indirectly enable the claimant in the 
future to discharge the cost of his daily living according to the standard established 
over the years whilst living with his parents.”  
 
296 [1980] 1 Ch.  (C.A.).461, 494. 
297 [1979] 1 Ch. 168, 175. 
298 Re Coventry Deceased [1980] 1 Ch. 461. (C.A.). 
299 Per Goff L. J. ibid. 485.  
300 [2007] 1 W. L. R. 1009.  
301 Manslaughter might preclude a person from benefiting under a will or intestacy but not from 
applying under the 1975 Act.    
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 The courts cannot on their own volition invoke the Act in favour of any 
person. An application must be made by the parties, generally through their lawyers 
not later than six months from the grant of probate or letters of administration.302 The 
courts, however, have the discretion to accept applications made after this period, 
especially after distribution.303   
But the courts have been unable to apply the cushioning effects of 1975 Act to 
good use in Cameroon, where its importance is yet to be seen. This Act is part of our 
law and we think that it is the duty of lawyers to bring it to the attention of the 
courts.304 It has a propensity to reduce the social tension and the scare of witchcraft 
often attendant on decisions that favour the surviving spouse or issue of the deceased, 
against relatives who feel legitimately entitled to a share of the succession. 
 
Conclusion  
The English law of intestacy effectively balances the interests and needs of 
family members, “family” including the marital and blood families. The list of 
beneficiaries takes into account the duty of maintenance and there is no gender-based 
bias. The surviving spouse even comes first in order precedence, subject only to the 
existence of issue. The principle of precedence however eliminates a substantial 
number of those who would otherwise have qualified as beneficiaries and this is 
responsible for decisions such as the Nforba case. This is basically because the courts 
                                                 
302 Section 4 Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975. 
303The guidelines as to how the courts could exercise the discretion conferred on it under section 4 of 
the 1975 Act to overlook the limitation period were spelt out in Re Salmon [1981] Ch. 167: “(i) the 
discretion is to be exercised judicially, (ii) the onus lies on the applicant to make out a substantial case 
for it being just and proper for the court to exercise its discretion, and the court should consider (iii) 
how promptly, and in what circumstances, the applicant applied to the court for an extension and also 
warned the defendant of the proposed application, (iv) whether negotiations commenced within the 
time limit (if so, and time ran out while they were proceeding, this is likely to encourage the court to 
extend the time), (v) whether the estate has been distributed before a claim under the Act was made or 
notified, (vi) whether a refusal to extend the time would leave the applicant without redress against 
anybody or, alternatively, with a claim against his own solicitor for negligence.”   
304 Failing to do might expose lawyers to actions in negligence under the rule Rondel v Worseley 
(1969) i W. L. R.. 191.  
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have not been ready to adapt the law in such a way that persons with a legal right to 
maintenance in customary law could be brought in as beneficiaries. 
However the existence of the inheritance (Provision for Family and 
Dependants) Act 1975 gives the persons excluded to apply for reasonable financial 
provincial out of the estate. Unfortunately the 1975 Act cannot be directly invoked by 
the courts and this reduces the effectiveness of English law as an alternative to the 
existing laws of succession.  
 Furthermore administration has no date limit and distribution is only 
facultative, the attitude of the courts of which is evident in Nana v. Nana305  where it 
was held that “Nothing shall be partitioned as neither the plaintiff nor the defendant 
asked for it although through all the proceedings the plaintiff insinuated that she was 
entitled to the …residence as her matrimonial home while the defendant insinuated it 
was the family home because she helped to build it.” This has been abused by some 
personal representatives who tend to treat the property as theirs during the prolonged 
period of administration.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
305 (2005) Suit No. HCF/PROB/AE1/2001-2002 (unreported) 
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CHAPTER THREE: INTESTACY IN FRENCH LAW 
Introduction 
French law also presumes death in the case of disappearance even though the 
approach differs from that adopted in English law. It begins with a présomption 
d’absence and culminates in a déclaration d’absence both of which are at the instance 
of the potential beneficiaries or the Attorney-General.306  
This chapter is concerned with determining the beneficiaries and their 
entitlements, given that French law has no interim period of administration. This will 
be after considering the applicable laws and their application.  
 
3. I: THE APPLICABLE LAWS 
The substantive rules governing French intestacy as applied in Francophone 
Cameroon are drawn mainly from articles 727 to 888 Civil Code of 1804. Other 
related matters such as the status of legitimated and adopted children vis-à-vis the 
estate of the deceased are governed by articles 333 and 358 respectively.   
 These articles are applied together with the amendments thereto occasioned 
by the presence of rules which smack of customary law. The code was made in the 
backdrop of conflicting customs and the idea not necessarily the modernisation but 
the harmonisation of the different customs, with a view to establishing a “le droit 
commun” consisting basically of codified customs binding on all persons. Much has 
changed on human rights since 1804 which necessitated the amendments intended to 
make the code a reflection of “la civilisation Française”. To this effect the following 
amendments are generally incorporated into the relevant articles: Law of 22 
November to 1 December 1790 establishing reciprocal succession rights for spouses, 
Law of 9 March 1891 giving the surviving spouse succession rights even when the 
                                                 
306 Article 112, civil code. 
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deceased is survived by relatives, Law No. 72-3 of 3 January 1972 which continued 
and completed the above amendment in articles 765 to 767 of the code and the 
Ordinance of 23 December 1958 which removed the need for a court order to enable 
the surviving spouse take possession of the estate.  
 
3.1.1: The application of the rules. 
The enabling statutes for the reception of French law contain no provision for a 
limitation date and adaptation. French law is only exceptionally applied where the 
parties have rejected the jurisdiction of the traditional law courts or where customary 
law is said to be non-existent, obscure or contrary to public policy. In any of these 
circumstances the courts function as if there is no customary law which require 
adaptation. 
The only known situation of adaptation is the recognition of the entitlement of 
the widows in polygamous marriages. This could be attributed more to the Civil Status 
Registration Ordinance of 1981 which recognises both monogamy and polygamy 
rather than the ingenuity of the courts. The real test for the courts, as is the case in 
Anglophone Cameroon, is whether they could vary the statutory allocation for the 
widow of a monogamous marriage which now has to be shared between more widows.  
In Veuve Ebongue c/ Ebongue Nyambe Nestor307 the Supreme Court showed its 
inability to effect such change when it held the widows of a polygamous marriage to be 
entitled to the one quarter of the estate reserved by the civil code for the widow of a 
monogamous marriage.308 
 
 
 
                                                 
307 Cour Suprême, Arrêt No. 14/L du 9 Décembre 1976. 
308  Article 767(3) of the code.   
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3.2: COURTS ADMINISTERING FRENCH LAW. 
  French law is administered as a rule309 by modern and traditional law courts.  
3.2.1: Original Jurisdiction: Tribunaux de Premier Degré  
The tribunaux coutumiers and tribunaux de premier degré have jurisdiction 
over matters involving persons subject to the customary and Muslim laws. They are 
regulated by Decree No.69/DF/544 of 19 December 1969 on organisation of the 
traditional law jurisdictions of that part of the country. Jurisdiction over succession is 
exercised by the tribunaux de premier degré pursuant to article 4(1)(a) according to 
which “Les tribunaux de premier degré connaissent des procédures relatives à l’état 
de personnes, à l’état civil, au marriage, au divorce, à la filaition, aux successions et 
aux droits réels immobiliers.”    
The courts are situated at the level of the administrative sub divisions and have 
jurisdiction over matters arising therein. Succession is normally opened310 in the court 
of the last residence of the deceased.311 Jurisdiction is limited to matters in which the 
parties are natives pursuant to article 1(1) of the Judicial Organisation Decree of 31 
July 1927. Sub-section 2 describes the rather than defines the term “native”:  
“The following are natives within the meaning of this decree: individuals 
who originate from the territories under the French mandate of Togo and 
Cameroon, of French West and equatorial Africa not having the status of 
French citizens–and those who originate from foreign countries or 
countries placed under foreign mandate–comprised in these territories or 
neighbouring countries who do not in their countries of origin have 
European citizenship.”312 
                                                 
309 This is to distinguish from Anglophone Cameroon where the high courts only exceptionally have 
jurisdiction over estates subject to customary law because of their monopoly over letters of 
administration.  
310 See article 8(8) of the Code de Procédures Civil et Commerciale  
311 See article 10 of the Civil Code and article 5 of Decree No. 69/DF/544 of 19 December 1969. 
312 “Sont indigènes au sens du présent décret: les individus originaires des territoires sous mandat 
français du Togo et du Cameroun, des possessions de l’Afrique occidenatale et de l’Afrique équatoriale 
français ne possédant pas la qualité de citoyen français–et ceux qui sont originaires des pays étrangers 
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Therefore, every African who does not have a European status is subject to the 
jurisdiction of traditional law courts.   
The application of French law by these courts may be explained by the fact 
that until the judicial reforms of 1972 they had exclusive jurisdiction over succession. 
Article 3(1) (a) of Decree No 69/DF/544 of 19 December 1969 endorses the 
application by stipulating that in the case of conflict of customs the courts could 
administer, inter alia, “the general principles of modern law.” The Supreme Court 
affirms the courts’ vocation to apply customary law and provisions of the civil code 
where customary law is silent, obscure or contrary to public order,313 and the trial 
courts themselves have not hesitated to rely on the provision to apply provisions of 
the civil code.314  
 The composition of the courts enables the application of French law. They are 
presided over by administrative or judicial authorities,315 assisted by assessors also 
nominated by the administration.316 Furthermore, the courts are attached to the Court 
of First Instance in the same jurisdiction317 where they constitute the “Chambre 
Coutumière”.318 Hence the president of the modern court is also the president of the 
                                                                                                                                            
ou placés sous mandat étranger–compris entre ces territoires ou pays limitrophes ne possédant pas dans 
leur pays d’origine le statut des nationaux européens.”  
313 See Keze Isaac v. Noumbissie Jean-Jacques, Arret No. 129 du 13 Mai 1967(obscure); Betow Omar 
Charles v. Ngo Mbenoum Julienne, Arret No. 151 du 18 Juin 1968(silence); Dame Wandji Agathe v. 
Dandou Frédéric, Arret No. 96 du 11 Mars 1969(contrary to the public order).   
314 See La Succession de Doualla Joseph, Jugement no. 232/c du 5 Mai 1988, TPG Dschang ; La 
Succession Kamte Louis Gabriel, Jugement no. 53/ADD/ TPD du 24 Janvier, 1994, TPD Nkongsamba. 
315This is the import of article 7 of the 1969 decree on traditional jurisdictions according to which: 
(1) The tribunal de premier degré is composed of a president and two assessors 
acting in a deliberative capacity 
(2) The president is nominated by an order of the Minister of Justice among the 
civil servants in the customary court area. 
(3) In case of absence or indisposition of the president, he is replaced fully by the 
Divisional Officer in the court area or by an assistant Divisional Officer 
designated by the latter.  
  
316 See article 10(1) of the 1969 decree. 
317Article 9(1)  directs the Minister of Justice to “by order attach the presidency of a tribunal de premier 
degré …to the presidency of the court of first instance of the court area.”   
318This became apparent to this researcher from a statement in the judgment of the supreme court in 
Affaire Baba Iyayi  c/ Hadja Aminatou and Hadja Bintou, Arrêt No. 083 of 32 March 2000 
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customary court, who being a complete stranger in the locality would find more 
comfort in applying the civil code, than get into the intricate and time consuming 
exercise of ascertaining the customary law of the parties.319 Litigants are also entitled 
to legal representation.320   
The application of the civil code is automatic where customary law is silent or 
obscure. Where, however, there is a clear rule in existence, it can only be excluded on 
grounds of ordre public or raison écrite.321 The courts have to make a choice between 
the rule of customary law and French law. French law applies automatically whenever 
one of the parties in the dispute is subject to French law.322 
 Where both parties are subject to customary law the fact that the deceased left 
a will or contracted a civil marriage becomes important. In the case of a will the 
question is whether it conforms to the requirements of validity in French law, as spelt 
out in articles 970323, 971324 and 976325 of the civil code.  
                                                                                                                                            
(unreported), the relevant part of which is highlighted: “Considérant que suivant process-verbal No. 11 
en date du 5 Novembre 1999 sieur Baba Iyayi a relevé appel du jugement No. 132 rendu le 28 Octobre  
1999 par la Chambre Coutmuière  du Tribunal de Première Instance de Yaoundé dans l’affaire de 
succession de feu  Alhadji Ibrahim Aba.”                                                    
319Avom, Vincelline Akomndja, « L’énonciation de la coutume en droit Camerounaise de la famille: 
Leurre ou réalité? » (2006) 116 Penant, 59-86, 70.  
320 Article 43(1) (a) ibid. Timtchueng has the following to say about the state of the traditional law 
courts and customary law in Francophone Cameroon: “The separation between the traditional courts 
and those of common law [having jurisdiction over all persons] has become increasingly blurred. The 
characteristics of those who use traditional courts have changed. The individuals appearing in cases 
brought before the traditional courts are increasingly legal professionals rather than those with no 
formal legal training. Furthermore, the customs that were the usual source of settlement of disputes 
have in practice ceased being applied, while at the same time, law based on western practice is 
becoming more widely used and rooted in these courts”. Timtchueng Moise, ‘The gradual 
disappearance of the particularities of traditional courts in Cameroon’ in Open Society Institute (Africa 
Governance Monitoring & Advocacy Project, AfriMAP, Oct 2005), 1-5 at 1. Available online at: 
www.afrimap.org/english/images/paper/file436f7 cb73c2d1.doc.   
321 We explained in 2.2.3.4 that this is the French equivalence of the English incompatibility doctrine, 
which establishes the supremacy of the civil code as written law over  customary law.   
322 Affaire Kouoh, C.S.C.O., Arrêt No. 29 du 23 Avril, 1963, Bull. P.293 (Cours Suprême Cameroun 
Orientale). 
323  Provides for holographic wills, which must be written, dated and signed by the testator. 
324 Provides for notatrial wills that must be made in the presence of two notary publics or one notary 
public and two witnesses.  
325 Provides for wills in mystical form, being wills in a sealed and stamped envelope presented to the 
notary public and two witnesses with the declaration that the envelope contains his last will and 
testament. 
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3.2.2: Original Jurisdiction: Tribunaux de Grande Instances 
The extension of the High Courts to Francophone Cameroon by the judicial 
reforms of 1972 meant that they share jurisdiction with the Tribunaux de Premier 
Degré. The courts are situated in each of the administrative divisions of the country 
and have jurisdiction over matters arising therein.  
The 1972 reforms failed to mention the type of law to be applied by the high 
courts. Was it to be the Civil Code, the customary law, or both as is the case in 
Anglophone Cameroon? The answer came through the Supreme Court decision in the 
1981 Arrêt Angoa Parfait which laid down the principle according to which “l’option 
de juridiction emporte option de législation”.326 This means that the choice of 
jurisdiction entails the choice of law and high courts being modern law courts can 
only administer French law.   
 These courts have jurisdiction in matters involving foreigners, native evolués 
and persons who have renounced their customary statuses.327 Renunciation of the 
customary status today no longer takes the form it did in the colonial days. Professor 
Camerlinck classifies renunciation into “la renunciation option” and “la renunciation 
admission.”328 The latter represents a complete assimilation to French law as would 
be the case when the deceased contracted a statutory marriage or left a valid will.329 
“Renunciation option” entitles the parties in litigation to decline the jurisdiction of 
traditional law courts and is statutorily provided for in article 2 of the Decree of 
December 1969 on the organisation of traditional jurisdictions.   
                                                 
326 Cour Suprème Arrêt No. 28/cc du 18 décembre 1981. 
327 This was made possible by article 72 of the French Constitution of 1946. 
328 Cited by André P. Robert, ibid. 
329 See Yvon Gouet, « L’Article 82 (Paragraphe1) de la constitution relatif à l’option de satut et 
élaboration de la ‘théorie des ststuts civils’ du droit Francias moderne, »  (1957) 67 Penant 1-94, 27. 
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In practice, however, the courts are circumspect to assume jurisdiction in cases 
of “renunciation option”.330 Litigants are referred to the Customary Courts considered 
to be the appropriate fora for matters of succession. Christine Youego qualifies the 
attitude of the High Courts as “contra legem” and blames it on the ignorance of Court 
Registrars who fail to realise that things are no longer as they were in the colonial 
days, when customary courts had exclusive jurisdiction over succession,331 and 
Nicole-Claire Ndoko describes it as “a characterised judicial obstruction,”332 meaning 
that the courts deliberately avoid to assume jurisdiction because it would enable 
women to have succession rights.  
The problem could be the wording of section 16(c) of Law No. 89/019 of 29 
December 1989 amending the 1972 Judicial Organization Ordinance. This section 
recognises the jurisdiction of High Courts in matters relating to “the status of persons 
and especially to civil status, marriage, divorce, filiation, adoption and succession” 
but makes it “subject to the legal provisions applicable to traditional courts as regards 
ratione personae jurisdiction.”  
As pointed out earlier, prior to 1972 only the traditional law jurisdictions were 
competent in succession matters. And the ratione personae jurisdiction of these courts 
as provided in article 1 of the un-repealed judicial organisation decree of 31 July 1927 
includes those who today claim to be subject to the jurisdiction of High Courts. So the 
courts have simply been considering themselves as still bound by this law, since the 
1972 judicial reforms and subsequent amendments say that the customary courts are 
to continue to function as before the reforms.  
                                                 
330 Since the 1972 reforms a High Court assumed jurisdiction for the first time in the1996 Affaire 
Succession Fokam Kamga Paul, heard by the High Court of Mifi Division in Bafoussam. Jugement No. 
49/CIV/du 05 Mars 1996, (1998) 34 Juridis Périodique, pp.43-47.  
331   “La situation Juridique du Conjoint Survivant au Cameroun,” (1990) 2 African Law Review, 
pp.17-44, 29. 
332   Nicole- Claire Ndoko, “L’idée d’egalité dans le Droit Successoral Camerounais: dernières 
tendances de la Jurisprudence en matière de la succession ab intastat” p. 1-72, 59 (unpublished). 
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This controversy might now be laid to rest as the present judicial organisation 
law333 no longer contains the phrase “subject to the legal provisions applicable to 
traditional courts as regards ratione personae jurisdiction.”  The courts could be less 
circumspect, although this might likely throw open the floodgates of litigation in the 
High Courts to persons who should normally be subject to the jurisdiction of 
customary courts but who want the advantages offered by French law.   
 
3.2.3: Appellate Jurisdiction: Courts of Appeal and Supreme Court.  
Same as in 2.2.2 (supra).  
 
3.3: DETERMINING THE INTESTATE BENEFICIARIES. 
French law like English law resorts to presumptions in order to determine 
survivorship when persons liable to succeed each other die together. In what is 
referred to as the théorie des comourants the ages and sex of the persons are 
determinant in ascertaining the order of death. To this effect article 720 of the Civil 
Code provides: 
“If many persons respectively called upon to succeed each other perish in 
the same event without the possibility of knowing who of them was the 
first to die, the presumption of survival is determined by the circumstance 
of fact, in default, by reference to age or sex.”334 
 
Establishing survivorship from the circumstances of fact would of course be 
impossible since the onus would be on the person claiming succession rights to do 
so.335 Emphasis is therefore placed on the second method which has led to the 
evolution of a number of presumptions. Firstly where the persons were below fifteen 
years old the oldest of them, for being more robust than the others, will be presumed to 
                                                 
333 Article 18(1) (b), Judicial Organisation Law No. 2006/015 of 29 December 2006.   
334 “Si plusieurs personnes respectivement appelées à la succession l’une de l’autre périssent dans un 
mème événement sans qu’on puisse reconnoitre laquelle est décédé la première, la présomption de 
survie est determiné par les circonstances des faits, et à leurs défaut, par la force de l’âge ou du sexe.”  
335 See articles 135 and 725 of the civil code. 
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have survived.336 Secondly, if they are more than sixty years old the youngest of them 
would be presumed have survived the others.337 Thirdly, if they are above fifteen years 
but less than sixty years, the youngest would be presumed to have survived. In this 
category the sex of the parties becomes relevant, for it is provided in the case of a man 
and woman of the same age or where the difference between them is less than one year 
that the man would be presumed to have survived the woman.338 Professor Savatier 
argues that this is wrong because statistically, women are more resistant to death than 
men.339 The last category is a mixture of persons, some below fifteen years old and 
others above sixty years. The presumption here favours persons of the former group.340 
The worry here is whether it could logically be presumed that a child of one day old 
survived a man of sixty years and one day.   
Article 731 of the French Civil Code lays down the categories of beneficiaries 
based presumably on proximity to the deceased: 
“The properties are granted to the children and descendants of the 
deceased, to his ascendants, to his collateral parents and to his surviving 
partner in that order and in accordance with rules hereinafter to be 
determined.”341  
The article gave rise to a number of assumptions as to the basis of the choices.  
Firstly, succession is said to be based on the existence of a lien de parenté, between 
the deceased and the claimant.342 We are unable to find an exact English equivalent 
for the term. The Collins French Dictionary translates it as “family relationship” 
which we submit could be appropriate for family law and not the law of succession. 
                                                 
336 Article 721(1) Code Civil. 
337 Article 721(2), ibid. 
338 Article 722. 
339 Savatier, René, “Successions et Liberalités” (1977) Rev. Trim. De Drt. Civ. 801-805, 802. 
340 Article 721(3). 
341 “Les successions sont déféres aux enfants et descendants du défunt, à ses ascendants, à ses parents 
collatèraux et à son conjoint survivant, dans l’ordre et suivant les règles ci-après déterminées.”   
342 See Guimchand, Serge, Droit Patrimonial de la Famille au Senegal, Paris, Librairie Générale de 
Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1980, 421. 
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The concept of the “family” varies in these subjects. In Family Law it includes the 
spouses343 while in the law of succession it is restricted to persons related through a 
common ancestor.344   
The lien de parenté therefore signifies a three-tiered relationship, traced from 
the deceased, then his parents and finally his grandparents. Naturally this 
interpretation would exclude adopted children and the surviving spouse. To prevent 
this narrow construction of the term Guinchard345 argues that the notion of parenté 
must be construed widely to include the surviving spouse. The parenté of the 
deceased is constituted by persons “who descend from him or from whom he 
descends,” and “allies” meaning the surviving spouse.346 With a similar 
preoccupation, Marty and Raynaud define the term as “the relationship between 
persons one of whom descends from the other, all of who descend from the same 
author or are assimilated to them by the law.”347 This last definition covers 
relationships by blood and adoption and excludes the surviving spouse. The 
compromise position between the two would result in the conclusion that the criteria 
for the existence of a lien de parenté could be biological, adoptive and marital.  
The second assumption is that succession is based on the presumed affection of 
the deceased.348  And according to Trielhard349 “the legislator called upon to trace an 
order of succession must be infused with the natural and legitimate affections” of the 
deceased towards the claimants, so that the rules laid down are a reflection of the 
                                                 
343 Ibid, 6. 
344 See Mazeaud et al, Leçons de Droit Civil. La Famille, Paris, Montchrestien, 1995, 5. 
345 Droit Patrimonial de la Famille au Senegal, Paris, Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 
1980, 421.  
346 “La parenté du défunt est constituée par l’ensemble de ceux qui descendent de lui ou dont il 
descend; quant aux alliés il s’agit du conjoint survivant et de lui seulement…” 
347 Marty, G. & Raynaud, P. Droit Civil. Les Personnes, Paris, Sirey, 3em edition, 1976, p.3.    
348 See Guinchard, Serge, Droit Patrimonial de la Famille au Senegal, Paris, Librairie Générale de Droit 
et de Jurisprudence, 1980, 424. 
349  Cited by Youego, Christine, “Sources et Evolution du Droits des Successions aux Cameroun.” 
Doctorat thesis, university of Paris II, 1994, 225 (unpublished). 
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manner in which the deceased himself would have distributed his property. Vallier 
therefore writes that “the classification of orders and in each order, the determination 
of heirs by the proximity of degree, are in principle adopted by the editors of the 
[Civil] Code because they correspond to the normal hierarchy of the deceased’s 
affection.”350 The civil code in articles 913 to 930 seems to endorse this theory by 
enjoining testators to dispose only of a given fraction of their property; the rest of 
which must go to the descendants or ascendants. 351  
 Finally it is assumed that the priority given to the relatives of the deceased is 
because family members have reciprocal duties.352 This theme has not been 
developed any further apparently due to absence of consensus as to whether a 
surviving spouse is part of the deceased’s family for the purpose of succession.   
                                                
Hence the lien de parenté and presumed affection of the deceased form the 
guiding principles in determining the intestate beneficiaries. Priority is given to the 
blood relations of the deceased, and the surviving spouse, considered initially as a 
stranger for not being a blood relative 353 comes after the relatives as an afterthought. 
 
3.3.1: Priority to the Blood Relations of the Deceased. 
 It is presumed that a person’s first affection goes naturally to the persons 
having a blood relationship with him, starting with the descendants and stretching to 
the ascendants. Even within these categories there are distinctions and the law 
presumes more affection towards persons closest to the deceased. The proximity of 
the descendants starts with the children while that of the ascendants starts with the 
parents of the deceased. Normally therefore the law will presume that the deceased 
 
350 “De l’exhérédation et des legs faits au profit d’héritiers présomptifs”, Thesis, Paris, 1895, Ibid, 409.   
351 See Chabot, Rapport au Tribunat, LOCRE. T.V. 107 cited by Youego, Christine, “Sources et 
Evolution du Droits des Successions aux Cameroun.” Doctorat thesis, university of Paris II, 1994, 225 
(unpublished). 
352 Breton, A, Mazeaud et Breton, Leçons de Droit Civil, Paris, Dalloz, 3e ed. 1980, 55.   
353 See Raymond, Pierre, Les Successions et Les Liberalités, Paris, Sirey, 1983, 68. 
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must have had greater affection for his child than for a grand-child, in the same way 
as he would be presumed to have more affection for his father and mother than for his 
grandparents. 
The descendants as the first recipients of the deceased’s affection are 
comprised of the children of the deceased and subsequent descendants to the 
umpteenth degree. The term children include not only the legitimate children of the 
deceased, but also the legitimated354, illegitimate355 and adopted356 children.  
The extension of the category of children has been accepted in Cameroon, 
though not without opposition from those who think that it operates to diminish their 
entitlements. In fact the courts have adhered religiously to the provisions of the Civil 
Code, provided that the conditions necessary for persons in these categories to 
succeed are fulfilled.357.  
The Affaire Succession Fokam Kamga358 presents a good illustration of the 
steadfastness of the courts. This case concerned two illegitimate children of the 
deceased, a former Minister of Public Health, who had been recognised and treated by 
the deceased as his children. Their quality as beneficiaries had been affirmed by an 
earlier ruling of the Tribunal de Premier Degré of Yaoundé at a time when they were 
still minors and the estate had to be managed by the more elderly legitimate children. 
In the action the plaintiffs having the age of majority claimed their own share of estate 
against the legitimate children who managed the property as if they did not exist.  The 
                                                 
354  Article 333 Civil Code: “Les enfants légitimés par le marriage subséquent auront les mêmes droits 
que s’ils étaient nés de ce marriage”.   
355 Article 757 Civil Code: “L’enfant naturel a, en général, dans la succession de son père et mère et 
autres ascendants, ainsi que de ses frères et soeurs et autres collatèraux, les mêmes droits qu’un enfant 
légitimé.”  
356 Article 358 Civil Code: “L’adopté a, dans la famille de l’adoptant, les mêmes droits et les mêmes 
obligations qu’un enfant légitime.”   
357 A study of those conditions does not fall within the scope of this work. 
358 TGI (Tribunal de Grande Instance) Bafoussam No. 49/ Civ of 5 March 1996. 
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court confirmed the earlier decision including the plaintiffs as beneficiaries and 
ordered the partition of the estate.359   
After the descendants the affection of the deceased moves down the line to the 
second category of relatives composed of his father and mother classified as 
privileged ascendants;360 and his brothers and sisters including their descendants to 
the umpteenth degree, classified as privileged collaterals.361 These are followed by the 
grand parents of the deceased and their own parents known as ordinary ascendants.362 
The fourth and last category of relatives consists of ordinary collaterals that include 
the uncles, aunts, and cousins of the deceased to the sixth degree or generation.    
Within these categories the civil code establishes complete equality between 
the sexes; the only criteria for succession being the membership of a designated 
category.  Article 745 (1) of the Civil Code stipulates: “The children or descendants 
succeed to their father and mother, grandfather, grandmother, or other ascendants 
without distinction of sex or of primogeniture…”363  
Consequently, if the traditional law courts decide to apply French law the old 
practice of viewing the categories only in terms of their male and elderly male 
members will have to be abandoned. But old habits die hard and in words of Professor 
Nicole-Claire Ndoko,364 “le juge Camerounais, tout en condemnant la pratique 
                                                 
359 See also Affaire Succession Kana Paul, TGI (Tribunal de Grande Instance) Bafoussam No. 49/ Civ. 
of 5 March 1996 and  Affaire Succession Bihina Mbarga Gabriel, 359 Arrêt No. 36 of 27 December 
1990 Yaoundé Court of Appeal.  
360 Art.  746 Civil Code. 
361 Art. 750 Civil Code. 
362 Art. 748, ibid. 
363 “Les enfants ou leurs descendants succèdent a leur père et mère, aïeuls, aïeules ou autres ascendants, 
sans distinction de sexe ni de primogéniture…”    
364 Ndoko, N-C., “L’idée d’égalité dans le Droit Successoral Camerounais: dernières tendances de la 
Jurisprudence en matière de la succession ab intestat” Yaoundé, 1990 
(unpublished ), p. 25 
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coutumière, n’en est pas encore arrivé à l’organisation prévue par code civil.”365 It 
would be proper to say le juge de fond or the trial judge, because the appellate 
jurisdictions have constantly taken positions aimed at curbing this tendency of the 
lower courts. In the land mark decision of the Supreme Court in Chibikom v. Zamcho 
Florence366, it was held that any custom which deprived women of succession rights 
to the estate of their parents is contrary to the public order and the constitution. 367  
Primogeniture as a principle of succession was also rejected by the Court of 
Appeal of the West Province in Affaire Succession Lonla Kuete.368 In the opinion of 
the court, “Cameroonian positive law recognises in legitimate children the same 
succession rights to their deceased father without assigning any right of seniority to 
any one of them” and “It is within the intimate framework of the family that the 
members thereof could decide to recognise in one of the children, be he the last born, 
as deserving the respect, honour and reverence which they reserved to their deceased 
father.” The general tendency is to construe primogeniture in terms of male members 
of the group but neither the code nor the above case distinguishes between male and 
female primogeniture.  
 
3.3.2: The Inclusion of the Surviving Spouse: An Afterthought.  
  Marriage generally operates an extension of the conception of “family” to 
include the spouse but legal relations are between the spouses inter se. Marriage 
establishes succession rights between the spouses and not between either of them and 
the members of the other family. The Court of Appeal of Yaoundé had in this respect 
                                                 
365“The Cameroonian judge, while condemning the customary practice, has not yet embraced the 
organisation provided by the civil code.” 
366 Supra. 
367 See also Affaire Puete Jacqueline v. Ngouoko Joseph, Supreme Court, Arrêt No. 15/L du 12 Avril 
1990;  Affaire Succession Guimfack Guillaume, Jugment No. 105/C du 11 Avril 1996, TPD Dschang;  
368 Arrêt No. 2/Coutume  of 24 October 1991 
 106
to overrule a decision of the Tribunal de Premier Degré of Obala in which a daughter-
in-law was designated as successor to her mother-in-law.369   
The assertion that the inclusion of the surviving spouse in the scheme of 
intestacy is the result of an afterthought is justifiable. Historically, the surviving 
spouse could only succeed in the absence of surviving relatives. That this was a 
remote possibility cannot be doubted given the number and elastic nature of the 
classes of beneficiaries. Jean Brissuad identifies three categories of persons entitled 
then, to succession. These were the descendants, the ascendant and collaterals and the 
third category actually unusual, consisted of persons who with the deceased formed 
part of the same league organised for mutual defence.370  
The widow was entitled only to the dower371 and the widower to one quarter 
of the wife’s estate known as the “poor man’s fourth.”372 Only by the Law of 22 
November to 1 December 1790 were reciprocal succession rights established for 
spouses. It also removed the unusual third category of beneficiaries. Of course it was 
possible even with the three categories of beneficiaries for the surviving to succeed 
but as such estates were classified as vacant, he or she had to vie with the state for 
possession, and in most cases the interest of the state prevailed.  
The civil code adopted this position which only succeeded in making the 
surviving spouse an irregular heir. Not having possession of the property he or she 
had to apply to the court for it.373 This appeared to have been a mere formality, it was 
nevertheless unlawful374 for the surviving spouse to take possession without a court 
                                                 
369 Arrêt No.47 du 10 Janvier 1991 (unpublished)  
370 Brissuad, Jean, A History of French Private Law, New Jersey, Rothman Reprints Inc., 1968, pp. 
628. 
371 Brissuad, Jean, A History of French Private Law, New Jersey, Rothman Reprints Inc., 1968, pp. 765 
372 Brissuad, Jean, A History of French Private Law, New Jersey, Rothman Reprints Inc., 1968, pp. 
652. 
373 See Guinchard, Serge, Droit Patrimonial de la Famille au Senegal, Paris, Librairie Générale de Droit 
et de Jurisprudence, 1980, 441. 
374 Ibid. 
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order, even if it meant that the court had no discretion in the matter. The need for a 
court order was removed by an Ordinance of 23 December 1958 
Today it is still difficult to state precisely the category of beneficiaries to 
which the surviving spouse belongs. None of the four categories of beneficiaries 
expressly includes the surviving spouse. She seem to occupy a category of her own as 
they come in only in the absence of persons having blood or assimilated relationship 
with the deceased. In terms of the presumed affection of the deceased the spouse 
comes at the end of the line, followed only by the state, said to be the ultimate love of 
everyone.375 
 
3.4: THE RULES OF DEVOLUTION 
  
Devolution is normally to the blood relatives but where the deceased was 
married and had issue the entitlement of the relatives becomes subject to that of the 
spouse, and this again demands that we use the spouse as the starting point. It is 
important to point out that unlike English law, French law treats the property as a 
single whole, so that there is no distinction between what would normally go the 
surviving spouse to assuage her pains the rest of the estate. Everything is brought into 
the account and distributed.  
 
3.4.1 Devolution to the Relatives.  
The system of devolution contained in the civil code is such that property 
devolves to the beneficiaries in accordance with the order in which they belong and 
the degree of proximity with the deceased. An order is represented by the various 
categories into which the beneficiaries are divided as identified in article 731 (above).  
                                                 
375 Guinchard, Serge, Droit Patrimonial de la Famille au Senegal, Paris, Librairie Générale de Droit et 
de Jurisprudence, 1980, 424. 
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The existence of an order closest to the deceased excludes the others. The 
priority of the descendants has constantly been asserted by courts in Francophone 
Cameroon. In one case the Supreme Court was called upon to decide who, between 
the nephew of the deceased and the grand-child, was entitled to succession. It was 
held that “the property devolves only on the known descendants of the deceased; the 
said descendants cannot dispute the attribution or enjoyment of the property with the 
collaterals.”376   
The exclusion also operates within the orders, this time by reference to the 
degrees representing the proximity of relationship with the deceased.  Within each 
order it is possible to have persons related to the deceased in different degrees and 
according to article 735 of the civil code “the proximity of the relationship is 
established by the number of generations; each generation of which is called a 
degree,”377 signifying in other words that the degree is represented by the number of 
intervals between generations.378 The ascertainment of degrees is enshrined in articles 
736 to 738 of the code which for want of space we cannot get into.  The existence of 
persons closest in degree to the deceased excludes others within the same order. For 
instance the child of the deceased and the grandchild may all come within the 
meaning of descendants but belong to the first and second degrees respectively.  
Hence the child will normally take to the exclusion of the grandchild, except 
through the process of representation provided for in article 739; the grandchild is 
made to inherit what would have gone his father or mother. Representation is defined 
as “a legal fiction, the effect of which is to put the representative in the place, degree 
                                                 
376 Arrêt No. 47 du 10 Janvier 1991 (unpublished). 
377 “La proximité de parenté s’établit par le nombre de générations; chaque génération s’appelle un 
degré”   
378Guinchard, Serge, Droit Patrimonial de la Famille au Sénégal, Paris, Librairie Générale de Droit et 
de Jurisprudence, 1980, 426.  
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and in the rights of the representatee.”379 It prevents the exclusion of a grandchild 
whose father or mother predeceased the intestate. Hence Grimaldi380 sees in 
representation “an institution by virtue of which an heir exercises the rights of another 
heir, of a closer degree, who died before the deceased.” And for Gerard Cornu, 
representation is a “substitution because of death.” 381 
  Representation is thus an exception to the rule that the existence of persons 
closest to the deceased excludes others within the same order and that property 
devolves undivided to the members of an order. Representation is, however, limited to 
the descendants of the deceased to whom it applies infinitely;382 and to the children of 
the brothers and sisters of the deceased and the descendants of those children.383 It is 
not applicable to ascendants and ordinary collaterals, so the rule within these orders 
remains that the closest relative excludes the rest.384 
 The general position of French law is that property devolves in one bulk and 
not as individually divided shares.385 In effect succession gives rise to what is known 
as l’indivision successoral. This is a type of joint or co-ownership which cannot be 
equated to the English joint tenancy or tenancy in common. The four unities of time, 
interest, title and possession could be present but the inapplicability of the right of 
survivorship disqualifies it as joint tenancy. Similarly, the absence of individually 
identifiable shares disqualifies it as a tenancy in common. Therefore, rather than 
fudge an English equivalent for the type of holding we think that the French 
                                                 
379 “La représentation est une fiction de la loi dont l’effet est de faire entrer les représentants dans la 
place, dans le degré et dans les droits du repéesenté 
380 Grimaldi, M., Droit Civil. Successions, Paris, Dalloz, 2e ed. 1992, 108. 
381 “La Fratenité des frères et soeurs par le sang dans le droit civil” written in honour of Professor Rene 
Savatier, 1992, 129, cited by Youego, Christine, “Sources et Evolution de Droit des Succession aux 
Cameroun,” Doctorat thesis, university of Paris II, 395.   
382 Article 740 (1) civil code 1804. 
383 Article 742, ibid. 
384 Article 741, ibid. 
385 Guinchard, Serge, Droit Patrimonial de la Famille au Senegal, Paris, Librairie Générale de Droit et 
de Jurisprudence, 1980, 426.  
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appellation ought to be maintained and understood to signify joint or co-ownership 
without the technicalities of a joint tenancy or tenancy in common.  
The successors are the alter ego of the deceased and must as a result hold the 
property as did the deceased himself. Joint ownership, it was believed would tighten 
the bonds of family relations and enhance the productivity of the estate, as against 
having it partitioned in several small lots.  
Should this be taken to mean that French law like the customary law favours 
the communal ownership of property? The answer would be in the affirmative 
because even though as will be seen soon partition could be ordered under article 815 
of the civil code the fact remains that joint ownership is the rule. And this as we will 
see would likely influence the courts to prefer joint ownership to partition whenever 
the application is made.  
To the principle of joint ownership the code posits another exception 
represented by a principle known as la fente which translated into English means “the 
split.” When property has to devolve to the ascendants, privileged386 or ordinary,387 
the principle directs that the property be split into two, one part for the maternal 
family another for the paternal family. So we see the continued influence of 
customary law on the French law of succession.  
 
3.4.2. Devolution to the Surviving Spouse. 
  We do not need to belabour the point that French law recognises succession 
rights for the surviving spouse only in the absence of relatives of the deceased 
extending to the sixth degree of ordinary collaterals. There were to be no half 
measures. The spouse got everything of the deceased or nothing at all. The dower and 
the “poor man’s fourth” had apparently been banished by the civil code with nothing 
                                                 
386 Article 748, ibid. 
387 Article 753, ibid. 
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to replace them. The surviving spouse was thus condemned to a life of destitution, all 
because the editors of the civil code labouring under the influence of customary law 
still believed in keeping property in the family.388 The spouse being a stranger to the 
family could not be allowed to succeed to property therein. Pierre Raymond389 tries to 
discern the prime motivation of the editors of the civil code when he writes: “The 
spouse is not part of the family by blood, he entered into the family only through 
marriage and when, assuming that death has dissolved this, the surviving spouse 
leaves the family to which he was attached by the marriage and, if he is granted 
succession rights, he is permitted to collect property originating from the family of the 
deceased, at the risk of transmitting same to his own family.”390 Coming from an 
African this would have raised an uproar and coming from a product of “la 
civilisation Française,” it is embarrassing. For while it is true that death puts an end to 
a marriage, it also creates property rights in favour of the surviving spouse.  
 Accepted, that a person’s first affection goes to his blood relatives, it is 
unimaginable that one would prefer relatives as remote as the sixth or even the twelfth 
generation of ordinary collaterals against his own widow, mother of his children and 
the person with whom he shared a common life before dying. The tendency today is 
to confine the family to the spouses and their issue, towards whom the deceased owes 
legal and moral duties.391 Furthermore, French matrimonial regime being one of 
community the argument about maintaining property in the family is deprived of any 
value. The question arises as to the family in which property should be maintained.  Is 
                                                 
388 See Barch, Eugène-Louis, « Contribution à  l’étude de la condition juridique du conjoint survivant » 
,  (1965) Revue Trim. De Droit Civil, 546-550, 547.  
389 Les Successions et Les Liberalités, Paris, Sirey, 1983, 68. 
390 « Le conjoint survivant ne fait pas partie de la famille par le sang, il n’est entré dans la famille que 
par le mariage et lorsque, par hypothèse, la mort a dissous celui-ci, le conjoint survivant sort de la 
famille à laquelle ce mariage le rattachait et, si on lui accorde des droits de successions, on lui permet 
de recueillir de biens provenant de la famille du defunct, au risque de leur transmettre en suite à sa 
propre famille. »       
391 See Raymond, Pierre, Les Successions et Les Liberalités, Paris, Sirey, 1983, 68. 
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it the family consisting of the deceased, the surviving spouse and their children or that 
consisting of the deceased and his blood relations, whose property must have become 
mixed with the products of the efforts of the deceased spouse? 392  
These considerations engendered the amendments to the Civil Code discussed 
above, as a result of which the surviving spouse is given succession rights even when 
the deceased is survived by blood relatives. The right ranges from full ownership over 
all or part of the estate, to the right of use. 
 
3.4.2.1: When the surviving spouse has absolute ownership. 
According to article 765, the surviving spouse is supposed to take all of the 
property absolutely if the deceased is survived by ordinary393 as against privileged 
collaterals,394 or their descendants. The exclusion of the ordinary collateral in this 
article seems to have been neutralised by widely-worded article 766. It provides that 
in the absence of paternal or maternal relatives liable to succeed, the surviving spouse 
gets one half of the estate absolutely. The paternal and maternal relatives liable to 
succeed are no other than the father and mother of the deceased, the grandparents, the 
great-grandparents, the uncles, aunts and cousins, the last  three of whom constitute 
the said ordinary collaterals. This provision is liable to extend the classes of 
beneficiaries to great and great-grand uncles and cousins when the relatives normally 
entitled are non-existent.  
Another observation here is that the article provides for what the surviving 
spouse gets in absence of the named relatives and not for when they are present. Does 
it mean that she gets nothing? Article 753 provides in this respect that the entire estate 
devolves to closest surviving relatives. The effect of this article is however mitigated 
                                                 
392 See Raymond, Pierre, Les Successions et Les Liberalités, Paris, Sirey, 1983, 68. 
393 The children and descendants of Grandparents.  
394 The brothers and sisters of the deceased. 
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by a phrase in article 766 to the effect that the un-divorced surviving spouse gets half 
of the estate “notwithstanding the provision of article 753.” This seems to underpin 
our assertion that the inclusion of the surviving spouse is the result of an after thought. 
Article 766, we submit gives rise to an ambiguity which could be removed only if it is 
considered that being the result of a later amendment to the civil code,395 it replaces 
article 753, itself the result of an earlier amendment396, whenever there is a surviving 
spouse.  
It will certainly not be an overstatement to assert that a surviving spouse can 
never accede to absolute ownership, given that this is only possible when the entire 
lineage of the deceased is extinct. It would thus be more logical to conclude that the 
surviving spouse will invariably have usufructuary rights over the share of the 
property she receives upon distribution. 
 
3.4.2.2: When the surviving spouse has usufructuary rights.  
 This arises whenever the deceased is survived by blood relatives. The 
quantum of these rights varies in function with the proximity of the relationship 
between the deceased and the surviving relatives. It accepted, however that the spouse 
keeps the matrimonial home397, though not necessarily the content which must be 
distributed together the other properties. Hence one finds ridiculous inventories such 
as was the case in Kegne René v. Nembot Pièrre & Others398 where even the 
television set was included and given to the plaintiff rather than the widow. 
The right is enshrined in article 767 of the civil code which also spells out the 
fractions of the estate over which it is to be exercised whenever the surviving spouse 
                                                 
395 Law No. 72-3 of 3 January 1972. 
396 Article 2 of Law No. 57-379 0f 26 March 1957. 
397 See Tchamo Thomas v Tiwouang nee Waffeu Jeanne, C.S. Arret No. 46/L of 14 June 1992 
(unreported); Affaire Njanjo Teclaire Cour d’Appel de l’Ouest jugement No 17/ C, 25 Nov. 1985 
(unreported).  
398 Cour d’Appel de l’Ouest jugement No. 85/C ,17 Février  1994 (unreported) 
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is in competition with the descendants or the other relatives of the deceased. A third 
situation not envisaged by the civil code for obvious reasons is when the surviving 
spouse is in competition with another surviving spouse of the deceased but this is not 
surprising because the code envisages monogamy and not polygamy.  
 
 
 
3.4.2.2.1: The Surviving spouse faced with the descendants of the deceased. 
 
Article 767(2) of the civil code gives the surviving spouse the right of use and 
enjoyment over one quarter of the estate if the deceased is survived by descendants. 
There is ambivalence in the application of this article as it is manipulated by the 
courts to achieve the goals of customary law. It is a recognised rule of most customary 
laws in Cameroon that a widow with children has the right of use and enjoyment over 
the estate of the deceased husband and on the contrary that the property of the 
deceased wife belongs to the husband. Thus when the surviving spouse is a widow the 
courts are fast to apply the provision to the letter as against when he is a widower. 
An example can be taken from the Affaire Zang, in which two widows of the 
deceased brought separate actions in the Tribunal de Premier Degré of Yaoundé 
demanding to be accorded equal succession rights with the children. They were 
declared co-heirs with the children held to be the principal heirs and one of the 
widows was named as administrator of the estate. On appeal to the Yaoundé Court of 
Appeal and eventually to the Supreme Court, it was held that in accordance with the 
customs of the parties which was in conformity to the civil code, the spouses had only 
usufructuary rights over one quarter of the estate.  
 In a good number of other cases the same court has in reference to decisions 
from the lower courts reiterated the position of the law and stated that “apart from the 
usufructuary right, all other qualities which are to be accorded to the surviving spouse 
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in competition with the children necessarily call for the reform of the decision for the 
want of legal basis.”399 
 However, the same court found no inhibition upholding a decision of the lower 
court declaring the widower to be the heir of his deceased wife in spite of the presence 
of six children. The court added contrary to the above statement that: “If the Beti 
custom which governs the parties recognises in the widower the right to succeed his 
wife, it does not exclude the rights of the direct descendants to expect also, to be 
declared as heirs of the deceased.”400 The widower as the surviving spouse thus has 
other qualities denied to the widow.  
 In a subsequent case the court apparently went against its own decision by 
overruling a decision of the lower court declaring the widower as co-heir with the 
children. From the ratio decidendi of the decision stating that “the widower cannot 
inherit when the deceased leaves children” and that “the court has violated the civil 
code and the Bassa custom which requires that the widower succeeds to his wife only 
in the absence of children”401 it is clear that the court did not actually overrule its own 
decision. What the court did was uphold the Bassa custom which, fortunately was in 
conformity with the civil code.   
 
3.4.2.2.2: The Surviving spouse faced with other relatives of the deceased.  
  
 If the courts have readily acceded to the widow’s usufructuary rights when faced 
with descendants the same is not true when faced with other relatives, since this 
implies that she is childless and therefore entitled only to maintenance and habitation 
from the family of the deceased. 
                                                 
399 See Cour d’Appel Yaoundé, arrêts No. 549 du 2 Juillet, 1986 ; No. 456 du 6 Mars 1986 ; No. 81 du 
25 Janvier 1986. (unreported)    
400 See Cour d’Appel Yaoundé, arrêt no. 186 du 24 Mai 1986, cited by  Ndoko, N-C., “L’idée d’égalité 
dans le Droit Successoral Camerounais: dernières tendances de la Jurisprudence en matière de la 
succession ab intestat” Yaoundé, 1990, 49 (unpublished ). 
401See Cour d’Appel Yaoundé arrêt no. 153 du 14 décembre 1989.  
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  Article 767 (3) of the civil code gives her the right of use and enjoyment over 
half of the estate, but no case could be found in which the code has been invoked to 
divide the estate equally between the widow and relatives of the deceased. When even 
the decision is taken to partition as in the 1974 Affaire Tchokossi,402 this is never 
equal. In that case the widow whose husband died in 1960 brought an action in the 
Tribunal de Premier Degré of New Bell Bassa in Douala claiming the property left by 
the late husband which had been usurped by the brother of the deceased. The trial 
court held in favour of the widow and demanded that the property be handed to her. 
On appeal to the Douala Court of Appeal the brother maintained that the widow was 
only entitled to the right of maintenance and lodging in the estate of her deceased 
husband. This contention was rejected, not by confirming the decision of the lower 
court but by invoking the provision of the code allocating one quarter of the estate to 
the widow and three quarters to the brother of the deceased. The widow also appealed 
to the Supreme Court which only confirmed the position of the Court of Appeal.  
 The basis of the decision is not clear. Was it the customary law or the civil code 
that was applied, given that under customary law the widow would have been entitled 
only to the right of maintenance and habitation, and under the civil code she would 
have been entitled to half the estate? The absence of a legal basis for the decision led 
Melone to state that “the partition though unequal appears more as a judgment of 
Solomon rather than a response to a specific legal problem”.403  
  
 
 
                                                 
402 Cited by Melone, S., « Le droit successoral Camerounais: Etudes des quelques points en 
jurisprudences” (1979) 17/18 Rev. Cam. De Droit, 55-79, 69. 
403 The famous judgment of King Solomon in deciding to divide a disputed child marked him out as the 
wisest King to have lived (See 1 King 3, 16-28). There was, however, no legal basis for the judgment 
and if the child was actually divided it would have raised a further question in modern times, whether 
the King would not have been guilty of culpable homicide.  
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3.4.2.2.3: The Surviving spouse faced with other surviving spouses. 
 Understandably the civil code does not provide for situations of polygamy but 
its application in Francophone Cameroon is not limited to monogamy. We noticed in 
chapter three that parties have total discretion on choice of jurisdiction in civil 
matters. The choice of jurisdiction is also the choice of law applied by that court so if 
the deceased contracted a polygamous marriage and the parties opted for a modern 
law court, the code will becomes  
 In Affaire Veuve Ebongue v. Ebongue Nyambe Nestor404 the deceased was 
survived by three widows and children. The plaintiff, one of the widows, claimed in 
accordance with the custom of the Douala people to be entitled to a usufructuary right 
to the whole estate to the exclusion of the other widows. The claim was upheld by the 
Tribunal de Premier Degré whose primary duty is to apply the customary law of the 
parties.  The decision of the lower court was overruled on appeal to the Douala Court 
of Appeal, which to fill the legal void in the civil code invoked the provision of article 
767(3) applicable when the surviving spouse is in competition with children. All the 
widows were thus held to be entitled one quarter of the estate, a share which the code 
intends for a single spouse. The court considered the custom which tends to exclude 
widows from the succession of their husband as being contrary to the public order. On 
further appeal to the Supreme Court, the ruling of the Court of Appeal was upheld, 
giving the four widows equal rights over one quarter of the estate.  
 There must obviously be a feeling of injustice in giving the widows one 
quarter of the estate no matter the number of children against whom they have to 
contend. We nevertheless consider the decision as a bold step on the part of the 
appellate jurisdiction, for bringing the widows of deceased polygamist within the 
protection of the code. That the fraction allotted to the widows is small is quite 
                                                 
404  Arrêt No. 14/L du 9 décembre 1976 (unreported).  
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another matter which could not have been resolved without doing violence to the civil 
code. 
 
3.5: ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES 
    Unlike the English law French law has no intermediate period of 
administration during which the beneficiaries wait to get into their entitlements. Upon 
the opening of succession pursuant to article 718 of the civil code the property vests 
directly in the universal heirs jointly. However the fact that property devolves jointly 
makes administration necessary during the period of joint ownership, which could be 
indefinite, even though the powers of the administrator are in no way compared with 
those of the personal representative in English law. He must, like the successor in 
customary law request and obtain the consent of other beneficiaries in view of 
important dealings with the property.  
Joint ownership is the rule in the French law of intestacy, and partition an 
exception, based on the rule adumbrated in article 815 of the civil code that “No one 
is obliged to remain in joint ownership and partition may always be provoked, unless 
it is excluded by judgment or convention.”405  
Administration is ensured through a jugement d’hérédité issued by the 
competent court. This is the equivalent of the English Letters of Administrations 
issued by Customary or High Courts.406 Generally the beneficiaries designate one or 
more of theirs to ensure the administration407 and pursuant to article 803 of the civil 
code, “The heir-beneficiary administers the property and must render account of his 
administration to the creditors and legatees.”408 The term “legatees” which is my 
                                                 
405 « Null ne peut être contraint à demeurer dans l’indivision et le partage peut être toujours provoqué, à  
moins qu’il n’ y ait été sousis par jugement ou convention. »  
406 See our discussion on the conflict of jurisdiction at 3.2.1.2 and 3.2.2.2. 
407 See the statement of the Bafoussam in Affaire Succession Lonla Kuete (supra)  
408 L’héritier bénéficiare est chargé d’administrer les biens de la succession, et doit rendre compte de 
son administration aux créanciers et aux légataires »    
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translation for the French “légataires” could be problematic in a context of intestacy, 
given that it relates only to testacy. However, Dahl’s authoritative French and English 
Law Dictionary gives “legatee” and “heir” as the English equivalents for the French 
“légataire.409 Hence the neutral word “heir” could substitute “legatees” in the article. 
This is more so as the explanatory notes to that article omits “légataires” and talks 
instead of “les intéressés.”410 
  An administrator could also be designated by a court order at the instance of 
creditors and beneficiaries opposed to the decision of the Family Council. The 
administrator himself could abdicate his functions and apply to the court for the 
appointment of an administrateur judiciare if due to the immensity of the estate, the 
complexity of its administration, numerous suits pending, conflicts of interests and 
opposition from the other beneficiaries, he feels incapable to effectively perform his 
functions.411   
 Unlike the personal representative in English law the powers of the 
administrator are limited due mainly to the fact that the property vests in the heirs 
jointly and not in the administrator who is merely a part-owner. The powers of the 
administrator are therefore limited to acts of representation and administration.412 
Disposition of property, be it real or personal and for any purpose must be with the 
consent of the other beneficiaries or the judge.413 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
409 Dahl, Henry Saint, Dahl’s Law Dictionary, Paris, Dalloz, 2001, 190. 
410 See the 1981 edition of the code published by LITEC. 
411 See (1937) 2 Gazette du Palais, 579, ibid.  
412 See Guinchard, Serge, Droit Patrimonial de la Famille au Sénégal, Paris, Librairie Générale de Droit 
et de Jurisprudence, 1980, 534 ; cited by Youego, Christine, “Sources et Evolution de Droit des 
Succession aux Cameroun,” Doctorat thesis, university of Paris II, 764 
413 See articles 805 and 806 of the civil code. 
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Conclusion 
Like English law French intestacy rules also contain a long list of beneficiaries 
and enshrine gender equality. These are persons to whom the deceased owed the duty 
of maintenance either directly or by proxy, but the principle of precedence eliminates 
many potential beneficiaries. This is responsible for the many cases of conflict, 
noting, especially that French law has no equivalence of the Inheritance (Provision for 
Family & Dependants) Act 1975 which would cushion the effects of exclusions.  
The original provisions of the civil code marginalised the surviving spouse but 
his has been removed by subsequent amendments. The fact that joint ownership is the 
rule, and distribution is an exception does little credit to the system, and even after 
distribution all that the spouse gets is a precarious right of use. Compared to her 
English counterpart therefore she cannot dispose of the property without the consent 
of the relatives of the deceased, or use the property to raise a loan and the property 
could be sold on her back. In Tchamo Thomas v. Tiwouang nee Waffeu Jeanne, the 
plaintiff, the administrator of the estate was barred from selling the matrimonial home 
occupied by the widow, but in so doing the Supreme Court only confirmed the 
precarious nature of the woman’s title when it held: “Considérant qu’en coutume 
Bamileke qui est celle des parties et défunt, seuls les héritiers reconnus comme tels, 
peuvent disposer de biens de la succession sans cependant porter atteinte aux droits 
de la veuve survivante, qui quant à elle, est héritière en usufruit de son conjoint 
prédécédé et qui dispose de droit d’usage et d’habitation sur la maison qu’elle 
partageait avec son mari de son vivant.”414 
Perhaps the only difference between her and the customary law widow is that 
the right of use is granted under the civil code and cannot be tampered with; however, 
                                                 
414 Jugement No. 46/L du 14 Juin 1992 (unreported). 
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without the right of ownership as her English counterpart the widow’s right is a 
fragile one.  
 In the light of its affinity with customary law French law cannot constitute a 
model for the reform of our law of succession.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 122
CHAPTER FOUR: INTESTACY IN CUSTOMARY LAW 
Introduction 
Disappearance also gives rise to a presumption of death in customary law. 
Initially there is a temporary management of the affairs of the person,415 the period 
varies from tribe to tribe and is not generally long. It would hardly last for one year 
and could be as short as three 416 or five months417 and possibly a few months longer.    
Under the Muslim Maliki code the period of interim administration could 
stretch as long as seventy years, followed by a presumption of death from the date of 
disappearance. The administration of the estate during the period of absence is 
ensured by the court in whose custody the property is deposited.418 
That said, we have to note from the outset that intestacy in customary law is 
more complex compared to the received laws. This is because of the plurality of 
systems of succession, which are patrilineal, matrilineal and Muslim all of which 
have different substantive rules. The rules for determining who the beneficiaries are 
vary, even though as we will see the procedure for designating the successor, 
distribution and administration are virtually the same.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
415 See Ngongang-Ouandji, Andre, “La devolution successorale au Cameroun”, (1972) 26 Rev. Jur. 
Pol. Ind. Coop. 639-662, 643. 
416 The Kaka and Baya tribes in the East Province, ibid. 
417  The Mbimous, and Moloundu of Northern Province, ibid.   
418 See Ajijola, A. D., Introduction to Islamic Law, New Delhi, International Islamic Publishers, 1989, 
231.  
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4.1: THE APPLICABLE LAWS 
 
The impression one gets from existing research is that the Cameroonian 
customary law of succession could be subsumed under a single system where the man 
reigns supreme.419 We submit that this is one area in which the application of the de 
minimis non curat lex doctrine to arrive at such a conclusion would be inappropriate. 
For it would make a difference to know that there are tribes, however few, which 
recognize succession by women.   
 While male supremacy might be the rule, the over two hundred ethnic groups 
that make up the country could be classified under different systems of succession. 
The systems are either patrilineal, matrilineal, bilineal or Muslim. These are not 
compartmentalized into specific geographical areas and so cut across the country 
which experts divide into420 the Western Highlanders;421 the Coastal Tropical Forest 
peoples;422 the Southern Tropical Forest peoples and423 the predominantly Islamic 
peoples of the Northern Sahel and Central Highlands.424 
 Most tribes are patrilineal and the following are only examples: Bamileke, 
Banyang, Bakweri, Bafut, Banso, Bali, Bakossi, Moghamo, Mankon, Bassossi, 
Ewondo, Eton, Bassa and Mendankwe. The common feature in all of them is the 
                                                 
419See Youego, « Sources et Evolution de Droit des Succession aux Cameroun, »  supra. 95-105; 
Doumbe-Moulongo, Maurice, « Consequences des Juridictions de Droit Traditionnel sur l’Evolution 
des Coutumes dans le Sud Cameroun,» (1963) 17 Rev Jur. Pol. O-M, 533-572, 565 ; Ngongang-
Ouandji, André, « La Devolution Successorale au Cameroun » (19720 28 Rev. Jur. Pol. Ind. Coop. 
639-662, 642 ;  Binet, Jacques, « La Devolution Successorale chez las Douala du Cameroun », (1955) 
65 Penant, 33-40, 35-37.  
420 John Mukum Mbaku, Culture and Customs of Cameroon, Westport, Connecticut, Greenwood Press, 
2005, pp. 1-2; Neville Rubin, Cameroon. An African Federation, p. 9. 
421 These consist of the Bamileke  Bamoun, Banso, Kom, Mankon, Mendankwe and many other 
smaller Tikar groups in the West and North West Provinces. The name Tikar is an omnibus term used 
to designate a great number of small ethnically related tribal units whose languages in general form 
part of a common linguistic stock but are not necessarily mutually intelligible. 
422Including the amongst whom are Bassa, Douala, Bakweri, Mbo, Bafaw, Bakossi, Bassossi, Oroko 
found in the Centre, Littoral and Southwest Provinces;  
423The Beti-Pahuin, Bulu, Fang, Maka-Njem, and Baka Pygmies  in the Centre, South and East 
Provinces.  
424 The Fulani (or Peuhl in French)  and the "Kirdi", of the Adamawa, North and Extreme North 
Provinces. 
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veneration of men seen as the source and originator of all property. Property must be 
preserved in the family to provide for posterity and keep the veneration of its 
originator alive.425 Allowing women to succeed would likely conflict with this goal 
since upon marriage, their allegiance shifts to the husband’s family, which is 
understandable given that her children are born therein. To attain the objective of 
keeping property in the family succession is either on the basis of male 
primogeniture,426 ultimogeniture, or any other competent male relative of the 
deceased.427 
A few tribes practice matrilineal succession, examples of which are the 
Bakundu Balue in the Southwest Province, Kom, Aghem, Weh and Buh in the 
Northwest Province and some communities belonging to the Foulbe tribe the 
Northern Provinces practice matrilineal succession. Matrilineal systems venerate the 
woman and the reasons seem to be specific to each tribe.428 
                                                 
425 Ngongang-Ouandji, Andre, “La devolution successorale au Cameroun”, (1972) 26 Rev. Jur. Pol. 
Ind. Coop. 639-662, 642. 
426 See See Youego, « Sources et Evolution de Droit des Succession aux Cameroun, »  supra. 95-105; 
Doumbe-Moulongo, Maurice, « Consequences des Juridictions de Droit Traditionnel sur l’Evolution 
des Coutumes dans le Sud Cameroun,» (1963) 17 Rev Jur. Pol. O-M, 533-572, 565 ; Ngongang-
Ouandji, André, « La Devolution Successorale au Cameroun » (19720 28 Rev. Jur. Pol. Ind. Coop. 
639-662, 642 ;  Binet, Jacques, « La Devolution Successorale chez las Douala du Cameroun », (1955) 
65 Penant, 33-40, 35-37. 
427 Chantal, Kwende, “The Procedure for designating next-of-kin in a patrilineal tribe”, term paper, 
Faculty of Law, University of Dschang, Cameroon, 2000.   
428 The Balue tribe for example bases the system on a story that the founder of the tribe was accused of 
having committed an atrocity. To clear himself  he had to swear in front of the oracles known as “beri.” 
The accused was required to present a girl of ten years old at the swearing and both of them were to die 
if the allegations turned out to be founded.  Having no daughter of his own he decided to use one of his 
nieces, the daughter of his deceased brother, but the widow objected saying that the child did not 
belong to him. He then turned to his sister who offered her own child and so rescued the tribe from the 
wroth of the ancestors. As a sign of appreciation therefore, the sister was given succession rights over 
her brother’s property. See Pascal Nanje “Theory and practice of succession in matrilineal tribes”, term 
paper university of Dschang, 2004 (unpublished); Anye Dieudonné, “Avoiding the Effects of Matriliny 
in the Balue Tribe in Ndian Division,” term paper Faculty of Law, University of Dschang, 
2004(unpublished). In the Kom tribe the veneration of women is based on the belief that it is easier to 
establish blood relationship between a sister’s child than one’s own child who must have been 
conceived in an illicit relationship. Folklore has it that in the past there were periods when wives were 
allowed to go out and consort with other men. See Ache Nforba Jupiter, “Avoiding the effects of 
matrilineality in Kom, ” term paper, University of Dschang 2004 (unpublished).   
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A person’s property passes on his death intestate not to his paternal family 
which would include his own children but to his maternal family. Hence women have 
succession rights therein which could not be ignored, even if watered down in actual 
practice, due to interaction with the patrilineal system. The Balue tribe of the South 
West Province follows the classic pattern whereby succession is by the closest 
maternal relative.429 In the neighboring Mbonge tribe priority is given to the nieces of 
the deceased.430  
The matrilineal systems of the North West Province431 display patterns similar 
to the patrilineal systems. John Anthony Howard thus proposes the appellation 
“patrilineal tribes with matrilineal emphasis.”432 Although descent is traced through 
the mother succession is by men albeit of the mother’s line. It is either the nephew,433 
full and uterine brothers434 as against the mothers and her maternal relatives.435 
The bilineal system of succession has elements of patrilineal and matrilineal 
succession. A person succeeds as of right436 from his paternal and maternal families. 
Our studies did not disclose any such tribes, nor does existing literature. However, we 
                                                 
429 See Anye Dieudonné, “Avoiding the Effects of Matriliny in the Balue Tribe in Ndian Division,” 
term paper Faculty of Law, University of Dschang, 2004(unpublished). 
430 See Julius, Ngape, “Property Rights of Female Children in the Mbonge tribe,” term paper, Faculty 
of Law, University of Dschang, 2004. 
431 These are the Aghem, Bafmeng, Bu and Weh tribes. 
432 “Customary Law of Marriage and Succession Among the Kom of Cameroon,” Ph.D. Thesis, 
University of London, 1972, 16. Audrey Richards had also made the point while writing of the central 
Bantu:  “It is generally recognised that no society is entirely matrilineal or patrilineal as regards 
descent, inheritance, succession and authority but that the family system provides a balance of interest 
and rights between the two sides of the family with a predominant emphasis on one side or the other.” 
See “Some Types of Family Structure Amongst the Central Bantu” in A. R. Radcliffe.Brown and 
Daryll Forde (ed) African Systems of Kinship and Marriage, Oxford University Press, 1950, 207.  
433 See Buo Kang Mathias v. Mih Izagha, Wum Customary Court, Suit No. 8/02-03 (unreported); Bah 
Ekom Amos v. Ebua Batali, Wum Customary Court, Suit No. 12/02-03 (unreported). Cited by Amos, 
Wango Chianan,“Theory and Practice of Matrilineal Succession,” unpublished term paper, Faculty of 
law, University of Dschang, 2003. See also Edith, Ndima, “Theory and Practice in Matrilineal Tribes,” 
term paper, Faculty of Law, University of Dschang, 2000.  
434 Still of the North West Province. 
435 See Lurshe, Chuye, “Avoiding the effects of Matriliny: Case study: Kom,” term paper, Faculty of 
Law, University of Dschang, 2003. See also Edith, Ndima and Chianan Wango, supra, 
436 In fact one may find in the other systems situations where a person is called upon to inherit from his 
mother’s or father’s family but this is not right. It is a magnanimous gesture of the family to show 
appreciation for the type of relationship which the person has with the family. 
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noticed a limited application of it in Aghem, a matrilineal tribe, wherein succession to 
the throne in patrilineal.437 This option according to the accounts of its origin was 
dictated by expediency, but has since become part of the Aghem custom.438  
Muslim law is not ethnically delimited and its general principles are drawn 
from surah 4, verses 8, 9, 12, 33, 34 and 170, surah 7, and from the traditions of the 
Prophet as recorded in the Sunna, and the consensus of Muslim scholars recorded in 
the Ijma.439  
 
4.2: RULES GOVERNING THE APPLICATION OF CUSTOMARY LAW 
The application of customary law is governed by section 27(1) of the Southern 
Cameroon High Court Law of 1955, section 18(1)(a) of the Native Courts Ordinance, 
Cap. 142 of the 1948 Laws of Nigeria and a number of already discussed French 
decrees.440 The provision of the 1955 Law governs the application in the high courts 
while that 1948 regulates application in the customary courts.  
Section 27 of the 1955 Law provides:  
“The High Court shall observe, and enforce the observance of every 
native law and custom which is not repugnant to natural justice, equity 
and good conscience, nor incompatible with any written law for the time 
                                                 
437 See Edith, Ndima, “Theory and Practice in Matrilineal Tribes,” term paper, Faculty of Law, 
University of Dschang, 2000; Chianan, Wango, “Theory and Practice of Matrilineal Succession.” term 
paper, Faculty of Law, University of Dschang, 2003. 
438 Chianan (supra) writes, “There exist, however, peculiarity among the Aghem. Inheritance to the 
paramount fondom (chiefdom). Zongokwo is  patrilineal. It passes from father to son. The reason is 
that the nephew and heir apparent of one of the early paramount fons disobeyed him and he decreed on 
death that he was to be succeeded by his son. After his death each of his nephews enthroned died in 
rapid succession and the villagers had no choice but to comply with the late fon’s wishes and enthrone 
his son, a practice which persists to this day.” If the above account is rooted in history, that of  Edith 
(supra) is not: “But an exception was brought out in Aghem where it was said that the paramount 
fondom practises patrilineal succession meaning that only the son of the paramount fon succeeds him. 
An explanation was given by the paramount fon to the effect that before his grandfather died he willed 
the fondom to his father but the nephews chased him out of the palace. Unfortunately, those who 
succeeded him died and the rest  were scared to take the risk. Since then the paramount fondom became 
an exception to the practice of matrilineal succession in Aghem where only the children of the fon and 
not the nephews can succeed him.”    
 
 
439 Ajijiola, A.D. Introduction to Islamic Law, New Delhi, International Islamic Pictures, 1989, 228. 
440 See chapter three.  
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being in force, and nothing in this law shall deprive any person of the 
benefit of any such native law or custom.”  
Section 18(1) (a) of the 1948 Customary Courts Ordinance  is similarly worded:  
“Subject to the provisions of this law a customary court shall administer 
the native law and custom prevailing in the area of the jurisdiction of the 
court or binding between the parties, such as it is not repugnant to natural 
justice, equity and good conscience nor incompatible directly or by 
natural implication with any written law for the time being in force.”   
 
The application of customary law is not automatic, given that an alleged rule of 
law must be proved as a matter of fact, otherwise it is considered non-existent. And 
even when proved it must pass the repugnancy and compatibility and any other tests 
put in place by the legislature.  
 
4.2.1: Proof of Customary Law   
The unwritten nature of customary law renders its ascertainment difficult in 
the modern courts staffed by persons with no knowledge of its rules. Colonial Judges 
equated customary law to foreign law in an English court, the existence of which has 
to be specifically established.  The point was made by Redwar, Ag. J. in the 
Ghanaian case of Bimba v. Mensah: “Native law when not incorporated by judicial 
decision in the law of this land … must stand therefore on the same footing as 
foreign law, and must be proved by evidence of expert witnesses.” 441   
The exigency subsists even though these courts are today staffed by Cameroon 
judges. They cannot be expected to have knowledge of all the systems of the 
customary law of succession, given even customary law as a subject does not form 
part of the curricula in the Universities and School of Magistracy. The Judges are thus 
more abreast with modern than with customary laws. This vindicates professor 
                                                 
441(1891)  Sar. F.C.L. 137.  
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Vanderlinden in his assertion that the African Judge is “often on the cultural plane and 
therefore legal, a stranger in relation to custom and the milieu where it originates and 
in which it is born, develops and dies.” 442   
It is incumbent on the party alleging a custom to prove its existence; for there 
is no presumption that any person or group of persons is governed by a custom if it is 
not specifically pleaded and proved to exist as a matter of fact.443 Customary law may 
be proved in two ways:444 By adducing evidence under section 14(3) of the Evidence 
Ordinance which provides: “Where a custom cannot be established as one judicially 
noticed it may be established and adopted as part of the law governing particular 
circumstances by calling evidence to show that person or the class of persons 
concerned in the particular area regard the alleged custom as binding upon them…” 
Evidence is admitted from expert witnesses who are frequently the chiefs or other 
titleholders, part of whose duties are to know the customs of their people.445 In Teke 
v. Teke446 the evidence of the Fon of Batibo was determinant in upholding a will 
made under customary law. Expert evidence could also be gathered from authoritative 
text-books or manuscripts recognized by the natives whose custom it is talking 
about.447 Here a possible merger of the customary law of the courts and that of the 
public can be envisaged, because a Judge bent on ascertaining the customary law on 
an issue should in addition to the above sources consult the decisions of traditional 
                                                 
442 “C’est dire qu’il est souvent sur le plan culturel et donc juridique, un étranger par rapport à la 
coutume et au milieu dont elle est originaire et dans lequel elle naît, se développe et meurt” in “Le Juge 
Africain et la Coutume en Afrique Aujourd’hui, cited by Christine Youego, “Sources et Evolution du 
f Paris II, 1994, p.246. 
a particular set of circumstances if it can be 
vidence. 
o (1938)14 N.L.R. 41. 
Droits des Successions au Cameroun”, doctorate thesis, University o
443 Laidi Giwa v. Bisiriyu Erinmilokun (1961) All N.L.R. 294, 296. 
444 Section 14(1) Evidence Ordinance, cap. 62 of the 1958 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria: “A 
custom may be adopted as part of the law governing 
noticed judicially or can be proved to exist by e
445 In Wokoko v. Molyk
446 (2005) 2 CCLR 49 
447 See section 58 Ibid. 
 129
councils448 whose role in settling disputes between natives in application of 
customary law is non-negligible.  
                                                
 The above renders the custom notorious and hence the second method for 
proving customary law. Section 14(2) of the Evidence Ordinance stipulates: “A 
custom may be judicially noticed by the court if it has been acted upon by a court of 
superior or co-ordinate jurisdiction in the same area to an extent which justifies the 
court asked to apply it in assuming that the persons or the class of persons concerned 
in that area look upon the same as binding in relation to circumstances similar to those 
under consideration.” In Laidi Giwa v. Bisiriyu Erinmilokun,449 Taylor F.J. pointed 
out that: 
“It is a well established principle of law that native law and custom is a 
matter of evidence to be decided on the facts presented before the court in 
each particular case, unless it is of such notoriety and has been so 
frequently followed by the courts that judicial notice would be taken of it 
without evidence required in proof.”  
There is no indication on how often a custom must have been acted upon to justify its 
becoming notorious.450 The above dictum talks of customs having “been so frequently 
followed” while section 14(2) of the Evidence Ordinance speaks of the custom having 
been “acted upon by a court”. The position of the Ordinance which was not 
considered by Taylor F.J. seems to intimate that a single decision on the custom in 
question would suffice, if, as specified in the section, the court is satisfied that parties 
concerned look upon the custom as binding on them in similar circumstances.451 In 
Agbortar & Oben v. Chief Bessong, Endeley J. held that “the custom that every chief 
in this state (and in particular those of the forest areas) rules through a traditional 
 
448 These are non-judicial bodies set up at village levels to oversee its functioning.   
449 (1961) All N.L.R. 294, 296. 
450 See also Tapper, Colin, Cross &Tapper on Evidence, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004, 86.  
451 Olabunmi Cole & Anor. v. Akinyele & Ors. (1960) 5 F.S.C. 84. 
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council is so notorious that this court is bound to take judicial notice of it.” 452 It is not 
clear on which authority the notoriety of the customs was based because no previous 
decision on the point was cited. The statement is a truism for most African 
communities, but that being the first decision on the point the custom was supposed to 
have been established by calling expert evidence. And not being an expert, the Judge 
could not, even under this method have provided the evidence himself.453 The general 
rule is that a Judge cannot act on his personal knowledge of facts known to him nor 
may he take steps to acquire such facts in private.454 
 This method of proving customary law saves time and money.455 It leads to 
the emergence of a type of doctrine of binding precedent for customary law, with the 
effect that previous decisions on particular customs can be followed by other 
courts.456 The importance of the doctrine of binding precedent lies in the ability of 
other common law jurisdictions to use such decisions as binding or persuasive 
authorities. That this is possible in customary law is evident in the Nigerian case of 
Awgu v. Nezianya,457 where Verity, C. J. relied on Ghanaian cases to hold that the 
owner of self acquired property does not require the consent of family members to 
dispose of it inter vivos or by will. These were held to constitute “the general 
principles of native law and custom throughout West Africa,”  “a departure from 
                                                 
452 [1968] W.C.L.R.43, 45 (West Cameroon Law Reports). 
453  See Iyamuse Ehigie v. Gregory Ehigie [1961] ALL N.L.R. 842. 
454 Tapper, Colin, Cross &Tapper on Evidence, supra, 89; Dennis, I. H. Law of Evidence, London, 
Sweet & Maxwell, 1999, 396. 
455 Tapper, Colin, ibid. 91; Jain,  M. P. “Custom as a source of Law in India”, in Renteln, Alison 
Dundes  and Dundes, Alan (ed),  Folk Law; Essays in the theory and practice of lex non-scripta, Vol. 1, 
the University of Wisconsin Press, 1995, 74. 
456 See Woodman, G. R, “Some realism about customary Law–The West African Experience”, Folk 
Law: Essays in the theory and Practice of Lex Non Scripta, Wisconsin, University of Wisconsin Press, 
1995, vol.pp.83-110, 91; Tapper, Colin, supra. 91. 
457 (1949)12 W.A.C.A. 450, 451. 
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which can only be justified if it is established by evidence that native law and custom 
in any particular area differs from the general principles.”458  
Hence Nigerian and Ghanaian authorities on customary law are used by 
Anglophone courts459 and academic writers offer no apologies for using decisions 
from these countries to substantiate assertions of customary law.460 
Proving of customary law is not a precondition for its application in the 
customary courts. 461 With a vocation to apply customary law, this can normally not 
be considered as foreign law in these courts and the courts are constituted of persons 
appointed on the basis of their knowledge of customary law.    
Customary court Judges administer the laws prevailing in their areas of 
jurisdiction being those of which they have or are presumed to have mastery. When 
they have to apply any other law, as would be the case in succession when the 
deceased was not a native of the locality, the courts will have to make up for their 
deficiency by calling witnesses on the custom of the deceased.462 However, the 
stringency on the source of evidence under the Evidence Ordinance is not applicable. 
According to section 40 of the Customary Courts Ordinance Cap. 142 of the 1948 
Laws of Nigeria, “any person present at the customary court, whether party or not in 
                                                 
458 At 451. See also the dictum of Lindley, J. in a Ghanaian case of  Biei v. Akomea (1956) 1 W.A.L.R. 
174,  that “This court cannot allow local customs to override general principles in these days of 
changing conditions.” 
459  In Daniel Ngu Geh & 3 others v. Geh George Goddy Ndi (2006) HCB/PD/LA/ 04-05 (unreported), 
for instance, a passage in  Ollennu’s  The Law of Testate and Intestate Succession in Ghana  was cited 
to explain the nature of gift under customary law; and in  Jemba Solomon Nangoh v. Emilia Okole Otte 
(2002) C.A.S.W.P./cc/14/2002, (unreported) Nwabueze’s Nigerian Land Law was cited to explain the 
fact that a native might through testamentary disposition alter the course succession at customary law.   
460 Fisiy, Cyprian, in Power and Privilege in the Administration of Law: land Law Reforms and Social 
Differentiation in Cameroon, Leiden, African Studies Centre, 1992, 131, cites Asofoatse Agbloe ll & 
Ors v. Sappor (1947)12 WACA 188, a Ghanaian case to establish that alienation of land by the family 
head without the consent of other family members is today permissible. See also Ngwafor, E. N. 
Family Law in Anglophone Cameroon, University of Regina Computer Services, Regina-
Saskatchewan, 1993, 232 and Anyangwe, Carlson, The Cameroonian Judicial System, Yaoundé, 
CEPER, 1987, 241.  
461 See Karchia v. Sarkin Kumin Musa (1975) N.N.L.R. 44.  
462See Ngwafor, E. N., Family Law in Anglophone Cameroon, 21; Aguda, T.A. The Law of Evidence, 
Ibadan, Spectrum Law Publishing, third ed. 1996, p.94. 
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such cause or matter, may be required by the court to give evidence, if and when 
summoned to attend and give evidence.” The other option would be to decline 
jurisdiction and direct the parties to the appropriate court, but this option has been 
criticised as liable to cause hardship if the appropriate court is not readily 
accessible.463   
In Francophone Cameroon there are no statutory provisions dealing 
specifically with proof of customary law. This could only be inferred from the 
provision of article 18 (f) of judicial Organisation Decree No. 69/DF/544 of 19 
December 1969 requiring judgments of customary courts to state the rule of 
customary law on which the decision is based, failing which the decision is  null and 
void.464  
The proof of customary law falls on assessors465 appointed in principle on the 
basis of their knowledge of the customary laws of the parties.466 This objective can 
hardly be achieved because there is for each jurisdiction, a fixed list of six persons 
from which assessors are chosen. Not only can this number not be representative of 
the different ethnic groups in a court area,467 the manner of designation leaves much 
to be desired. Nominations for the positions are supposed to be made by local 
divisional officers and presidents of the Magistrates’ Courts based on the nominee’s 
knowledge of the customary law they are to represent. But often and especially in the 
urban areas this criterion is not respected. Most assessors, because they are not of the 
same tribe as the litigants are completely ignorant of the customs they are called upon 
                                                 
463 See Emmanuel, Mbah, “The conflict of laws dilemma: Divorce in the conflict of laws in 
Cameroon,” (2000) 44 Juridis Périodique, 65-73, 72.   
464 Procureur General c/ Mbarga Gaston et Mbarga Charles, C.S.C.O. Arrêt No. 20 du 17 Mai 1960 
465 See Maticou Rou, “L’Organisation Judiciaire du Cameroun” (1969) 79 Penant, 33-65, 41. 
466 See Article 10(2) (c) of Decree No.69/DF/544 of 19 December, 1969 on Customary Courts in East 
Cameroon.  
467 See Avom, Vincelline Akomndja, « L’énonciation de la coutume en droit Camerounaise de la 
famille: Leurre ou réalité? » (2006) 116 Penant, 59-86, 71. 
 133
to represent. The law requires that in situations where an assessor is ignorant of the 
custom of the party he is to represent, the president of the court is to invite a notable 
of the tribe, in a consultative capacity, to sit in the hearings,468 but this is hardly 
respected.469 Furthermore, of the six persons, the first two on the list are permanent 
members while the remaining four are alternate members. In the absence of any of the 
permanent members, he is replaced by an alternate member.470 By implication the 
permanent members must always take part in hearings even if they are not of the same 
ethnic groups as the parties. 
 Having to prove customary law as a matter of fact is a very important 
requirement. Otherwise, fictitious persons could emerge from nowhere to claim 
succession rights471 and rules of succession could be tailored to satisfy the greed of 
some persons.  
 
4.2.2: Exclusion of customary law. 
Pursuant to section 27(1) of the Southern Cameroon High Law 1955 and 
section 18 (1)(a) of the Customary Courts Ordinance of 1948 the exclusion of 
customary law is governed by the repugnancy and compatibility doctrines.472 Section 
14(3) of the Evidence Act, cap 62 of the 1958 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 
introduces “public policy” as another ground for exclusion and is in line with Law 
No. 79-4 of 29 June 1979 on the Customary and Alkali Courts, article 1 of which 
enjoins the courts to apply the customs of the parties which are not contrary to law 
and public policy. 
                                                 
468 Ibid. 
469 Christine Youego, “Sources et Evolution du Droits des Successions au Cameroun,” p. 246-247. 
470 Article 11 (1), ibid. 
471 In Mary Ngoh Timothy v. Njimba Jacob (2006) Suit No. HCF/PROB/AE96/2001 (unreported) the 
estate was managed by the widow and the sister of the deceased when the defendant, a man unknown 
to both of them and to other member of the deceased family surfaced and claimed to be a relative of the 
deceased.  
472 These sections are full quoted above. 
 134
Exclusion in Francophone Cameroon is governed by article 51(1) of the 
Decree of 31 July 1927 organising the traditional justice system in that part of the 
country. That article enjoins the courts to apply only the customary law that is not 
contrary to the public order in all civil and commercial matters between natives.473  
Hence customary law may in Cameroon be excluded on the grounds of, (a) 
repugnancy, (b) public policy, (c) public order or “ordre public,”474 and (d) 
incompatibility with written law. 
 
4.2.2.1: Exclusion on the basis of the Repugnancy Clause. 
The precise meaning of “natural justice, equity and good conscience” has so 
far eluded the courts. The difficulty was admitted by Speed Ag. C.J., in Lewis v. 
Bankole, where he described the phrase as “high sounding” and held that” it would 
not be easy to offer a strict and accurate definition for the terms.”475 
The terms could be separated and construed individually to see if a rule of 
custom is repugnant to any of them. Equity will thus be taken in its technical meaning 
as was done in Lewis v. Bankole,476 where it was said that, “rules of equity, are or 
ought to be known to this Court, and if a native law or custom is found to be 
repugnant to the fundamental rules of equity it is absolutely the duty of the Court to 
ignore it.”477  In that case certain family members demanded that land which had been 
held as private property should in accordance with customary law be declared family 
property. The equitable doctrine of acquiescence was invoked to declare the custom 
“repugnant to the fundamental rules of equity.”  
                                                 
473 Journal Officiel Camerounais. 1927, 427.  
474   “Ordre public” and “public policy” are not one and the same thing.   
475 (1908) 1 N.L.R. 81, 83. 
476 Ibid, p. 83 et seq. 
477 Ibid, 83-84. 
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While this approach is possible for equity to which a restricted meaning can be 
given, it is not possible for natural justice and good conscience, which like equity in 
its broad meaning are incapable of definition. Hence the second and most appropriate 
approach is to construe the phrase as one whole.  Here “equity” in its general meaning 
takes the same significance as “natural justice” and “good conscience”,478 and might 
lead to the question whether the additional words are not superfluous.   
Either approach would make a difference in the customary law of succession, 
especially with respect to the rights of women. In the first approach, equitable maxims 
such as “equality is equity” will favour succession by women in the same way as the 
universal ideas of “natural justice” which constitute the second approach.  
The second approach is however beset by divergences on the appropriate 
standard of justice to be applied by the courts. The judge has the discretion to choose 
between the English, customary or some neutral standard of justice. But judicial 
discretion is qualified,479 for in exercising the discretion, the judge must be guided by 
the law. In the words of Lord Mansfield, “Discretion when applied to a court of 
justice means sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule not by 
humour; it must not be arbitrary, vague or fanciful; but legal and regular.”480        
English law having evolved a standard of justice based on equity is considered 
the best example to follow.481  It provides for uniformity and any other standards 
could throw open the floodgates, giving room to standards tailored on the basis of 
communities.482 
                                                 
478 Daniels, W.C. Ekow, The Common Law in West Africa, London, Butterworths, 1964, pp.268-271. 
479 See Andrews, Neil, English Civil Procedure, Oxford University Press, 2003, 356. 
480 R. v.  Wilkes (1770) 4 Burr. 2527, 2539. 
481  See Allott, Essays in African Law,  p. 200 
482 The point was made by Wilson J. said in Gwao bi Kilimo v. Kisunda bin Ifuti : “Morality and 
justice are abstract conceptions and every community probably has an absolute standard of its own 
by which to decide what justice is and what is morality. But unfortunately, the standards of different 
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The English standard was employed by the Privy Council in Eshugbayi Eleko v. 
Government of Nigeria483 to quash a decision of the Supreme court of Nigeria, which 
upheld an order of the Governor deporting the appellant on the basis of a custom that a 
deposed chief or native was required to leave the area over which he exercised 
jurisdiction or influence by virtue of his chieftaincy or office. The standard was also 
invoked against slavery and its incidents. In Santeng v Darkwa484 an argument that the 
child of a slave could not inherit property in the family was rejected on grounds of 
repugnancy and it was held that for purposes of succession the child was to be 
considered as a member of the family. In David Tchakokam v. Keou Magdaleine485, the 
standard was applied to invalidate a levirate marriage. 
Advocates of an African standard argue that a rule of custom that has been 
observed for many years should not suddenly become unenforceable on grounds of 
repugnancy. The application of the test should take cognisance of the values of the 
people to whom the rule is applicable. A judge confronted with the question of the 
repugnancy of a rule of customary law should first consider the essential philosophy 
behind that rule before pronouncing on it.486 In the Southern Rhodesian (Zimbabwe) 
case of Tabitha Chiduku v. Chidano487 Tredgold J., laid down the rule that “Native 
customs should not be interfered with unless they impress us with some abhorrence or 
are obviously immoral in their incidence.” 
                                                                                                                                            
communities are by no means the same. To what standard, then, does the Order in Council refer –the 
African standard of justice and morality or the British standard? I have no doubt whatever that the 
only standard of justice and morality which a British court in Africa can apply is its own British 
standard.”  
 (1938) 1 T.L.R. 403 (Tanganyika). 
483   [1931] A.C. 662.   
484 (1940) 6 W.A.C.A. 52. (Ghana) 
485 (1999) G.L.R, p. 111 (Gender Law Report). 
486 See Cardozo, Benjamin N., The growth of the Law, London, Humphrey Milford, 1934, p.62. 
487 (1922) S.R.L.R. 55. 
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Others advocate a completely neutral standard. Park proposes a standard based 
on “some less specific factor, which is not derived from any legal or social system, but 
rather from general notions of what is just and proper.”488 Woodman thinks that, “if the 
repugnancy clause was to have any effect, the standard was to be external…. ideally it 
should be an absolute universal standard”.489 Such a standard, we think derives from 
natural law and does not assume the colouring of any particular, legal system, political 
organisation, and religion.  
In practice the courts vacillate between the English and African standard and 
the gender of the judge seems to influence the standard of justice adopted by the court. 
It might perhaps be an Olympian jump to hold that female judges invariably apply the 
English standard, but this is not far from the truth490 given that English rules are more 
favourable to women and that by natural instinct women will be more inclined to 
favour other women. The first judgment recognising the property rights of a woman on 
divorce was that of a lady Judge491 and has since been followed by others including 
some male judges. This is an unhealthy situation for a justice system that should be 
gender-neutral. A common standard is therefore necessary, and if customary law is to 
make the necessary progress, this should be based on natural law, which would be 
applied on the basis of constitutional provisions on fundamental human rights. 
 
 
 
                                                 
488 Park, A. E. W. Sources of Nigerian Law, London, Sweet and Maxwell, 1963, p.70. 
489 “How State Courts Create Customary Law in Ghana and Nigeria”, Bradford W. Morse and G.R. 
Woodman,(eds), Indigenous Law and the State, Foris Publications Dordrech-Holland/Providence RI-
USA, 1988, p.181-215,193.  
490 See Ngassa, Vera (Justice) Gender Approach to Court Action, Frederick Ebert Foundation, 1998, p. 
97. 
491 This was in Alice Fodje v. Ndansi Kette (1986) BCA/45/86 (unreported) decided by Justice 
Florence Arrey.  
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4.2.2.2: Exclusion on grounds of Public Policy. 
English Judges are circumspect to proffer a definition for public policy. In 
Besant v. Wood Jessel M.R. said: “You cannot lay down any definition of the term 
‘public policy’, or say it comprises such and such a proposition, and does not 
comprise such and such another.”492 Kekewick J. in Davies v. Davies gave the 
possible reasons for this when he said: “Public policy does not admit of definition and 
is not easily explained… public policy is a variable quantity; that it must vary and 
does vary with the habit, capacities and opportunities of the public.” 493 
Winfield, however, defines the concept as “a principle of judicial legislation or 
interpretation founded on the current needs of the community.”494  It is based on the 
recognition that legal rules are built upon certain implicit moral and social 
assumptions which cannot be readily or precisely formulated in advance and which 
may change fundamentally from time to time.495 Public policy is thus viewed as a 
legal standard that encapsulates the values which the legal system is designed to 
serve. It cannot, however, be invoked because a judge personally thinks that a rule is 
contrary to the public interest.496 It must be something which the very structure or 
character of the community demands. In Mitchel v. Reynolds,497 Lord Macclesfield 
had indicated that a rule is against public policy if it is “a general mischief to the 
public.”  
The public interest goal of public policy distinguishes it from the repugnancy 
clause, which depends upon the personal sentiments of the judge on questions of 
                                                 
492 (1879)12 Ch. D. 620. 
493 (1887) Ch D. 364. 
494 Ibid, p. 92. 
495Bell, John, “Conceptions of Public Policy”, in Cane, Peter and Stapleton, Jane (ed) Essays for 
Patrick Atiyah, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1991. p.90.     
496 Atiyah, P. S. An Introduction to Contract, 4th edn. Oxford, 1989, 360-1. 
497 Cited by Knight, W.S.M “Public Policy in English Law” (1922) L.Q.R., pp.207-219, 208.  
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morality, often influenced by his training, religious faith, gender and cultural 
background. Public policy looks beyond these, to the position of government with 
respect to the rule in question, as ascertained from legislative enactments.498 But it is 
conceded that public policy could be invoked in default of legislative enactment, 
whenever the considerations of the public interest so desire.499   
In applying a rule of customary law the court has to weigh the outcome of its 
decision on the whole community as well on a considerable section of it, even where 
they are not concerned with the outcome of the case. No doubt the interest of the 
individual is also a matter of public interest but inconvenience to an individual is 
likely to be less mischievous than if it was to the whole public.500 If preserving the 
public interest is the criterion for public policy, rather than some abstract conception 
of morality or justice, liable to vary with the “length of the judge’s foot”, it is 
indubitable that public policy confers a wider power of discretion than does the 
repugnancy clause.501 
Anglophone courts have not shown any enthusiasm towards public policy as a 
separate ground to exclude customary law. Quite often it is treated as a synonym for 
the repugnancy doctrine.502 Enonchong writes that: “The term ‘public policy’… adds 
nothing to the common law requirements of ‘natural justice, equity and good 
conscience’.”  In Asaba v Sub-Chief Forfutazong503, the Buea Court of Appeal relied 
                                                 
498 Knight, W.S.M “Public Policy in English Law” (1922) L.Q.R., pp.207-219, 212. 
499 Ibid. 
500 Knight, W.S.M., “Public Policy in English Law”, p.212. 
501 Philips, Arthur, A Survey of African Marriage and Family Life, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1953, p.177. 
502 See  Anya v. Anya, where section 2(1) of the 1979 Law on the Customary and Alkali Courts was 
invoked to exclude a rule of customary, on the ground that it was “against public policy, that is, 
‘natural justice, equity and good conscience’ as spelled out in section 27 of the Southern Cameroon 
High Court Law 1955.” Taken from Enonchong, Nelson, “Public Policy and Ordre Public: The 
Exclusion of Customary Law in Cameroon” (1993) 5 R.A.D.I.C. 503-524, 504. 
503 Taken from Enonchong, Nelson, “Public Policy and Ordre Public: The Exclusion of Customary Law 
in Cameroon” (1993) 5 R.A.D.I.C. 503-524, 505. 
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on the provisions of section 14(3) of the Evidence Act which enshrines both public 
policy and repugnancy, to exclude a rule of customary law. Public policy was given as 
the basis of the decision without reference to the repugnancy clause. English judicial 
tradition would have required the two concepts to be distinguished to explain why the 
decision was founded on public policy. Failure to do so could only mean that the 
learned judge considered the two concepts as being synonymous.    
In Re Adadevoh,504 Verity, C, J. evinced the possibility of the public policy 
criterion being fully covered by the compatibility doctrine. In order to decide whether 
children, illegitimate by English law, were entitled to succession on the ground that 
they were legitimate in customary law, by reason of having been acknowledged by the 
deceased said: “The Judge would… satisfy himself first that such a custom is 
established and secondly, that it is not repugnant to natural justice, equity and good 
conscience nor incompatible either directly or by necessary implication with any law 
in force in Nigeria, including therein the rules of the common law as to  the 
unenforceability of claims contrary to public policy.”505 
The raison d’être of the public policy criterion stands questioned if the same 
objective would be possible under the repugnancy and compatibility doctrines.506 But 
the absence of a general standard of repugnancy and the fact that the compatibility 
doctrine is effective only where there are written laws, justify the maintenance of the 
public policy requirement.  
However, public policy is bedevilled with the spectre of the “unruly horse,” let 
loose on the legal profession by Justice Burrough in Richardson v. Mellish: “public 
policy is a very unruly horse and when once you get astride it you never know where 
                                                 
504 (1951)13 W.A.C.A. 304. 
505 Ibid 310. Emphasis added. 
506 Park, A. E. W. Sources of Nigerian Law, London, Sweet and Maxwell, 1963, p.70 
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it will carry you.” 507 Lord Denning tried to allay the fears of the courts by intimating 
that “a good man in the saddle”508 should be able to steer the horse in the right path. 
Vestiges of the old attitude are however current in English courts. Recently in In re 
Land Deceased509 the question was whether the sole beneficiary of an estate, 
convicted for the deceased’s manslaughter was entitled to the provision made for him 
in the will. He had actually given up his employment to nurse the deceased, his 
incapacitated mother. At one point he negligently allowed her to catch bed sores from 
which she died. The Forfeiture Act 1982 was invoked to bar him from taking under 
the testacy of the deceased, as it would have been be tantamount to allowing him 
make benefit out of his crime.  
Alternatively he applied for financial provision under the Inheritance 
(Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, on the authority of section 3(1) of 
the Forfeiture Act 1982, which stipulates: “The forfeiture rule shall not preclude any 
person from making an application under any provision of the Inheritance (Provision 
for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 or the making of any order on the application.”  
The question was whether public policy could be invoked to prevent him from 
applying under the 1975 Act. Section 3(1) of the Forfeiture Act 1982 on the basis of 
which the application was made was construed to mean that the court could only 
invoke public policy to deprive the wrongdoer of benefiting from the estate where it is 
in the public interest to do so. It was held not to be in the public interest to deprive the 
applicant from applying under the 1975 Act. Norris, J. held thus: 
“I hold that the claimant may advance a claim under the Act. As Vinelott 
J. put it in In re K [1985] Ch. 85, 102, ‘Despite the revulsion which any 
                                                 
507(1824), 2 Bing, 229, 242-243. 
508 Enderby Town Football Club v Football Association Ltd. [1971] Ch. 591, 606, per Lord Denning. 
509 [2007] 1 W. L. R. 1009. 
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person must feel at conduct which leads to the death of another human 
being it is impossible in the tragic circumstances of this case not to feel 
sympathy for the [claimant]’. Indeed for my part, I do not think that, on 
the facts as I have found them, the forfeiture rule serves the public 
interest. It deprives the one person who devoted himself to the 
deceased’s care without significant outside support (albeit that he lapsed 
at the end) of the benefit she intended for him and confers it upon 
remote relations most of who [sic] did absolutely nothing for her.”510 
 
As suggested by some dicta in that case the conduct of the appellant is not in the 
public interest because it is occasional and affects only a few persons.511 This cannot 
be true of the custom that excludes certain persons from succession. It is all pervading 
and could result in the social ills described at the start of this work. It should thus be a 
matter of public interest worthy of exclusion on the basis of public policy, whenever 
the repugnancy clause fails to do so. So, should the courts refuse to “ride the horse” 
because of the uncertainty of its destination? Enonchong is optimistic that public 
policy “is not such a terrifying animal near which Anglophone judges may not 
approach. It is an animal which when guided correctly can pull down obsolete and 
unjust barriers and open the way to equality, freedom and justice based on equity and 
good conscience.” 512 
Accepted that public policy could be applied is it not time for the pejorative 
repugnancy clause to be abandoned altogether? Law No. 79-4 of 29 June 1979 on the 
Customary and Alkali Courts, directing the courts to apply only custom that is not 
                                                 
510 At 1019. 
511 Ibid. 1018. 
512 Supra. 524. His optimism in the eventual outcome of public policy if well managed is matched to 
that of  Winfield, supra, 91, when he writes that “Some judges appear to have thought it more like a 
tiger, and have refused to mount it at all, perhaps because they feared the fate of the young lady of 
Riga. Others have regarded it as Balaam’s ass which would carry its rider nowhere. But none, at any 
rate at the present day has looked upon it as Pegasus that might soar beyond the momentary needs of 
the community.”    
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contrary to law and public policy seems to do this. It does not, however, go far 
enough; it fails to repeal previous provisions on the point. And even if it did it would 
not bind the High Courts which with the Alkali and customary courts have original 
jurisdiction over succession. 
 
4.2.2.3: Exclusion on the Basis of Ordre Public in Francophone Cameroon. 
Ordre public is a generic expression which encapsulates repugnancy and 
public policy. It is incapable of precise definition because of its variable nature.513 
Attempts at a definition have been variously described as “quicksand”514 or a “thorny 
field”515  on which no reasonable person would want to tread. 
The tendency is to describe the concept with reference to the organisation of 
the state. Capitant states that it refers “order in the state, that is to say the arrangement 
of the institutions, the organisation of rules that are indispensable to the existence and 
functioning of the state.”516 Thus described, ordre public achieves three principal 
goals: (1) it helps to defend certain principles of natural law such as the equality of 
sexes and right to property enshrined in the constitution, (2) protects the social 
foundations of government policy such as the secular character of the state and 
recognition of polygamy and (3), it enables the courts to strike down any rules of law 
that seem irreconcilable with the legislative policies of the state.517 
                                                 
513 Jacques Ghetstin, “L’Ordre Public, Notion a contenu variable en Droit Privé Français”, in Perelman, 
Chaïm and Vander Elst, Raymond (ed.),  Les Notion a Contenu variable en Droit, Bruxelles, 
Etabilessement Emile Bruyant, 1984, p.78. 
514 Ibid. 
515 Ibid. 
516 “L’Ordre dans l’Etat, c’est -à - dire l’arrangement des institutions, l’organisation des règles qui sont 
indispensables à l’existence et au fonctionnement de l’Etat”,   Introduction à l’étude de droit civil, 
notions générales, Paris, 1898, pp. 25-33. 
517 Jacques Ghetstin, supra.,   94. 
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It is clear therefore, that ordre public is wider than public policy.518 In 
addition to enabling the courts to ensure the adaptability of law to the current need of 
a community, it also enables the conformity of rules of customary law to the general 
principles of law, which in succession should be the equality of all the members of the 
deceased family.519 
Consequently, courts in this part of the country have found no difficulty in 
relying on the constitution which enshrines the equality of sexes to exclude a rule of 
customary law in favour of relevant provisions of the French civil code on the ground 
that its application could result in a disruption of the established social order. The 
adopted principle of the code is said to constitute an evolution of the custom in 
question.520   
 
4.2.2.4: Exclusion for Incompatibility with Written Law 
In addition to repugnancy, section 27(1) of the Southern Cameroon High 
Court Law 1955 provides for the exclusion of customary law which is incompatible 
directly or by necessary implication “with any law for the time being in force.” For a 
custom to be excluded on this ground the statute and custom must regulate the same 
matter, and must be in conflict. There is no incompatibility if the customary law rule 
and the statute rule can function without interfering with the other. In Cameroon the 
payment of the customary dowry is not incompatible with a monogamous marriage, 
                                                 
518 See Dahl, Henry Saint, Dictionaire Juridique Dahl, Paris, Dalloz, 2001, 602. 
519 Youego, Christine, “Sources et Evolution de Droit des Succession aux Cameroun,” Doctorat thesis, 
university of Paris II, 1994, 306.  
520 See Enconchong, “Public Policy and Ordre Public: The Exclusion of Customary Law in Cameroon”, 
519. For example Affaire Tchokossi, 14 February 1974 (Supreme Court); Affaire Zang, 30 May 1974 
(Supreme);  Ebanda Njoh Elisse c/. Eyombwan Njoh Isaac, Arrêt No.42 du 9 Mar 1978 (Supreme 
Court) 
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given that the Civil Status Registration Ordinance No. 81-2 of 29 June 1981 
recognises its payment in both monogamous and polygamous marriages.521  
But the application of the requirement has been beset with the meaning to be 
attached to the word “law”; whether it includes both the common law and statutory 
law on the one hand, and the local and received English statutory laws on the other. 
Re Adadevoh522 intimated that it includes the common law but that view has been 
rejected by experts,523 because such a position entails engaging the entire arsenal of 
English law against customary law. And since custom must always conflict with 
some rule of common law, the position would mean the demise of customary law. 
 An acceptable view, 524 held in Rotibi v. Savage525 is that “law” refers to 
local enactments only. The defendant sought to avoid the payment of debt contracted 
under customary law, by invoking a provision of the Statute of Limitations, 1833, 
under which the debt had become time-barred. His reason was that since customary 
law knows no such limitation it was incompatible with the statute. His claim failed 
because no local statute contained a similar limitation. The same statute was pleaded 
in Lawal v. Abayomi526 with the intention to bar an action for account brought by 
family members against the successor. “Law” was held therein to include the 
received English law, the application of which is subject to the provision that “as 
regards causes and matters between natives, customary law shall be deemed 
applicable where it may appear to the Court that that substantial injustice would be 
done to either party by a strict adherence to English law.”527 Obviously the statute 
                                                 
521 Sections 70, 71, 72 and 74.  
522 (1951)13 W.A.C.A. 304. 
523 See for example Park, The Sources of Nigerian Law, London, Sweet and Maxwell, 1963, 78. 
524 Park, supra. 78. 
525 Also known as in the matter of Herbert Macaulay (1944) 17 N.L.R. 77, 82. 
526 (1946)18 N.L.R. 45, 47. 
527 See section 27(2) of the Southern Cameroon High Court Law, 1955.  
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was inapplicable because it would have resulted to injustice on the rest of the family 
and would have established a precedent preventing successors from rendering 
account of their management of an estate.  
More controversy was generated by Adesubokan v Yinusa.528 A Moslem 
made an English will and disposed of property contrary to the rules of Moslem law. 
The will was rejected at first instance for being incompatible with the rule of Moslem 
law. The decision was quashed by the Supreme Court of Nigeria on the ground that it 
constituted an infringement on testamentary freedom embedded in section 3 of the 
Wills Act 1837.  
We could not find a case in which the question has arisen in our courts.  If it 
did the majority view which is that compatibility is determined with reference to 
local statutory law will certainly prevail. Because these statutes take cognisance of 
local conditions, any incompatibility between them and customary law would be 
construed as an intention to abrogate the latter.  
For the courts in Francophone Cameroon customs “contrary to law” are 
excluded on the basis of raison écrite, the equivalent of incompatibility, which 
establishes the supremacy of written over unwritten law.529 Under Civil Law, law 
means written law since primacy is given to written as against case law. Therefore 
the problem as to whether “any law” includes non-statutory law does not arise. 
Incompatibility is judged with reference to both local and received French statutes, 
because the latter were specifically promulgated in that part of the country.  
Conscious that this might entail the complete exclusion of customary law 
since it is unlikely for most rules of customary law to be compatible with provisions 
                                                 
528 [1971] N.N.L.R. 77. 
529 See Nguini, Marcel, « Droit Moderne et Droit Traditionnel » (1973) 83 Penant, 1-10, 9. 
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of French statutes, a circular letter of the Ministry of Justice and Keeper of the Seals 
in January 1963530 established customary law as the droit commun531, while the 
written law was the law of exception. The colonial statutes maintained after 
independence were to be invoked only in the event of the silence of customary law in 
a given matter. However, the courts go their own way. Francophone Cameroonian 
judges are classed amongst those who even after independence, continue to behave as 
if they were in the colonial days when French law was the droit commun and 
customary law was the law of exception.532   
 
4.3: THE EFFECT OF THE EXCLUSION OF CUSTOMARY LAW 
The various methods of excluding customary law underscore the desire by the 
authorities to maintain only the rules likely to foster harmony and peaceful existence 
and not those with a propensity to result in strife and social disorder.  
When a customary rule that would otherwise be applicable is held inapplicable 
the question arises as to the effect of the exclusion. Firstly, the excluded custom does 
not thereby become invalid.533 The exclusion merely renders the custom inapplicable 
by the courts,534 but it continues to be applicable in non-judicial instances535 competent 
to settle matters in application of customary law. Certainly this practice is liable to 
retard the modernisation of the customary law because many people knowing that non-
judicial instances would settle their matters in application of the old rules of custom 
would prefer to take their matters there. True, these decisions have no legal force and 
                                                 
530 Marticou Riou, “Les statut personnels au Cameroun”, (1969) Revue Sénégalese de droit, p. 40. 
531 Droit commun in French law means the law applicable to every one. 
532 Vanderlinden, J., “Le juge et la coutume en Afrique aujourd’hui, cited by Youego, Christine, 
“Sources et Evolution de Droit des Succession aux Cameroun,” Doctorat thesis, university of Paris II, 
1994, 333-334.   
533 See Daniels, The common law in West Africa, 286. 
534 Ibid. 
535 See article 21 of the Decree of 15 July 1977 on the organisation of traditional chieftaincies; section 
61(2) Customary Courts Ordinance, chapter 142 of the 1948.   
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could still be reversed by the courts but, most aggrieved persons would be less inclined 
to pursue the matter after the decision of the divisional officer or the traditional 
council. 
Secondly, the courts will have to apply an alternative rule depending on the 
ground for exclusion. If the custom is excluded on grounds of incompatibility with 
local statute law the rule contained in the statute will be applied. If, on the other hand, 
the exclusion is on the other grounds, the initial approach is to apply an alternative rule 
of customary law approved by both parties as meeting the imperatives of natural 
justice, equity and conscience.536 The most common approach necessitated by the 
absence of alternative rules of custom is to apply the appropriate rule of the received 
laws. The latter option raises the question whether the rule of received law becomes 
assimilated to customary law or retains its status as a rule of English or French law. 
Francophone courts are authorised to substitute excluded rules of customary 
law with the relevant provision of the civil code of 1804.537 The adopted provisions 
take the form of coutumes evolués. The concept was evolved in the mid-1960s when 
the Supreme Court of East Cameroon departed from its initial position538 according to 
which it is the responsibility of the local population through its institutions to ensure 
the evolution of customary law, by empowering the courts to ensure such evolution. 539 
                                                 
536 See Park, The sources of Nigerian Law, 81. 
537 See Doumbé-Moulongo, M., Les coutumes et Droits aux Cameroun, Yaounde, CLE, 1972, 69. 
538 Supreme Court, arrêt No. 15/C du 22 Janvier, 1963, Bull. No. 8, 572. « Attendu que le caractère 
essentiel de la coutume est d’être évolutive ; que dans le domaine qui lui est réservé par le législatuer, 
elle est élaborée, décidée, et mis en oeuvre par les organes institionelles du groupe social qu’elle 
concerne, et anisi se développe, se modifie et se’ renouvelle d’une manière autonome et par ses propres 
voies en vue de son adaptation continue aux conditions et aux exigences nouvelles de la vie sociale.» 
539 Supreme Court decision of 11 June 1963, Penant, 1966, 73. Supreme Court decision of 19 May 
1964, Bull. 10 
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In Anglophone Cameroon the position has until recently been in line with the 
decision of the Privy Council in Eshugbayi Eleko v. Government of Nigeria.540 The 
court was confronted with two options in this case. Be guided by the objective of the 
repugnancy and public policy doctrines to exclude a supposedly modified version of 
the customary law or uphold the version and thus effect a modification of the 
customary law on the point. The court opted for the first alternative and held: “the 
Court cannot itself transform a barbarous custom into a milder one… It is the assent of  
the native community that gives a custom its validity, and, therefore, barbarous or mild, 
it must be shown to be recognised by the native community whose conduct it is 
supposed to regulate.” Hence a rule of English law applied in the place of an excluded 
rule of customary law does not become a rule of customary law. 
Professor Enonchong, however, seems to imply that the new rule becomes a 
rule of customary law: 
“In practice, however, the courts use principles of English common law 
and equity as substitutes [and statutes of general application]. I should 
perhaps take leave here to sound a note of caution. It is that when a rule 
is to be substituted for a displaced customary law rule it should be asked 
whether the replacing or ‘foreign rule’ can be inserted in toto into the 
system of customary law without doing violence to the basic and un-
impugned principles of that customary law as a whole.”541   
It is clear that he intends modification rather than substitution of the excluded 
rule. Daniels, fearing the disappearance of customary law had also proposed the use 
of the doctrine of severance, to save rules of customary law by “pruning away the 
palpably unpleasant aspects”542 of the custom. The problem is that neither of them 
                                                 
540   [1931] A.C. 662, 673. 
541 Enonchong, N., “Public policy and Ordre Public: the exclusion of Customary Law in Cameroon.” 
(1993) RADIC, vol.5, No. 3, pp. 503-524, 520. 
542 Daniels, W.C. Ekow, The Common Law in West Africa, London, Butterworths, 1964, p. 286. 
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provides guidelines as to how an excluded rule could be modified. How, for instance, 
would the rule that a woman cannot inherit property be modified, without doing 
violence to the principle according to which judicial discretion can only be exercised 
within accepted legal rules?  
As will be shown later the High Courts with authority to administer both 
English and customary law can only apply the customary law “binding between the 
parties”. Failing this, the courts could only apply English law543 as they have no 
authority to apply any other customary law which could be more favourable to 
women. 
This question is, however, only of academic significance today, because of the 
extension to Anglophone Cameroon of the concept of coutumes evolués,544 by the 
Supreme Court in the Chibikom v. Zamcho Florence.545 Hence a rule of English law 
used as the substitute of an excluded rule of customary law becomes customary law 
and can be invoked in other cases of customary law. 
 
4.4: APPLICATION OF MUSLIM LAW 
The status of Muslim law varies from one country or community to another. In 
some, such as Somaliland and Northern Nigeria where its application per se has been 
expressly decreed, it constitutes the fundamental law with respect to the matters for 
which its application is decreed.546 It is there not applied as customary law no matter 
how fused it must have become with the latter. Instead it is customary law whose 
exceptional application is expressly or tacitly authorised.  
                                                 
543 See 3.3.2.2.1. 
544 As will be shown later in 7.4. 
545 Arrêt no. 14/ L du 4 Fevrier 1993 (1995) 21 Juridis Info 29. 
546 See J.N.D. Anderson, Islamic Law in Africa, London, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1954, pp. 5-
6. 
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In others it is applied as the dominant law because as a result of the presence 
of a Muslim majority its treatment as “the native law and custom prevailing in the 
area of the jurisdiction” of a customary court is justified.547 Muslim courts exercise 
jurisdiction over persons still subject to customary law, but who are represented in 
litigations by assessors. This is also the case in parts of Northern Nigeria.  
In the third category, Muslim law is only a particular law attaching to greater 
or less extent to some group, family or individual.548 Muslim law constitutes the 
minority but its adherents are granted certain privileges in regard to its application and 
administration within their own communities. In the last category, no recognition is 
given to Moslem law and its application is ensured by the ordinary courts subject to 
the rules that govern people whose personal law differs from the local customary 
law.549 
Cameroon is a secular state550 with a unified judicial system, thus Muslim law 
is neither the fundamental law of the country nor the dominant law of any community.  
It applies only within the third and fourth categories. The North West Province, 
because of the existence of a large Muslim population would fall in the third category. 
Muslim law is applied and administered not by ordinary customary courts but by the 
Muslim Alkali Courts.551 On the other hand, the South West Province with only a few 
Muslim converts and immigrants would fall in the fourth category. Disputes involving 
Muslims are determined in the ordinary customary courts which with the help of 
                                                 
547 See Park, The sources of Nigerian Law, p. 180. 
548 Anderson, Islamic Law in Africa, London, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1954, pp. 5-6. 
549 Phillips, Arthur, (ed), A Survey of African Law, Oxford University Press, 1953, p. 232-233. 
550 See Article 1(2) of the 1961 Constitution, and the preamble of the 1972 and 1996 Constitutions. 
551 More on these in the section on Jurisdiction in chapter three 
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witnesses applies Muslim law as “the law binding between the parties” as against the 
predominant law of the locality.552 
In Francophone Cameroon Muslim law is administered in the same courts that 
administer ordinary customary law. Thus the rule that the courts apply the customs of 
the parties reduces Muslim law to an insignificant position even with the existence of 
a dominant Muslim population, as in the three Northern Provinces and Noun Division 
in the Western Province.  
In-as-much as there is no derogation from the basic tenets of the law553 
contained in the Quran and Sunna,554Muslim law could be modified by the local 
customary law. The secondary sources are the agents of modification as they are 
themselves the results of scholastic adaptations of Quranic or Sunni provisions to the 
specific circumstances of their time and localities. What is accepted as Muslim law in 
Cameroon is thus the adaptation of Quranic and Sunna prescriptions to the customary 
laws of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, India and Pakistan.555 In this respect the great 
Muslim scholar Dr. Hashim Mahdi, concludes his account on the evolution of Muslim 
law with the statement: “This is the law we have selected for presentation to all 
Islamic minorities of non-Muslim states, acting in accordance with the efficiency 
demanded of us. We have selected this law because its preparation matured for nine 
years at the hands of eminent scholars and committees, first in Egypt and then in 
                                                 
552 See Alhaji Garuba v. Next of Kin, C/S 29/84-85 (unreported), submitted to the Limbe Customary 
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553 Anderson, supra. P. 172. 
554 See Ajijiola, A.D. Introduction to Islamic Law, p.340. 
555See François, A., Commentary on   AffaireDame Dada Balkissou v. Abdoul Karim Mohamed, Cour 
Supreme, Arrêt No. 2/L du 10 Octobre 1985, in Juridis info. No.8, 1991, pp. 53-59, 56, see also Ajijola,  
ibid, p. 347. 
 153
Damascus, and because it has dealt with all that needs to be dealt with in the present 
day.”556 
Hence local customary laws tend to lend colour to Muslim law. Anyangwe’s 
statement that “given the interaction over the years with the local natives and their 
customs, Islamic law which obtains in the Northern part of Cameroon has become 
diluted”557 is true of all the other communities with a Muslim population and even 
beyond.558  The concept of family property is for example, unknown in Muslim law, 
but was held to constitute part thereof in In the Estate of Baba Nya,559 where the 
customary and appeal courts in application of Muslim law held that the family of the 
husband of a deceased widow was entitled to her property against claims of next-of- 
kin (another example of the influence of custom), made by the appellant, a complete 
stranger claiming to be the “God-son” of the deceased. In the opinion of the appellate 
jurisdiction no other person is entitled to succession “when the family is still in 
existence. The late man died and his family came and did his death rites.”560 The 
influence of the local customary law is also evident in Gboron Yaccouba & Anemena 
Suzanne v. Mbombo Asang & Ndam Emile.561 The deceased was a Bamoun from 
Noun Division, one of the communities in Cameroon with a predominant Muslim 
population. The widow sought for the estate to be distributed so that she gets into her 
entitlement under Muslim law. This was rejected by the trial court and the decision 
                                                 
556 Muslim Personal Law, London, TA-HA  Publishers Ltd., 2009, 5.  
557 The Cameroonian Judicial System, p. 13.   
558 Roland and Lampue writing about Muslim law in French West Africa write “le droit Musulman 
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559(1985) Suit No. C.A.S.W.P/CC/16/85 (unreported). 
  
560 Emphasis added. 
561 Cour d’Appel de l’Ouest, Bafoussam, Arrêt No.001/C du 23 Octobre 1997 (unreported)  
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was upheld by the Court of Appeal which, basing the decision on the local customary 
law held that “en coutume Bamoun, la femme n’ hérite pas.”       
 
4.5: COURTS ADMINISTERING THE CUSTOMARY LAW OF 
SUCCESSION 
4.5.1: Original Jurisdiction: Customary Courts and Tribunaux de Premier 
Degré  
We will only discuss the Customary Courts here, as their counterparts the 
Tribunaux de Premier Degré have already been considered in chapter three.  
The Customary Courts include ordinary customary courts administering native 
laws and custom and Alkali courts administering Muslim law. The first Alkali Court 
was established in Ndop by the Alkali of Yola (Nigeria) in 1946,562 and the Alkalis’ 
Courts (Validation of Acts) Law, 1960 was passed to validate all the acts of the court 
from the date of its creation563. Seven others have since been created and all of them 
in the North West Province.564 The Alkali of Ndop serves as the chief Alkali and goes 
on assizes to the South West Province where no Alkali Courts exist. Muslim litigants 
in the South West either take their cases to the ordinary customary courts 565 or the 
local Imam who attempts conciliation and when this fails transmits it to the Chief 
Alkali for hearing during the assizes.  
We noticed the absence of women in the constitution of both the customary 
and Alkali courts. Any changes in the customary law coming from these courts can 
                                                 
562 Information provided by Mallam Muhamadou Bello, chief Alkali of Cameroon. 
563 Section 2 of the Act reads: “Anything which has been done by an Alkali’s Court (which expressly 
mean an Alkali acting with or without assessors) in Southern Cameroons before the commencement of 
this Law in purported exercise of any such powers as are conferred on Native Courts by the Native 
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Court lawfully established under the Native Courts Ordinance shall be deemed to have been lawfully, 
validly and effectively done.”  
564 The Alkali courts of Banso, Nkambe, Mbengwi, Wum, Ndarawa, Fundong, and Kumbo.  
565  See Alhaji Garuba v. Next of Kin, C/S 29/84-85(Customary Court ,Limbe) (unreported). 
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therefore only be initiated by men and might, as we shall see, only be in half measures 
or laden with limitations.566   
This anomaly could be attributed to the continued application of the Native 
Courts Ordinance Cap 142 of the 1948 Laws of Nigeria.567 The English colonial 
policy of indirect rule prevented the administration from interfering with the manner 
in which the courts were composed.568 The Ordinance has been partly modified by the 
Adaptation of Existing Laws Order 1963, based on the Customary Courts Law of 
1956 which never went into effect because the official notice in the Gazette required 
to render it operational was never given.569 The modifications are today contained in 
the Customary Courts Manual Volume 1, rendered operational by Legal Notice 
No.119 of 1965, which serves as guide for the customary courts. The practice, though 
unorthodox is to refer to the amended version of the Customary Courts Ordinance as 
contained in the Manual as if it is the original version of the Ordinance.570 
The ratione personae jurisdiction of the Courts is embedded in section 14(1) 
of the Native Courts Ordinance of 1948:  
“Every Native Court shall have full jurisdiction and power, to the extent 
set forth in the warrant establishing it, and, subject to the provisions of this 
law, in all civil and criminal matters in which all the parties belong to a 
                                                 
566 This will be demonstrated in the chapter four, dealing with intestacy under customary law . 
567 Jesco Manga Williams’s v. The President, Native court Victoria. (1962-1964) W.C.L.R. 34. 
568 The colonial administrators were only concerned with the conformity of the customs and court 
procdure with the notions of natural justice, equity and good conscience.     
569 Section 1 of the Law reads: “This … and shall come into operation on a day to be appointed by the 
Governor-general by Notice in the Southern Cameroons Gazette,”    
570 Just a few examples: In Anyangwe’s The Cameroonian Judicial System, citations from the 
Customary Courts Ordinance in pages 76-77 are actually of the Customary Courts Law. Professor 
Enonchong in his article “Public Policy and Ordre Public: The Exclusion of customary law in 
Cameroon.”(1993) RADIC, 503-524 refers in page 505 to section 18 of the Ordinance and then to 
section 10 which actually comes from the Ordinance without noticing the oddity of two sections in the 
same statute saying the same thing. In Jemba Solomon Nangah v. Emilia Okole Otte, (2002) 
C.A.S.W.P/CC/14/2002 section 18 was also cited as if it is of the Ordinance. 
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class of persons who have ordinarily been subject to the jurisdiction of 
customary tribunals.”571  
 
Persons of Cameroonian nationality immediately come to mind as being 
ordinarily subject to the jurisdiction of customary courts. The Ordinance, however, 
allows the possibility for the jurisdiction to be extended to any other person of an 
African background who must have consented to such jurisdiction.572 It is therefore 
commonplace to find foreigners submitting their cases to either the customary573 or 
Alkali574 courts. 
Section 16, read together with its schedule enshrines the ratione materiae 
jurisdiction of customary courts. It gives the courts:   
“Full jurisdiction in matters and causes relating to succession and 
administration of estates under customary law and in causes and matters 
in which no claim is made for, and which do not relate to, money or 
other property, and full jurisdiction in all matrimonial causes other than 
arising from or connected with a Christian marriage as defined in section 
1 of the Criminal Code.” 
 
The courts therefore are competent if the deceased was ordinarily subject to 
their jurisdiction. However, if the action is instituted by a creditor, for example, 
because of a debt owed to him by the deceased, the jurisdiction of the courts will be 
excluded if the amount involved exceeds the equivalent of £100 in the local CFA 
                                                 
571 My emphasis.  
572 Historically the jurisdiction could only be extended as provided by section 14(3) of the Customary 
Courts Ordinance 1948, on the orders of the Governor-General and endorsed in a resolution of the 
Southern Cameroons House of Assembly. One such resolution extended the jurisdiction to Nigerians 
and “Native-foreigners. (See Anyangwe, Carlson, The Cameroonian Judicial System, p. 77).  
573 The Matter of Ethel Nworie Akabueze (Nigerians), Muyuka Customary Court, Suit 
No.34/2003/2004.   
574 Hadjih Isah v. Buba Balkissou (Nigerians), Alkali court Mbengwi, Suit No.24/91-92.  
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Francs.575 This should dispel misunderstandings according to which the jurisdiction of 
the courts is generally limited by the pecuniary value of the property involved.576   
The schedule clearly excludes Christian marriages from the jurisdiction of the 
courts, implying that marriage types are common indicators as to whether or not a 
person is ordinarily subject to the jurisdiction of customary courts. De facto 
monogamous marriages common in customary societies do not per se divest a person 
of his status under customary law, given that such marriages are generally potentially 
polygamous.577  
Another indicator is the general life-style of the deceased. In Daniel Njike v 
Zachius Ehang578 it was clear that the deceased was a polygamist, but the High Court 
ignored this fact and instead ordered579 the case to be tried at first instance by the 
appropriate Customary Court on the basis of evidence provided by the chief about the 
customary status of the deceased. 
 Leaving a will in English form would also produce the same effect as 
contracting Christian marriages on the basis that both are unknown in customary law 
as will be shown in the chapter on the conflict of laws. In either situation the deceased 
would not be said to have been ordinarily subject to traditional jurisdictions which 
should normally decline jurisdiction and direct the parties to the appropriate High 
Court. 
 
 
                                                 
575 The limitation is ordained by schedule 16(B)(1) which empowers the courts to entertain “Civil 
actions in which the debt, demand or damages do not exceed one hundred pounds.” 
576 See Ewang, Andrew Sone, “The place of customary law in the Cameroonian Legal system” (2001) 
FUNDAMINA, 70-84, 80); Mikano Emmanuel Kiye, “The Importance of Customary Law in Africa:  
A Cameroonian case study”, Doctoral Thesis, VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT BRUSSEL,  June 2007, 94. 
577 In Tufon v. Tufon, Suit No. HCB/59MC/83 (Unreported),  the High Court of Bamenda declined 
jurisdiction in a case where the marriage certificate showed that the parties were monogamously 
married but the surrounding circumstances showed that the marriage was potentially polygamous. 
578 (1978) The University of Yaoundé Law Reports, pp. 92. 
579 The Court was acting in its capacity as an appellate jurisdiction. 
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4.5.2: The High Courts. 
 The competence of the High Courts in the administration of the customary 
law of succession could be drawn from section 27(2) of the Southern Cameroon High 
Court Law 1955. That sub-section empowers the courts are to administer “such native 
law and custom as shall be deemed applicable in causes and matters where the parties 
thereto are natives and also in causes and matters between natives and non-natives 
where it may appear to the courts that substantial injustice would be done to either 
party by a strict adherence to the rules of English law.”   
For the purpose of the High Courts section 3 of the Interpretation Ordinance 
(Colony and Protectorate), chapter 94 of the 1948 Laws of Nigeria defines a native as 
including “a native of Nigeria [Cameroon] and a native foreigner.” A native of 
Cameroon is “any person whose parents were members of a tribe indigenous to 
Cameroon and the descendants of such persons, including any persons one of whose 
parents was a member of such a tribe”. A “native foreigner” is “any person [not being 
a native of Cameroon] whose parents were [Sic] members of a tribe or tribes 
indigenous to some part of Africa and descendants of such persons, and shall include 
any persons one of whose parents was member of such a tribe.” 
It follows that an African from any part of the continent where tribal 
institutions have existed is a “native.” Moreover, persons of half-blood, only one of 
whose parents was an African also come within the classification. Reference to the 
descendants of such persons could result in a situation where Negroes from America 
or the West Indies would be treated as natives,580 liable to claim succession rights 
under customary law and their estates equally subjected to customary law. 
 
                                                 
580 Park, p.108 
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4.5.3: Appellate Jurisdiction: Courts of Appeal and Supreme Court  
Same as in 2.2.2 (supra.) 
 
4.6: DETERMINING THE INTESTATE BENEFICIARIES 
There are no equivalents of a presumption of survivorship in customary law. 
Probably there is no need for one because succession is by the family which has a 
perpetual existence and it is impossible for the whole family to perish simultaneously. 
No such presumption also exists in the Muslim Maliki law581 and Authority for the 
position is drawn from account by one of the early Muslim leaders. It is recounted that 
after the battle of Yamanah in which many Muslims died, Sayyiduna Abu Bakr 
ordered Zayd Ibn Thabit to distribute their estates. In a later appointment by Umar Ibn 
al-Khattab, Zayd Ibn Thabit himself narrated as follows: “Umar ordered me to take 
charge of distributing the inheritance of people who died in the plague, and in some 
cases, a whole tribe had died, so I made those who survived inherit from those who 
had died, but did not make those who had died to inherit from each other.” 582 It was 
therefore not presumed that any of the deceased persons had survived the other, 
because if it did their next-of-kin would have been given their shares. 
 
4.6.1: THE FAMILY AS THE MAIN UNIT OF SUCCESSION  
The rules governing the devolution of property in any society are generally a 
reflection of the way in which that society deals with the question of economic 
stability beyond the life of the present members.583 According to Rattray “it is in the 
social organisation of a people in which lie the germs of the legal system which they 
                                                 
581 Ajijola, A. D., Introduction to Islamic Law, New Delhi, International Islamic Publishers, 1989, 231.  
 
582 See Abdar Rahnman I. Doi, Shari’ah: Islamic Law, London, TA-HA Publishers Ltd., 2009, 415. 
583 See Okoth-Ogendo, H.W.O., “Property Systems and Social Organisation in Africa: An Essay on the 
Relative Position of Women under Indigenous and Received Law,” in Takirambudde, P. N. (ed.) The 
individual Under African Law, Gaborone, University of Botswana, 1982, 152.  
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are later to develop.”584 The communal nature of property ownership therefore 
influences succession in customary law. With the exception of Moslem law585 
succession is by the family and not the individual. The idea, writes Ngongang- 
Ouandji is “founded on the necessity to continue and to transmit the state of the 
society from the former to the present generation.”586 The rights acquired by the 
individual beneficiaries are those of use and enjoyment. It is immaterial that the 
property in question is personally acquired, for the idea of private ownership subsists 
only while a person is alive or dies testate. When he dies intestate the presumption is 
that the property becomes family property.587  
   In Stella Nunga & 5 others v. Clara Kumbongsi & 4 Others, the deceased 
died intestate leaving personally acquired property covered by a certificate of 
occupancy. He was survived by his widow who was the fourth respondent in this 
appeal and six children, appellants in this action. The widow to whom letters of 
administration were granted borrowed money from the first respondent which she was 
unable to repay. Against protests from the appellants the first respondent brought an 
action at first instance to attach the property and succeeded. The decision was 
reversed at appeal and Ekema, J. said: 
“The late Nunga did not at his death, will the property in question to his 
wife, Helen Nunga. His property therefore became family property at his 
death. Consequently, all the beneficiaries of the Nunga estate had an 
interest in the estate.”588 
                                                 
584 Ashanti Law and constitution, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1929, 2.  
585 See Ngongang-Ouandji, Andre, “La devolution successorale au Cameroun”, (1972) 26 Rev. Jur. 
Pol. Ind. Coop. 639-662, 645. 
586 «  L’ordre de succession est fondé sur la néccessité de continuer et de transmettre l’etat de la sociét, 
de la génération qui passe à celle qui suit. » Ibid, 642. 
587 See Binet, Jacques, “La devolution successorale chez les Douala du Cameroun”, (1955) 65 Penant, 
33-40, 34. 
 
588 Cameroon Common Law Report, Part 5, 189, 194. See also Jemba v. Emilia Kombone Bakundu 
Customary Court, Civil Suit No. 25/2000/2001(unreported). The deceased intestate left two personally 
acquired farms. Upon his death his sister who was the mother of the parties succeeded to the property 
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In Daniel Nde v. Mokom Clement589, the parties were the grand children of the 
deceased intestate. The respondent as administrator of the estate instituted and 
succeeded in an action in trespass to land against the appellant at the trial level. This 
was reversed on appeal on the ground that, the land not having been distributed was 
family land over which both parties had equal rights to possession.  
 
4.6.1.1: The conception of “Family” for the purpose of succession.  
Ollennu’s conception of the family as “the social group into which a person is 
born”590 could be unequivocally applied in all the three systems of the customary law 
of succession. Birth into the same family with the deceased is cardinal in the 
relationship, meaning that persons related to the deceased in a manner other than by 
birth cannot aspire to be his successors. The family consists of all the persons lineally 
descended from a common patrilineal ancestor or matrilineal ancestress, to be seen 
soon.   
One important question relates to the ambit of the family entitled to 
succession, whether it includes everyone who claims the relationship, however 
remote. Experts on African customary law classify the family into the extended, 
immediate and sub-families. The extended family is that which is originated by a 
grandparent or great-grand parent of the deceased and includes in order of priority 
that parent and his descendants.591  
                                                                                                                                            
since this was a matrilineal society. When their mother also died conflict erupted between the parties 
when the plaintiff as the male surviving relative claimed that the property belonged to him exclusively. 
It was held that both farms belonged to the parties as a family and not to an individual. In the words of 
the court the, “family or maternal family properties are usually inherited and enjoyed by the entire 
maternal family. Therefore the property of Sango Thomas Tanye who died without a surviving child is 
the maternal property enjoyed by the maternal family.” 
589 (1998) 34 Juridis Périodique 39.  
590 The Law of Testate and Intestate Succession in Ghana, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1968, 71. 
591 See Ollennu, The ;law of testate and intestate succession in Ghana, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 
1966, 73. 
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The immediate family is originated by the parent of the deceased. It includes 
the parent, the brothers and sisters, their children and subsequent generations of 
children. There is no limit to the number of generations of descent of the extended and 
immediate families. It could be assumed, however, that given the short life 
expectancy in customary communities it would be difficult to have cases in which the 
gap between the deceased and the claimant goes beyond two generations in each 
category.  
The sub-family is originated by the deceased and consists essentially of his or 
her children if the deceased is a male in a patrilineal system or a female in matrilineal 
system.592 
Ideally every one who comes within the definition of “family” should qualify 
as a beneficiary as this would prevent the exclusions, principally responsible for the 
bickering that often follows upon succession rulings.  Ollennu must have had this in 
mind when he wrote: “When in later life a person comes to have children, he or she 
becomes inseparable from either the immediate family into which he or she was born, 
or from the generation he or she raises, he therefore must of necessity belong jointly 
to the trunk and to the branch.”593 Literally it means that the succession should be by 
the sub or nuclear family and the immediate family jointly. In this arrangement the 
immediate family would certainly come in only in order of precedence. Accepting 
that Ollennu intended this order of precedence, it will mean, in the absence of 
members of the immediate family, that members of the extended family would come 
in.  
The arrangement would have taken cognisance of the duty of maintenance 
which as noted earlier should constitute the basis for succession. But it is apparently 
                                                 
592 See Bentsi-Enchill, Ghana Land Law, 27. 
593 Supra, 74. 
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too ideal to be adopted in practice, unless, perhaps, in a situation where the estate is 
very large and there is only a lone surviving relative of the category closest to the 
deceased. 
Neither the patrilineal nor the matrilineal systems in Cameroon adopt 
Ollennu’s view, each of which adopts an order of succession to reflect its basic 
principle. 
 
4.6.1.2: The Patrilineal System. 
In patrilineal systems, jural relations in kinship are strictly confined, through 
males, to a lineage or clan going back to an original ancestor. It is based on a 
branching process which extension and complexity increases with each generation of 
male children. The lineage bears the name of its founder and the rules of succession 
are designed to keep the lineage alive. Such a mission could only be assured by male 
descendants as against women who would be called to marriage one day in order to 
ensure the continuity of another lineage-that of their husbands. Succession to the 
property of an unmarried woman is subjected to the same rules notwithstanding that 
women are not deemed capable to ensure the continuity of the lineage.  
Most studies on the customary law of succession tend to interpret the need to 
keep land in the family as meaning that women are not entitled to succession. 
Credence is given to this by studies which purport to lay down the order of succession 
but fail to clarify that the order relates only to the designation of the family head or 
successor with a mission to ensure that land remains in the family. Nwabueze for 
example lays down the following order (i) the issue; (ii) brothers ( and sisters in some 
communities) of the whole blood; (iii) parents; (iv) half brothers (and half sisters in 
some communities); (v) issue of brothers. Etc.  These orders594 embody the privileged 
                                                 
594 Nigerian Land Law, Enugu (Nigeria) Nwamife Publishers, 1972, 381 
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position of male relatives as family heads but do not exclude women from the list of 
beneficiaries.  
The absence of clarification has given rise to the practice of excluding women 
even from being beneficiaries. These orders should normally only be indicative and 
while the headship goes to the male, each member within the category, without 
distinction of gender should qualify as a beneficiary. 
The existence of issue either as sons and daughters excludes persons of the 
more remote categories. And the issue include children en ventre sa mere, illegitimate 
children acknowledged by the deceased in his lifetime and adopted children. In 
Ministère Public c/ Pangou Bello,595 the respondent failed at the trial and appeal 
levels to be declared successor over the estate of his son. The custom provided that 
the father succeeds the son when the latter dies without an heir but it was established 
that the widow was pregnant with the principal beneficiary in this case before the 
deceased’s death.  Similarly in La Succession Messe Madeleine, the deceased woman 
was survived by her children and her father. In this action the father claimed to be 
entitled to her succession to the exclusion of the children. It was held that in 
accordance with the Bamileke customary law when the deceased is survived by issue, 
these are the joint beneficiaries to the exclusion of any other persons.596 In Jemba v. 
Emilia597 the nephew and niece took because the intestate “had no child of his own 
who should have been beneficiaries of the assets” and their mother who was the 
deceased sister was also dead. In default of the immediate family, members of the 
extended family come in, taking in the same order of precedence.598 
                                                 
595 (1996) 26 Juridis Périodique, 24. (Tribunal de Premier Degré of Kaele and the Court of Appeal of 
Maroua) 
596 Tribunal de Premier Degré de Dschang, Jugement No. 18/C du 15 Janvier 1996 (unreported) 
597 Kombone Bakundu Customary Court, Civil Suit No. 25/2000/2001. (unreported) matrilineal society. 
598 See Ngongang-Ouandji, Andre, “La devolution successorale au Cameroun”, (1972) 26 Rev. Jur. 
Pol. Ind. Coop. 639-662, 652. 
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 4.6.1.3: The Matrilineal System.   
The distinctive feature in matrilineal systems is that descent is traced through 
the mother, all those descended from a common ancestress forming a matrilineage. 
This means that a man and his children must necessarily belong to different 
matrilineages. A man’s immediate matrilineage consists of himself, his mother, his 
full and uterine brothers and sisters, his mother’s brothers and sisters, his maternal 
grandmother, his maternal grandmother’s maternal grand mother etc. it is from this 
group that he can inherit and it is they who can inherit from him. On a man’s death 
therefore the order of succession is divided into the following categories (i) his 
mother, his full and uterine brothers and sisters; (ii) the issue of his full and uterine 
sisters; (iii) his mother’s full and uterine brothers and sisters; (iv) the issue of his 
mother’s full and uterine sisters; (v) his maternal grandmother etc.599 Clearly as in 
any other system of succession the existence of persons in the category closest to the 
deceased excludes the others and even within the categories the closeness in degrees 
is another ground for exclusion. For example in the first category, the existence of the 
mother automatically excludes the full and uterine brothers and sisters.  
Two observations emerge from this arrangement. The first and undoubtedly 
the most distinctive characteristic of the system is that a child cannot inherit from his 
father, and child under the system includes that who was born out of wedlock but was 
recognised by the deceased and treated as his child. If there is anything repugnant in 
this it is that the rule could dissuade a man from acquiring property knowing that it 
                                                 
599 See Edith, Ndima, “Theory and Practice in Matrilineal Tribes,” term paper, Faculty of Law, 
University of Dschang, 2000 (unpublished); Anye Dieudonné, “Avoiding the Effects of Matriliny in 
the Balue Tribe in Ndian Division,” term paper Faculty of Law, University of Dschang, 
2004(unpublished). 
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would go to some relative of his mother’s or even to educate his own children on the 
ground that the child’s property will go his mother’s family.  
From the point of view of the child the rule cannot be dismissed immediately 
as being repugnant given that it could be possible that the uncle from whom he 
succeeds is richer than his own father. Furthermore although succession is matrilineal 
members of the communities live in the compounds of their various patrilineages, 
hence the children live in their father’s compound and this means that he has 
obligations towards them. A father in matrilineal communities has an unquestioned 
obligation to house, support and advance his children600 and these are the obligations 
which upon the death of a man intestate are taken over by the successor and which are 
enforceable against him.601 
If the rule that children are not entitled to their father’s succession has been 
applied with ease in the case of a deceased male it has not been the same in the case 
of a deceased female. The rule according to which succession follows the woman’s 
bloodline implies that every woman is the beginning of a new family602 and the 
question arises whether her direct descendants should not be given priority in 
succession as against her matrilineal relatives. In Mills v. Addy603 Ollennu, J. ruled in 
favour the descendants but apparently, only because there were no surviving members 
of the deceased’s matrilineal family. This decision could not therefore be authority on 
the point since a different decision might have been possible if there were matrilineal 
descendants of the deceased.604  
                                                 
600 See Ollennu, N. A., The Law of Testate and Intestate Succession in Ghana, London, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1966, 217-222. 
601 See In the Matter of the Estate of Edward Anfu Whyte (1946) 18 N.L.R 70. 
602 See Mills v. Addy   (1959) 3 W.A.L.R. 357, 362, cited by Ollennu, supra, 78, in which it was said 
that every woman is the originator of a family.  
603 (1959) 3 W.A.L.R. 357, 
604 See Woodman, G. R. “Two Problems in matrilineal succession” (1969) 1 Rev. Ghana Law, 6-30, 
18. 
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This was the case in Krakue v. Krabah605 where the plaintiff, a brother of the 
deceased sued the daughter of the deceased for an account of rents from the property, 
and an injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the plaintiff’s right. 
The defendant challenged the plaintiff’s locus standi arguing inter alia that he was not 
a member of the inheriting family. It was held by the Supreme Court that the right to 
the immediate enjoyment vested in the immediate family, and that this consisted of all 
the matrilineal descendants of the mother of the deceased woman. 
 It seems, however, to be settled law that the issue of a deceased woman takes 
precedence over her matrilineal relatives. In Krakue v. Krabah Ollennu delivered a 
dissenting judgment in which he changed his earlier position in Mills v. Addy. Bentsi-
Enchill favours succession by the descendants of a deceased woman.606 In a similar 
vein Woodman writes that “If a man and his female uterine cousin are the sole 
surviving matrilineal descendants of their grandmother, he belongs to the cousin’s 
immediate family; but as soon as she has children, he ceases to belong to it….”607    
The second observation which emerges from the order of succession is that 
men and women have equal succession rights, for not only are they entitled to share in 
the distribution of the estate,608  it is accepted as a rule that they can be family heads 
or successors. This is so in the Bakundu Balue matrilineal system. In The matter of 
Chief Moleke of Bafaka Village609 the sister of a deceased male was made successor 
as against his children.   
  A variation has however been noted in the Kom and other tribes in the North 
West Province purporting to practice matrilineal succession. Even though the general 
                                                 
605 Cited by Woodman, ibid, 19. 
606 Ghana land law, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1964, 128. 
607 “Two Problems in matrilineal succession” (1969) 1 Rev. Ghana Law, 6-30, 24. 
608 Ngongang-Ouandji, Andre, “La devolution successorale au Cameroun”, (1972) 26 Rev. Jur. Pol. 
Ind. Coop. 639-662, 645; John Anthony Howard, “Customary Law of Marriage and Succession among 
the Kom of Cameroon”, Ph. D. thesis, University of London, 1972, 218-222 (unpublished). 
609 Mbonge Customary Court, suit no. 17-10-12 (unreported) 
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rule that succession follows the woman’s bloodline in respected, women find 
themselves in a position similar to their counterparts in the patrilineal tribes.610 
According to Vubo, “A woman is almost confined to the role of producer of the 
lineage, ensuring lineage continuity although she could intercede before the ancestral 
spirits for the welfare of her household or usurp the right of exercising the role of 
caretaker over her deceased brother’s property.”611 Hence upon the death of a man 
succession to his property is by his nephew.612 In default of nephews the search for a 
successor goes down the line to his first maternal cousins rather than give succession 
to the nieces. Only when no cousins are found are nieces allowed to succeed but only 
after the fiat of a family council. 
 
4.6.1.4: The position of widows. 
 None of the definitions for the term “family” includes the widow on the 
ground that she and the husband have different lineages. But if this is true of the 
extended and immediate families, it cannot be so with the sub-family. This is a family 
which consists of the spouses and their descendants and which ought therefore to be 
defined not in terms of lineage but in terms of marriage, reason why the widow ought 
to be considered as a member of the deceased sub-family and given succession rights 
therein, although not in the larger family?613 
The widow is the bête-noire of the family accused of the all the ills. Her 
greatest challenge comes from her female counterparts who, if they do not accuse her 
                                                 
610 See John Anthony Howard, “Customary Law of Marriage and Succession among the Kom of 
Cameroon”, Ph. D. thesis, University of London, 1972, 17. 
611Vubo, Emmanuel Yensu, “Matriliny and Patriliny Between Cohabitation- Equilibrium and 
Modernity in the Cameroon Grassfields, available at  http://www.jamboafrica.kyoto  
612 See Buo Kang Mathias v. Mih Izagha, Wum Customary Court, Suit No. 8/02-03 (unreported); Bah 
Ekom Amos v. Ebua Batali, Wum Customary Court, Suit No. 12/02-03 (unreported). Cited by Amos, 
Wango Chianan,“Theory and Practice of Matrilineal Succession,” unpublished term paper, Faculty of 
law, University of Dschang, 2003. See also Edith, Ndima, “Theory and Practice in Matrilineal Tribes,” 
term paper, Faculty of Law, University of Dschang, 2000.  
613 See the decision of Yaoundé Court of Appeal, Arrêt No. 47 of 10 January 1991 (unreported) which 
ruled that a daughter-in –law could not be her mother-in-law’s successor.    
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of having killed their brother, would accuse her of having enjoyed his wealth alone 
and for having probably prevented him from helping the family members. With this 
image of the widow and coupled with fact that she is viewed as a stranger to the 
family, the possibility of her succeeding are very remote.    
  Native law and custom generally resolved the question of the succession rights 
of widows by providing that they could get married to another male relative of the 
deceased husband and so continue to be a member of the household with all the rights 
that go with it. As will be shown later the institution of levirate marriage is fast ebbing 
out but this should not be taken to mean that widows are always left destitute.  
Widows have rights erroneously described as succession rights, probably 
because of the death of their husbands. They include the right to maintenance, 
residence in the matrimonial home and arable land. These actually constitute some of 
the duties which the deceased owed to his wife and which were enforceable against 
him.614   
In Nsom Fombui Amborse v. Nkuo Kelvine615 the nephew of the deceased was 
held to have erred in sending the widow and children out of the compound and 
installing himself therein. In fact the widow was reinstated in the home and the 
succession was transferred to a different person. Enforcement of the right to 
maintenance against the successor could even result in the successor losing some of 
his rights in favour of the widow. This is common where the deceased was entitled to 
financial benefits which after his death go to the successor. Such benefits are 
generally transferred to the widow so that the successor only has the title of family 
                                                 
614See Mbouyom, Francois-Xavier, « Le statut juridique, politique et social de la femme au 
Cameroun.» (1974)  28 Rev. Jur. Pol. Ind. Coop. 600-612, 603 ; John Anthony Howard, “Customary 
Law of Marriage and Succession among the Kom of Cameroon”, Ph. D. thesis, University of London, 
1972, 218-225 ; Dzeukou, Guy Blaise, « Le Juge entre coutume et la loi dans le droit de la famille : 
Essai sur le pluralisme juridique au Cameroun », thesis, university of Paris I, 2002, 428 et seq. 
(unpublished)  
615 Suit No. BOHC/PD/LA/02/02-03 (High Court Boyo Division, North West province) (unreported) 
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head. In Mukete Rebecca v. Mokube Solomon Sakwe616 the widow brought an action 
in the customary court claiming to replace the successor on the ground that he was 
irresponsible and was neglecting his obligations to maintain her and the children. Her 
plea was upheld by the court and she was named next-of-kin for the purpose of 
managing the funds of the deceased.617   
 Paradoxically a widower might without precondition inherit from his 
deceased wife. A distinction is made between her nuptial and ante-nuptial property. 
Property acquired during marriage is regarded as belonging to her husband and when 
he dies the property devolves as described above, without distinction between male 
and female descendants of the husband.618 The ante nuptial property of the woman 
goes normally to her children and in default of children, to her relatives and never to 
her husband, except as regards personal property which she took to the husband’s 
house.  This principle was affirmed in Nwugege v. Adigwe619, in which the claim by 
the family head of a deceased widow for letters of administration to her estate was 
opposed by her husband’s son by another wife. The step-son was held to be the proper 
person to administer estate.  
Inheritance of a wife’s property by her husband contradicts the general 
principle that succession follows the blood. It could be defended by another principle 
of customary law in patrilineal societies that marriage transfers the wife to the 
husband’s patrilineage and subjects her to its control.620  
  
 
                                                 
616 Ekwe Customary Court, Civil Suit No. 7/7/2001. (unreported).  
617 See also Kwoh Wandim Ndonyi Theresia v. Nsang Martha &Chinwo Joseph, Suit No. C/S58/01/02 
(Kom Customary Court) (unreported); Mary Diang v. John Aboh ,Suit No. 63/01/02 (Kom Customary 
Court) (unreported); Achumchu Tantoh Vivian v. Ndeh Martin Tantoh &4 ors (2004) Mankon 
Customary Court, Civil Suit No.45/03-04 (unreported). 
618 See Armstrong, R. G., “Intestate succession among the Idoma” in J. Duncan M. Derrett, Studies in 
the Laws of Succession in Nigeria, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1965, 225 et seq. 
619 (1934)11 All \N. R. 134. 
620 See Nwabueze, Nigerian Land Law. 391.  
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4.6.2: WOMEN IN MUSLIM LAW 
 
The Muslim system of succession greatly modified by indigenous customary 
law is observed in the Muslim areas and by converts in other parts of the country.621  
In accordance with the principles of the Maliki code applicable in Cameroon, 
property is never held in the name of the family because the distribution is expected to 
take place after a brief period of administration intended to settle funeral expenses and 
pay the debts622 owed by the deceased including any deferred dower.623 However, 
when the deceased’s issue are still minors administration might last longer. 
Furthermore, the agnatic heirs could decide to maintain the property as a single entity 
if that option renders the property more productive and profitable. The rules of 
distribution are so complex that in order to be workable the property is more often 
than not sold and the proceeds shared among the beneficiaries.624 The question will 
certainly arise whether the administration could be entrusted to females either as 
daughters or widows in these circumstances.  
The provision of the Quran which has guided the provisions of the Maliki 
code relating to women is chapter 4 verse 7 in which the Holy Prophet ordains that 
“From what is left by parents and those nearest related there is a share for men and a 
share for women, whether the property be small or large,- a determinate share,” And 
by a determinate share it means that a male gets twice the share of a female.625 
Women are an integral part of both the Quranic and agnatic heirs, these being 
the categories in which beneficiaries are classified.  Quranic heirs are specifically 
mentioned and allotted specific shares of the estate in the Quran. Male Quranic heirs 
                                                 
621 Discussed in chapter two. 
622 See Hussain, A., The Islamic Law of Succession, Riyadh, Darussalam, 2005, 413. 
623 Muhammad Abul Hai’Arifi, Death and Inheritance, Lahore, Idara-e- Islamiat, 1998, 194. 
624 See Smith, M. G., “Hausa Inheritance and Succession,” in J. Duncan M. Derrett, Studies in the 
Laws of Succession in Nigeria, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1965,252-253.  
625 Chapter 4 verse 11 of the Holy Quran. 
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are the father, true grandfather i.e. the father’s father, widower and uterine brother. 
Female Quranic heirs are the mother, true grandmother, widow, daughter, son’s 
daughter(s), full sisters, consanguine sisters (same father), uterine sisters (same 
mother).626 The preoccupation of the Prophet seems in this category to have been to 
provide for the less privileged persons and allowing those privileged to continue to 
benefit in accordance with a modified version of Arabian customary law which he 
succeeded to render more humane. The absence of children of the deceased is 
therefore not an omission because they take as agnatic heirs, since only a small part of 
the estate is distributed to Quranic heirs. The bulk goes to the agnatic heirs and this is 
where the similarity with the patrilineal system becomes manifest.  
 Literally agnatic heirs are persons who descend from the deceased or claim 
the same patrilineal descent with him.627 Descent is reckoned in the same way as in a 
patrilineal system. Hence agnatic heirs consist of the issue of deceased, father and 
brothers of the whole blood and their issue, and the grandfather and his male 
descendants. Excluding women with the same degree of relationship with the 
deceased would have rendered nugatory the Prophet’s effort to improve on the lot of 
women. Females are therefore assimilated as agnatic heirs whenever there is in 
existence a corresponding male agnate with the same degree of relationship with the 
deceased.628 For example the son makes the daughter an agnatic heir. It is in the 
context of agnatic heirs that the rule that males get twice the share of females is 
applicable.629  
                                                 
626 See Hussain, A., The Islamic Law of Succession, Riyadh, Darussalam, 2005, 62-66; Ajijola, A.D. 
Introduction to Islamic Law, New Delhi, International Islamic Pictures, 1989, 233-235.   
627 Hussain, ibid. 67; Ajijola, ibid. 237. 
628 Hussain, ibid, 69. Ajijola, ibid. 237 
629 Hussain,, ibid. 71; See Smith, M. G., “Hausa Inheritance and Succession,” in J. Duncan M. Derrett, 
Studies in the Laws of Succession in Nigeria, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1965,247. 
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 In the light of the foregoing general principles males and females have a 
parity in succession rights,630 which puts Moslem law ahead of customary law. It is 
not a mathematical equality but one based on the necessities of justice and the 
allocation of duties and responsibilities in the family.631 Islam imposes on men 
various financial obligations and none on women, who contrary to men have the 
dowry and an inheritance.632    
But there is a large gap between what the law says and the actual practice.   
Women are generally deprived of their rights by the male relatives. Daughters are 
physically or psychologically coerced into giving up their shares in return for 
protection from their brothers when their marriages terminate by divorce or death.633 
In a study conducted by Hamisu in the Moslem communities of Cameroon one 
question addressed to 55 women was whether “children” usually receive their share of 
inheritance as prescribed by law. 39 responses were positive and 16 negative 
attributed to the obstructionist attitudes of some male relatives. The use of the generic 
“children” is of very little help in determining the gender of the persons whose rights 
the questionnaire sought to establish. It can only be assumed to have been females 
given that opposition came from male relatives.634 Against such attitude, the Moslem 
Scholar Muhammad Abdul Hai’Arifi had cautioned:  
“That some people do not give sisters and daughters their share in the 
inheritance is certainly an act of rank injustice. Just because they are 
given gifts and things at the time of their marriage, they presume that 
                                                 
630 See See Ngongang-Ouandji, Andre, “La devolution successorale au Cameroun”, (1972) 26 Rev. Jur. 
et Pol. d’Outre-Mer, 639-662, 639.. 
631 Mohamed Salah Rached Sammari, “Reflexion sur la Condition de la Femme en Droit Musulman,” 
(1974) 28 Rev. Jur. Pol. Ind. Coop. 548-557, 556.  
632See Tahir Mahmood, “The Grandeur of Womanhood in Islam.” (1986) 5(1) Islamic and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, 1-14, 12; Hamisu, Rabiatu Danpullo, “Women, Property and Inheritance– 
The case of Cameroon.”Recht in Africa 2005, 143-161, 151.  
633 See Owen, Margaret, A world of Widows, London, Zed Books, 1996, 65.  
634 Hamisu, Rabiatu Danpullo, “Women, Property and Inheritance– The case of Cameroon.”Recht in 
Africa 2005,, 143-161, 159. 
 174
such givings [sic] were enough to take care of their rights. This is totally 
incorrect; gifts never cancel the right to receive from the inheritance. It 
is obligatory to give sisters and daughters their share in the inheritance 
and any effort to exclude them from it is forbidden and is also an act of 
tyranny committed against them”635   
 
Furthermore, by being applied as native law and custom Moslem law is 
greatly influenced by the local customs that preceded its advent, so that its even 
application in all the communities can not simply be assumed.636 There is a tendency 
for the person charged with the administration to refuse to distribute, preferring to 
hold the estate as family property on the ground that “everyone can share and use 
things around.”637 As noted above succession by the family is not a rule of Moslem 
law, hence any such acts are harãm meaning that they are prohibited, unlawful and 
punishable from the point of view of Islam638 and that everyone who indulges in them 
stands to face punishment in Hell.639 An exception to this rule is where the 
beneficiaries acquiesce in the idea of family property or fail to claim their rights in 
court. By treating the property as family property the rights of women become 
curtailed and they are placed in a position worse than their counterparts in the other 
systems, where at least, there is hope of distribution.   
It seems that very few succession cases ever get to the Moslem courts, 
considering that Succession was one of those matters where the application of custom 
was allowed by early Moslem leaders. Most cases are therefore handled informally by 
                                                 
635  Death and Inheritance, Lahore, Idara-e- Islamiat, 1998, 194. 
636 See our discussion on the application of Muslim law.  
637See Muhammad Abdul Hai’Arifi,  Death and Inheritance, Lahore, Idara-e- Islamiat, 1998, 193. 
638 See Qazi, M. A., A concise Dictionary of Islamic Terms Lahore (Pakistan), Kazi Publications, 1979, 
19.  
639 Muhammad Abdul Hai’Arifi,  Death and Inheritance, supra. 
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instances that follow the local customary law as against Moslem law.640 When they 
do get to the courts the customary law prevailing in the area is more often than not 
favoured.641    
 If daughters as members of the family are excluded then the widows lack the 
locus standi even to contemplate succession, and a fortiori to become successors. A 
study conducted in the Moslem North revealed a sort of indifference on the part of 
married women. One of them said: “I know that when my husband will die, I will 
have nothing, I will return to my village after the funeral and continue my life there. It 
has been like that through the generations, men are considered as our leaders. This is 
even stated in our Coranic law.”642And another added: “I know I will return to my 
family.  But I have my children; they will inherit and take care of me. So through 
them I will have something.”643 Islamic law as against customary law makes no 
provision for the maintenance of widows given that they are normally entitled to an 
inheritance. But a widow who is thus excluded could sue for maintenance under 
customary law644 or cause her rights under Moslem law to be enforced by the 
appropriate Moslem court, a course which many avoid. 
 
4.8: DESIGNATION OF THE SUCCESSOR 
The assertion that succession is by the family must be qualified by the fact that 
the family as a corporate entity645 lacks the attributes of human beings which would 
                                                 
640 See Smith, M. G., “Hausa Inheritance and Succession,” in J. Duncan M. Derrett, Studies in the 
Laws of Succession in Nigeria, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1965, 245.  
641 See In the Estate of Dada Baba Nya (1985) C.A.S.W.P/CC/16/85 (unreported), where contrary to 
Muslim the concept of family land was upheld; also in Gboron Yaccouba et Amemena D. Suzanne c/ 
Mbombo Asang et Ndam Emile Issiaka, Court of Appeal, Bafoussam, Jugement No. 001/C of 23 
October, 1997 (unreported).   
642 Ngoli Ze Irene, “Attitude of the rural woman towards the rule that a woman cannot inherit 
property.” Term Paper, University of Dschang, p. 4, (Unpublished).  
643 Ibid, p.5. 
644 By refusing to follow Moslem law the successor is bound by customary law. 
645 It is necessary to point out that the term “corporate” as used here is unique to customary law as 
English law recognises no corporation in a family as compared to a company or partnership. Hence the 
concept of family property is unknown under that law for even when property is acquired for the use of 
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enable it to exercise effective control over property. The rights and duties inherent in 
succession are exercised through the agency of human beings. The family therefore 
designates one of its members to play the role; this person is called the successor. The 
successor might be likened to the heir-at-law of the old English law. But whereas the 
heir-at-law took an absolute interest over realty, subject only to the rights of the 
surviving spouse, the successor takes only a possessory interest over both land and 
movables. He has control of the property prior to its distribution, and since 
distribution is often unlikely, he literally takes the place of the deceased as family 
head.646  
 He could be likened to the personal representative but with the difference that 
while the property vests in the personal representative in English law, in customary 
law the property vests in the family and not the successor.647 This position is 
vindicated by Ngongang-Ouandji, one time minister of Justice when he writes: 
“succession could be analysed in Cameroon as consisting of a transmission of the 
powers of administration of family property from father to sons.”648 
A distinction needs to be made between the caretaker and successor. A 
successor is beneficiary but a caretaker not. The caretaker is generally the oldest male 
relative, often the brother of the deceased,649 called upon to play the role when the 
deceased is not survived by any male issue or the male issue is still too young. This 
practice is responsible for the view that when a person dies it is his brothers or father 
                                                                                                                                            
the family and enjoyed by them as “family property”, the members thereof are considered as joint 
tenants or tenants in common.  
646 See Ngongang-Ouandji, Andre, “La devolution successorale au Cameroun”, (1972) 26 Rev. Jur. et 
Pol. d’Outre-Mer, 639-662, 656. 
647 See Affaire Ebanda Njok Elie /c Eyombwain Njoh and others, Supreme Court, Arrêt No. 42/L of 9 
March 1978, (Douala tribe) (unreported); Affaire Peuteu Jacqueline /c Ngouoko Joseph, Douala Court 
of Appeal, Arrêt No. 131 of 23 May 1991 (Bamileke tribe) ( (unreported).   
648 « La succession peut s’analyser au Cameroun comme étant une transmission des pouvoirs 
d’adminsitration des biens de la famille du père au fils. »  Ngongang-Ouandji, Andre, “La devolution 
successorale au Cameroun”, (1972) 26 Rev. Jur. Pol. Ind. Coop. 639-662, 642. 
649 See Daniel Njike & 3 ors v. Zachius Ehang (1978) Y.U.L.R. 78. 
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who succeeds him.  The result is that many a caretaker considers himself as successor 
and neglects his responsibilities towards the family of the deceased and appropriates 
the patrimony to his own use or to the use of his own children.  
Successors are designated by family councils following the burial and funeral 
ceremonies.650 
 
 
4.7.1: The Burial and Funeral  
The burial is generally organised and financed by the patrilineal or matrilineal 
kinsmen of the deceased depending on the nature of the tribe and irrespective of 
whether the deceased was subject to English law.651 Funerals are generally a mixture 
of Christian and traditional rites. In many cases, the deceased though a polygamist 
often belonged to some denomination. And if he did not, his family ensures the 
performance of Christian rites at the funeral ceremony.  
Under common law individuals are generally free to determine in advance 
how their bodily remains should be disposed of by the inclusion of a burial clause in 
their will. Legally such wishes are not enforceable against the executors because of 
the rule that the law recognises no property in the dead body of a human being, but 
might have an effective moral force.652 If they die intestate their wives decide on 
where the burial should take place.653  
                                                 
650 Ngongang-Ouandji, Andre, “La devolution successorale au Cameroun”, (1972) 26 Rev. Jur. Pol. 
Ind. Coop. 639-662, 643. 
651  For example in Njonji Godlove v. Esther Njonji (2002) HCK/AE/K.16/2000 (unreported), the  
funeral of the deceased, a retired teacher who contracted a Christian marriage was organised by his 
entire family as emerged from the judgment; Boston, J. S., “Igala Inheritance and succession,” in  J. 
Duncan M. Derrett (ed), Studies in the law of succession in Nigeria, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1965, 123.    
652 See Clark, J. B., Parry and Clark the Law od succession., London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1983, 6. 
653 See Bennett, Customary law in South Africa, Cape Town, JUTA, 2004, 333.   
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The situation is not as easy in Africa because burial and succession rights 
seem to be intricately linked together. The Kenyan cause célèbre, the Otieno case654 
epitomises the conflict between custmary and modern law in this respect. The 
deceased a Western educated lawyer was of the Luo tribe while his wife was a 
Kikuyu. They had contracted a Christian marriage, led a western life-style and were 
therefore subject to the English law. Pursuant to English law the widow claimed that 
the body was to be buried at their family home near Nairobi, while the eldest brother 
of the deceased wanted it buried near Lake Victoria, the land of his patrilineal Luo 
ancestors. The Kenya Appeal Court ruled in favour of the brother and thus established 
a precedent in favour of customary as against English law in matters of burial.  
If the deceased intimated a wish to be buried elsewhere the clansmen are not 
obliged to comply if this is not in conformity with custom.655 For when such a wish is 
expressed the situation is treated in a similar manner as would be the case when it is 
impossible to convey a corpse home. The family head and members of his tribe 
resident in the chosen place or where he died would by custom constitute his family to 
perform the ceremony. Something representing the deceased is then taken to report to 
the family which will then perform the final obsequies656 aimed at laying the deceased 
to rest with his ancestors.   
                                                 
654 Virginia Wambui Otieno v. Joash Ochieng ‘Ougo’ This case is fully described by Howell, Roy 
Carleton, “Otieno Case: African Customary Law versus Western Jurisprudence,” in  Renteln, A. D. and 
Dundes, A. (ed), Folk Law; Essays in the theory and practice of lex non-scripta, Vol. 1, the University 
of Wisconsin Press, 1995, p. 827-844.  See also John W. Van Doren, “Death African Style: The case of 
S. M. Otieno”(1988)36 American Journal of Comparative Law, 329-350;  Evans Monari, Burial Law– 
Reflections on the S.M. Otieno Case (1988) 31 Harvard Law Journal, 667-674.        
655 The operative part of the judgment read: “The decision as to where and how an adult Luo will be 
buried rests with the clan from which he hails. Even if a man may have in his life time expressed a 
wish as to his place of burial, it is in evidence that the wish will be subject to the customs and traditions 
of his clan. The clan are not, necessarily bound to comply with those wishes if they do not conform 
with the customs and traditions of that clan.”    
656 Ollennu, N, A,, The law of testate and intestate succession in Ghana, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 
1966, 68. 
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The disputes are generally because of succession, as so aptly expressed by a 
Ghanaian proverb according to which “… he who buries the leper is the person 
entitled to take his sandals.”657 On the customary law of South Africa Bennett writes 
“… burial is often an emotionally and culturally charged issue. Disputes are therefore 
likely to arise about where and how a deceased is to be buried. These disputes arise in 
part because the person with the right to decide on burial usually stands to inherit the 
estate.” 658  
An article in “The Post” of 29 September 2008, a popular newspaper in 
Cameroon carries the caption “Court rules in favour of corpse”. The Douala Court of 
Appeal had just confirmed the decision of the High Court granting burial rights to the 
family of a deceased woman as against her husband. Her corpse had remained in the 
mortuary for sixteen months because of a dispute between the two families as to who 
has the right to bury her. The husband was allegedly responsible for her death and 
according to the judge he could not be honoured with the right to bury her. This seems 
to be overshadowed by the fact that the dispute was actually a question of succession 
and not necessarily the honour to bury a beloved one. This emerges from a statement 
by the brother according to which, “They [the husband’s family] were just 
dillydallying hoping that they would impoverish us but we just kept going until finally 
we have a legacy….”659  
In Ajong v. Ajong660, the parties were nephews of the deceased intestate, who 
was not survived by any son of his. The respondent claimed to be solely entitled to his 
estate on the ground that he took care of the deceased from when he took ill to when 
                                                 
657 Ollennu, N, A,, The law of testate and intestate succession in Ghana, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 
1966, 69. 
 
658 Bennett, T. W., Customary Law in South Africa, Cape Town, JUTA, 2004, 333. 
659 Article by Elvis Tah available at http://www.thepostnewsline.com  
660 Known in full as Abi Zachariah Ajong v. Nji Michael Ajong (2000) 1CCLR, 67. 
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he died. The appellant claimed to be entitled to share in the estate on the ground of 
having contributed to the funeral celebrations. The trial court held, and this was 
confirmed at appeal, that because both parties “celebrated Enwebadang’s death each 
of them was entitled to share in his estate.”661       
The burial is followed by a period of mourning which could last days, weeks 
or months. At the end the funeral is organised and rounded up with a family council, 
during which important matters including the payment of the debts of the deceased, 
maintenance of minor children and widows are discussed. These are responsibilities 
that require the making of arrangements on the fate of the property left by the 
deceased. The council thus has the mission after the funeral to decide on whom to 
entrust the management of the property to in the name of the family.662   
 
4.7.2: The Family Council. 
4.7.2.1: The Composition. 
According to Doumbé-Moulongo the family council is composed of all the 
adult male members of a family. Women and children, he writes are admitted only 
when the matters to be discussed are not weighty. 663 The situation has so far evolved 
that the membership of the family council is no longer limited to male members of the 
family. Women are known to occupy prominent positions in this institution today.664  
                                                 
661 Ibid. 69. 
662 See generally Ollennu, N, A,, The law of testate and intestate succession in Ghana, London, Sweet 
& Maxwell, 1966, 68-70. 
663 Doumbé-Moulongo, M., Les coutumes et le droit au Cameroun, Yaoundé Edition CLE, 1972, 24.  
664 See Peter Charles Chi v. Chinkwo Nde Fidelis & Caroline Chi (2006) Appeal No. BCA/62/2003 
(unreported) where the family council there were six women as against three men and a woman served 
as secretary. Also in the family meeting that preceded the case of Nzoukekang Stephen Tchinda v. 
Nzoukekang Eric &Seven others, (2005) Appeal No. BCA/24/2004, unreported, there were eight men 
and eight women.  
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The council aimed at designating the successor665 or successors666 is generally 
chaired by the eldest male relative of the deceased, failing which it could be the 
village chief or his representative. Other members may include persons from the 
extended family, but the most important are persons entitled to the succession. These 
must be personally present or represented by the principal members of the family. 
The principal members depend on the number of branches to a family. There 
is one branch if the deceased had one wife with children or was a woman. In the 
family of a deceased who had more than one wife with children, the children of each 
wife constitute a branch. 667 In the first scenario each child is a principal member 
while in the second, the principal members are the eldest children of each of the wives 
irrespective of their sexes. 
 
4.7.2.2: The Mission. 
 Ordinarily the family council sits as an informal court in matters involving 
members of the family,668 and it is in this capacity that succession matters are first 
submitted to them and taken to the courts only when a satisfactory solution is not 
found.  
The mission of the council in the circumstances under consideration will be 
(1) to hear the will where there is one and (2) to designate a successor where none has 
been designated by will. Family members are not generally bound to accept the 
person appointed by the deceased if the choice is at variance with custom. In tribes 
                                                 
665 The single-heir system is practiced, for example, by tribes in the West, North West and South West 
provinces. 
666 This is common in tribes in Centre, South and Eastern provinces.  
667 See generally James, R. W., Modern Land Law of Nigeria, supra, 86-88. 
668 Doumbé-Moulongo, M., Les coutumes et le droit au Cameroun, Yaoundé Edition CLE, 1972, 26 
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such as Douala, Bassa, Bassossi, Mendankwe and Banyang the successor is known in 
advance, a choice which the deceased is not free to alter.669  
This is, however, not a general rule. The Bamileke, for example recognise 
male primogeniture and the possibility for the deceased to designate any other of his 
male children as successor.670  In fact the custom in this area has evolved so that the 
deceased could even designate a daughter as was the case in Nana v. Nana.671 The 
deceased left a will in which he named his daughter as successor and during the 
hearing of the will by the family it was asked if anyone was opposed to the 
designation. There was no opposition but it was conceded that this might eventually 
come from the eight years aged son of the deceased when he comes of age. What this 
implies is that the priority given to males is not displaced but merely that when there 
is no male child a person might designate a daughter as successor.  
 
4.7.2.3: The Binding Force of Council Resolutions  
Consensual resolutions of Family Council are generally binding on the 
members. These are sufficient to enable the administration of the estate to be pursued 
but often the family, in a bid to clothe the resolution with legality submits same to the 
customary court in exchange for a next-of-kin declaration said to be the prerequisite 
for the grant of letters of administration. This is in contrast with the position in 
Francophone Cameroon, where Family Council resolutions are submitted to the 
competent court in view of the jugement d’hérédité, the French equivalent for letters 
of administration. 
                                                 
669 See Binet, Jacques, “La devolution successorale chez les Douala du Cameroun”, (1955) 65 Penant, 
33-40, 35. 
670 In a decision of the Court of Appeal of Bafoussam, arrêt no. 108 of 11 January 1968 it was stated 
thus: « Considérant qu’en coutume Bamileke, le propriété étant familiale, collective et géré par le seul 
chef de famille, seul le fils aîné ou le fils designé par le chef de la faille est héritier de celui-ci. »    
671 (2005) Suit No. HCF/PROB/AE1/2001-2002 (unreported) 
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The courts will not question a resolution of the family council on the choice of 
the successor, provided that the council was properly constituted and the resolution 
was taken in accordance with accepted procedure.672 The choice could be questioned 
in court only when the rightful person is shown to have been passed-over unjustly or 
capriciously.673 In Nzoukekang v.  Nzoukekang,674 a resolution of a family council 
removing the plaintiff, the oldest son of the deceased from the office of successor was 
rejected on the ground that the resolution was not consensual and the plaintiff had 
done nothing to justify being passed-over.    
Family council resolutions are more likely to be disregarded on grounds of 
repugnancy or public policy when a woman, especially the widow is excluded, even 
when the decision was taken by a regularly constituted family council. In the Estate of 
Noumbissie675 a family council resolution and the resultant next of kin declaration 
were rejected because the brother of the deceased rather than the widow was 
designated.676 The next-of-kin declaration and by extension family council resolutions 
was said not to “tie the hands of the court.”  The purpose of next-of-kin declarations 
as disclosed in Peter Charles v. Chinkwo Nde 677 is that it “consists of a proposal to 
the Administrator-General while examining applications for letters” and “does not 
                                                 
672 See Woodman, G. R., “Judicial Control of the Family Meeting”, (1981-82) 13 &14 Review of 
Ghana Law. 222-226, 224. 
673 See Poh v. Konamba & Ors. (1957) 3 W. A. L. R. 74. 
674  (2005) Appeal No. BCA/24/2004 (unreported).  
675 (2002) 1 C.C.L.R. 1, 5; see also Stephen Ncha & 5 ors. v. Chi Simon Nde, (2006) Appeal No. 
BCA/33/2004 (unreported). 
676 The reverse is true when the person excluded is a man and notwithstanding proof of  irregularity. In 
Ajong v. Ajong676 the appellant argued that the trial court erred by admitting the family council 
resolution. He claimed that he was not present at the meeting and that not being a constituted court nor 
a juristic person family council resolutions are only of evidentiary value. The response of the court in 
the face of the claims was that “The family council is the nearest nucleus of the family made up of the 
entire family members who are better placed to trace the issue of inheritance as they did. The trial court 
was therefore correct to rely on their findings.”   
677 (2006) Appeal No. BCA/62/2003 (unreported).  
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bind him and consequently cannot limit him to a particular group of persons from 
whom an administrator may be appointed.”678 
   This begs the question whether the next-of-kin declaration is a sine qua non 
for letters of administration. Taminang, J. in Chibikom No. 2679 said that the next-of-
kin declaration constitutes “the pre-requisite for granting letters of administration.” 
The question is whether this does not contradict the earlier description of the 
declarations as a “proposal”? Besides the judge seems to ignore the fact that 
customary courts have no jurisdiction over the estates of persons who contract 
monogamous marriages and that, therefore, the declaration cannot be mandatory in 
those cases. 
Such was the situation in Galega v. Galega,680 where letters of administration 
were granted in the absence of a next-of-kin declaration. The case was held not to be 
good law in Catherine Makebe v. Chambo née Wongibe Rosemary681 on the ground 
according to Wacka, J. that:  
“With regard to the Galega case, the Court of Appeal is not bound by its 
decisions. Shortly after the decision in BCA/19/93: Nwana Galega 
Getrude v. Wamyonga Galega Thomson, Thomson who was granted 
letters of administration died. Of course some of the property was in his 
custody. What happened? Since he died intestate his widow disposed of 
some of the property having obtained letters of administration for the 
deceased husband’s estate. How fair is justice in this case?”  
 
                                                 
678 Francophone Cameroonian courts adopt a similar attitude as evident in the statement by Ndoko 
according to which  « Ces délibérations sont des avis purement consultatifs pour le juge qui est tenu de 
vérifier leur conformité a l’ordre public et d’écarter systématiquement leurs décisions qui violent les 
lois et règlements. » “L’idée d’egalité dans le Droit Successoral Camerounais: dernières tendances de 
la Jurisprudence en matière de la succession ab intestat” Yaoundé, 1990, 8 (unpublished ). 
679 Chibikom v Zamcho Florence No. 2.  (2006) HCB/PD.LA.57M/05-05 (unreported). 
680Appeal No. BCA/19/93 (unreported). 
 
681 (2005) 1CCLR., 83, 93. 
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The question is whether this was not just a case of abuse of the office of 
personal representative, common even in cases of regularly obtained letters of 
administration. Must it be taken that the woman behaved thus because there was no 
next-of-kin declaration?  Of course, next-of-kin declarations embody the consent of 
the family and the idea that the person to whom letters are granted holds the property 
on behalf of the beneficiaries, but so too do the letters of administration themselves.   
  Anglophone Cameroon seems to be the only former British colony where a 
customary court judgment on the choice of the successor is said not to stand on its 
own.682 This is defended on the ground that only letters of administration would give 
access to certain types of property left by the deceased. The question is if the 
“jugement d’hérédité, in Francophone Cameroon which emanates from the traditional 
law courts683 gives access to such property, why not the next-of-kin declaration?  
True, a customary successor cannot on behalf of the estate, benefit from the 
application of English law,684 but the property in question, which could consist of 
pension benefits, bank accounts, shares in a company, is not necessarily governed by 
English law, but by the same laws that admit the “jugement d’hérédité.    
  However, rather than castigate the practice it is worth the while to seek its 
raison d’être, since it could be likely that by instituting the practice, the High Courts 
think thereby, to be able to control decisions of the customary courts deemed to be 
repugnant or against public policy. The “jugement d’hérédité” would rarely fall foul 
of the requirements of ordre public considering that the decisions are arrived at in 
application of the civil code.  
 
                                                 
682 We understand that this is apparently a very lucrative business for the Probate Division of the High 
Court and the probable reasons for the centralisation.    
683 This was the situation until the introduction of High Courts in that part of the country in 1972, 
which now share the jurisdiction to issue the letters. 
684 This has been explained in chapter two.  
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4.7.3: The Requisite Qualities for a Successor.  
Each beneficiary is a potential successor and until recently it was also required 
for the successor to be of the male gender. Other factors such as character, ability, 
suitability and other relevant qualities and circumstances are taken into consideration 
before deciding on the choice of the successor.685 The successor is a father figure, 
hence the person qualified in terms of the general principles but lacking in any of 
these qualities might be passed-over in favour of a more suitable person. The point 
was made by the Bafoussam Court of Appeal : 
« L’héritier principal est cet enfant qui, jugé apte à poursuivre l’oeuvre du 
père, hérite de la concession familiale, de la garde des crânes des 
ancêstres et des avantages y attachés et surtout du respect que toute la 
famille et l’entourage reconnaissaient au de cujus. »686  
 
The Ghanaian case of In the Matter of the Estate of Emmanuel Nelson 
Tamakloe687 gives a clear picture of the person amongst the beneficiaries who could 
step into the shoes of the deceased and stand in loco parentis vis-à-vis the others and 
the community:  
 “The senior boy or girl never automatically succeeds to the estate; an 
election by the deceased maternal or paternal relatives must be done 
strictly in accordance with the rules of native custom, and in most cases 
the choice goes to the senior surviving son of the deceased, when not 
proved to be a delinquent, i.e., a drunkard, spendthrift, litigious person 
or general waster. When the eldest son is disqualified for any reason 
from succeeding, the choice is given to one of his fit younger brothers”   
 
                                                 
685 Ollennu, The law of testate and intestate succession in Ghana, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1966, 86. 
686 “The successor is that child who, judged apt to pursue the task of father, inherits the family home, 
the guard of the skulls of ancestors et advantages attaching thereto and above all of the respect that all 
the family and the surrounding recognised in the deceased.” Arrêt No. 29 du 22 Juillet 1993 
(unreported)   
687 Cited by Ollennu, The law of testate and intestate succession in Ghana, 87. 
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These considerations, including when the would-be successor is still a 
minor688 have resulted in daughters and widows being considered at least, for the post 
of temporary successors pending the birth or majority of the rightful customary law 
successor.   
In Lizette Kwende v. Vejai Elizabeth the plaintiffs, issue of a deceased female 
applied for a next-of-kin declaration over their mother’s estate, in order to inter alia, 
follow up the pension benefits. The defendants made up of two brothers and a sister of 
the deceased thought that the declaration should be in their favour. The Mankon 
Customary Court found no difficulty in holding that “The plaintiffs are empowered to 
administer the estate of their deceased mother …pending such a time that a would-be 
successor shall be installed to take over the inheritance and administration 
permanently.” 689   
  Widows could, if they have issue who are still minors be exceptionally placed 
in an analogous position with daughters as regards next-of-kin declarations.690 It is 
only exceptional because not being a beneficiary the widow should normally not be 
successor even if only temporarily. The foregoing is only as far as patrilineal tribes 
are concerned. In matrilineal tribes the widow has no right whatsoever in the estate 
and cannot even be made temporary next-of-kin. The children who would justify such 
an appointment are not themselves entitled to inheritance from their father.    
 Hence the fact that women are successors today is not yet a cause to rejoice. 
Firstly, the right is only temporary. Secondly, widows are designated not in their own 
interests but in that of their children and they could only be designated when the 
                                                 
688 See Victor, Keubou, “Procedure for designating next-of-kin in Bafou (Bamileke)” term paper 
presented to the Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Dschang, 2000.   
689 (2006) Civil Suit No. 91/05-06 (unreported). 
690 See Mary Ngoh Timothy v. Njimba Jacob Nkangah (2006) Suit No. HCF/PROB/AE96/2001 
(unreported) See  also Bih Che et al., “Intestacy and Widowhood in two Patrilineal Tribes: Mankon and 
Nkambe,” term paper presented to the Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Dschang, 
2002.   
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children are still minors. Thirdly, as explained above widows in matrilineal and 
Moslem communities are generally not entitled to be designated. Finally, many 
succession quarrels are settled in the family hence only very few of the cases ever get 
to the courts. By implication there might be more women out there, to whom the right 
has been denied and who would not risk the stigma attendant on taking their 
“brothers”, “fathers” and “husbands” to court.   
  Herein is the importance of the Chibikom case691 which has become a cause 
célèbre for having instituted female succession in customary law in Cameroon. The 
deceased intestate was survived by five widows, two concubines and 38 children 
including the appellant, a married woman and the eldest child of the deceased. She 
applied to and was made temporary next-of-kin by the Mankon Customary Court,692 
and with the declaration obtained letters of administration which, like the next-of-kin 
declaration were also supposed to be temporary. Some of her male relatives were 
dissatisfied with the grant of letters and brought an action for their revocation. Having 
failed in the High Court they appealed to the Bamenda Court of Appeal which 
revoked the letters for reasons stated as follows: 
“It is common ground that the respondent at all times material to these 
proceedings was and is still a married woman. She belongs to a family 
different from the one in which she was born. She cannot inherit from 
her father in accordance with customary law, and a fortiori she cannot be 
her father’s next of kin. The respondent was doubtless aware of her 
disability when she applied to the Mankon Customary Court for a 
declaration of temporary next of kin.”  
 
                                                 
691 Zamcho Florence Lum v. Chibikom Peter Fru &Others, Supreme Court judgment No. 14/L of 14 
February 1993. 
692 In Zamcho Lum Florence v. Susana Bih & Two Others (1985) Civil Suit No. 22/85-86, Mankon 
Customary Court (unreported). 
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The woman proceeded to the Supreme Court which quashed and annulled the 
decision of the lower court. The ratio decidendi of the decision went thus: 
“Not only was the decision of their learned lordships based on sex 
discrimination in gross violation of the … contents of the preamble of 
the constitution, but it was in total misrepresentation of section 27 of the 
Southern Cameroon High Court Law which ensures the observance of 
the native law and custom only on the sole condition that it is neither 
repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience nor 
incompatible either directly or by implication with any law in force in 
the Republic, that they applied the so called principle of native law and 
custom which sustained a discrimination based on the sex of 
individuals.”  
  
After this decision female succession can never be the same again. It 
establishes a precedent which is so far followed by the lower courts.693 Previously it 
would have been heretical for a woman to aspire even to the office of a temporary 
successor,694 as always there would be male relatives to play the role of caretaker.  
 That decision did not however end the squabbles in the Chibikom family, due 
particularly to the fact the next-of-kin declaration was temporary, a point which the 
Supreme Court failed to address. Another appeal on the same estate is pending in the 
Supreme Court. In Chibikom No. 2695 the customary next-of-kin upon attaining 
majority obtained a next-of-kin declaration from the same customary court and with 
this demanded the revocation of letters of administration previously issued to Zamcho 
Florence. The decision in this second appeal will no doubt establish once and for all 
                                                 
693  Few examples are Keyaka Francis v. Taah Regina (2000) BCA/10/2000 (unreported), where the 
daughter of the deceased was made successor against her paternal cousins; Catherine Makeba Joke v. 
Chambo, HCB/PD/CA/46m/99-2000 (unreported).   
694 See Irene Ngum, “Rethinking Female Succession to Property in Cameroon- The decline of 
customary law?”  Recht in Africa 2004, 121-132, 128 
695 Chibikom Richard Fru v. Zamcho Florence Lum & Administrator General Mezam High Court 
(2006) HCB/PD/LA.57M/04-05 (unreported) 
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whether a successor could in addition to the reasons given above, be deposed on the 
ground, simply that the next-of-kin declaration was temporary. 
 We foresee the supreme court considering the matter as res judicata and 
thereby confirming its previous decision without upsetting the status of the next-of 
kin, who would then as the father of the family be consulted by the administrator in 
all but the routine matters concerning the administration.696 It would be establishing 
the position which the lower courts have so far avoided to address directly, that the 
offices of successor and administrator could be held by different persons.  
The point was canvassed in Chi Stephen & others v. Simon Ndeh.697 The 
appellant was the duly designated successor and demanded the revocation of letters of 
administration granted to the respondent who though a beneficiary was not the 
successor. The appellant argued that the administration ought as of right to have been 
granted to him as successor while the respondent contended that the successor was not 
necessarily the person entitled to the letters. The court’s ruling went in favour of the 
appellant on the ground that the other beneficiaries were in favour of him managing 
their common inheritance. The point as to whether the offices could be held by 
different persons was not addressed and therefore remained open. It could occur as 
was the case in the Chibikom case that the popular choice of the beneficiaries is 
against public policy because it is incompatible with written law such as section 27 of 
the Southern Cameroon High Court Law 1955 and the constitution. Hence in Peter 
Charles v. Chinkwo Nde698 it was argued that “while succession may, according to 
many traditional norms in this province[North West] be limited to male children, the 
administration of an estate is open to all close relatives of the deceased including 
wives and children, whether males or females.” But unfortunately again the court was 
                                                 
696 See Nwabueze, Nigerian land law, supra, 430. 
697 (2006) Appeal No. BCA/33/2004 (unreported) 
698 (2006) Appeal No. BCA. 62/2003 (unreported). 
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silent on the point. The Tribunal de Premier Degré of Dschang was categorical on the 
point that the successor is also the administrator: « être l’héritier principal consiste à 
administrer les biens de la succession et gérer les biens non encore partagés ou 
demeurés indivis entre les cohéritiers. » 699 
It will not be unique to Cameroon if Chibikom No. 2 comes out with a decision 
that the offices could be held by different persons. It is the position in Nigeria700 and 
Ghana, both of which like Cameroon encourage the appointment of successors as 
administrators of the estate, but nevertheless recognise that the right for successors to 
be thus appointed is not inalienable.701  
 
 
4.7.4: The Chibikom case as Coutume Evolué.702 
Chibikom must be viewed as a milestone in the evolution of the women’s 
succession rights in Anglophone Cameroon. It was the first decision on the point from 
that part of the country to get to the Supreme Court. And it would appear that until 
then the highest judicial body was unaware that the appellate jurisdictions of the 
Anglophone provinces almost religiously observed the rule that a woman cannot 
inherit property, when that right had been recognised in Francophone Cameroon703 
through the concept of coutumes évolués. The decision was based on the enabling 
                                                 
699 “Being the successor consists in administering the property of the succession and the managing 
property not yet divided or held communally by the beneficiaries.” Jugement no. 67 13 Juillet 1991 
(unreported) 
700 See Nwabueze, supra. 
701 In Ghana, section 79 (2) of the Administration of Estates Act (Act 63) provides that the courts shall 
“In granting administration have regard to the rights of all persons interested in the estate, including the 
successor, if any under customary law, and, in particular, administration with will annexed may be 
granted to a devisee or legatee and administration may be limited in any way the court thinks fit.” 
These choices could be derogated from on the strength of section 79(3) (ii) according to which “if  by 
reason of the insolvency of the estate of the deceased or of any circumstances, it appears to the be 
necessary or expedient to appoint as administrator some person other than the person who, but for this 
provision, would not by law have been entitled to the grant of administration, notwithstanding anything 
in this Act, appoint as administrator such person as it thinks expedient…”          
702 See the effects of the exclusion of customary law 
703 See Enonchong, N. “The exclusion of customary law in Cameroon”, supra, 518.  
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statute for the application of customary law and not some English statute that would 
have taken it out of the realm of customary law. 
But the attitude of Anglophone courts towards that decision is different. They 
seem not to understand that customary law is not static704 and that a rule of customary 
law does not become assimilated to English law simply because it adopts a position 
similar to it. They tend to think that the case alone does not suffice to enable a woman 
to be named successor/administrator and so it is always buttressed with English 
statutes, notably the Non Contentious Probate Rules of 1954 and the Administration 
of Estates Act 1925.  
This is because High Courts have the monopoly over letters of 
administration.705 Customary courts have not the powers to grant letters of 
administration but could pursuant to their auxiliary powers order administration 
without such letters.706 
Letters of Administration are therefore not a mandatory requirement and in 
fact most estates are administered without them. They are nevertheless necessary for 
access to property such as bank accounts, company shares, and accident and pension 
benefits. In customary administration the administrator might not be able to bring an 
action pertaining to the estate if the resolution of the problem will require the 
application of English law. In Njoke v. Njoke707 the appellant was unable to use a 
customary court declaration of next-of-kin to institute an action on behalf of the estate 
in the High Court. In the words of Mukete, J: 
 “For an estate to sue either the beneficiary applies for a grant ad litem or 
obtains letters of administration. Both are obtainable from the High 
Court. However a person declared next of kin by the customary court 
                                                 
704 See more on our discussion on customary law in chapter two. 
705 See the discussion on the jurisdiction of High Courts.  
706 See section 47 (1) of the Customary Courts Ordinance 1948.   
707 (2006) C.A.S.W.P/35/04-05 (unreported). 
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can go before that court for any remedy that that court can give. But if 
he seeks a remedy in the High Court, he must comply with the rules of 
the game in the High Court….” 708  
 
Hence holders of customary court declarations of next-of-kin, if they intend 
the estate to benefit from the application of English law and to have access to funds 
left by deceased, must submit the declarations to the High Courts in exchange for 
letters of administration. 
 The High Courts seem to think that because the letters are issued on the basis 
of an English statute, the administration, including the rules of priority must be in 
accordance with English law. This point was informally raised by one of the writer’s 
postgraduate students709 with Justice Ayah, then the Administrator-General of the 
Kumba High Court. His view was that the point was yet to be raised by any lawyer 
and that even if this happened only the appellate jurisdictions would have the final 
say, since they as trial courts could only apply English law for the reasons given 
above. This position is arguable, on the ground that the Supreme Court (Civil 
Procedure) Rules of the 1948 Laws of Nigeria which gives the courts authority over 
letters of administration lays down the procedure to be followed by the High Courts, 
with authority to administer the English and customary laws. It cannot therefore be 
assumed that only the English law is applicable since the courts will normally apply 
the substantive law that is relevant in any given situation.  
Hence applications for grants concerning the estate of a person subject to 
English law should be governed by the English law of priorities while customary law 
                                                 
708 See also Lawal & Ors. v. Younan & Sons (1961) All N. L. R. 245, 253. The plaintiffs as customary 
administrators relied on the Fatal Accident Acts of 1846 and 1864 in their action for negligence against 
the defendants.  Ademola, J., said that “it is clear a person to whom power is given under customary 
law to administer the estate of deceased person, is a person empowered by that law to administer the 
estate of the deceased where customary law can be invoked, and such power cannot be extended to 
matters which are statutory rights under English law and to which statutory remedies apply.” 
709 Kembeng Richard, Chief Registrar of the Court and Probate Clerk. 
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should be applied when the deceased is subject to it. But what obtains is a situation 
whereby no distinction is made between the two as the courts almost invariably apply 
the English rules of priority. In Mary Ngoh v. Njimba Jacob710 the quarrel was 
between the widow and brother of the deceased. The Probate Practice Non 
Contentious Rules of 1954 were applied to grant “administration” to the widow when 
this was in fact a potentially polygamous marriage. In Peter Charles v. Chinkwo 
Fidelis711 consolidated with Chinkwo Fidelis v. Chi Caroline712 the court recognised 
that the intestate had more than one wife but still invoked the Administration of 
Estates Act 1925.  
Lest we be misunderstood, we are not contesting the appointment of the 
spouses in these cases as administrators. The point is that they could still have been 
appointed in application of customary law by relying on the Chibikom case provided 
that in the estimation of the courts, they were the persons most suited to administer 
the estates in the interest of all the other beneficiaries. 
In Nana v. Nana, 713 Ngassa, J. adopted what we think was the right position 
when she abstained from invoking the provisions of the Non Contentious Probate 
Rules of 1954 on the ground that the “applicant-for-grant was polygamously married 
to the deceased.” But apparently she too did not consider the Chibikom case authority 
enough to permit approving the grant of letters to a woman regularly chosen by the 
customary law instances as successor. The Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women was invoked even though it is yet to be 
enacted into law by the Cameroonian legislature.   
 
                                                 
710 (2006) Suit No. HCF/ PROB/AE96/2001 (unreported).  
711 (2003) Suit No.HCB/PD/LA.36M/99-2000 (unreported). 
712 (2003) Suit No. HCB/PD/LA.26M/99-2000 (unreported). 
713 (2005) Suit No. HCF/PROB/AE1/2001-2002 (unreported) 
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4.7.5: FACTORS WHICH INHIBIT THE DESIGNATION OF WOMEN AS 
SUCCESSORS  
Of all the dependants of the deceased, women have without doubt borne the 
full brunt of the customary law, reason why we deem it germane to consecrate this 
section to the examination of the ground advanced by customary law to exclude them 
from the important office of successors, deemed to be the preserve of men.  
The successor is appointed on the basis of the principle of male 
primogeniture714 whereby the eldest male child is given priority, or male 
ultimogeniture according to which priority is given to the youngest male descendant 
of the deceased.715 A different approach would have been expected in matrilineal 
systems given that women are venerated, but this is not the case, and for Asanga to 
lament: “in matrilineal communities… one would expect the woman to have more 
rights. However, this is simply a community in which descent is traced through the 
mother’s line. When it comes to succession, a man is succeeded not by his own 
children but by the male children of his full blood sister from one womb.”716   
Responsible for this state of affairs is the early communal life of 
Cameroonians as explained in the problem statement.    
It is thought that women could be unreliable as successors, since upon 
marriage their loyalties become divided between the biological and marital families. 
Naturally, loyalty to the marital family is stronger because the woman’s children are 
part of that family. It is feared that a married woman might take away the property to 
their husband’s family. In the case of land, there is evidence that some married 
women register their family land in their marital names. This was the case in 
                                                 
714 See Efosi Kombe v. Lydia Ngale (1980) C.A.S.W.P/cc/5/79 cited by Enonchong, N. “Public Policy 
and Ordre Public: The Exclusion of customary law in Cameroon.” (1993)  5(3) RADIC, 511. 
715 In Joseph Tanjang Bamu v Emmanuel Awankem Bamu, (1990) Appeal No. 65/86, unreported, one 
of the witnesses said that “by our tradition the eldest child in Mendankwe is not made successor.”  
716 “Rethinking Female Succession to Property in Cameroon- The decline of customary law?, Recht in 
Africa 2004, 121-134, 124. 
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Chibikom v. Zamcho717 where after being named administrator of her late father’s 
estate, the respondent, a married woman, set about registering the family land in her 
marital name. This was in spite of the prohibition enshrined in section 10 of the land 
registration decree of 27 April 1976, according to which, “Trustees of an inheritance 
may not obtain land certificates for its properties in their own name.” 718   
To justify women’s exclusion customary law evolved the idea that because 
they are destined for marriage and procreation are themselves “property” liable to 
pass to the successor.719 This is underpinned by the payment of the bride price said to 
constitute the purchase price for the woman.  
 
4.7.5.1: The Bride-Price: basis for the “Woman as Property” theory.720 
The terms bride-price and dowry721 are often used interchangeably. This usage 
is wrong because dowry in western jurisprudence consists of property which a girl 
receives from her parents upon marriage and which forms part of her ante-nuptial 
property.  
We are yet to learn of any dowry being paid at customary law in Cameroon. 
Moslem law has a system of dower mahr in which it is the bride-groom and not the 
bride’s parents who makes gifts to her. The mahr is a precondition for marriage in 
                                                 
717 (1997) 1 C.C.L.R. 212 
718 Decree No. 76-165 of 27 April, 1976.  Unfortunately the judge defended the action of the 
respondent on the ground that as administrator the estate vested in her and that it was the duty of the 
government department responsible for land registration to mention that she registered the land in her 
capacity as administrator.    
719 See Mary Umaru v. Asopo Makembe (1981) C.A.S.W.P/CC/87/81, cited by Enonchong, N., “Public 
Policy and Ordre Public; The exclusion of customary law in Cameroon,” (1993) 5(3) RADIC, 503-525, 
512.   
720 Professor Enonchong uses the term “property rule” which we humbly submit is inappropriate given 
that the treatment of women as property is not a rule of law as such, but only a possible reason for the 
exclusion of women from succession.  “Public Policy and Ordre Public: The exclusion of customary 
law in Cameroon,” (1993) 5(3) RADIC, 503-525, 512.   
721 Other appellations such as “marriage consideration”, “bride-wealth” marriage gifts, “and marriage 
payment” have also been used. 
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Moslem law.722 Because it is made to the bride and not her parents Moslem jurists 
argue that this does not constitute the purchase price of the bride. 723 
The bride-price on the other hand is payment made by the bride-groom to the 
parents of the bride. 724 This is clear from the definition of dowry proffered in section 
2 of the Limitation of Dowry Law, Cap. 76 of the 1956 Laws of Eastern Nigeria, and 
adopted for the purpose of the bride-price by Professor Nwogugu:725   
“Any gift or payment, in money, natural produce, brass rods, cowries or 
any other kind of property whatsoever, to a parent or guardian of a 
female person on account of a marriage of that persons which is 
intended or has taken place.”     
 
This is the practice in non-Moslem communities while Moslem communities 
either practise both the dower and bride-price simultaneously or only the dower. 
Where both are practised the dowry is kept in abeyance pending divorce or death.726 
In Saidu Manu v. Hubeba Usmanu,727 the defendant after divorce had sued the 
plaintiff in the Alkali Court of Mbengwi claiming the promised “cow and calf being 
‘Sadiki’ a bridal gift from the groom according to Islamic Law.” The court held in 
favour of the plaintiff, against which decision the defendant instituted the present 
appeal. The decision of the lower court was upheld and Wacka, J. said: “The question 
of the law on ‘Sadiki’ requires no polemics. As long as there is consummation, even if 
the marriage lasts only for hours the bride is entitled to her ‘Sadiki.’ We have no 
reason therefore, to differ with the trial court on it finding of facts.”  
                                                 
722 See Ajijola, A.D. Introduction to Islamic Law, New Delhi, International Islamic Pictures, 1989, 154.   
723 See Lemu, Aisha et al.  Woman in Islam, Markfield, The Islamic Foundation, 2003, 19.   
724 Kasunmu and Salacuse in Nigerian Family Law, London, Butterworths, 1966, 77, define the term as 
“a payment of some sort --- made by the boy or his family in order to establish a valid marriage.”. 
725 Family Law in Nigeria, Nigeria, Heinemann, 1996, 51.   
726 Phillips, Arthur, A Survey of African Marriage and Family Life, Oxford, Oxford university Press, 
234.  
727 (1997) Appeal No, BCA/9CC/ 95 (unreported) 
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Where only the dowry is maintained an amount of money is paid to the parents 
of the bride who could utilise part thereof for the preparation of the marriage.728 In 
Zeinabu Sadi Buba of Issu v. Alhaji Jae Mundayi,729 it was disclosed in a divorce case 
that the parents of the girl had obtained money from her purported husband to prepare 
her for the marriage. Effectively therefore, the dower in these communities takes the 
form of the bride-price. This is statutorily recognised in Francophone Cameroon as a 
French colonial order of 1926 converted the Moslem dowry into the bride-price and 
made it payable to the parents of the girl.730  
The bride-price is therefore commonly practised under the Moslem and non-
Moslem customary laws. The question, however, is whether it constitutes the 
purchase price of the bride.  
The fact that the payment is to the parents of the bride lends credence to the 
purchase price analogy propounded by early European observers731 and now 
sustained by western educated Africans who ignore the many differences that exist 
between a customary marriage and a commercial transaction. Similar payments were 
in fact current in early English law. These were never considered as the sale of the 
bride, but rather as a sale of the mund or right of protection which the parents have 
over their daughter.732 This helped to maintain the personality of the woman as an 
entity capable of owning property, contracting, liable for torts and crimes committed 
                                                 
728 See Nwogugu, E. I., Family Law in Nigeria, Heinemann Educational Books (Nigeria) Plc., 1996, 
illips, A. (ed), A Survey of African Marriage and Family Life, Oxford 
Wealth”.http/:www.umanitoba.ca/faculties/arts/anthroponlogy/tutor/marria
59.  
729  Ndop Alkali Civil Suit No. 4/2002.2003 (unreported) 
730Article 3 of Arrêté of 26 December 1922, codifying the Moslem law of marriage: « En fait c’est à la 
femme elle-meme que la dot devrait  etre versée, en fait la coutume a prévalu de verser le prix de la dot 
aux parents de la femme. » (Ph
University Press, 1953, 236).  
731Schwimmer,Brian,“Bride
ge/bride_wealth.html  p.2. 
732 See Holdsworth, A history of English Law, vol. II,  London, Methuen, 1923, 87.  
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by her.733 Jacob laboured for seven years to be given Rachael’s hand in marriage734 
and this was not considered as the purchase price.  
                                                
 Due to the sale analogy, statements such as “I have no business with girls who 
are supposed to be in their husbands’ houses”735 and “I am surprised that the widow 
of my late father is also challenging me for the next-of-kin on behalf of the son, of 
which she is my property”736 are commonplace. Academics such as professor 
NKouenjin think similarly that the payment of the bride-price makes marriage a sale 
contract.737  And the judiciary joins in the fray when in Achu v. Achu Inglis J says that 
“the wife is still regarded as part of her husband’s property. That conception is 
underscored by the payment of dowry on marriage and on the refund of same on 
divorce.”738 Yet in Nanje v. Bokwe, the same judge ruled that a “woman cannot, 
unless given by will, inherit from her father, let alone be his next of kin.”739 The 
question is whether a will has such magical powers to convert a chattel into human or 
whether a woman is property only in intestacy and human in testacy.                             
Mbarga argues, fortunately, that : 
“La femme n’a jamais été et n’est pas une chose, un bien quelconque du 
patrimoine. Et elle n’a jamais été considérée comme telle dans la tradition 
africaine, quoi qu’on en ait dit. La femme est une personne physique qui a 
toujours eu ses droits et obligations, différents de ceux de l’homme certes, 
dans la civilisation africaine. La place que celle-ci lui a assignée a peut-
 
733 See Glanville Williams, “The Legal unity of husband and wife” (1947)10 M.L.R, 16-31, 18  
734 See the Holy Bible Genesis 29: 18-20. 
735 Statement of a brother when invited by the sisters to attend a family meeting to decide the fate of the 
property left by their late father and which he was mismanaging. The uncooperative attitude led to the 
case of Peter Chi Charles v. Chinkwo Nde Fidelis & Caroline Chi (2006) Appeal No. BCA/62/2003 
(unreported) 
736 Statement by defendant in Elive Njie Francis v. Hannah Efeti Manga (C.A.S.W.P/CC/12/98 
(unreported) 
737 Yotnda, Muarice Nkouenjin, Le Cameroun a la Reserche de son Droit de la Famille, Paris, Librairie 
Generale de Droit et de la Jurisprudence, 1975. « Les sommes que verse le mari ne sont ni des cadeaux 
ni des symboles, encore moins des assurances ou ciment d’alliance ; mais il s’agit d’un achat et tout 
autre appellation doit s’analyser comme tel,»  63.  
738 Appeal No BCA/62/86 (unreported). See also Ndumu v. Ndumu, Suit No. HCB/97/MC/86 
(unreported) ; Ngnitedem Etienne v. Tashi Lydia, Appeal No. BCA/46/86 (unreported) 
739 (1983) C.A.S.W.P./CC/22/82, cited by Enonchong, N, supra, 511. 
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être été inférieure à qu’il occupait l’homme, soit ! mais de là à dire que la 
femme était et est considérée comme une chose, comme un bien chez les 
africains, c’est inexact et faux. »740       
 
Oki J. in the Nigerian case of Ibikade v. Aize distinguishes the bride-price 
from purchase price in a sales contract:  
 “Is the term “dowry” equivalent to the term “price”? The purchase price 
of an article is a single sum payable (even if by instalments) to the 
owner or owners of the article. Dowry on the other hand is not usually a 
single or simple sum like the price. ” 741 
 
Furthermore anthropological studies show that the actual sums transferred as 
bride price are less significant as economic inducements or assets, than as 
counters in a social exchange system that binds two families together in 
marriage.742 
If the payment of the bride price makes marriage a sale transaction sui juris it 
becomes necessary to determine what is sold. Is it the person or the fruits of her 
womb?  It can certainly not be the person because in certain customs, such as the 
Banyang in the South West Province when a married woman dies she has to be buried 
in her family of origin.743 The idea that the bride price is payment for the fruits of the 
woman’s womb emanates from certain customs according to which the paternity of a 
                                                 
740 “The woman has never been and is not a thing, a chattel whatever of the patrimony. And she was 
never considered as such in African tradition, whatever is said on the subject. The woman is a  physical 
person who has always had her rights and obligations, different from those of men of course, in African 
civilisation. The place assigned to her by this might be inferior to that occupied by men, very well! but 
from there to say that a woman the woman was and is considered as a thing, as a chattel among the 
Africans, is inexact and false,” Emile Mbarga, “Quelques reflexions sur le projet de la loi reorganisant 
l’etat civil au Cameroun Oriental et protant diverses dispositions relative au marriage”  (1966) 76 
Penant 286-302, 291.     
741 (1974) U.I.L.R. 18, 21. Also Ngwafor, E. N. Family Law in Anglophone Cameroon, supra, 72.  
742 Brian Schwimmer, supra.  
743 Apparently this is not unique to Cameroonian tribes, for upon her death, the Congolese-born wife of 
the President of Gabon was buried in her native village in the Congo Republic and the reason given for 
this was the desire by her family to “S’entinir au strict respect des us et coutumes Odimba.” In 
Rapatriement: Edith Lucie Bongo sera inhumée au Congo,” Cameroun Tribune of  15 April 2009, 
available on line at   http://www.cameroun-info.net   
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child is in the payer of the bride price as against the biological father. However since 
Ngeh v. Ngome that custom has been declared to be contrary to natural justice, equity 
and good conscience.744 That apart it has also to be noted that barrenness is not a 
ground for nullity or divorce. In a contract of sale of goods the purchaser reserves the 
right to reject the goods on grounds that they are not merchantable or fit for the 
purpose for which they are bought. 
Far from being the purchase price the bride price serves inter alia745 as proof 
of the parents’ consent to the marriage.746 The law is against using the bride-price as a 
condition for the essential validity of marriage.747 The validity of marriage and bride-
price are, however, intricately linked as long as the bride-price is the only means by 
which the consent of the girl’s parents could be established. A parent wishing to 
contest the validity of a marriage does not need to plead none or partial payment of 
the bride-price.748 It suffices that he pleads the absence of his consent749 whereby the 
burden shifts to the spouses to show that consent was given. The bride-price 
constitutes a sort of “registration” of customary marriage since it is such an overt and 
notorious act witnessed by many people that it is impossible later to deny having 
received it.   
 
 
                                                 
744 (1962-1964) W. C. L. R., 32. (selected judgments of the High Court of West Cameroon.) 
745 Some other functions of the  bride-price are that (1), it serves as a bond to unite the families of the 
spouses, (2) compensate the bride’s family for the loss of her services (3) is a stabilising factor in the 
marriage and enhance the man’s affection and devotion to the woman since the payment of the bride-
price is a sign that he values her highly. See Nsereko, supra, 693-697; Yotnda, Muarice Nkouenjin, Le 
Cameroun a la Reserche de son Droit de la Famille, Paris, Librairie Generale de Droit et de la 
Jurisprudence, 1975, 71-79. 
746 See Kasunmu, A. B. and Salacuse, J. W., Nigerian Family Law, London, Butterworths, 1966, 78. 
747 See Enonchong, N., “Public Policy and Ordre Public; The exclusion of customary law in 
Cameroon,” (1993) 5(3) RADIC, 503-525, 508.   
748 Section 70 (1) (b) of the Civil Status Registration Ordinance of 1981 provides : “Any action against 
the validity of a marriage as a result of the total or partial failure to execute a dotal or matrimonial 
agreement shall be rejected on grounds of public policy.”   
749 Section 64 (2) ibid, “The consent of the spouse-to-be shall be valid only when supported by that of 
his father and mother.” 
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4.7.5.2: Women as heritable property: Levirate Marriage. 
 The fact that the bride-price is seen to concretise the union between two 
families rather than two individuals has far reaching consequences.750 The death of 
the man does not normally terminate the marriage, as it is possible, with the consent 
of the woman, for her to be attached to another member of the family in marriage.  
It was an old Jewish custom for the “levir” or brother751 of a deceased to take 
over his wife in order to produce a son for the latter and perpetuate his name.752 The 
objective in customary law is different. It assuages the widows’ incapacity to 
succeed753 and Professor Elias writes that the union is “a scheme of social insurance 
against neglect and hunger for the deceased’s dependants.”754 In The Estate of 
Agboruja755 it was explained that the basis of the custom was to ensure the continued 
maintenance of the widow and her children and was not repugnant as contended by 
the widow; unless it could be shown that the new husband was wicked towards that 
family when the deceased was still alive. The male relative becomes a new father for 
the children and is responsible for their upbringing as if they were his own children.   
The term “widow inheritance” is also commonly used giving the impression of 
compulsion. Widows have always had the option to refuse to take a relative of the 
deceased as husband756 without thereby forfeiting the right to maintenance by the 
                                                 
750 See Melone, Stanislas, “le Droit Successoral Camerounais: Etude de Quelques Points en 
Jurisprudence (1979) 17/18 Cameroun Law Review, pp. 53-97, 66.  
751 Taken in context this would include other male relatives of the deceased including sons in 
polygamous families. 
752 See Deuteronomy 25: 5-10. 
753 Ombiono, Simon, « L’application de la loi du 7 Juillet 1966 portant diveres  disposition relative aux 
marriages dans l’ex Cameroun Oriental » Masters thesis, Yaounde, cited by Melone, supra. 
66. Ngongang-Ouandji, Andre, “La devolution successorale au Cameroun”, (1972) 26 Rev. Jur. Pol. 
Ind. Coop. 639-662, 655. 
 
754 Elias, T. O., Nigerian Land Law, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1971, 195. 
755 (1949)  19 N. L. R. 38.  
756See Mbouyom, Francois-Xavier, « Le statut juridique, politique et social de la femme au 
Cameroun.» (1974)  28 Rev. Jur. Pol. Ind. Coop. 600-612, 612.  Nwogugu, E. I., Family Law in 
Nigeria, Heinemann Educational Books (Nigeria) Plc., 1996, 223.  
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family if they remain in the family.757 The true significance of the expression is not 
necessarily that the successor inherits the widow as wife,758 but rather the 
responsibilities towards her, which were initially those of the husband. An Ashanti 
proverb cited by Rattray says that “The one who takes the gun of the deceased also 
takes the widow”.759 The gun symbolises the means of livelihood and one cannot take 
it away without assuming the responsibility to feed the mouths that depended on it.  
Therefore whether the widow becomes a wife to the successor or any other 
person depends on her consent. This was emphasised by a West African chief who 
described the situation as follows: “If somebody dies any member of the family can 
go secretly to any of the wives and find out if she would marry him. If the woman 
agrees, there is a customary present which the relative gives to the woman.... If there 
is agreement between the woman and the man, the man is to go and inform the oldest 
person in the family.”760 In his study on the Bali tribe in Cameroon Rubin establishes 
that widows generally have three options. They could return to their parental homes, 
remain in the home of the successor under his guardianship as a widow, or become 
the wife of one of the relatives of the deceased. Where she elects to return to her 
parental home the bride price must in principle to be returned, although the right may 
be waived by the family.761 Where she chooses to remain in the husband’s compound 
as a widow, with or without children, the obligation to refund the bride price is 
removed and she is entitled to maintenance from the husband’s family.   
                                                 
757 See Rubin, infa.  
758 Ngongang-Ouandji, Andre, “La devolution successorale au Cameroun”, (1972) 26 Rev. Jur. Pol. 
Ind. Coop. 639-662, 655. 
759 Ashanti law and custom, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1929, 28. 
760See Armstrong, R. G., “Intestate Succession among the Udoma,” in J. Duncan M. Derrett, Studies in 
the Laws of Succession in Nigeria, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1965, 215  
761 In fact the general practice today is for the woman to be allowed to return to her parents without the 
demand for the bride-price but if she is young and remarries then the new bride-price is used to pay off 
the first. 
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Indubitably therefore, the consent of the widow is necessary especially as 
article 77 (2) of the Civil Status Registration Ordinance No. 81-02 of 29 June 1981 
provides that “In the event of the death of the husband, his heirs shall have no right 
over the widow, or over her freedom.” When there is consent the matter cannot get to 
court, and in fact we came across a case which is representative of the actual situation. 
In Asane Florence v. Ndeh Thomas762 the plaintiff’s mother and three other widows 
were taken over by her “uncle” when their husband died. Other children were born of 
these unions and the defendant was one of them. In the case, however, the point in 
issue was not the levirate marriages but rather whether the plaintiff was to succeed to 
property as the child of her biological father or of the father by inheritance.  
The courts generally castigate levirate marriages as being contrary to natural 
justice, equity and good conscience. Thus in David Tchakokam v Keou Magdaleine763 
it was stated that “any custom which says that a woman or any human being for that 
matter is property and can be inherited along with a deceased’s estate is not only 
repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience, but is actually contrary to 
written law.”764  
In the light of what is said about the bride-price and levirate marriages it is 
clear that the “woman as property” theory is in sharp decline. The process was started 
in the divorce case of Fodje v.  Kette,765 described by Professor Ngwafor as “a famous 
                                                 
762 (2006) Suit No. HCK/AE/K.28/98 (unreported) 
763 1999 G.L.R. 111.  
764 Ibid, 118, per Ngassa, J. See also the ruling of the South West Court of Appeal in Elive Njie Francis 
v. Hannah Efeti Manga. The appellant claimed that in accordance with the Bakweri custom he had 
provided a sack clothe for the widow of his uncle and this made him the next-of-kin of the deceased 
and husband to the widow. This contention was rejected by the Bwenga Customary Court which named 
the widow as next-of-kin. The decision was upheld at appeal, with Nana, J., saying that “Even if it is 
the Bakweri custom that by buying a sack cloth for the widow of the deceased, the provider is deemed 
next-of-kin, that custom cannot be enforced by this court. It is repugnant to natural justice, equity and 
good conscience.” (1999) Suit No. CASWP/cc/12/98).    
765 Appeal No. BCA/45/ 86 (unreported) cited by Hamisu, Rabiatu Danpullo, “Women, Property and 
Inheritance– The case of Cameroon.”Recht in Africa 2005, 143-161, 149.  
 205
first,”766 because Arrey, J. granted the wife the right to occupy the matrimonial home 
as well as collect rents from two other houses.767 An appeal against that decision to 
the Supreme Court is still pending. This could just be indicative that the highest 
judicial authority considers the case to have been rightly decided. The equality of 
sexes is a matter of public policy proclaimed in the preamble of the constitution. The 
principle is also enshrined in article 2 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, which has been ratified by Cameroon.768 In this respect the high judicial body 
overruled a decision of the Bamenda court of appeal in Chibikom v. Zamcho Florence 
in which a married woman was held not have the capacity to administer her father’s 
estate.    
 
4.8: ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES IN CUSTOMARY LAW. 
   
Because administration is governed by the Supreme Court (Civil Procedure) 
Rules of the 1948 Laws of Nigeria, most estates in this country tend to be 
administered in accordance with English law.  
   The Chibikom Case for example was subject to customary law as evident in 
the fact that the deceased was survived by five wives. But the court had no qualms in 
holding that “it is settled law that the effect of the grant of letters of administration is 
                                                 
766 Ngwafor, E. N., “Cameroon: Property Rights for Women- A Bold Step in the Wrong Direction” 
(1991) 29 (2) Journal of Family Law, University of Louisville, 296. 
767 Professor Ngwafor commends the boldness of the judge but criticises the decision for having been 
arrived at without reference to existing customary law or English precedents, both of which would have 
resulted in the woman being excluded. It could be submitted, however, that the decision could have 
been justified on grounds of the repugnancy of a custom which treats women as property. The English 
position at the time that the law knows of no community of property between spouses could not have 
been applied without necessary modification. Most spouses in Africa acquire property only after 
marriage and given the contribution, direct or indirect of either it becomes difficult to actually say 
whose property it is, although in the case of land it might be registered in the name of one of the 
spouses. In England on the other hand spouses go into marriage already owning property or a 
substantial part of it. But even here the idea of the “community of surplus” comes up as spouses are 
expected to share the benefit of any increase in their wealth produced during the marriage by their work 
or thrift.   
768 See Enonchong, “ . N., “Public Policy and Ordre Public; The exclusion of customary law in 
Cameroon,” (1993) 5(3) RADIC, 503-525, 511. 
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to vest the estate of the deceased in the administrator,”769 when the rule in customary 
law is that property passes to the family770 and not the successor, who is only the 
agent with an interest in the estate appointed by the family.   
Although customary courts do not have jurisdiction over letters of 
administration their decisions are sufficient to ensure administration of an estate in 
customary law. This could be under auxiliary powers conferred on them by section 
47(1) of the Customary Courts Ordinance, 1948: 
 “A customary court may, whenever it shall think it necessary to do so for 
the preservation, proper custody or management of any property in dispute 
in a cause, appoint any person as a receiver or manager to receive and to 
take charge of the property and to deal with it in such a manner as shall be 
directed by the said customary court.”  
 
This is by no means different from the powers which letters of administration 
conferred on personal representatives. Letters are therefore not indispensable and in 
fact most estates in this country are managed without them, even though the point 
needs to be made that such estates are generally deemed to be unrepresented in law, 
so that an action cannot be maintained on their behalf in the High Courts. 
 The point was made Njoke v. Njoke771 where  next- of- kin prior to obtaining 
letters of administration  instituted an action in the High Court purporting to protect a 
house which was part of the estate. The suit was held to be inadmissible whereupon 
the plaintiff appealed to the South West Court of Appeal, which upheld the decision 
of the trial court:  
“For an estate to sue either the beneficiary applies for a grant ad litem or 
obtains letters of administration. Both are obtainable from the High Court. 
                                                 
769 (1997) 1 CCLR, 213, 219. 
770 See Bentsi-Enchill, Ghana land law, supra, 142. 
771 (2006) Suit No. C.A.S.W.P/35/04-05 (unreported). 
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However a person declared next-of- kin by the customary court can go 
before that court for any remedy that that court can. But if he seeks a 
remedy in the High Court, he must comply with the rules of the game in 
the High Court under Cap. 211, Order 48 by obtaining the letters of 
administration required by the law.”   
 
The responsibilities incumbent on the successor are actually those of the family, 
hence he needs the consent of the family, express or tacit, to carry out his 
functions.772 He cannot, for example dispose of property nor sue in respect of it 
without the consent of the family. He pays the debts left by the deceased and funeral 
expens
the rule is that responsibility for the debts is not 
limited
                                                
es. 
Funeral debts are normally settled with contributions from members of the 
extended family and donations from sympathisers. If the available amount is 
insufficient to settle the funeral expenses the balance is discharged by dividing it 
among the members of the immediate family. The debts of the deceased could be paid 
by disposing of some of the property,773 but this is only the last option as the family 
will hardly permit that land be sold to settle debts. Generally therefore the successor 
pays the debts out of his pocket and 
 to the value of the estate.774  
Other duties include legally enforceable rights to maintenance by the 
dependants of the deceased who will include the children, widows, and members of 
the direct and extended families of the deceased.775 Generally the movable property is 
 
772 See Nwabueze, Nigerian Land Law, supra, 430. 
773 See Kwende, Chantal, “Procedure for designating the next-of-kin and his powers over property in 
the Baforchu tribe” Term Paper, University of Dschang, 2000. (unpublished) 
774Ngongang-Ouandji, Andre, “La devolution successorale au Cameroun”, (1972) 26 Rev. Jur. Pol. Ind. 
Coop. 639-662, 658; Binet, Jacques, “La decvolution successorale chez les Douala du Cameroun”, 
(1955) 65 Penant, 33-40, 36. 
775 Ngongang-Ouandji, Andre, “La devolution successorale au Cameroun”, (1972) 26 Rev. Jur. Pol. 
Ind. Coop. 639-662, 647 ; Bentsi-Enchill, Ghana Land Law, supra, 167. 
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distribu
 the public 
roperty of the state,777 and so ceased to be the subject of succession. Public property 
of the s 778
uthority of the chief. Eventually members of 
the com
                                                
ted shortly after burial and funeral ceremonies and so powers administration 
are actually exercised only with respect to land.  
Land under customary law can be community land, chieftaincy land, family 
land, and privately owned land. Only the last two categories raise questions of 
succession but a discussion of community lands is necessary because of its role as a 
pool of land from which the needs of persons excluded from succession could be met. 
Chieftaincy land will not be of interest to us in this study, because by the 1974 land 
reforms776 properties occupied by persons qua chiefs were converted into
p
tate is said to be inalienable, imprescriptible and un-attachable.    
 
4.8.1: COMMUNITY LAND  
It happens during the early settlement of each community that the land 
acquired either as a result of conquest or peaceful settlement generally belongs to the 
entire community,779 placed under the a
munity are allotted part thereof or appropriate parcels of the land on behalf of 
their families, existing or prospective.    
Un-occupied lands are never the subject of succession as they continue as 
community lands under the authority of the chief and could be put to rational use by 
any member thereof. In Agbortar v. Chief Besong, Endeley J. said “That land falling 
within settled and well defined village boundaries is communal property of the village 
is so well entrenched a fact as to be axiomatic. The communal rights are exercised 
 
776 The land reforms of 6 July 1974 are contained in three ordinances that were followed in 1976 with 
an equivalent number of decrees of application.  The relevant ordinance is Ordinance No. 74-2 of 6 
July 1974   
777 Section 4 (i) reads “The artificial public property of the state shall comprise the concession of 
traditional chiefdoms and property relating thereto, and more especially in the provinces where the 
concession of chiefdom is considered as the joint property of the community, the chief having only the 
enjoyment thereof.”  
778.Section 2 (2)  
779 Kamga, Victor, Le Droit Coutumier Bamiléké au contact des droits Européens, Yaoundé, 1959, 130.   
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over areas of land which are unoccupied by villages for building or farming purposes. 
Any benefits, financial or otherwise which accrue from the use of such land by 
strangers would go to the village community as a whole in accordance with their 
democratically ascertained wishes.”780 It also accepted that members of the 
commu
on is made for such grants of land. However, the case of John Kpumia v. 
John A
given that women are not prevented from acquiring land for valuable consideration. 
However the process is long and expensive and the lands are allocated for investment 
                                                
nity could do anything on the land subject only to the interest of the village 
community to which it belongs.781   
They provide a pool of land from which allotments could be made to needy 
persons through application to the chief, and these include persons excluded by the 
rules of succession.782 Because of the gender bias of customary law one would be 
tempted to think that men would be more favoured by the chief to whom the 
applicati
bongwe783 shows that women could also benefit from grants from community 
lands.   
Providing land to members of a community out of this pool of land would be 
virtually impossible today, considering that the 1974 land reforms converted lands 
that previously fell under the authority of chiefs into national lands of the second 
category784, the acquisition of which passes not by a simple application to the chief 
but to the administrative authorities. The fact that applications are made to 
administrative officers not influenced by custom could be advantageous to women 
 
780 (1968) WCLR, 43, 45. 
781 Anyangwe, supra. 34. 
782 See Tambi Eyongetah and Robert Brain, A history of Cameroon, London, Longman, 1974, 44-45. 
783 (1978) Y.U.L.R. 78. In that case the husband of the deceased claimed succession rights over land 
left by the deceased on the ground that they had contracted a Christian marriage. Evidence was 
adduced to prove that the land in question had been granted to the deceased by the paramount chief of 
Mankon and that since she did not will it to her husband it had upon her death become family property. 
784 These are unoccupied lands and occupied land became national lands of the first category which 
could be registered by their occupiers.  
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and not habitation.785  Occasionally the chief might request a portion of the national 
land to accommodate the increasing population. Often very little land is obtained in 
this way and most of it ends up in the hands of a few influential men and women, 
leaving out those who are actually in need of land as a result of the customary law of 
succession.  
 
  
4.8.2: FAMILY LAND 
  These lands are created out of community lands in the manner described and 
members obtained them not in their personal names but in the name of their families, 
actual or anticipated. The passage of time has not in any way diminished the 
attachment of Cameroonians to the concept. Family lands continue to be created by 
individual family members out of their personally acquired land by will, gifts inter 
vivos and by the acquisition of land with family resources.786 When a member who 
acquired land with the use his own resources dies intestate and did not contract a 
monogamous marriage which will lead to the presumption that he intended the 
received law to regulate his succession, the courts generally presume that it has 
become family property.787  
This attitude towards land can be explained by certain factors. In subsistence 
economies land is the main source of wealth and livelihood. To be without land is to 
be like a tree without roots. Of no less relevance is the religious significance of land, 
believed to be the means of communion between the living and the dead believed to 
be the real owners of the land. This fact is acknowledged for Cameroon by 
Anyangwe: “land throughout Cameroon (and throughout Africa) has religious or 
                                                 
785 It is stipulated in section 2 of Decree No. 76-166 of 27 July relating to the terms and conditions for 
the management of national lands that “Temporary rights shall be granted for development projects in 
line the economic, social or cultural policies of the nation.”   
786 James, R. W. Modern Land Law of Nigeria, Ife University Press, Ile-Ife Nigeria, 1975,55-56. 
787 See John Kpumia v. John Abongwe, (1978) Y.U.L.R. 78. 
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supernatural significance as tribal or family ancestors are buried on the land, or the 
land is itself a deity which requires placating.” 788 
This reverence for land is observed more in the rural communities even though 
this is ebbing as a result of advancing urbanisation and education. The population of 
the urban areas no longer hold such reverence for land neither do they think that the 
function of land is limited to providing man with means of subsistence. Land, 
according to this segment of the population, should in addition to subsistence afford 
the possibility for investments and serve as collateral security for loans.  
This is possible only when communal ownership of land gives way to 
individual ownership and its corollary- alienation. In fact as far back as 1908 in Lewis 
v Bankole, Speed C. J had predicted the demise of communal land ownership through 
a “legislative or judicial coup de grâce.”789  A legislative coup de grâce was given by 
the Cameroonian legislature in the 1974 land reforms whereby the customary system 
of land tenure was purportedly abolished. The combined effects of sections 14790 and 
15791 of Ordinance No. 74-1 of 6 July 1974 lead to the assumption that all lands held 
under customary law including those in effective occupation have been nationalised. 
Though not express, a circular letter792 of the Minister of Finance issued in 1976, 
purporting to represent the government position stated to the effect that the Ordinance 
had effectively put an end to customary land rights in the country. Certainly a circular 
letter cannot supersede the provisions of an ordinance and for this reason very little 
                                                 
788 Anyangwe, Carlson, “Land Tenure and Interests in Land in Cameroonian Indigenous Law.” (1984) 
Cameroon Law Review, 29-41, 35.  
789 (1909) 1N.L.R. 81, 83. 
790 “National lands shall as of right comprise lands which at the date on which the present Ordinance 
enters into force  are not classed into the public or private property of the state  and other public 
bodies.”  
791 “National land shall be divided into two categories:  
(1) Lands occupied with houses, farms and plantations, and grazing land manifesting human 
presence and development.) 
(2) Lands free of any effective occupation.”   
792 Cited by Ngwasiri, C.N. “The impact of the present land tenure reforms in Cameroon on the former 
west Cameroon.” (1984) Cameroon Law Review, pp. 73-85, 76. 
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weight has been attached to this circular. The abolition is also assumed from section 
17(2) which calls upon the holders of customary titles to register same in their names 
or the names of the group if they are family heads.793 This too is not mandatory and 
the lacuna has been exploited by traditionalist judges to perpetuate the continued 
existence of customary land tenure.794 Even academics such as professor Ngwasiri 
argue that “one cannot abolish an aspect of customary law simply by enacting 
legislation to say that one has done so.”795    
Membership of the group entails rights over the family property which we 
noticed in the introduction is heritable. Lands which a member occupies for 
residential or other purposes devolves as a matter of principle to his descendants and 
in default reverts to the family to be reallocated to the other members of the family.  
Successors tend to consider these as part of their inheritance which upon their 
death should also devolve to their own descendants. This is fallacious as evident in 
Ndiba v. Ndiba796 where it was held that the property which the deceased father of the 
defendant held as a family member remained family property and did not pass with 
the estate administered by the defendant.  
Even improvements on the land do not change the family character of the land. 
Thus it was held in Bodylawson v. Bodylawson,797 that a house did not cease to be 
family property because of the renovation work done on it by the deceased, father of 
the plaintiff, to repair the damage caused by fire.  
                                                 
793 “Provided that customary communities, members thereof,  and any other person of  Cameroonian 
nationality, peacefully occupying or using lands in category 1 as defined in article 15, on August 5 
1974, the date of entry into force of the present Ordinance, shall continue to occupy or use the said 
lands. They may apply for land certificates in accordance with the terms of the decree….”       
794See for example Thomas Ngo v. Moses Lukong & Another, Appeal No. BCA/ 10/75 (unreported); 
Daniel Nde Ndenka v. Mokom Clement (1995) Appeal No. BCA/11/93 (unreported); Stella Nunga & 
Five Others v. Wumnyonga & Three Others, (19..) 5 CCLR 189. 
795 Ibid. 76. 
796 (2006) Suit No. HCK/AE/K.77/98 (unreported) 
797 (2006) Suit  No. HCF/PROB/AE105/04-05/1M/05 (unreported). 
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A member is also entitled to a share in any proceeds arising from the sale of 
the property and the rents and profits accruing from it.798 Members have a voice in the 
management of the property which consists in being consulted directly or through the 
principal members for important transactions concerning the property. There is also 
the right of ingress and egress on the property held by members of which the main 
effect is to prevent actions for trespass to land between members of the family.799 
Actions in trespass to goods and conversion are, however possible if upon entering 
land in the possession of another, a member interferes with the property of that person 
to justify any of the actions.  
 
4.8.3: PERSONALLY ACQUIRED LAND  
Not even the customary law is against the acquisition of land by family 
members in their personal name and with their private resources. Such lands could 
validly be disposed of inter vivos or by will and could be held under registered or 
unregistered titles. 
Security of such tenure is guaranteed by the system of land registration 
introduced by the 1974 land reforms. It must be said that the system has been used by 
many an unscrupulous successor to register family land in their individual names.800  
Section 9 of Decree No. 76-165 of 27 April 1976 governing land registration 
empowers members of the customary communities to register lands in their individual 
or collective names. The precondition for registration is “occupation” of the land from 
5 August 1975 which is the date when the 1974 Land Tenure Ordinance went into 
force and the successor, even though a derivative owner of a portion of the land as 
any other member also has the power of supervision of all the land. 
                                                 
798 See Bodylawson v. Bodylawson, ibid. 
799 Daniel Ndenka v Mokom Clement (1995) Appeal No. BCA/11/93 (unreported). 
800 See Youego, Christine, “La Situation Juridique du conjoint survivant au Cameroun”, (199) 2 
African Law Review, 23  
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We take “occupation” as used here to mean possession which is the basis for 
title to land.801 Possession is the exclusive occupation of land with powers to exclude 
intruders. It may be argued that the successor does not have exclusive possession 
because the other family members have possession as well. However the parameters 
for determining the exclusiveness of possession are not the actual occupation but the 
powers of control and management which include the ability to institute legal 
proceedings against intruders. These are the prerogatives of the successor,802 and 
although other members of the family could institute legal proceedings to protect the 
family land, this is only when the successor neglects or fails to do so.803 Hence the 
requirement of occupation favours the successor against the other family members. 
Section 10 of the land registration Decree No. 76-165 of 27 April 1976 is against the 
trustees of an inheritance obtaining land certificates in their names, but this has not 
prevented such occurrences.804    
  The concept of personally acquired property runs into difficulties in the 
African context due to the role played by families in bringing up its members. 
Accordingly there are people who argue that the concept does not exist at all, since 
without the assistance of the family the person would have had nothing to call his 
own.  The point was however made in the Ghanaian case of Larbi v. Cato805 that: 
 “While it [the support] places upon them certain recognised moral 
obligations towards the family it does not stamp with the mark of the 
family everything that they afterwards acquire by their own efforts, 
whether as lawyers, doctors or merchants or by activity in other fields. If 
                                                 
801 See Harpun, C, Bridge, S & Dixon, M, Megarry & Wade: The Law of Real Property, London, 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2008, 89. 
802 See Mahmudu v. Zenuah (1934) 2 W.A.C.A. 172; Kwan Nyieni (1959) G.L.R. 67; Adagun v. 
Fagbola (1932) 11 N.L.R. 110; Bassey v. Cobham (1924) 5 N.L.R. 92; Uwana v. Ewa (1925) 5 N.L.R. 
25. 
803 See Mahmudu v. Zenuah (1934) 2 W.A.C.A. 172; 
804 This as we saw was one of the points of contention in Chibikom No.1 (above). 
805 [1960] Ghana Law Report, 146. 
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the contrary were the correct view there is hardly a person of distinction in 
the country who could claim to possess anything that he could call his own, 
and much of the body of the customary law on the disposal and inheritance 
of self-acquired property would be cast away, which is the reductio ad 
absurdum of the whole argument.”         
   
Self-acquired property however maintains that status in the lifetime of the owner and 
when he dies testate bequeathing the said property to the beneficiaries individually.806 
When he dies intestate a presumption arises in favour of family property.807 The 
absolute right which he had over the property in his lifetime is in recognition of his 
effort and this comes to an end on his death intestate.  
Family property created out of privately acquired property must not be 
confused with the family property already discussed, which the deceased must have 
held on behalf of his immediate or extended family. Both are of course family 
property but subject to different rules of devolution. The first category of family 
property devolves to the members of the sub family while that in the second category 
is limited to the immediate and possibly extended families.808   
 Hence the circle of successors for family property of the second category is 
wider as it is not limited to members of the sub-family generated by the deceased. In 
Joseph Bamu v. Emmanuel Bamu809, the respondent was made successor to the estate 
of his deceased father who was also in possession of land obtained from the family 
when his own father died. The respondent purported to treat the family property as 
being part of the succession but was met with opposition from members of his father’s 
                                                 
806 See Stella Nunga v. Clara Kumbongsi Cameroon Common Law Reports, Part 5, 189.  
807 See Adeyeye v. Adewoyin (1963) 1 All N. L. R. 421. 
808 Ngongang-Ouandji, Andre, “La devolution successorale au Cameroun”, (1972) 26 Rev. Jur. Pol. 
Ind. Coop. 639-662, 646. 
809 (1990) Appeal No. BCA/65/86 (unreported) 
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immediate family who argued successfully that his succession did not include the land 
obtained from the family. 
 Another problem is in the distinction between family properties of both 
categories. Successors have a tendency to use resources from family property to 
develop, or set up their own property, so that when they die their own successors find 
it difficult distinguishing between the two categories of property. The solution to this 
problem could lie in the direction of a requirement that letters of administration must 
be obtained by every person appointed successor and that each grant of administration 
should apart from detailing the particular properties in respect of which administration 
is granted, 810 include projections on envisaged development of the property. These 
would enable the identification of accretions to the estate which would otherwise be 
claimed by the successor as private property. In Bodylawson v. Bodylawson,811 the 
plaintiff was estopped from excluding other beneficiaries from obtaining rents from 
family property on the ground that it was the private property of his deceased father. 
The father had carried on renovation works on the buildings and replaced buildings 
consumed by fire with new ones. Similarly in Peter Charles v. Chinkwo Fidelis812 the 
plaintiff failed in his bid to exclude the other family members from enjoying proceeds 
of part of family property on the ground that it was property which his deceased father 
had redeemed from a pledge.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
810 See Order 48 Rule 11 of the Supreme Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, Cap. 211 of the 1948 Laws of 
Nigeria. 
811 (2006) Suit  No. HCF/PROB/AE105/04-05/1M/05 (unreported). 
812 (2003) Suit No.HCB/PD/LA.36M/99-2000 (unreported). 
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4.8.4: DISTRIBUTION OF THE ASSETS  
 
At the end of the administration the successor is expected to distribute the 
property. Movable property as we said is distributed shortly after the funeral.813 Every 
member without distinction of sex receives something even if the entitlements are not 
equal. The share of the property which each person receives is a function of the 
responsibilities entrusted on him by the family meeting.814 
 It is common practice in all the tribes for the female relatives to receive the 
items of adornment of a deceased female, while things such as kitchen utensils go 
primarily to the successor for the use of his wife. In the case of a deceased male it 
would only be expected that his sons get his items of clothing as well as the utensils 
of his trade because generally a son should take over the father’s trade.  In Ajong v. 
Ajong,815 the deceased had no son but was survived by daughters and two nephews 
who were the parties in this case. He left property including palm and raffia trees 
which the customary court shared between the nephews. In the present appeal one of 
the nephews claimed to be solely entitled, but the appellate court upheld the partition 
and stated the law regarding the distribution of such property as follows: “The 
Widikum Customary Court [law?] is grounded on patrilineal succession. The question 
of palm trees and raffia mats is a male affair and that is why apparently, none of the 
… three daughters are interested in the matter.”816 Items of furniture are also shared 
and in most of the cases the successor gets most, if not all of it.817 
                                                 
813 Ngongang-Ouandji, Andre, “La devolution successorale au Cameroun”, (1972) 26 Rev. Jur. Pol. 
Ind. Coop. 639-662, 649. 
814 See Youego, Ch., “Sources et Evolution de Droit des Succession au Cameroun,” Doctorat thesis, 
university of Paris II, 1994, 623.  
815 (2000)1 CCLR. 67. 
816 Ibid, 70. 
817See Guy Bertrand, Momo, Le Partage des successions en droit Camerounais, University of Dschang,    
Maitrise dissertation, 1997, 45-48 (unpublished). 
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The distribution of land is not countenanced818 unless there is proof that the 
beneficiaries can no longer live together as a family because of squabbles borne of the 
fact that the successor is depriving the others of their rights in the use and enjoyment 
of the property.  Distribution proceedings could be initiated through the successor819 
and when he refuses, through a court order. When consensual, the distribution is 
normally conducted by the traditional council upon application by the family. The 
Council visits the locus in quo in order to ascertain the extent of the property and 
determine how to allocate the shares. In the absence of agreement an application 
could be made to the Customary Court to order the partition. The decision to partition 
is generally followed by wide publicity requiring the presence or representation of all 
the beneficiaries.  
  Distribution operates on the basis of the hotchpot principle according to 
which every member must account for and bring into the hotchpot any family 
property in their possession. This must however be distinguished from outright gifts 
of property made by deceased in his lifetime to members of his family. It would 
appear that gifts of property made in conformity with accepted procedure do not come 
into the hotchpot. In Geh v. Geh 820 Taminang, J, excluded a gift from an inventory by 
quoting the statement by Ollennu that “A most essential [?] of customary law 
regarding either gifts inter vivos or testamentary is that it should be made in 
unambiguous terms and must have the widest possible publicity, in other words 
customary law does not favour gifts made clandestinely.”821 Secondly, all the 
                                                 
818 Youego, ibid, 623. 
819 Binet, Jacques, “La decvolution successorale chez les Douala du Cameroun”, (1955) 65 Penant, 33-
40, 36, 40. 
820 (2006) HCB/PD/LA/243M/04-05 (unreported) Also in Arrêt Mpempele, the deceased made an inter 
vivos gift of a house to one of his son. When he died the other five children questioned the validity of 
the gift in order to have the house brought back into the succession and partitioned. It was held by the 
Supreme Court that the gift was valid and could not be set aside. Cour Suprême Arrêt No. 47/L du 21 
Fevrier 1980.  
821 The Law of Testate and Intestate Succession in Ghana, supra, 228.  
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beneficiaries are treated alike and finally the eldest of the beneficiaries has the priority 
of choice after the property has been broken down into portions.822   
Distribution is per capita or per stirpes known in French law respectively as 
partage par tête and partage par souche. The various tribes in Cameroon have 
appellations that relate to either method. The Bassossi for example will talk of Nlue, 
meaning head, when referring to the per capita method, and Abum, meaning womb 
when referring to the per stirpes method.823 The choice seems to depend more on the 
nature of the family.  The per capita method is good for the estate of a woman as well 
as that of a man survived by one wife or who had children only by one wife.824 The 
per stirpes method is suitable where the deceased is survived by children from more 
than one wife.  
The per stirpes method could be stigmatised for being repugnant to natural 
justice, equity and good conscience where there is inequality between the number of 
children of each wife or where some of them have no children. This notwithstanding, 
it appears to be universally followed where there is no objection to its use. Its 
application was in fact solicited in Affaire Tengou Emmanuel.825 The deceased was 
survived by children from two wives and one illegitimate child and the property was 
accordingly divided into three shares, even though one of the widows had six children 
and another had three. Also in Ambo v. Angah826 the deceased was survived by two 
widows with issue from both marriages. Letters of Administration were granted to 
one of the widows and constant bickering led the other widow to institute an action 
for a revocation of the letters. The court opted for distribution because  due to “the 
unsavoury and uncomfortable relationship of the plaintiff and defendant which 
                                                 
822 See Richardo v. Abal (1926) 7 N. L. R. 58. 
823 The Yorubas call them Ori Ojori  and Idi-Igi respectively.  
824 See James, Modern Land Law of Nigeria, supra, 159. 
825 Cour d’ Appel Bafoussam, Arrêt No.19/C du 26 Janvier, 1995 (unreported)  
826 (2006)  Suit No. C.A.S.W.P/23/2004 (unreported). 
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undoubtedly smacks of bad blood… it is[was] in the interest of the parties to share the 
above named property between them.” The property was divided between the 
branches irrespective of differences in the number of children. The method was 
proposed by the Fon of Mankon in the Chibikom case when the successor demanded 
partition on the ground that her life was at stake if she continued as successor. In the 
final communiqué from the palace the property was divided in accordance with the 
number of wives and the oldest child of each wife advised to apply for letters of 
administration.  
That the method is applicable to cases of multiple wives with children is only 
a presumption which could be rebutted by evidence showing that the family prefers 
the per capita method, or that the customary law actually prescribes the latter method 
because the allocation of responsibilities during the funeral was also per capita.827  
The family has the discretion to decide whether or not use the per stirpes method. In 
the Ghanaian case of Siaw v. Sorlor828 Ollennu J. said: “Although that may be the 
general custom, that is sharing per stirpes according to mothers, there is discretion in 
the family to share per capita if in their opinion the sharing according to the number 
of mothers will work hardship, or would be against natural justice, equity and good 
conscience.” The per capita method was adopted in La Succession Doualla Joseph829 
where the deceased was survived by ten children unevenly divided between three 
widows. 
  The decision to adopt either method must be made expeditiously and not 
dictated by envisaged economic benefit. In Akerele v Balogun830 it was held that a 
                                                 
827 James, supra, 159. 
828 (1960) G. L. R. 77, 79. 
829 Tribunal de Premier Degré Bafoussam, Jugement No. 232 ?c du 5 Mai 1988 (unreported)  
830 (1964) L. L. R. 99. 
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member who has accepted a benefit under one method of distribution cannot later 
demand that the rest of the estate be distributed by the other method. 
Distribution in customary law does not change the family character of the 
land. True the beneficiaries might register the lands thus obtained in their personal 
names, but because they receive the shares as family heads, the interests of the other 
persons must be recorded and protected in the land register. This is possible under 
section 16(1)(b) of land registration Decree No. 76-165 of 27 April 1976, according to 
which when an application is made for registration “any interested party may 
intervene with an application for registration in the event of a claim being based on 
the existence of a real right or of an encumbrance liable to be entered in the certificate 
under preparation.” Hence any alienation of the land is subject to these interests.  
 
 
Conclusion 
It is evident from the foregoing that the customary law of succession accounts 
for most the succession woes in this country. The need to keep property in the family 
based on a land tenure system which has long outlived it usefulness is used to justify 
the exclusion of women from succession. Administration is indefinite and distribution 
is only symbolic since at the end of the day the property still remains in the family. 
Children are also seen to be at the mercy of care-takers who qua successors have a 
tendency to using the property for their benefits and for that of their immediate 
families.  
By failing to adopt the broad based category of beneficiaries put forward by 
Ollennu customary law fails in the position as the received laws. It adopts the system 
of succession to the nearest and so excludes persons who had depended on the 
deceased for their maintenance. The effect of such exclusion is at least reduced in 
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English law because of the existence of the Inheritance (Provision for Family and 
Dependants) Act 1975. No such facility exists in customary law and the end result has 
been that successors cannot have peaceful enjoyment of the property. Either there is 
physical intervention or threats of witchcraft.  
Since this ends the examination of the different systems of intestacy, we are 
able to assert that neither of them meets the objectives of a good succession law set 
out at the beginning of this work. The principle of precedence reduces the categories 
of beneficiaries and so it is difficult to say that the law actually ensures the continuity 
of the obligation of maintenance which the deceased had towards certain members of 
his family. This is only done as far as the members of the nuclear family are 
concerned but the duty of maintenance does not end here, as a person has the duty to 
maintain his parents and other needy members of the family.  
Neither system has a satisfactory system of administration, given that this is 
generally indefinite and prolonged administration is what gives rise to abuse. With the 
exception of English law, distribution gives rise to the right of use only. The situation 
is exacerbated by the absence in Cameroon of a social security scheme that could take 
care of vulnerable persons. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE CONFLICT OF LAWS  
Introduction.  
With three different systems of intestate succession, each of which has 
different substantive rules, administered by a parallel system of modern and 
customary law courts, a study of the rules of conflicts is only normal in a study of this 
nature. The usual type of conflicts will normally be internal conflicts, which arise 
when persons in a territory having different systems of private law enter into judicial 
relations.831 Conflicts of this category will be expected between different systems of 
customary law inter se and between the received and customary law.  
The rules for resolving internal conflicts differ from the rules of private 
international law, which since the decision in Ghamson v. Wobill,832 were held not be 
applicable in the resolution of internal conflicts. Rules of private international law are 
evolved to resolve conflicts between different legal systems operating in different 
territories and are therefore unsuited to the problems of internal conflicts. This 
statement would need qualification in the case of Cameroon where no local rules exist 
to govern conflict between the common law and civil law.  
The variegated nature of the conflicts therefore makes the existence of 
uniform rules impossible and so to better understand the rules, we propose to examine 
them within the different courts, after explaining the central position of the personal 
law in succession matters.    
 
5.1: PERSONAL LAW: THE LAW GOVERNING SUCCESSION.  
Succession like other matters of personal status is governed by the personal 
law of the deceased. Personal law is acquired by birth or descent. It is based on the 
                                                 
831See Bartholomew, G.W., “Private Interpersonal Law” [1952]1I&CLQ, 325-344,325.  
832 (1947) 12 W.A.C.A. 181. 
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conception of man as a social being, so that those transactions of his daily life which 
affect him personally, such as marriage, divorce, legitimacy, many kinds of capacity 
and succession may be governed universally by the law deemed most suitable and 
adequate for the purpose.833 The law acquired by birth or descent could be replaced 
by codified law if the code supplants all other laws.  Our law of succession is yet to be 
codified, and so what constitutes the personal law will certainly vary, depending on 
whether the deceased was subject to the customary or received law.  
When the conflict is internal the personal law governs the devolution of all the 
property without distinction between movable and immovable property. When the 
conflict is external the rules subject movable property to the personal law of the 
deceased and immovable property to law of the situs.834 The submission of 
immovables to the law of the place rather than the personal law of the deceased is 
explained by the desire by states to protect their sovereignties.835 This distinction is of 
course unknown in internal conflicts which because they arise within the same 
territory do not involve any concerns as to the protection the sovereignty.836   
Even in private international law the movable/immovable dichotomy has been 
criticised for encouraging the fragmentation of the property of the deceased and 
thereby ignoring his intentions, which would certainly not have been for the property 
to be divided up and subjected to different laws.837 The argument about protecting the 
sovereignty is today questioned by scholars who contend that the protection of 
sovereignty is the domain of public international law. Private international law being 
                                                 
833See Graveson, R.H., Conflict of Laws, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1974, 188.  
834 See David McClean, Morris: The Conflict of Laws, London, Sweet &Maxwell, 2000, 379, 
 835 See Freke v. Lord Carbery (1873) L. R. 16 Eq. 461, 466, cited by J.H.C. Morris, “Intestate 
Succession to Land in the Conflict of Laws” (1969) 85 L.Q.R., pp. 339-371 at 342;   
836 See Bouckaert, F. “Les Regles de Conflit de Lois en Afrique Noire”, (1967) 77 Penant, 1-12, 4.  
837 See generally J.H.C. Morris, “Intestate Succession to Land in the Conflict of Laws” (1969) 85 
L.Q.R., pp. 339-371; Clarkson , C. M.V.,and Jonathan, Hill, The conflict of Laws, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2006, 453.   
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a species of private law ought to be preoccupied with finding fair and just solutions to 
meet the legitimate aspirations of parties in dispute.838 
These criticisms favour the application of the personal law of the deceased in 
the devolution of all of his property irrespective of the nature of conflict. In this 
respect the Hague Conference on Private International Law of 1988 adopted a draft 
Convention on the law applicable to succession. The Convention proposed the 
adoption of the personal law in the devolution of movable and immovable property.  
This is still to be as law in France and Great Britain.839  
 
5.2: CONFLICT OF LAWS IN CUSTOMARY COURTS 
 What is personal law in the customary courts? Being the law acquired by 
birth or descent the personal law of persons subject to the jurisdiction of these courts 
cannot but be customary law. Normally the persons would be born to a tribe which is 
either patrilineal or matrilineal or must have been born of Muslim parents.840 The 
question of conflict does not arise if a person lived, married and died in his or her 
place of origin. Conflicts are however made possible because of the disappearance of 
rigid geographical divisions between tribes, intermarriages, and the corresponding 
growth of mobility among the population, for various economic and social reasons. 
When a settler dies in the tribe where he resides, and neither the received nor local 
statutory law is applicable, the local customary court has jurisdiction and has to 
decide on the applicable law. Would it be the law of the locality or the personal law of 
the deceased?  
                                                 
838Ibid.  For a detailed analysis of the objectives of choice of law rules in private international law, See 
Jaffey, A. J. E., “The foundations  of rules for the choice of law”, in Fentiman, Richard (ed), Conflict 
of Laws, Singapore, Dartmouth, 1996, 368-392.   
839 Moves with similar objectives have been engaged in the European Union since 2002 and it is 
proposed when they go operational they shall bind non-EU states also. See Clarkson , C. M.V.,and 
Jonathan, Hill, The conflict of Laws, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, 445. 
840 The particular case of conflict involving Muslim law will considered separately. 
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5.2.1: REGULATION OF CONFLICT BETWEEN DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF 
CUSTOMARY LAW IN ANGLOPHONE CAMEROON 
  
There are no specific rules for the resolution of conflicts of this nature, but it is 
thought that these could be resolved in reliance on the principles governing the laws 
to be applied by these courts. To think otherwise would mean that each system 
evolves its own rules of conflict, an option rejected by Bennion because it might 
result in inconsistent rules.841 It is not only a question of inconsistency, but also one 
of the predictability and certainty of the law in a society with a multiplicity of tribal 
laws. 
The application of customary law is purportedly governed by Law No. 79-4 of 
29 June 1979 attaching the Customary and Alkali Courts to the Ministry of Justice842 
and the Customary Courts Ordinance of 1948. The former, which fortunately does not 
abrogate the latter, provides without more in article 2 that “The Customary and Alkali 
Courts apply customs of the parties which are not contrary to law and public policy.” 
The provision is drawn from section 51 of a French Decree of 1927 organising the 
traditional jurisdictions in Francophone Cameroon. But it is inadequate in the case of 
succession which is governed by the personal law of the deceased and not of the 
parties. True, the parties could have the same personal as the deceased, but this cannot 
always be assumed. Hence that provision is complemented in Francophone Cameroon 
with article 3(1) (b) of Decree No. 69/DF/544 of 19 December 1969 governing 
traditional law jurisdictions in that part of the country, which provides that the custom 
of the deceased prevails whenever it conflicts with that of the parties. This Decree is 
                                                 
841 Bennion, F.A.R., The Constitutional law of Ghana, London, Butterworths, 1962, 446. 
842 Prior to this law the courts were unlike their Francophone counterparts placed under the Ministry of 
Territorial Administration.  
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not applicable in Anglophone Cameroon and this renders inappropriate the 
application of the 1979 Law therein.   
This leaves the Customary Courts Ordinance of 1948, section 18(1) of which 
ordains the administration of the “the native law and custom prevailing in the area of 
jurisdiction of the court or the law binding between the parties…” What constitutes 
the “prevailing custom” was considered in R v. Ilorin Native Court843 where 
“prevailing” customs were construed to signify “predominant” customs. This 
generated some debate as to the significance of the term “predominant.” To Park, it 
signifies the law of the majority tribe.844 This position would entail assimilating the 
laws of the minority tribes in the area to those of the majority tribe.  
Professor Allott, on the other hand, is of the opinion that the term “does not 
refer to the majority-tribe or to the native customary laws actually found in the area 
but to the single predominant system of law.”845 This seems to be a better view since 
construing the expression in terms of tribes would imply the non-applicability of 
Muslim law.846 The interpretation also eliminates the fear of foisting the law of the 
majority tribe on the other tribes in the locality.     
In succession the predominant law of a locality is also the personal law of the 
deceased if he was a native of the locality. Otherwise, the second option- “the law 
binding between the parties” becomes the applicable. The point was made by West 
African Court of Appeal in the Ghanaian case of Ghamson v. Wobill 847, accepted as 
authority in West Africa that “the law binding the parties” is the personal law of the 
deceased.  
                                                 
843  (1953) 20 N.L.R. 144. 
844 Park, The Sources of Nigerian Law, 117 
845Antony Allott, Essays in African Law: with special reference to the law of Ghana, London, 
Butterworth, 1960, p 160.  
846 Which was in issue in R v. Ilorin Native Court. 
847 (1947)12 W.A.C.A.181. 
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The view according to which personal law is immutable and follows the 
person wherever he goes848 therefore seems stronger in customary law. As a general 
rule a person cannot shed one customary law in favour of another.849 Migration and 
settlement in a different locality have been advanced and rejected as possible factors 
of change. The point was raised in the Yinusa case,850 where it was argued that 
because the propositus resided and died in a place different from his tribe of origin, 
his estate was subject to the customary law of his place of residence. The contention 
was rejected and it was held that “The mere settlement in a place, unless it has been 
for such a long time that the settler and his descendants have merged with the natives 
of the place of settlement and have adopted their ways of life and customs, would not 
render the deceased or his descendants subject to the native law and custom of the 
place of settlement.”    
Whether a person has converted to the personal law of the place of residence 
is in fact not easy to prove. In Cameroon most settlers purport to be part of the local 
community and yet belong to tribal unions representing the various settler 
populations. When a settler dies his remains are conveyed to his home for burial. 
Hence conversion cannot be conclusive proof of an intention by the deceased to 
change his customary law, often the convert is influence by some gain that such 
conversion would bring without the intention to become part of the community.851  
                                                 
848 See Lush, L.J. in In re Goodman’s Trust (1881) Ch. D. 266, 278; Arret du 22 Mai 1905, Cour de 
Cassation (1905) 1 Penant, 205; Arret du 18 Octobre,1950, Cour de Cassation (1952) 1 Penant, 123. 
(Both French cases are cited by Youego, Ch., “Sources et Evolution de Droit des Succession aux 
Cameroun,” Doctorat thesis, university of Paris II, 1994, 201-202.  
849 See Omidire, Kolapo, “Change of personal law under customary law in Nigeria”, (1990) 39 I&CLQ, 
671-675, 673.  
850 Yinusa v Adesubokan, reported in [1970] J.A.L. 56-67, 58.  
851 See Bartholomew, G. W., “Private Interpersonal Law”, (1952)1 I. & C. L. Q, 325-344, 343.  
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Not even marriage has such an effect on women in spite of contentions that 
upon marriage a woman becomes the husband’s property. She always conserves her 
personal law which governs the devolution of her ante-nuptial property when she dies.   
Exception is made to the general rule, if the personal law of the deceased has 
not been sufficiently established.852 In Ekem v. Nerba853, another Ghanaian case, the 
deceased intestate was a Nigerian resident in Cape Coast (Ghana), where he married 
two wives of the Fanti tribe. The present dispute opposed a daughter of the deceased 
who claimed a share of the estate and the widow who claimed that the property in 
question had been jointly acquired by her and the deceased husband. The argument on 
joint ownership was rejected and question became whether the Fanti law of 
succession which is matrilineal and gives children no interest in their fathers’ property 
or the personal law of the deceased would be applicable. The deceased had contracted 
customary marriages which as we saw do not change the personal law and so the 
question ought not to have arisen at all.854 The personal law of the deceased was held 
to be applicable but the impossibility to establish this personal law led to application 
of the law of the locality, which goes against the rule that migration does not change 
the personal law. Verity C. J. justified the decision in the following terms:  
 “As it is, although it is common ground that the deceased Johnson was 
a Nigerian it does not appear from the evidence to what part of Nigeria 
he belonged, and there is nothing to show what would be the nature of 
the law applicable, if some foreign law is binding between the 
parties…”855 
 
                                                 
852 Park, supra. 119. 
853 (1947) 12 W.A.C.A. 258. 
854 “It is necessary to mention that the deceased, Johnson, was a native of Nigeria, and that though he 
was long resident in Cape Coast, it was not shown that he had lost his domicile of origin.” Ibid, 258.   
855 p. 260. 
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We take issue with this decision, as we are surprised that the appellate court 
decided on the application of the law of the locality in spite of the fact that it excludes 
the children. Even though there is nothing in the judgment to show that attempts were 
made to prove the customary law of the deceased the court ought to have treated the 
case as one for which there was no applicable rule of customary law. The lacuna, we 
submit ought to have resulted in the court invoking the repugnancy doctrine to decide 
on which law to apply. Certainly any law which excludes children from succession is 
prima facie “repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience.” Whenever this 
is established, English law ought to apply and not an alternative rule of customary 
law, which in this case was the law of the locality. This was an appellate court with 
competence to administer both the English and customary laws.     
The law of the locality rule would be good in cases of inter vivos dealings in 
land, because the parties whose personal laws differ from that of the locality entered 
voluntarily into the transactions and are taken to have consented to the application of 
the local law.856 This will also be true of succession if the deceased was a native of 
the locality, for those interested in the land would be local people subject to the local 
customary law. 857 
The foregoing are relevant in cases of intestacy and would be useful in cases 
of testacy too, because the terms of a will would reflect the intention of deceased 
which could differ from his personal law.  
More would be said of wills elsewhere in this work, so we can only state here 
that natives could make wills, written or nuncupative, in which dispositions could be 
made which operate a change in the customary law that would otherwise have been 
                                                 
856 See Park, 119. 
857 Bennion, F.A.R., The Constitutional law of Ghana, London, Butterworths, 1962, 448.  
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applied. Nuncupative or oral wills made by a person of sound mind in the presence of 
responsible and disinterested witnesses858 are generally accepted in customary law 
and do not present any problem of applicable law.   
 
5.2.2: REGULATION OF CONFLICT BETWEEN DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF 
CUSTOMARY LAW IN FANCOPHONE CAMEROON 
 
Since 1921, a French colonial decree stipulated that traditional law 
jurisdictions apply “exclusively the customs of the parties.”859 This was reproduced in 
article 51(1) of the Judicial Organisation Decree of 31 July 1927 which represents the 
current position. These texts do not refer directly or even obliquely to the personal 
law of the deceased. However, to understand the provision in the context of 
succession it has to be read together with sub-section 2, currently article 3(1) (b) of 
the Judicial Organisation Decree No. 69/DF/607 of 3 December 1969, according to 
which: “In the case of conflict of customs, it is provided: For questions relative to 
succession and testaments according to the custom of the deceased.” This means that 
the conflict must be resolved in application of the customary law of the deceased.  
In effect therefore, it is the personal law of the deceased which is applicable. 
For the absence of conflict will mean that the parties have the same personal law with 
the deceased. And the restriction on the ability to change from one customary law to 
another is also applicable. So a person who migrates to a place where the customary 
law differs from his own and even marries a woman of that tribe does not find his 
status change as a result. 
But if a situation as that in Ekem v. Nerba (discussed above) was to arise the 
solution would certainly not be the law of the locality. One of the situations in which 
                                                 
858 See Oluyede, P.A., Nigerian Law of Conveyancing, Ibadan University Press, 1975, p.77.  
859 Article 29, decree of 13 April 1921, (1923) II Penant, p.86.  
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the courts are allowed to administer the civil code is where the customary law is 
found to be silent.860   
 
5.3:  CONFLICT OF LAWS IN THE HIGH COURTS 
  
  What is personal in the High Courts? It is assumed that persons over whom 
these courts are competent are those who, for one reason or the other are said to have 
shed their customary statues. This is because while it is impossible to change from 
one system of customary law to another, it is accepted that a person could change 
from customary to modern law. Again, we refer to Bramford Griffith J. in Cole v. 
Cole when he says: 
 “Where on the other hand, the matter before the court contains elements 
foreign to native life, habit and custom, the court is not bound to observe 
native law and custom.”     
  
It is generally presumed that the personal law of the deceased changes if he 
contracted a monogamous marriage or left a will in modern form or if the parties 
renounce the jurisdiction of customary courts, as is possible in Francophone 
Cameroon. The personal law then becomes English or French law for the purpose of 
succession. 
The existence of a local statutory law on the subject could supersede 
customary law and become the personal law of the deceased, if the statute expressly 
supplants customary law. But if the statute does not abolish customary law then it 
only becomes applicable upon the existence of any of the events identified above. 
                                                 
860 See Betow Omar Charles v. Ngo Mbenoum Julienne, Arret No. 151 du 18 Juin 1968. The 
competence of the courts to apply customary law has already been discussed in chapter 3. 
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Cameroon is yet to have a statutory law on succession and so the question does not 
arise.861  
The point to make and which is the raison d’être of this inquiry is that English 
or French law does not automatically become applicable on the mere existence of a  
monogamous marriage or a will, because persons who stand to benefit if customary 
law is applied would not concede to the change of personal law without a fight.  
 
5.3.1: REGULATING CONFLICT BETWEEN ENGLISH AND CUSTOMARY 
LAW. 
  
Choice of law questions are fairly easy when the parties are natives, for 
customary law is normally applicable, except its application is excluded for some 
such reasons as repugnancy or incompatibility or the parties opted for the application 
of English law. The principal cause for conflict between the customary and English 
laws is the possibility for persons, natives and non-natives alike, to enter into 
transactions unknown in customary law and this raises the question as to whether it is 
the customary or English law which governs the transaction.  The answer lies in 
section 27(3) of the Southern Cameroon High Court Law, 1955 according to which: 
“No party shall be entitled to claim the benefit of any native law or 
custom, if it shall appear either from express contract or from the nature 
of the transaction out of which any suit or question may have arisen, that 
such party agreed that his obligation in connection with such transaction 
should be regulated by English law or that such transactions are 
unknown to native law and custom.”  
 Monogamous marriages and English Wills are examples of transactions said to be 
unknown in customary law. Their mere existence prima facie subjects the deceased’s 
                                                 
861 There is of course a family code in the making and we will in chapter 7 consider whether it should 
completely abrogate the customary law of succession. 
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his estate to English law. It is only prima facie because it could be argued that these 
matters are not really unknown, given that their equivalents exist and differ from 
English law only on points of formality.  
 Now, could the terms marriage and wills be construed as constituting 
transactions in the proper meaning of the word, which signify an agreement on a 
given subject between the parties present in court, and the legal consequences of 
which are limited to them, except where on the basis of the doctrine of privity of 
contracts third parties are said to derive benefits or liabilities under the contract. 
Marriage is a contract and comes within the meaning of “transaction”, but only with 
respect to inter-vivos incidents of marriage such as divorce.862 As concerns the post-
mortem incidents the “transaction” is sui generis, because disputes in succession will 
never involve the spouses inter se. If succession rights are enforceable at all, it is 
because marriage works a transformation of the status of the spouses and creates 
extensive legal consequences affecting not only them but their children and relatives 
as well.863  
  Wills on the other hand can never qualify as transactions. They are not even 
unilateral contracts or contracts made for the benefit of a third party entitling the latter 
to enforce them on the basis of privity. Wills are essentially unilateral acts 864 of the 
testator, of which the existence is generally unknown to the beneficiaries. But like all 
gifts, wills expressly create enforceable rights on behalf of the beneficiaries.  
 
 
 
                                                 
862 A. B. Kasunmu, “Intestate Succession In Nigeria” (1964)1 N.L.J., pp.50-58, 56; Bennion, F.A.R., 
The Constitutional law of Ghana, London, Butterworths, 1962., 440-444; Park, supra, p.111. 
863 J.W. Salacuse, “Birth, Death, and the Marriage Act: Some Problems in Conflict of Laws.” (1964)1 
N.L.J., pp.59-72, 59. 
864 Park, supra, p.111. 
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5.3.1.1: When a Native Contracts a Monogamous Marriage.  
We saw earlier that the schedule to section 16 of the Customary Courts 
Ordinance 1948 bars customary courts from exercising jurisdiction over the estate of 
a person who contracts a Christian marriage. Judicial blessing for this position of the 
law was given in the Nigerian case of Cole v. Cole.865 John William Cole, a native of 
Lagos had contracted a Christian marriage with the plaintiff, Mary J Cole in Sierra 
Leone. The spouses later returned to Lagos where John William Cole died intestate 
survived by his widow, son and brother. The action was initiated by the brother of the 
deceased claiming to be declared sole successor and trustee for the son of the 
deceased, excluding the widow. The trial court in application of customary law held 
in his favour. The widow instituted the present appeal claiming that because they had 
contracted a Christian marriage, English law should be applied to vest the estate in her 
on behalf of their son, Alfred Cole. English law was held to be applicable because “a 
Christian marriage clothes the parties to such marriage and their offspring with a 
status unknown to native law.”866 This has been described as the “inherent 
incident”867 theory according to which English law inexorably follows the celebration 
of a Christian marriage.   
Our choice of the term “monogamous marriage” instead of “Christian” or 
“statutory” marriage” is because Christian marriages are unknown in Cameroon,868 
and the statute which governs marriages in Cameroon recognises monogamy and 
polygamy. For the present purpose the term signifies the classical statutory marriage 
defined as “a marriage which is recognised by the law of the place where it is 
                                                 
865 (1898) 1N.L.R. 15. 
866 p.22 
867 Salacuse, J.W., “Birth, Death, and the Marriage Act: Some Problems in Conflict of laws” (1964)1 
N.L.J. 59-72, 60.   
868 Generally the parties celebrate a civil marriage before going to the church for the blessing thereof, 
and this might be immediately after the civil marriage or years after. 
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contracted as a voluntary union of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all 
others during the continuance of the marriage.”869 It is thus not the de facto 
monogamous marriage in customary law which legally, is potentially polygamous, 
since there is no commitment to the rule of “one man one wife.”  
The tendency in Cameroon is to describe marriages celebrated under the Civil 
Status Registration Ordinance No. 81-2 of 29 June 1981 as statutory.870 This is 
because section 49 provides that a marriage certificate must inter alia specify the form 
of marriage chosen by the spouses and there is space in the marriage certificate for 
this. 
However, that a polygamous marriage is described as “statutory” because 
celebrated under the above Ordinance does not alter the personal laws of the spouses 
who remain subject to customary law. 871 A marriage certificate for them serves as 
proof of the marriage, and for workers, it gives access to such funds as family 
allowances.872 Upon dissolution by death the widow or widower would need it to 
obtain probate for a will or apply for letters of administration.  
One problem with which the courts have been confronted arises from the 
additional requirement for spouses to specify the system of property rights. It is 
common for the space reserved for this information to be left blank because most 
often, the Registrar who does not know the significance of the requirement skips the 
question.873 Even when the question is posed, some responses raise problems relating 
                                                 
869 See section 3B of the Interpretation Ordinance (Colony and Protectorate) cap. 94 of the 1948 Laws 
of Nigeria. Lord Penzance had in Hyde v. Hyde, (1866) L.R. &.D. 130 defined marriage in 
Christendom as “the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others.” 
This definition has been superseded by events and can no longer be taken as representing the actual 
position, given, for example, the proliferation of divorce which means that a marriage is not union for 
life. For more on the shortcomings of the definition, see Poulter, Sebastian, “The definition of marriage 
in English law.”[1979] 42 M.L.R. 407-429. 
870See Nana v. Nana (2005) Suit No. HCF/PROB/AE1/2001-2002 (unreported)  
871 See Tufon v. Tufon Suit No. HCB/59/MC/83 (unreported). 
872 See Ngwafor E. N. Family Law in Anglophone Cameroon, supra. 41. 
873 See Ngwafor E. N. Family Law in Anglophone Cameroon, supra, 178. 
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to the applicable law. There are cases where the spouses chose monogamy as the form 
of marriage and on the question of the system of property rights they state “according 
to the native laws and customs” of the husband’s tribe.  
What this means effectively is not clear. The phrase, said to represent the 
system of property rights, is construed by some Judges as effectively signifying a 
customary marriage. By implication spouses have opted for monogamy and 
polygamy, a possibility rejected by Ekema, C.J. in Kumbongsi v. Kumbongsi: “A man 
is either polygamously married or monogamously married but not the two forms 
simultaneously.”874 The impact of the construction however remains as a result of 
which the courts have the discretion to decide which form of marriage to uphold. The 
inclination is in favour the customary marriage, for according to Asu, J. in Tufon v. 
Tufon875, “The inference is that what the parties stated as the marriage, i.e. Native 
Laws and Customs of Kom people was what they intended. The insertion of the word 
‘monogamy’ is therefore absurd.”876  
This contrasts sharply with the position adopted by courts in other countries 
with similar problems. An example is the Southern Rhodesian case of Rex v. 
Machingura877 where the court upheld the Christian marriage on the ground that 
because it is celebrated according to “civilised rites” it supersedes marriage celebrated 
according to native law and custom. This would be avoided if the phrase were to be 
taken for what it stands for, to wit, the system of property rights. True, it is 
incompatible with monogamy but that is no reason for it to be taken out of context. 
The most that the courts would have done should have been to ignore it, uphold the 
                                                 
874 Suit No. C.A.S.W.P/ 4/84 cited by Ngwafor E. N. Family Law in Anglophone Cameroon, supra, 42. 
875 Suit No. HCB/59/MC/83, unreported but cited by Ngwafor E. N. Family Law in Anglophone 
Cameroon, supra, 39. See also Kumbongsi v. Kumbongsi, Suit No. C.A.S.W.P/ 4/84, ibid; Lyonga v. 
Lyonga, Suit No. C.A.S.W.P/CC/5/94 (Unreported)  
876 Emphasis added. 
877 (1932) S. R. 67. 
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type of marriage and presume the appropriate system of property rights, which is 
separate property. There is no doubt that property arrangements on marriage are only 
a consequence of the marriage878 and can therefore, not override the marriage itself 
and become determinant in the choice of law. Biblically marriage is not conceived in 
terms of property as Genesis chapter 2 verse 24 ordains simply, “Therefore shall a 
man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave unto his wife, and they shall be 
one flesh.”879   
Little wonder therefore that in Nana v. Nana,880 Ngassa, J. expressly rejected 
all previous decisions on the point:881 “I deviate from the school of thought which 
holds that once the above superfluous words appear on a marriage certificate it 
renders the marriage customary and polygamous.”882 This was a succession case in 
which the marriage certificate bore “monogamy” as the form of marriage and the 
phrase “according to the native laws and customs of the Bamileke people”, for the 
system of property rights.  
Another problem likely to raise choice of law questions relates to customary 
marriages purportedly converted into monogamous marriages. Section 81 of the Civil 
Status Registration Ordinance 1981 provides that “customary marriages shall be 
recorded in the civil status registers of the place of birth or residence of one of the 
spouses.”  It seems doubtful, if this could amount to conversion, giving the marriage 
validity independent of the previous customary marriage. It is conceded that the 
process only serves to provide evidence for an existing customary marriage.883 
                                                 
878 See Herring, Jonathan (ed) Family Law: Issues, Debates, Policy, London, William Publishers, 2001, 
17.    
879 Also in study on why people marry there is no indication that people marry for property. See 
Herring, Jonathan, Family Law, London, Pearson Longman, 2007, 38. 
880  (2005) Suit No. HCF/PROB/AE1/2001-2002 (unreported). 
881 Tufon v. Tufon Suit No. HCB/59/MC/83 (unreported); Kumbongsi v. Kumbongsi, Suit No. 
C.A.S.W.P/ 4/84(unreported); Lyonga v. Lyonga, Suit No. C.A.S.W.P/CC/5/94 (Unreported).  
882 Emphasis added 
883 See Ngwafor E. N. Family Law in Anglophone Cameroon, supra, 37. 
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However, nothing in the law prevents the spouses of a potentially polygamous 
marriage from going through a fresh marriage ceremony which would effect changes 
to their personal law if they choose monogamy and the appropriate system of property 
rights. 
Kumbongsi v. Kumbongsi884 appears to have excluded the possibility for such 
conversion. But it could hardly be conclusive on the point and is justified only on its 
own facts. The plaintiff was already married with three wives under customary law. 
For the purpose of obtaining family allowance, he decided with the respondent, the 
first wife to have their marriage registered and as it was before the 1981 ordinance, 
this could only be done through a court judgment. The court declaration resulted in a 
marriage certificate containing the mention “monogamy with common property.” 
This was subsequently disclaimed by the plaintiff and led to a decision of the Court of 
Appeal ordering the rectification of the marriage certificate. This was only normal, 
given that the plaintiff, already polygamously married could no longer change his 
personal law. The decision would certainly not have been the same if he had been 
only potentially polygamously married.  
The “inherent incident” theory has been adopted in Cameroon in the oft-
quoted dictum of Epuli, J. in Nforba v. Nchari: 
“Where a married Cameroon man or woman domiciled in Cameroon dies 
intestate, the rule of succession applicable to his estate will depend on 
whether the marriage was monogamous or polygamous. In the light of 
section 15 as read with section 9(b) and section 27 of the Southern 
Cameroon High Court Law 1955, as well as sections 3, 16 and 34 of 
Ordinance No. 72/4 of 26th August 1972, as amended, on Judicial 
Organisation, where the marriage was monogamous, the rules applicable 
will be those in force in England and where the marriage was polygamous 
                                                 
884 Suit No. C.A.S.W.P/ 4/84(unreported). 
 240
the rules would be those of the relevant native law and custom provided they 
are not repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience would 
apply.” [sic]885   
 
As noted above there are people who would reject the automatic application of 
the rule in Cole v. Cole and advocate instead the application of rules of customary law 
evolved for a similar situation. Rules of English law were developed in response to a 
social and economic environment peculiar to England and have nothing in common 
with Cameroon, except, perhaps for the fact that the spouses are monogamously 
married. The rule is criticised for advocating an immediate and automatic application 
of English law without regard to the socio-cultural differences between England and 
African countries and for ignoring the intention of the parties who might not have 
attained a stage of culture and development that should reasonably make them subject 
to English law. Even if they had, contracting a Christian marriage might not 
necessarily mean that they intended to divest themselves of their customary status. 
Often a Christian marriage is only a concretisation of the spouses’ faith in 
Christianity, with no effect on their general life style. They continue to live as 
members of the extended African family and to assume their customary family 
responsibilities.886  
Against the “inherent incident” theory, therefore, is posited the “manner of 
life”887 established in Asiata v. Goncallo.888 The spouses of Muslim backgrounds met 
in Brazil due to slavery where they contracted a Christian marriage.  They returned to 
Nigeria and the man took other wives under Muslim law without objection from the 
wife by Christian marriage, and later died intestate. Asiata, the plaintiff in this case 
                                                 
8851999 G. L. R.  89, 63.  
886 See H. F. Morris, “Attitudes Towards Succession Law in Nigeria During the Colonial Period” 
[1970] J.A.L., pp.5-16, 12 
887 Another coinage of Salacuse, supra 
888 (1900) N.L.R. 41 
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was the issue of one of the Muslim marriages and sought to recover possession of a 
piece of land that belonged to the deceased.  
The question was whether as the issue of a customary marriage coming after a 
Christian marriage, she had the locus standi to institute the action. It was held on the 
basis of the “inherent incident” theory that she lacked the capacity to institute the 
action. But the decision was reversed at appeal on the ground that in spite of the 
Christian marriage deceased lived and died as a Muslim.   
The “manner of life” theory waters down the rigours of the “inherent incident” 
theory by reducing the rule in Cole v. Cole to having only established a presumption 
that by celebrating a monogamous marriage the spouses intended the application of 
English law.889 Customary law continues to be applicable unless by the express 
intention of the parties contained in a will890 or by their “manner of life”, it is evident 
that they intended English and not customary law to govern the post-mortem effects 
of their marriage.  
In Ajayi v. White891 it was suggested that the two theories could be applied to 
the estate of a deceased couple. The property in dispute in this case was that of the 
wife a deceased pastor. There was evidence that the parties had treated the property in 
question as family property. And rather than base the application of customary law on 
this fact, Baker, A.C.J., delivering the judgment of the court said:  
“The original owner was no doubt the wife of an educated man but it is 
very doubtful whether she was literate or knew anything about the 
                                                 
889The point was made by Van Der Meulen, J. in  Smith v. Smith (1924) N.L.R. 107: “The fact that a 
man has contracted a marriage in accordance with the rites of the Christian church may be very strong 
evidence of his desire and intention to have his life generally regulated by English law and customs , 
but it is by no means conclusive evidence. In my opinion the question as to what law it is equitable to 
apply in any given case can only be decided after examination of al the circumstances of the case”. See 
also  Petrides J in Haastrup v. Coker (1927) 8 N.L.R. 68, 70. 
890 See Smith v. Smith (1924) N.L.R. 105, and Ajayi v. White (1946) 18 N. L. R. 41 
891 (1946) 18 N.L.R. 4.1   
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English law of succession; if she had done so it is more than probable 
that she would have made a will.”   
 
It follows that the devolution of the husband’s property would have been submitted to 
English law if his manner of life was different. We can only suppose that their 
Lordships felt in any case that the spouses must have gone in for the regime of 
separate property. If that is the basis then the decision would run into difficulties 
being applied today, given the gradual disappearance of the system of separate 
property in favour of community of property.892 
Another novel situation arose in Haastrup v. Coker.893 The deceased contracted 
a Christian marriage but later took fifty more wives after succeeding his father as 
chief, not because he wanted to but because custom so demanded. Some, he married 
under customary law and others he took under widow inheritance. In this action the 
plaintiff, an issue of one of the customary marriages sought, on behalf of all the 
children, to set aside a sale of family land by one of the issue of the Christian 
marriage to the defendant. English law was held to apply whereby the plaintiff was 
held not to have the capacity to sue in the name of the Haastrup family, since he was 
an issue of a customary union. The argument that the “manner of life” theory ought to 
apply because there was no proof that the deceased and his wife were professing 
Christians was jettisoned.  
This was a case in which the spouses lived a “palace life” in accordance with 
custom and the “manner of life” theory ought normally to have applied. The decision 
could be defended on one point not raised in the judgment, that the deceased did not 
take more wives on his volition, he was compelled by custom to do so, and this 
distinguishes the case from Asiata v. Goncallo. Hence even though living “a palace 
                                                 
892 See Simon Tabe Tabe, “Property adjustment after divorce in Cameroonian statutory law: 
Rapprochement of the common and civil law systems?”, 2 RADIC (2002), 703-717, 711.    
893 (1927) 8 N.L.R. 68. 
 243
life” he remained committed to his Christian marriage, and according to Sagay, “the 
prior monogamous marriage had, however, taken the distribution of the Oba’s 
property from customary law into English law.”894   
     From the foregoing it becomes questionable whether the “inherent incident” 
theory espoused by Epuli, J895 is appropriate for Cameroon. The celebration of a 
Christian marriage might as noted above only be intended to strengthen the faith of 
the spouses, rather than to divest them of their customary statuses and subject the 
devolution of their property to English law.896 Cameroon is a country where many 
people go to church on Sunday mornings and in the evenings,897 dressed in traditional 
regalia, are participating in cultural activities.  
Perhaps therefore the easiest way to assume the automatic application of 
English law is if the deceased left an English Will rather than if he contracted a 
monogamous marriage.    
 
5.3.1.2. The Existence of a Will in English form  
Since the Nigerian case of Apatira v. Akande898 it was established that a native 
could make a will in English form. English wills must not only be in writing, they 
have to conform to certain strict formalities concerning signature and witnessing of 
the will.899 When these formalities are complied with, then by all intents and purposes 
English law of testacy is applicable.  
                                                 
894 Sagay, Itse,  “Widow Inheritance Versus Monogamous Marriages: The Obas’ Dilemma,” (1974) 
JAL 168-172, 171. 
895Nkengong, John Monie adopted a similar position “The Development of the Laws and Constitutions 
of Cameroon” Ph. D Thesis, University of London, 1970, 788, (unpublished).  
896 John Anthony Howard, “Customary Law of Marriage and Succession among the Kom of 
Cameroon”, Ph. D. thesis, University of London, 1972, 333,(unpublished). See also Allott, A. N., 
Essays in African Law: With special reference to the law of Ghana, London, Butterworth, 1960, 219. 
897 Sunday evening are generally set aside by tribal and cultural groups to hold their meetings. 
898 (1944)17 N.L.R 149. 
899 See section 9 Wills Act 1837. 
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The attitude of the courts suggests that a native who translates his will into 
writing must always have had English law in contemplation with the effect that non-
respect of the formalities brings in English rules of intestacy.900 And so the courts fail 
to consider whether a will not admissible to probate because it fails to conform to the 
formality could be admitted as a customary will subject to customary law.901  
  But in Teke v. Teke902 the Bamenda Court of Appeal upheld a customary 
will. Generally the courts are diffident to do so when an estate comprises commercial 
assets, bank accounts, pension benefit and any other assets which require a High 
Court grant before they can be assembled for distribution. The will must be proved in 
the normal way or if it fails letters of administration are granted as if the deceased had 
died intestate.903 No such assets were involved in this case and that is why the appeal 
emanated directly from the customary court without transiting through the High Court 
responsible for probate and letters of administration.  
Conclusively, the High Courts when confronted with a matter between natives 
and the choice is between English and customary law, customary law should be the 
first option, unless as result of the manner of life or the existence of a will in English 
form, English law is seen as being most likely to meet the reasonable expectations of 
the deceased. And we want to think that the deceased would have been averse to 
                                                 
900See the Bamenda Court of Appeal Judgment in Marianne Bongyilla Ntoh v. Che Peter Suit 
No.BCA/48/2003(unreported). Pauline Mbonjoh v. Peter Ngabi Eyoh (2005) Suit No. 
HCK/AE/K.19/02-05 (unreported). 
901See Tantoh v. Tantoh where a deceased polygamist made a will which was not admitted to probate 
because though signed by the testator it was not attested by witnesses. The will was set rejected for 
failing to comply with section 9 of the Wills Act of 1837 in spite of  the argument that it could be 
admitted as evidence of the testamentary intention of its maker.  See also the Nigerian case of 
Onwudinjoh  v. Onwudinjoh(1957)11 E.R.L.R. 1, the court refused to countenance a will not 
complying with the Wills Act without even discussing any possibility of its alternative validity under 
customary law.   
902 (2005) 2C.C.L.R.40. 
903 See Harvey, \Brian, The law and Practice of Nigerian Wills, Probate and Succession, London, Sweet 
& Maxwell, 1968, 43 
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having persons who depended on him in his lifetime being left out his succession.  
    
5.3.2: THE REGULATION OF CONFLICTS BETWEEN FRENCH AND 
CUSTOMARY LAW.  
 
Since the extension of High Courts to Francophone Cameroon pursuant to the 
1972 judicial reforms, jurisdiction was assumed for the first time in the 1996 Affaire 
Fokam Kamga904decided by the High Court of Mifi Division. It was a bold step for 
the courts to assume jurisdiction in matters not classified as “conflit mixte,” being 
cases involving persons, one of whom is subject to customary law and another to 
French law.  
In 1948 the French Minister of Overseas Territories had issued a declaration 
that “in a case of conflict between the normal legal system of the French common law 
and a local legal system, it is the former which must necessarily win.”905 Luchaire 
also wrote that “French law being that of the state prevails over local law; it also 
prevails because it constitutes the common law, while the local status is a status of 
exception.”906  
In affair Kouoh the Supreme Court of East Cameroon held: “In the case of 
internal conflict in interpersonal matters between the common law or written law 
status governed by the local Civil Code on the one hand, and customary status on the 
other, it is a general rule that in mixed causes, the first prevails over the second and 
becomes the law of the parties.”907 The deceased, subject to the Douala customary 
                                                 
904 See Moïse, Timtchueng, (1998) 34 Juridis Périodique, pp. 43-47, 45. 
905 Cited by R.D. Kollewijn “Conflicts of Western and Non-Western Law” in Alison Dundes Renteln 
and Alan Dundes (ed), Folk Law, Volume 1, The university of Wisconsin Press, 1995, pp. 775-793 at 
781. 
906 Gonidec, Les Droits Africains , p.267. 
907 “S’agissant en l’espèce d’un conflit de droit interne, en matière interpersonal entre statut personnel 
dit de droit commun ou encore de droit écrit regime par le Code Civil local, d’une part, et statut 
coutumier d’autre part, il est de règle que dans les rapports mixtes, le premier l’emporte sur le second 
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law was married to a Senegalese woman who had French citizenship. In the present 
action pitting the widow against the children of a previous marriage, the latter asked 
for the application of customary law of succession while the widow demanded the 
application of French law. The Court held French law applicable on the ground that 
the “widow acquired the right to succeed, not from the relationship of origin with the 
deceased, but from the marriage that united her with Kouoh.”908     
French law thus becomes the personal law of the deceased if he contracted a 
civil marriage, as ordained in a 1929 decision of the French Cour de Cassation 
according to which the spouse of local status “by appearing before the civil status 
registrar had submitted himself to French law,” and that “the union pronounced in the 
name of French law entails necessarily all the consequences that the common law909 
attach to it.”910 Hence in Baba Iyayi v. Hadja Aminatou911 the Supreme Court 
confirmed the decision of the trial courts which applied Moslem law on the ground 
that the deceased had not contracted a civil marriage. 912 
                                                                                                                                            
et fait la loi des parties.”  Affaire Kouoh, C.S.C.O., Arrêt No. 29 du 23 Avril, 1963, Bull. P.293 (Cours 
Suprême Cameroun Orientale). 
908 “La veuve tirait sa vocation successorale, non de la parenté d’origine avec le défunct, mais du 
marriage qui l’aviat unie à Kouoh”.  See also the decision of French Cour de Cassation of February 14 
1929 in which it was held that the spouses, “by appearing before the civil status registrar submitted 
themselves to French law…the union pronounced in the name of French law entails necessarily all the 
consequences that common law attach to it.” ( “Le conjoint de statut local en comparant devant 
l’officier d’état civil sextant soumis a la législation Française… l’union prononcée au nom de la loi 
française entrains nécessairement toutes les conséquences que le droit commun y attaché” ) Crim. 14 
fevrier, 1929, sirey, 1930, p. 280.  
909 It is necessary to explain that when French law used the term common law it is not in the same 
sense as English law. Rather it means it means the law which is applicable to every person, for even in 
France there were local customs limited in their application but the civil code was applicable to all 
persons. Similarly, the customary law is limited to natives but the civil code applies to them and non-
natives equally.  
910 “Le conjoint de statut local en comparant devant l’officier d’état civil s’etant soumis a la législation 
Française”  “l’union prononcée au nom de la loi française entrains nécessairement toutes les 
conséquences que le droit commun y attaché” Crim. 14 fevrier, 1929, sirey, 1930, p. 280.  
911 Arrêt No. 083 of 32 March 2000. 
912In their usual cryptic nature the ratio decidendi of that case reads thus : « Considérant que tous les 
efants de cette succession sont des enfants naturels nés du marriages coutumières non célébrés devant 
l’Officier d’Etat Civil ; Considérant par conséquant que les dispositions du code civil relatives au 
partage judiciaire sont inapllicable en l’espèce ; Par ces motifs ; Statuant publiquement, 
contradictoirement en matière civil de droit local et en dernier resort, confirme le jugement entrepris. »          
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As is the case in Anglophone Cameroon the fact that the deceased left a will 
might also be determinant. The question will certainly be if the Will conforms to the 
requirements of validity in French law, as spelt out in articles 970913, 971914 and 
976915 of the civil code.  
In Nguea Lottin v. Quan Samuel916 the deceased Kwedi Nguea Maurice, a 
native of Douala left a will in which his daughters were appointed successors and a 
stranger was appointed as guardian for his children. In an action at Tribunal de 
Premier Degré of Douala, the plaintiff (appellant) argued that both provisions violated 
the Douala customary law. The appointment of the daughters as successors was 
upheld on the ground that the custom according to which daughter are excluded from 
succession infringes the preamble of the constitution which enshrines the equality of 
sexes. The designation of a stranger as guardian for the children was also upheld 
because according to the court, there is no rule in Douala customary law which 
prevents a father from organising the guardianship of his children in a manner which 
he considers best to protect their interests. This decision was upheld by the Douala 
Court of Appeal. On further appeal to the Supreme Court, a third ground of appeal 
was added, namely, that the will, said to be holographic, was not executed in 
conformity with article 970 of the civil code requiring such wills to be in the hand 
writing of the deceased.  
After confirming the decisions of the lower courts on the points of customary 
law the court ruled on the validity of the will as follows: “The validity of the will 
must be appreciated with regard to the custom of the deceased in conformity with 
                                                 
913  Provides for holographic wills, which must be written, dated and signed by the testator. 
914 Provides for notatrial wills that must be made in the presence of two notary publics or one notary 
public and two witnesses.  
915 Provides for wills in mystical form, being wills in a sealed and stamped envelope presented to the 
notary public and two witnesses with the declaration that the envelope contains his last will and 
testament. 
916 Arrêt No.67 du 11 Juin 1963 (CSCO). 
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article 51 of the Decree of 31 July 1927; since custom does not impose any special 
formality, it is not forbidden for the testator to adopt the form of written law, without 
the validity of the will being dependent on that law.” Hence in the case of testacy 
French law is always very likely to be applied whether or not the Will complied with 
the requirements of form laid down by that law.  
This is different from the position in Anglophone Cameroon where English 
law becomes applicable only when the Will conforms to the formalities laid down in 
section 9 of the Wills Act 1837. But the position in Francophone Cameroon could be 
explained by the fact that French Wills like customary law wills do not require any 
strict formality, as it suffices that they are written, signed and dated.    
 
5.3.3: RESOLVING CONFLICT BETWEEN DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF 
CUSTOMARY LAW IN THE HIGH COURTS IN ANGLOPHONE 
CAMEROON. 
These types of conflicts would actually be unusual in these courts given that 
matters in which different systems of customary law are in conflict should normally 
be heard in the Customary Courts. If the subject arises here at all it is because as we 
noted earlier, the High Courts have evolved a practice of entertaining such matters on 
the basis of their exclusive jurisdiction over letters of administration.  
Now since such conflicts were never envisaged there are in fact no provisions 
to regulate them. The practice in former British colonies is to apply the provisions 
governing similar conflicts in the customary courts.917  However, the fact that High 
Courts are established at Divisional levels918 could render the determination of the 
“law prevailing” in the area quite difficult. It cannot be assumed that like the 
customary courts there will only be one predominant system of customary law in the 
                                                 
917   Park, Sources of Nigerian Law, London, sweet and Maxwell, 1963, p.118. 
918  See section 14, Judicial Organisation Ordinance No. 72/4 of 26 August 1972.  
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divisions which consist of many tribes within a number of sub-divisions, since unlike 
the customary courts the jurisdiction of the high courts is based not on tribal lines. 
The application of the predominant law would not, therefore, be possible. 
Alternatively, therefore, the courts would apply “the law binding between the parties” 
which according to Ghamson v. Wobill 919 constitutes the personal law of the 
deceased. Since assessors are not allowed in the High Courts, this will have to be 
established through the procedure of proving customary law discussed in chapter two. 
5.3.4: RESOLVING CONFLICT BETWEEN DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF 
CUSTOMARY LAW IN THE HIGH COURTS IN FRANCOPHONE 
CAMEROON 
The High Courts in Francophone Cameroon apply French law exclusively. By 
taking their matter to the high courts the parties are presumed to have agreed on 
French law being the applied on the basis of the rule according to which “the option 
of jurisdiction entails the option of applicable law”. And since the high courts do not, 
like their Anglophone counterparts have monopoly over the jugement d’hérédité it is 
impossible to envisage a situation where they will be faced with cases in which both 
parties are subject to customary law.    
 
5.3.5: THE UNUSUAL SITUATION OF REGULATING CONFLICTS BY THE 
USE OF RULES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
Politically Cameroon is a unitary state and this is the subject matter of article 2 
of the constitution of 18 January 1996 which states inter alia that: “The Republic of 
Cameroon shall be a decentralised unitary state… It shall be one and indivisible.” As 
a result the country has a single executive, legislature and judiciary. But this is where 
the unity ends, for in the absence of harmonised laws the common and civil laws 
continue to be applied in the Anglophone and Francophone sectors respectively. In 
                                                 
919 (1947)12 W.A.C.A.181. 
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that case therefore, English and French laws are said to be in conflict when for 
example an Anglophone gets married to a Francophone.  
The question is whether this is not just a species of an internal conflict. 
Marriage which we have said effects a change in personal is regulated by the Civil 
Status Registration Ordinance No. 80-2 of 29 June 1981. The Ordinance governs 
marriage generally and when a monogamous marriage is celebrated, either the 
English law applies depending on the place of it celebration. So celebrating a 
marriage under the Ordinance cannot give rise to a conflict between English and 
French laws. In fact such a situation, if it ever occurs, will actually be a case of 
bigamy, where a person contracts an ordinance in one part of the country and without 
dissolving it contracts another in the other part of the country.920  
Normally a marriage should give rise to conflict between either of the received 
laws and customary law and should be dealt with in the manner already described 
above. But it would appear that when a person contracts a civil marriage and moves 
out of the jurisdiction of his legal system, considerations of internal conflict cease to 
be relevant. He or she is legally speaking an Anglophone or Francophone and not a 
Bamiléké, Ewondo, Bakweri, Bulu, Banyang, Bassossi, Meta, Kom, Balue etc. Being 
so considered, the person is subject to the English or French law and when they are  
involved in a relationship with a person on the other side or have died leaving 
property therein, it becomes a matter for the rules of private international law to 
determine the applicable law.  
In Anglophone Cameroon, it is suggested that conflict with civil law 
constitutes an external conflict and should be governed by rules of private 
                                                 
920 Bigamy is a crime in Cameroon punished under section 359 of the Penal Code. 
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international law.921 Faithful to the English position a person’s personal law derives 
from his domicile922 and in this respect Enongenekang v. Enongenekang923 is famous 
for having established the existence in Cameroon, of the common law and civil law 
domiciles:  
“In this country we do not yet have a single system of law. It follows for 
the purpose of matrimonial proceedings [and succession] that one cannot 
have a Cameroonian domicile. Every person should be domiciled in either 
one or other part of the territory where the legal system pertaining to his 
personal law applies.”  
 
Hence a person is either subject to the English or French law and this is 
understandable, for although defined as a person’s “permanent home”924, a person’s 
domicile associates him to a given legal system.925 Domicile is therefore not 
synonymous with a country which might, as is the case of Cameroon have more than 
one legal system.  
On the other hand the Francophone courts following on the footsteps of 
France base the personal law on nationality.926 Nationality is said to represent a 
person’s political status by virtue of which he owes allegiance to some particular 
country927 and the notion derives from the understanding that laws are made for an 
ascertained people than for an ascertained territory. Hence Cameroonians have a 
single personal law irrespective of where they are found on the national territory and 
this is French law as far as the matter is tried in a Francophone court. 
                                                 
921 See Ngwafor, E. N.,  Family Law in Anglophone Cameroon, p.22-23 
922 See Peter North and J.J Fawcett, Cheshire and North’s Private International Law, London, 
Butterworths Thirteenth Edition, 1999, pp. 134-161.   
923 Suit No.HCSW/28MC/82, per Inglis J. (unreported) 
924 See Lord Cranworth V-C in Wicker v. Hume (1858) HLC 124, 160. 
925 See Collier, J. G. Conflict of Laws, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, 37. 
926See Peter North and Fawcett, Cheshire and North’s Private International Law, London, Butterworths 
Thirteenth Edition, 1999, pp. 134-161.    
927 Ibid, 159. 
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  A number of mock situations would be helpful in describing the nature of 
conflicts that could arise between English and French laws and how the courts would 
handle them.  
(1) Two Anglophone Cameroonians contract a monogamous marriage in the 
Anglophone town of Nguti. They migrate to and settle in Nkongsamba a Francophone 
city and acquire land therein and one of them dies. 
(2) Two Anglophone Cameroonians meet in Nkongsamba and contract a civil 
marriage at one of the local civil status registration centres. They acquire property 
there and one of them dies.  
(3) Two Francophone Cameroonians from Nkongsamba migrate to the Anglophone 
Cameroonian town of Nguti. They had contracted a civil marriage in Nkongsamba 
and while in Nguti they acquire property there and then one of them dies. 
(4) Two Francophone Cameroonians form Nkongsamba meet in the Anglophone 
town of Nguti. They contract a monogamous at the local civil status registration 
centre; acquire property and then one of them dies.  
The first two situations concern Anglophone Cameroonians who find 
themselves in Francophone Cameroon and the last two concern Francophone 
Cameroonians who find themselves in Anglophone Cameroon. In all the situations 
the courts of the place of migration would rightly assume jurisdiction. Article 8(8) of 
the French Civil Procedure Code provides that succession proceedings are 
commenced in the last residence928 of the deceased while Order 48 rules (1) and (2) 
of the Supreme Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, Cap. 211 of the 1948 Laws of Nigeria 
gives the courts jurisdictions over property situated in their jurisdiction. The real 
question, however, will be that of the applicable law as the assumption of jurisdiction 
                                                 
928 French law conceives residence in the same way in the way as English law does domicile. 
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does not necessarily mean the application of the law of the forum in the devolution of 
the estate.929 In determining the applicable law it is the marriages that are relevant 
given the fact established above that migration cannot change the personal law.  
On the basis of the domicile rule, an Anglophone court will normally apply 
English law in the first hypothesis as the deceased was an Anglophone Cameroonian 
and contracted monogamous marriage there. For the same reasons French law will 
apply in third situation even though the matter is heard in an Anglophone court. 
Problems are bound to arise in the second and fourth situations because the marriages 
are contracted under laws different from the laws of the domicile. However since it is 
marriage that affects a change in the personal law English law should still apply in the 
fourth hypothetical case, for even though the deceased was a Francophone 
Cameroonian, he married in Anglophone Cameroon. For similar reasons French law 
will apply in the second situation. 
There have been a number of cases involving conflict between the two 
systems and all of them have been divorce cases. The only case we could find on 
succession is In the Estate of Sam Edward Charlie.930 The deceased was a 
Francophone who died intestate leaving property in both parts of the country and in 
France. The high court of Buea assumed jurisdiction as result of the property found in 
the division. This is one of the cases in which the court ought normally not to have 
assumed jurisdiction because the deceased was a polygamist and this matter pitted 
one widow and the oldest issue of the deceased against the other widow. The court 
assumed jurisdiction because the eldest son applied for letters of administration 
therein. The son had been named successor by the family council and with this 
applied for and obtained a next-of-kin declaration from Customary Court of Limbe.  
                                                 
929 See David McClean, Morris: The Conflict of Laws, London, Sweet &Maxwell, 2000, 417. 
930 (2002)HCF/AE/24//2001-2002 (unreported) 
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Since the deceased was a Francophone and therefore of the civil law domicile 
the court held French law to be applicable, as a result of which the letters were 
granted to the eldest son. This was on the basis of the rules of priority contained in 
article 731 of the Civil Code which place children in the first category and widows in 
the fourth, coming after the descendants, ascendants and collaterals. English law 
would in the circumstances have granted the letters to the surviving spouse pursuant 
to the rules of priority contained in section 21 (1) of the Non-Contentious Probate 
Rules of 1954.  
We need to deplore the fact, however, that nowhere in the judgement is it 
acknowledged that the case involved conflict between English and French laws, since 
it was only by so doing that the application of French law in an Anglophone court be 
justified. French law is not the law of the forum in Anglophone Cameroon and its 
application needs to be justified.    
Returning to the hypothetical cases the nationality rule adopted in 
Francophone Cameroon will make French law applicable in all the cases that arose 
within its jurisdiction. This position has been adopted in number of divorce cases 
notably the famous Arrêt Lantum931 in which Yaoundé High Court assumed 
jurisdiction even though the parties were Anglophone Cameroonians living and 
working in Yaoundé. 
Now the nationality rule requires the application of national laws and it is no 
secret that Cameroon is still to have a national law of succession. The tendency is to 
present the received laws as if they were Cameroonian laws. In the Law Faculties the 
former departments of English Private Law and French Private Law are now known 
as département de “Droits d’inspiration common law” and département de “Droits 
                                                 
931 CS No. 23/CC du 13 Décembre 1979, cited by Ngwafor, E. N., Family Law in Anglophone 
Cameroon, 22. 
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d’inspiration Française”932 respectively, suggesting that these are Cameroonian laws 
as influenced by the respective colonial laws.  
This is true as far as concerns the harmonised laws,933 because the French 
Civil Code of 1804 on which basis the national law theory was developed had the 
principal objective to replace the various coutumes with a system of unified law 
applicable to French people everywhere.934    
That a country with a unified legal system should follow such divergent paths 
in the resolution of conflicts that arise between its laws cannot but be preoccupying, 
in the midst of clamours for unified rules for the resolution of conflict between 
different legal systems.935 Professors Pougoué and Anoukaha, arguably amongst the 
country’s best legal minds of Francophone extraction, in recognition of the oddity 
make the following suggestion towards establishing a common rule: 
“If the relationship in issue is not mixed, it is practical and logical to apply 
the law of the Anglophone or Francophone sector from which both parties 
originate. The law of the domicile prevails over the law of the residence. If 
the relationship is mixed, that is to say involving an Anglophone and a 
Francophone, it will be necessary to set out clear rules of conflict except 
privilege is given to the proper law system…or the search for the law most 
favourable to the interest in issue (for example the interest of  the child).936  
 
                                                 
932 The Departments of English Private Law and French Private Law were thus named since the 
university reforms of 1993. 
933 Some harmonised areas are the Labour Law, Criminal law, Criminal Procedure, Land tenure. 
934 See article 3 (1) of the Civil Code. 
935See the projection of Francescakis made way back in 1964 and which is even more relevant today, 
with African countries increasingly common together in commercial and economic unions: «Les 
courants politiques actuels pourraient amener les législateurs Africains à reconsidérer les règles 
Européens  de droit international privé.  Plus particulièrement, le panafricanisme serait appelé, tôt  ou 
tard à éliminer progressivement le principe de la nationalité au profit de celui de la territorialité, dans le 
but de faciliter les apports de droit privé entre les différents Etats africains. » In Problemes de Droit 
International privé en Afrique noire indépendante, Recueil des Cours 1964, tome II. 275-261, cited by  
Bouckaert, F. “Les Regles de Conflit de Lois en Afrique Noire”, (1967) 77 Penant, 1-12, 2 
936 See Pougoué, Paul Gerard and Anoukaha François, “Legislation comparé,” Juridclasseur, 1996, 
vol.3, p. 7. My emphasis.  
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From all indications they must have been inspired by the numerous divorce 
cases to think only of the inter-vivos consequences of marriage, but the suggestion 
would be good for the law of succession too. We think, with due respect that the first 
hypothesis for not being a mixed cause is not a case of conflict of laws but rather a 
case of conflict of jurisdiction. They are thinking of situations where the parties find 
themselves on the other side of the legal divide. Jurisdiction in divorce might be 
different but as explained above any court within which jurisdiction the deceased left 
property would be competent in succession. The second hypothesis being a mixed 
cause between English and French law is a case of conflict of laws and the solution, 
we think is not far way, to necessitate setting out “clear rules of conflict”. The answer 
lies in the solution to first hypothesis which in effect adopts the domicile as the basis 
of the personal law of the parties and would be applicable where Anglophones and 
Francophones marry. We have gone beyond the age when marriage was said to 
operate a fusion of the legal personalities of husband and wife. Upon marriage the 
spouses maintain their individual personal laws and in the case of succession it is the 
personal law of the deceased spouse that should govern the devolution of his or her 
estate, irrespective of the part of the country in which they are found.   
 
5.4: CONFLICT INVOLVING MUSLIM LAW 
5.4.1: When Muslim law becomes the personal law. 
Without any doubt Muslim law constitutes the personal law of an individual 
where it is the fundamental or even the dominant law. If it is the fundamental law, it is 
the personal law of everyone within its jurisdiction.937 If it is the dominant law it 
would pass as under the denomination of “native laws and customs prevailing in the 
                                                 
937 In this case the jurisdiction could be the whole country in a unitary state with a single legislature; it 
could also be a region in a Federation with each state having its own legislature as in Nigeria.  
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area of the jurisdiction” of a customary court and is the personal law of the natives of 
that area.938 
Neither of the above exists in Cameroon and so Muslim law could only 
become the personal law of persons who profess the faith and conduct themselves in a 
manner to show that they intend such a consequence. Professing the faith merely 
gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that a person has adopted Muslim law as his 
personal law.  
One could become a Muslim through birth by Muslim parents, marriage and 
conversion.939 A Muslim by birth could renounce the status even though this option is 
rendered difficult by the fact of being stigmatised as apostasy, attended by 
consequences such as the dissolution of an existing marriage to a Muslim woman940 
and forfeiting succession rights to the estate of a Muslim relative.941 In a strong 
Muslim country like Algeria where Muslim law coexists with French law, a person is 
only subject to Muslim law if he is Muslim by birth and has embraced the faith.  
Contracting a Muslim marriage automatically subjects the spouses to Muslim 
law with regard to the incidents of the marriage. Like other customary law marriages, 
marriages between Muslims must be recorded in civil status registers of their area of 
jurisdiction, in accordance with section 81(1) of the 1981 Civil Status Registration 
Ordinance if they intend to have official evidence for the marriage. There is no 
evidence of any Moslem marriages having been so recorded but it can assumed when 
spouses register their marriage they will expressly state that it is a Muslim marriage. 
                                                 
938 Muslim law, we noted is applied in Cameroun as customary law pursuant to the interpretation 
section of the Southern Cameroon High Court Law 1955. 
939 Paras Diwan, “Who is a Muslim” (1978) Indian Socio-Legal journal, Vol. IV, No.1, 75-85, 76.   
940 See I. O. Agbede, “Application of Islamic Law in Nigeria”, (1971) 5 N.L.J, pp.119-128, 125.  
941  See A.D. Ajijola, Introduction to Islamic Law, New Delhi, International Islamic Publishers, 1989, 
170.  
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 Conversion could be through a ceremony in a mosque in which the person has 
to accept the principle of the unity of God, and of Muhammad as the Prophet of 
God.942  It could also be by a mere declaration or profession of the faith,943 through a 
ceremony culminating in the convert taking a Muslim name. Whatever form 
conversion takes, the rule is that mere conversion does not automatically change a 
person’s personal law.944 For conversion to have that effect it must be shown that the 
convert intended Muslim law as his personal law. This would be established from the 
state of his knowledge at the time of conversion. If after being informed of the 
possible consequences of the act with respect to his property after death he still goes 
ahead with the conversion, then the personal law changes. In India, as an indication 
that the convert was duly informed, he is expected to sign a declaration that he desires 
to be governed by Muslim law in matters of succession.945 The position in Cameroon 
as regards conversion can be ascertained from this exchange between me and the 
Chief Alkali of Cameroon: 
Me: “How is conversion to the Moslem faith done in Cameroon”? 
Chief Alkali: “The person is made to come to the Mosque for a number of days to be 
educated on the Koran.” 
Me: “How long”?  
Chief Alkali: “Could take days or weeks depending on how fast he learns”.  
Me: “Then”?  
                                                 
942 Ibid. 
943 This point was made by Lord Macnaughten in the Indian case of Barolo Razes v. Aga Mohamed.  
(1893) 21, I. A. 56 at 64.         
944 See I. O. Agbede, “Application of Islamic Law in Nigeria: A Reflection”, (1971) 5 The Nigerian 
Law Journal, pp.119-128, 121.  
945 See Paras Diwan, supra. 81. 
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Chief Alkali: “At the end we give him a Moslem name (optional), tell him to always 
do the ablutions and that he has to bury his parents normally when they die.”  
I listened intently for more and seeing that he was silent, asked: “Is that all”? “Yes”, 
he answered. Then I added: “So you do not tell them what happens to their property 
when they die”? “No”, he answered and everyone present946 laughed including 
himself.  
Conversion to the Muslim faith cannot therefore in Cameroon be said to 
automatically effect a change in the convert’s personal law. In fact in Cameroon there 
many cases where people convert to the Muslim faith because of some political or 
economic advantage that conversion entails and when such persons die their property 
devolves normally in accordance with their personal law of birth. It may therefore as 
in India require some overt declaration for Muslim law to become the personal law of 
a convert. 
 
5.4.2: Resolving conflict between Muslim law and the other systems of law. 
The resolution of conflict with any system of customary law begins with the 
consensus among Muslim Maliki Scholars that a non-Muslim may not inherit a 
Muslim’s property and vice versa. This is based on a hadith947 according to which 
inheritance is an expression of solidarity and enhances cooperation, a principle which 
could hardly bind persons of different religious faiths.948 Hence a convert forfeits his 
succession right in his family and the others cannot expect to succeed from him, 
                                                 
946 This discussion took place in the presence of the Registrar-in-Chief of the Ndop High Court and the 
full panel of the Alkali court which excluding the Chief Alkali himself included: Ismaila Muhamed 
(Member), Ali  Garba (Member), Mbonifor Shu Peter (Clerk), Bambili Garba and George Omia 
(Messengers). 
947 Recordings of solutions to problems that arose after the Holy Prophet and were resolved with 
reference to sayings or actions of Prophet in His lifetime.   
948See Hamisu, Rabiatu Danpullo, “Women, Property and Inheritance– The case of Cameroon.”Recht 
in Africa 2005, 143-161, 156. 
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except, of course, with respect to property which he held as a family member and 
which upon his conversion should normally revert to the family.  
Decisions are liable to vary depending on whether the matter is determined in 
the Alkali or the customary courts. The customary courts would on the basis of the 
rule in Ghamson v. Wobill be expected to apply Muslim law as the personal of the 
deceased and therefore the law binding between the parties. Instinctively the tendency 
as was the case in Alhaji Garuba v. Next-of-kin949 the courts would the application of 
the customary law. If on the other hand the matter is tried by an Alkali court the 
tendency is generally for Muslim law to be applied.950 In Ndjobdi v. Gabilla,951 the 
Ndop Alkali court was faced with a dispute involving a Muslim and a non-Muslim 
over the estate of deceased Muslim. Muslim law was held to be applicable on the 
grounds that the “plaintiff is a Muslim by faith and tradition while the defendant is a 
non-Moslem” and “the properties claimed are the properties of a Muslim.”  
In Francophone Cameroon where Muslim law has no status as such, conflict 
with customary law will most certainly be resolved in favour of the latter, on the 
ground that Muslim law is not indigenous to Cameroon and that Cameroon being a 
secular state should not permit court decisions to be based on religious beliefs.952 
However this is only as far as it will not be repugnant to the public policy to apply the 
rule of customary law which Muslim law is in conflict. In Affaire Baba Iyayi953 the 
Yaoundé court of Appeal upheld a decision of the Tribunal de Premier Degré which 
had distributed the property in accordance with Moslem law, against the contention of 
                                                 
949 Limbe Customary Court, Civil Suit No.29/84-85. 
950 Ijaodola, J.O. “The proper Place of Islamic Law in Nigeria”, (1969) 3 The Nigerian Law Journal, 
pp.129-140, 131.  
951 Civil Suit No. 3/2002-2003 
952 See the unanimous decision of the Supreme Court in Dame Dada Balkissou v. Abdoul Karim 
Mohamed, Arrêt No. 2/L du 10 Octobre 1985, discussed earlier 
953 Arrêt No. 083 of 32 March 2000  
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the eldest son that customary law should be applied to make him sole beneficiary and 
successor.     
Conflicts between Muslim and the received laws will be governed by the same 
rules as conflict between customary and the received laws. It means that in 
Anglophone Cameroon Muslim law will be excluded if the deceased contracted a 
Christian marriage. Of course this will be apostasy on the part of the Muslim but it 
could occur in circumstances similar to Asiata v. Goncallo. When this happens the 
question of the applicable law will have to be resolved on the basis of the rules in 
Cole v. Cole and Asiata v.Goncallo.  
In Francophone Cameroon the position as understood in Baba Iyayi v. Hadja 
Aminatou954 is that French law will supplant Moslem law if the deceased contracted a 
civil marriage.  
When a Muslim dies testate it will be inferred that he intended the application 
of French or English law.  
 
Conclusion  
   This chapter provided the opportunity to establish the different types of 
conflict of law situations that could arise in Cameroon’s law of succession. Internal 
conflicts are seen as the usual types of conflict to expect within a single territory 
while the external conflicts are actually artificial. The latter could one day disappear 
when an Anglophone or Francophone Cameroonian who finds himself on the other 
side of the legal divide will be regarded as being subject to his or her personal law 
acquired by birth or descent.  
 
                                                 
954 Arrêt No. 083 of 32 March 2000  
 262
CHAPTER SIX: MOVING FORWARD-PRIVATE ORDERING THROUGH 
THE MAKING OF WILLS. 
 
Introduction 
Wills or testaments are oral or written declarations by persons of sound mind 
and understanding955 in the form prescribed by law956, in which property is disposed 
in favour of others. Wills take effect on death, to distinguish them from gifts inter-
vivos. Testamentary power is generally viewed as enabling a person to make 
provisions for certain persons. A person’s aspiration when he acquires property is to 
ensure a better life, primarily his or her sub-family composed of the spouse and 
children. Other relatives could, of course, be part of these aspirations, but generally 
only in the absence of persons of the priority group. This responsibility does not end 
when he dies and might even be aggravated by death due to the loss of a 
breadwinner.957 
Herein can be found the importance of Wills even though the tendency is to 
construe wills as being in lieu of rather than in addition to what would be obtained 
under the intestacy rules. Such feelings have led to assertions according to which 
when intestacy rules provide adequately for the family after the death of the deceased 
there is very little inclination to resort to the technique of wills making.958 Unger 
extols the virtues of Wills when he writes: 
“If the rules of intestate succession are unsatisfactory from the point of 
view of the family the power of testation assumes the character of an 
instrument serving for the protection of the family. If the distribution of 
the intestate’s property is not in accordance with the wishes of the 
                                                 
955 To be considered briefly in the second part of this chapter. 
956 To be considered briefly in the second part of this chapter. 
957 See Bentsi-Enchill, Ghana Land Law, 207. 
958 See for instance the statement of Maine after the enactment in France of the 1804 Civil Code “in 
France at this moment, the heads of families generally save themselves the trouble of executing a 
will”,958 and Amos and Walton: “the small proportion of Frenchmen who make wills is perhaps an 
indication that the legal rules of succession are satisfactory,” cited by Unger, “The Inheritance Act and 
Family” (1943) M.L.R. 215-228,217 & 218 respectively. 
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family, the power of testation becomes, not the means of effecting 
disinherison but the method for the preservation and just distribution of 
the estate among the family.”    
 
He fails to avert his mind to the fact that Wills might not always produce the 
effect described. This idealistic conception of wills is partly responsible for current 
intestacy rules of most, if not all the legal systems, because the tendency is to 
deliberately lay down unbalanced intestacy rules with the hope that wills will cover 
any deficiencies. As a system of private ordering wills are susceptible to being 
affected by a number of factors liable to cast doubts on their reliability as instruments 
through which the interests and needs of family members would be taken care of, 
when, as is the case in Cameroon the applicable rules of intestacy fail to do so. Hence 
we are in this chapter going to examine the extent to which wills could be relied upon 
to provide that balance between the interests and needs of family members which the 
various systems of intestacy have failed to ensure.  
 
6.1: WILLS AS INSTRUMENTS TO AVOID DEFICIENT INTESTACY 
RULES 
It is generally accepted that wills provide an instrument through which 
provision could be made in favour of persons for whom the existing intestacy rules 
give nothing or very little. The notion of testamentary freedom embraced by all legal 
systems is largely responsible for this, even if in some, the freedom is limited to a 
given fraction of the estate. 
 
6.1.1: TESTAMENTARY FREEDOM 
6.1.1.1: Testamentary freedom in English law. 
English law recognises absolute testamentary freedom as evident in the 
statement according to which a person “may disinherit… his children and leave his 
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property to strangers to gratify his spite or to charities to gratify his pride.”959 This 
must not be taken to mean that all is left to the whim of the testator as even though 
there is absolute freedom statutes such the Inheritance (Provision for Family and 
Dependant) Act 1975 are intended to check the abuse of the freedom. Hence a 
beneficiary capriciously excluded by a will could sue under the Act for reasonable 
financial provision. 
 
6.1.1.2: Testamentary freedom in French law 
French law allows a person to dispose only of a certain fraction of his estate if 
survived by descendants and ascendants that normally have a legal claim to his 
succession. These are entitled to specific portions of the estate which correspond to 
their entitlements on intestacy in French law and cannot be disposed of by will. The 
reserved portion of which the testator may not dispose by will is one half of the estate 
if survived by  one child,  two-thirds if there are two children and three-fourths if 
there are three or more.960 When there are no descendants but ascendants of the 
paternal and maternal lines, half of the estate may be disposed of by will and three-
fourths when there are ascendants of one lineage only.961 It is clear that the widow is 
not entitled to a reserve portion. 
 
6.1.1.3: Testamentary freedom in customary law. 
The concept of modern wills might be new to customary law but the sanctity 
of a person’s last wishes has always been respected even when written wills were 
unknown. It is accepted in customary law that a person might through a will alter the 
course of inheritance to his property.962 The only known restriction is against the 
                                                 
959 See Broughton v. Knight (1873) L.R. 3P & D. 64, 65-66. (Per Sir J, Hannen) 
960 See article 913 of the 1804 Civil Code. 
961 See article 914, ibid. 
962 See Binet, Jacques, “La dévolution successorale chez les Douala du Cameroun”, (1955) 65 Penant, 
33-40, 38.   
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disposition of family property, but this more a case of nemo dat quod non habet rather 
than one of limitation to testamentary freedom.963 The freedom is however tempered 
by the repugnancy doctrine as the courts will not hesitate to set aside a will if its 
content is found to have been influenced by malice. Hence in Jesco Manga Williams 
v. Helen Otia & Chief Ikome964 a will in which the deceased left the major part of his 
property to his friend as against his polygamous family was rejected because the 
disposition was held to be repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience.   
 
6.1.1.4: Testamentary freedom in Muslim law. 
Muslim law also has a system of limited testamentary freedom. A Muslim 
cannot by a will dispose of more than a third of his estate965 unless the disposition is 
approved by a valid custom, there are no heirs at all, the heirs give their consent or the 
husband or wife is the sole surviving heir and the disposition does not affect his or her 
intestate entitlement.966 It must be noted that it is one third of his disposable property 
which is concerned here and this must exclude any property as a trustee.967 Secondly, 
persons already entitled to benefit at intestacy cannot be beneficiaries under a will.968 
 The question is whether these restrictions are limited to wills made in Muslim 
form where no particular formality is prescribed, or also cover wills made in English 
form. In In the Estate of Baba Nya969 the deceased had willed part of his property to 
his widow and although this contradicted Muslim law no objections were raised. 
Problems started when the widow also died and the appellant, as the Imam presented 
                                                 
963 See Van Den Wiele, “Les Systemes Familiaux et Matrimoniaux au seins de Societes Negro-
Africaines », (1963)17 Rev. Jur. et Pol. d’Outre-Mer, 429-507, 461.   
964Limbe Customary Court, Civil Suit No.LM/16/97 (unreported)  
965 See Muhammad Abdul Hai’ Arifi, Death and inheritance, 164; Ajijola, Introduction to Islamic Law, 
268; Hussain, The Islamic Law of Succession, 385. 
966 See Ajijola, ibid. 281. 
967 Muhammad Abdul Hai’ Arifi, Death and inheritance, 149. 
968 See Muhammad Abdul Hai’ Arifi, Death and inheritance, 164; Ajijola, Introduction to Islamic Law, 
268; Hussain, The Islamic Law of Succession, 385. 
969 (1985) C.A.S.W.P/CC/16/85 (unreported). See also Apatira v. Akande 1944)17 N. L R. 149. 
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a will in which the property was granted to him. It was argued that the property 
should go to the family of the deceased Baba Nya and not the appellant who was a 
complete stranger. Respondents also argued that even if the appellant was entitled, it 
would not be to more than one third of the property. The will was thus set aside at the 
trial level.  
This was undisturbed on appeal though not because of Muslim law 
restrictions, but because the formal requirements for English wills were found not to 
have been complied with and the Muslim law of intestacy applied. The court however 
used the case to establish that a Muslim who chose to make a will in English form and 
complied with the requirements could break with the restrictions imposed on Muslim 
wills. Mbuagbaw, J. said: 
“Under Moslem law a man may not bequeath by his will more than one 
third of his estate. This stringent limitation on powers of Testation may 
be abrogated by writing a will in English form.”  
This decision must be contrasted with the Nigerian case of Yinusa v. Adesubokan,970 
where Bello J. admitted that a deceased Muslim could make a will in English form 
but cautioned:  
“He (a Muslim) has no right to deprive his heirs, who are entitled to 
share his estate under the Muslim law, of their respective shares to 
which they are entitled under the Muslim law.” 
 
The decision was reversed on appeal971 because the limitation was incompatible with 
section 3 of the Wills Act, 1837, which enshrines testamentary freedom.972 The 
                                                 
970[1970] 14 J.A.L. 1,57-64, 62.   
971 T.T. Adesubokan v. Rasaki Yinusa, reported in Nigeria Lawyers’ Quarterly, Vol, 6, No. 1-4,  pp. 
186-193.  
972 Per Ademola C.J.N. at p. 193.    
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decision gave rise to a spate of criticism973 because contrary to the settled law it 
resolved the issue of compatibility between law and custom with reference to the 
received rather than local statutory law.974 For that reason the decision of the trial 
court is said to constitute the better, though not conclusive view.975   
 
6.1.2: THE EXTENT TO WHICH WILLS ARE USED TO MODIFY 
DEFICIENT INTESTACY RULES 
 
Wills are known to have been used to grant succession rights where none 
exists at intestacy or increase such rights. We will see how far this is true under the 
various systems. 
 
6.1.2.1: English law. 
English intestacy rules are not gender-biased and above all, favour the 
surviving spouse against the relatives of the deceased. These could all be varied, for 
example, by a man who having contracted a monogamous marriage is subject to 
English law. Dispositions could be made in favour of sons by appointing them as 
executors of an estate, a role reserved for their mothers under intestacy. A man 
without children could make use of his testamentary power to prevent the bulk of his 
estate from passing to his wife and eventually to her family.  
In In re Ntoh976, the plaintiff and the deceased were monogamously married. 
The respondent, brother of the deceased produced a will in which the later appointed 
him successor to his estate, this was admitted to probate and Letters of Administration 
were granted to him. The plaintiff instituted the present appeal on the grounds, first, 
that the purported will was invalid, and secondly, that it disposed of property jointly 
                                                 
973 See for example, Olawale Ajai, “Legal Pluralism and the Mis-handling of Moslem Wills: Further 
considerations of Adesubokan v. Yinusa and the Internal Conflict Rules,” (1986) Nigerian Current Law 
Review, 127-140. 
974See supra. 2.2.3.4 dealing with the exclusion of customary law that is incompatible with written law.   
975 See Oluyede, P.A., Nigerian Law of Conveyancing, Ibadan, Ibadan University Press, 1978, p.73. 
976 Marianne Bongyila Ntoh v. Che Peter (2006) Appeal No. BCA/48/2003 (unreported). 
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owned by her and the deceased. The first ground of appeal was successful and the 
second failed because the appellant could not adduce evidence of joint ownership 
with the deceased as the marriage certificate did not mention the system of property 
rights. It would have been expected that once the will was held to be invalid the 
deceased would be assumed to have died intestate977 and administration transferred to 
the appellant. This was not to be, as the court pursued the second ground of appeal 
even though distribution was not in issue and because the appellant could not produce 
evidence of joint ownership, went ahead to transfer administration to the 
Administrator-General. 
Hence as far as the English intestacy rules are concerned wills could be used 
to provide for other family members, even though they could apply for reasonable 
financial provision under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 
1975.  
 
6.1.2.2: French law.  
French rules of intestacy establish parity between male and female relatives of 
a deceased but place the surviving spouse in the last position in the order of priority. 
All of these could be altered with use of wills, such as providing for persons who 
would be excluded by the rules and appointing the widow as successor. 
In Affaire Dame Bebey978 the widow was able to be made successor on the 
basis of a will in which the deceased excluded his son, the rightful successor under 
customary law. The deceased claimed in the will that the son did not recognise his 
parental authority, beat him, made him understand that he was not his father and 
threatened to change his name.  
                                                 
977 See in In the Estate of Charly Namalongo (2005) Suit No. HCK/AE/K. 19/02-03 (unreported). 
978 Veuve Ekambi Elise c/ Bebe Moise Arret no. 46/ of 4 May 1995 (Supreme Court) (unreported). 
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Provision could be made in favour any person within the legally disposable 
portion.  But the freedom also means that the property could be willed to other 
persons and that the widow, not being entitled to a legitimate portion could be left 
destitute. The only security for widows would be through the system of property 
rights. French law recognises joint property rights between spouses and this is given 
effect in a contrat de mariage979 specifying their respective interests in the 
matrimonial property.  
This will restrict the husband’s testamentary power over the property but often 
the parties are blinded to this security measure by the euphoria that precedes the 
marriage and certain that their marriage would last “pour le meilleur et pour le pire”. 
This often turns out to be true; however, questions of property rights arise not only 
upon inter vivos dissolution of the marriage, but also upon dissolution by death. The 
contract is the only proof that the property was jointly owned by the spouses; 
otherwise she will be required to adduce evidence of her participation in their 
acquisition.980    
 
6.1.2.3: Customary law. 
The succession rights of women in customary law are inferior to those of the 
male relatives of the deceased. Female relatives receive an insignificant share of an 
estate after distribution and could be successors only temporarily. Whatever rights 
widows have depend on the existence of children, otherwise, they are at the mercy of 
whoever is the successor.   
                                                 
979 See section 1400 Civil Code. 
980 See Arret Eding (1967)CSCO 6 Juin, Arret Dayas (1971) CSCO 12 Juin, cited by Ndoko, « L’idee 
d’egalite dans le droit successoral Camerounais : Dernieres tendences de la jurisprudence en matieres 
de successions ab  intestat. » (1990) unpublished, 55 ; see also Lizette, Elomo-Ntonga, Affaire Koum: 
Commentaire (1990) 3 Juridis Info. 99-103.    
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It is common for a person to circumvent the effects of customary intestacy by 
making provision for the female members of the family including the widows. In 
Jemba v. Emilia981 the deceased made a will in due form in which he devised certain 
property to his wife and remainder to the appellant in this case. When the wife also 
died instead of the estate going to the appellant, it was distributed between the 
appellant and his sisters. The appellant protested against the distribution in an action 
to the customary court but failed to have the will respected. The decision of the trial 
court was reversed by the Buea Court of Appeal. Nana, J relied on a statement by 
Nwabueze: 
 “A Nigerian [Cameroonian] can by testamentary disposition defeat the 
course of inheritance in intestacy under customary law. For he will have 
no cause to make a will at all if all he can do by it is to confirm the 
scheme of inheritance that would have resulted upon an intestacy under 
customary law.” 982   
 
In In re Lokendo983 the deceased, survived by a brother and sister, had made a 
will in which he devised part of his estate to his sister.  As the only surviving male 
relative of the deceased the brother was granted a next-of- kin declaration over the 
whole estate and with this, applied for Letters of Administration. The sister posited a 
caveat demanding exclusion of the portion given to her under the will from the 
inventory. Her plea was upheld,984 giving rise to the present appeal. It was argued that 
rather than admit the will to probate the court ought to have followed the evidence of 
the traditional council on the custom of the deceased. In an earlier action in the 
customary court, the will was rejected because that court “would not allow her [to] 
                                                 
981 Suit No. C.A.S.W.P/CC/14/2002 (per Nana J) (unreported)  See also Nana v. Nana(2005) Suit no. 
HCF/PROB/AE1/2001-2002(unreported), in which the deceased designated his daughter as his 
successor.  
982Nigerian Land Law, supra,   
983Lokendo James v. Francisca Diangi Lokendo (2006) Suit No. C.A.S.W.P/21/2005. 
984 (2004) suit No. HCK. AE/K.61 2001 (Unreported). 
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inherit because she was a woman and married.” It was held at the appeal that the farm 
devised to the respondent should be excluded from the inventory.  
The court probably overlooked the fact that this was a case of partial intestacy 
governed by section 49 of the Administration of Estates Act 1925. The whole estate 
vests in the personal representative985 whose duty at the end of the administration, is 
to pay out the various legacies to which the estate is subject and then distribute the 
rest in accordance with intestacy rules.986 The difference between a testamentary 
bequest and the rest of the estate is that while the latter might be subject to a 
continuing trust the former must be given out to the beneficiary. We do not think that 
the woman would have been negatively affected if the normal course was to be 
followed.  
 In In re Johnny987 the deceased left part of his property to his widow and part 
to his adult children. Soon after the death of their father the older sons of the deceased 
by other women invaded and ransacked the property allotted to the widow. In an 
action to the Bamenda High Court it was ruled that the defendants were to desist from 
further acts of interference with the property. In Teke v. Teke988  the opinion of the 
chief was determinant in admitting the validity of a disposition in a customary will 
designating the younger of two brothers as successor over the estate of their uncle. In 
Ossengue Francois v Jackie Cecile,989  a will purportedly designating a step-daughter 
as successor over the estate of her step-mother against the widower was upheld by the 
Customary Court of Tombel. This decision was reversed by the South West Court of 
Appeal not because it preferred the widower against step-daughter but because the 
will was found to have been a forgery. The reversal does not therefore detract from 
                                                 
985 Section 33 Administration of Estates Act 1925. 
986 See supra. 5.2.2.  
987 Grace Lum Johnny v. Tresor Ndeh Johnny (1989) Suit No. HCB/14.M/89 (unreported). 
988 (2005)2 C. C. L. R. 40. 
989 (2000) Suit No. C.A.S.W.P/CC/15/99 (unreported). 
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the fact that the courts are willing to give effect to customary wills which make 
dispositions contrary to intestacy at customary law. In Nguea Lottin v. Quan 
Samuel,990 the deceased a native of Douala left a will in which he made gifts to his 
daughters and appointed a stranger as guardian for his children. The will was upheld 
by the Douala Customary Court and Court of Appeal, to the chagrin of the plaintiffs 
who claimed that it violated the principle of Douala customary law which excludes 
women from succession. The decision of the lower courts was confirmed by the 
Supreme Court 
 
6.1.2.4: Muslim law. 
 Muslim law grants succession rights to every relative of the deceased 
including widows. What a will could do therefore would be to increase the 
entitlements recognised by the rules of intestacy. We should in this respect mention 
that Muslim law does not allow testamentary dispositions in favour of persons who 
already qualify as Quranic or agnatic heirs under the rules of intestacy.991 The 
limitation is explained by the fact that wills in Muslim law have the prime objective 
of giving Muslims the opportunity to make provision for persons who would, 
otherwise not be entitled to succession.992 Hence dispositions can only be made in 
favour of strangers.   
The limitation contradicts Surah 2(180)993 which gives priority to the 
testator’s family without prejudice to charitable bequests. Furthermore verse 240 of 
the same chapter prescribes that: “Those of you who die and leave widows should 
bequeath for their widows a year’s maintenance and residence.” This verse is said to 
                                                 
990 Arrêt No.67 du 11 Juin 1963 (CSCO). 
991 See Muhammad Abdul Hai’ Arifi, Death and inheritance, 164; Ajijola, Introduction to Islamic Law, 
268; Hussain, The Islamic Law of Succession, 385. 
992 Ajijola, 269; Hussain, 385.  
993 Infra, the effect of Muslim wills at 9.4. 
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have been abrogated by subsequent verses994 dealing with intestacy giving women 
succession rights.  Verses in the Quran are said not to abrogate one another and the 
most that a subsequent verse could do to an earlier verse would be to restrict its 
scope.995 Muslim Sunni scholars are themselves not unanimous about the 
restrictions996 and they are not part of the Shi’a Muslim law. 997  
                                                
 
6.2: THE LIMITATIONS OF WILLS AS INSTRUMENTS TO AMEND 
DEFICIENT INTESTACY RULES 
 
The effectiveness of wills depends on the testator rather than on some 
legislative intervention. In these circumstances wills cannot be counted upon to 
achieve the objective of always modifying deficient intestacy rules. A number of 
factors, most of which may be independent of the testator’s intention might reduce the 
effectiveness of wills in this respect.   
 
6.2.1: Uncertainty of testamentary provisions.  
The legislature has no control over the contents of a will and so it cannot be 
guaranteed that provisions in a will are always going to be positive, aimed at making 
up for deficiencies in intestacy rules. Wills are justified by the fact that the testator has 
property liable to exist after his death, which must be disposed of. Hence the 
presumption is always that wills can only dispose of property but it is common for 
wills to make other dispositions, such as the way in which the corpse would be 
disposed. Above all a will may contain provisions to deprive intestate beneficiaries of 
even the little they would have been entitled to at intestacy. 
 
994 See Hussain, The Islamic Law of Succession, supra, 384. 
995 Ajijola, 269. 
996 See Hamisu, Rabiatu Danpullo, “Women, Property and Inheritance-The case of Cameroon.” Recht 
in Afrika 2005, 143-161,153.    
997 Coulson, Conflicts and tensions in Islamic Jurisprudence, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1969, 
32. 
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 This is common in systems with absolute testamentary freedom. In Findi 
Laban Njo & ors v. Enow Emmanuel the testator willed all of his farms and cocoa 
plantations to his youngest son, leaving nothing for the older and other children. The 
other children did not contest the choice of the first son which was clearly in 
contradiction to customary law, but argued that he holds the property on behalf of 
them all. Their contention was rejected and the youngest son was given allodial 
ownership.998 Similarly in Re Kinge Francis Evakisse999the appellant, daughter of the 
deceased and the respondent, his nephew, both of who presented different wills by the 
deceased claimed the right to be designated next-of-kin. At the Buea Customary Court 
the daughter’s claim was dismissed because she was not even included as beneficiary 
in the will tendered by her. An appeal to the South West Court of Appeal failed, and 
on further appeal to the Supreme Court, the decision was quashed, not on the point of 
law but on the ground that the customary courts have no jurisdiction over wills in 
English form. The matter was remitted to the same Court of Appeal, which would be 
expected to overrule the jurisdiction of the customary court and transmit the matter to 
the High Court. It is unlikely for the decision to differ, for not only did the name of 
the applicant not feature on either of the wills which were fairly detailed,1000 the will 
under which the nephew claimed was more recent to constitute a codicil revoking the 
first will.1001 
Where freedom of testation is limited as in the French and Muslim laws a 
person is limited only in the extent of property he could dispose of by will, but is free 
to disinherit persons to whom specific potions are assigned under the rules of 
                                                 
998 Limbe Customary Court, Civil Suit No. LM/105/2001 (unreported). 
999 Also known as Manyi Pauline Evakisse v. Joseph Evakisse Evelle (1999)1 G.L.R. 17  
1000 She could only succeed to have the wills set aside if it is proved that the testator lacked the mental 
capacity as established in Banks v Goodfellow.  
1001 The first will under which the daughter claimed was executed on 30 November 1979 while the one 
under which the nephew claimed was executed on 14 January 1985. 
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intestacy. In Affaire Okalla1002 the deceased in his will designated one of his sons as 
successor, excluded his widow and daughters and gave property to collaterals. The 
persons thus excluded claimed that no sufficient reasons were given for their 
exclusion, the will gave property to collaterals against the law and the will failed to 
respect the fixed portion of a widow. It was held that they were rightly excluded. It 
could be argued in this case that the widow was not one of the beneficiaries entitled to 
a definite share of the estate; but the daughters were, given that French law does not 
discriminate between male female blood relatives.  
 
6.2.2: Apathy towards the making of wills and Ignorance.  
Many people do not make wills because making a will is seen as precipitating 
ones own death.1003 Studies conducted in Great Britain and which would be true of 
any other society reveal that most people keep putting off making their wills at some 
future time only to end up dying before doing so.1004 So there is a correlation between 
age and will-making and for a country with a very low rate of life expectancy like 
Cameroon, one can only expect most deaths to be intestate. 
  Will-making would normally also have a correlation with social class as the 
tendency is for the educated and the affluent to make wills. However, Cameroonians, 
educated and uneducated alike are more conversant with the making of nuncupative 
wills which are not subject to a complicated formality as does modern wills, than with 
modern wills. It is on the point of formality that the ignorance is more pronounced 
because most persons without distinction of social class are known to make wills 
without legal assistance. For by seeking legal assistance they will know that section 9 
of the Wills Act 1873, which is the only pre-1900 English statute of general 
                                                 
1002 Jugement no. 25 du 7 novembre 1979, Tribunal Grande Instance, Yaounde.    
1003 See Brian W Harvey, The law and practice of Nigerian wills, probate and succession, London, 
Sweet & Maxwell, 1968, 68.  
1004 See Andrew Borkowski, Textbook on succession, London, Blackstone limited, 1997, 3.  
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application which application has not been questioned, lays down specific formalities 
for English type of wills. The will must be in writing, it must be signed by the testator 
in the simultaneous presence of two witnesses, failing which it is inadmissible to 
probate. Most wills are rejected in this way and are thus prevented from effecting any 
change that must have been intended by their authors.  
 The courts are impervious to any arguments that though not valid in English 
law the wills could be valid in customary or Muslim laws. This was the position of 
Ames J. in Apatira v. Akande: “The fact that the deceased was a Nigerian 
[Cameroonian] cannot make any difference to the necessity of complying with the 
requirements of the Wills Act.”1005  In In the Estate of Charly Namolongo1006 the will 
was held to be invalid because in the words of the Judge, “when I look at exhibit ‘C’ I 
notice that all the witnesses signed before the testator. For exhibit ‘C’ to be admitted 
as a Will it has to comply with the requirements of section 9 of the Wills Act as 
subsequently amended.” In Tantoh Agnes v. Achunche Vivain the plaintiff, widow of 
the deceased presented an unattested will signed by the deceased appointing her as 
successor to the estate. The signature was authenticated but because of the want of 
attestation, the will was held not be admissible to probate, in spite of entreaties by the 
plaintiff that the document, though not technically a will should be admitted as a 
guide in ascertaining the testamentary intention of the deceased.  
 
6.2.3: Failure of wills for the want of animus testandi. 
The absence of animus testandi constitutes another ground for wills to be 
refused by the probate division of high courts and thereby prevents it from achieving 
the desired objective. The expression is used to describe the capacity to make a will 
and the knowledge and approval of its contents. The test for testamentary capacity is 
                                                 
1005 (1944) 17 N.L.R 149.  
1006 (2005) Suit No. HCK/AE/K.19/02-03. 
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contained in the judgment of Cockburn J in Banks v. Goodfellow1007 which establishes 
in a nutshell that the testator must understand: (1) the effect of his will being carried 
out at his death, though he need not understand their precise legal effect; (2) the extent 
of the property of which he is disposing, though he is not required to carry in his mind 
a detailed inventory of it; and (3) the nature of the claims on him.  
The requirement of knowledge and approval is based on the assumption that 
wills are written not by the testator but by a third party, generally a legal practitioner. 
The legal burden of proving testamentary capacity and knowledge and approval rests 
on the person seeking to obtain probate of the will. Once it is proved that testator was 
capable at the time of execution, and the will was executed duly complying with the 
statutory formalities, knowledge and approval are to be presumed.1008 However, if 
circumstances surrounding the execution raise a suspicion that the will did not express 
the testator’s intention, knowledge and approval must be specifically proved. The 
absence of such proof could be indicative that the will was made as a result of undue 
influence or the fraud of another person. The will in Marianne Bongyilla v. Che 
Peter1009 was held to have been a forgery because at the time of its purported 
execution in a lawyer’s chambers the deceased was bedridden in hospital and the 
medical records showed that he lacked the necessary mental capacity to make a will. 
The will was also seen to have wrongly described some of the property, excluded 
property which ought to have been included and instead included property which had 
been sold by the purported testator.    
 
 
 
                                                 
1007 (1870) L.R.5 Q.B. 549, 565. 
1008 See Charles, H, Stuart, B, & Martin, D.  Megarry & Wade: The Law of Real Property, London, 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2008, 558. 
1009 (2006) Appeal No. BCA/48/2003 (unreported). 
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Conclusion 
While it is possible for wills to effect changes to intestacy rules and make up 
for any deficiencies therein, they cannot be completely relied upon to effect the 
changes that are necessary to make the law of succession conflict-free. Wills are 
subjective and so their content might not actually reflect what the average man would 
expect of them. Furthermore, there is a general reluctance towards the making of wills 
and also, in spite of the testators’ good intentions wills might fail for the want of 
formality, or animus testandi.  
 Notwithstanding the shortcomings wills remain a necessity in every legal 
system. Taking testamentary power away would be infringing on one of the 
fundamental rights of Cameroonians, to dispose of their property in any manner they 
wish, subject only to public policy considerations. Government position on this aspect 
of human rights is reflected in section 1(1) of the Land Tenure Ordinance No. 74-1 of 
6 July 1974 which stipulates: “The state guarantees to all natural persons and 
corporate bodies having landed [and movable] property the right freely to enjoy and 
dispose of such lands [movable property]”  
What needs changing is the perception of wills. The fact that wills have over 
the years been perceived as constituting a panacea for the inadequacies of intestacy 
rules has led many a legislature to condone discriminatory intestacy rules, hoping that 
these would be rectified by wills. Wills, we submit, should not be viewed as 
compensating for inadequate intestacy rules; they should rather serve the same 
objective as reasonable financial provision for the surviving spouse under the 
Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975.1010 This means literally 
that the effect of wills should be to pamper the beneficiary by giving him or her 
                                                 
1010 This is explained in chapter two. 
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something more than intestacy rules do, and on the other hand that in the absence of a 
will the person should not be pauperised.  
For wills to have this effect there is need for legislative intervention to lay 
down equitable intestacy rules. This means that they are not exclusionary, make 
distribution mandatory and enshrine a system of distribution which should leave 
everyone satisfied within the limits of the estate, so that it makes no difference 
whether or not there is a will. How far the proposed Family Code meets these 
objectives is what we intend to discover in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: MOVING FORWARD-INTESTACY UNDER THE 
FAMILY CODE. 
 
Introduction 
Hopes are focused on the family code to lay down intestacy rules that would 
ensure the necessary balance in the conflicting interests of the family members and 
thereby reduce the dependence on wills to compensate for the weaknesses of 
intestacy. To do this the code needs, as a matter of course, to be an innovation on the 
exiting laws. It should provide criteria for succession, it should remove the principle 
of succession to the category of beneficiaries nearest to the deceased, and it should 
replace the current open-ended system of administering estates with a definite period 
of administration and make distribution mandatory.  
 
7.1: THE GENESIS OF THE CODE 
Cameroonians know that the idea of a code has been conceived since 
independence and it has taken almost half a century for the initial step to be taken in 
this direction, through a government bill1011 tabled in Parliament during the 2006 
legislative year. That the bill has not yet been enacted into law is not surprising to this 
researcher, given that law making is generally a very slow process in the country. 
Cameroonians have for long awaited the advent of a law governing family relation in 
the country1012 and are confident that however long it takes the code will one day 
become a reality. Parliament to which it has been submitted has the powers to amend 
and not reject bills.1013 
 
 
                                                 
1011 See article 29(1) of the 1996 Constitution. 
1012 See generally Tataw, Mbeng, “Ou en est-on avec le droit de la famille au Cameroun”? (2005) 115 
Penant, 347-357.   
1013 See article 29(3). 
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7.2: THE SCOPE OF THE CODE 
 The code could best be described as a consolidating statute for the reason that 
it brings together all existing enactments relative to family relationships, and proposes 
initial legislation for other areas such as succession. The code consists of 697 sections 
divided into fifteen parts:  
Part one: The binding nature of laws, ordinances, regulations and international treaties 
and agreements. 
Part two: The law of persons. 
Part three: Civil status. 
Part four: Nationality. 
Part five: Marital relationships. 
Part six: Affiliation. 
Part seven: Adoption. 
Part eight: Relationship by blood and by marriage. 
Part nine: Maintenance. 
Part ten: Guardianship and emancipation. 
Part eleven: Incapacity. 
Part twelve: Property regimes. 
Part thirteen: Succession. 
Part fourteen: Gifts. 
Part fifteen: Wills. 
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The code is therefore an all-embracing piece of legislation which when it goes 
operational will at least achieve one objective of codification, which that of making 
the laws readily accessible. It will remove the need of having to look for the law from 
different sources and this will be of particular importance to the law of succession 
which interacts with all the other matters.   
 
7.3: THE STATUS OF THE CODE 
Elsewhere codifications are preceded by the publication of draft codes with 
accompanying commentaries. These usually explain the solutions adopted, give their 
motivations and indicate any national or foreign sources which inspired them.1014   
In the absence of such publication in Cameroon the question of its status is left 
to conjecture. The concern here is whether the code when it becomes law will be a 
harmonisation of only the received laws, in which case it will leave the customary law 
intact or it will abrogate the rules of customary law. Judging from the effects of 
existing statutes such as the Civil Status Registration Ordinance of 1981 and the Land 
Tenure Ordinance of 1974 one would be more inclined to think that the customary 
law would be unaffected, even though the code will occasionally be brought in 
stealthily, as is the present case with the received laws.  
This position will likely be at variance with government policy since 
independence which has been to ascertain and record the acceptable aspects of 
customary law which could then be integrated within the modern law.1015 The idea 
has been to remove the dichotomy between modern and customary law in the area of 
                                                 
1014 See Krzeczunowicz, G. “The Ethiopian Civil Code: Its usefulness, relations to custom and 
applicability” [1963] J.A.L. 172-177, 172. 
1015 In 1962, Njoya Arouna, the Federal Minister of Justice while opening the first session of the West 
Cameroon High Court in Buea had expressed the desire of Government to elaborate law s in all the 
domains that will take a large account of African customary laws. See Eloi Lagoui:  « Les Problèmes 
Particuliers de Codification du Cameroun. » (1966) 28 Rev. Jur. Ind. Coop. 107-112, 110.  
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civil law generally and to have only one civil law.1016 Of course this would stifle the 
adaptability of customary law to new situations, but it would be the better of two 
evils. It is preferable to have rules of customary law ascertained and integrated within 
a modern legal system, and allowed to evolve normally within the system as a whole, 
than to let them continue in their repugnant state. 
 It can be assumed that for having interacted for so many years with the 
received systems, which has seen the rejection of customary law intestacy rules on 
grounds of repugnancy or public policy, that the customary law of succession has 
attained an acceptable stage of evolution that needs to be codified and applied 
uniformly in the whole country. We, like others before us want to be guided in our 
attitude to customary law during codification by Professor David according to whom 
“most customs are uncertain or vary from place to place, group to group and time to 
time and made it inconceivable even to consider an idea of a mere legislative 
consolidation of all the customary rules that are found to be followed in practice.”1017   
The objective of codification is generally to establish a uniform system of law 
that will not only make the law readily accessible but would also guarantee the 
cardinal principles of modern jurisprudence, which are certainty, regularity and 
predictability of court decisions. These cannot be possible if all the code does is to 
harmonise the French and English laws while leaving customary law which is should 
be the real reason for the reforms intact. 
                                                 
1016 Anyangwe, Carlson, The Cameroonian Judicial System, Yaoundé, CEPER, 1987, 266-267. 
1017 In “A Civil Code for Ethiopia: Considerations on Codification of the Civil Law in African 
Countries,” (1963) Tulane Law Review; “A New Legislative Approach to Customs: The Repeals’ 
Provision of the Ethiopian Civil Code of 1960”, (1963) 1Journal of Ethiopian Studies, cited by 
Krzeczunowicz, “The Ethiopian Civil Code: Its usefulness, relations to custom and applicability” 
supra, 173 and Farnsworth, E. A. “Law Reform in a developing country: A new code of obligations for 
Senegal” [1964] J.A.L. 6-19, 16.    
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Certainly there would be the problem of application if the code is said to 
include customary law. Anglophone Cameroon will be the most affected in this 
respect because the customary courts will not be able to apply its provisions given that 
unlike their Francophone counterparts they are limited only to the application of 
customary law. But this is something that can be taken care of by simply organising 
the customary courts in the same line as the tribunal de premier degré. It will also 
require making a demarcation, based probably on the pecuniary value, between 
estates over which the customary courts and high courts are competent as is the case 
in Malawi, for example.  
7.4: THE SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS ON SUCCESSION 
7.4.1: THE BENEFICARIES. 
The code provides no definition for the term beneficiaries or the nature of 
relationship with the deceased necessary to qualify as such. All that is done in this 
respect is to adumbrate the conditions for succession in section 503, according to 
which:    
“A beneficiary shall be required to possess the following qualities: 
a) be alive or should have been conceived during the devolution of 
succession, 
b) be related to the deceased in a relationship which permits such a 
person to aspire to succession, 
c) shall not be barred from succession.” 
  
Relevant to the question as to who the beneficiary is, is section 503(b) which is not 
helpful. One would have expected a clear definition of the type of relationship rather 
than the highly ambiguous “relationship which permits such a person to aspire to 
succession.” This could well be a legal or social relationship, but for the salutary 
intervention of sections 502 and 511. Section 502 reads:  
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 ”Succession in the absence of a will shall devolve on the surviving 
spouse, the children, parents, brothers and sisters in accordance with the 
provision of section 503 et seq.”  
  Section 511 provides:  
“Where the deceased shall be survived neither by a father and mother 
nor by brothers and sisters or their children, a quarter of the estate shall 
devolve by one half to a blood relative of the parent and the other half to 
a blood relative of the collateral parent.”    
 
We must admit the difficulty concerning the meanings of the word “parent” used in 
the highlighted phrases and to which we propose the following interpretations: Firstly, 
we assume that it signifies the father and mother of the deceased. In which case the 
“blood relative of the parent” is no other than the ordinary collaterals in French law, 
who consist of uncles or aunts or their issue. This class of beneficiaries might stretch 
to infinity as the section does not limit the beneficiaries to any particular generation of 
descendants. Secondly, it stands not for “parent” according to the first interpretation, 
but for “relative” in which case any other relative in the absence of those mentioned 
above could take as parent collateral.  
The two sections put together give the following as beneficiaries arranged in 
order of precedence: The surviving spouse, the issue, the mother and father, brothers 
and sisters or their issue, uncles and aunts or their issue, and descendants of grand 
parents.  
The code has therefore gone the same way as the existing laws by establishing 
an order of succession based on precedence and by so doing automatically excluded 
certain persons with a legal right to maintenance. Section 336 of the code provides 
that the legal obligation of maintenance shall result from blood and marital 
relationships. The obligation arising from blood relationship is limited in the case of 
direct lineage or immediate family, to the second degree, and in the case of collaterals 
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or extended family, to the second degree as well. The legal obligation of maintenance 
resulting from marriage is limited the first degree, which means between the spouses 
and their children. It is surprising that while a person is alive he has to maintain so 
many people and when he dies the category is reduced by the principle of precedence. 
The reverse would have been preferable where upon death the number of persons 
claiming succession rights should have been increased to include persons claiming by 
the proxy of those with a legal right to maintenance. It is only normal that the classes 
of persons with a right to maintenance should be restricted because the law takes into 
consideration the needs of the person himself. But when he dies the need to maintain 
himself no longer exists and this, we think should be the logic behind the long lists of 
beneficiaries in the case of death.    
The problem is that law makers always consider the different parts of the laws 
they make as being independent of each other, when in fact they are interrelated and 
provisions of one part could be called in to complement another part. With that in 
mind the beneficiaries in succession ought to be based on the combined effect of the 
succession and maintenance provisions. We noticed that the descendants of the 
children of the deceased are not entitled to maintenance but are entitled to succession, 
and consider it paradoxical that they should thus be entitled while the persons for 
whose maintenance the deceased was responsible are excluded by their mere 
existence. These children get maintenance as a legal right from their own parents and 
also succession rights from the deceased. If the law provided that certain persons are 
to be maintained it must have seen that they are in need and must this end with death, 
to permit the over-enrichment of the direct descendants of the deceased?  
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The classes of beneficiaries could be added to through the principle of 
representation1018 common in French law whereby children of deceased or those of 
his brothers and sisters who die before attaining a vested interest are represented by 
other persons who are given the same rights as the children. This is in direct contrast 
with English law where a child who dies before attaining a vested interest and without 
issue of his own, is deemed not to have survived the intestate.  
Children as used in the code include legitimate, illegitimate and adopted1019 
children1020 and their descendants. Brothers and sisters include both those of the 
whole-blood and half-blood and their children.1021    
Section 507(a) ordains the equality of sexes as it provides that “children 
irrespective of sex shall have priority over parents” and article 507(b) continues that 
children of both sexes shall benefit equally. The question is whether the equality is 
limited to children only or the provision is indicative of what should obtain in every 
category of beneficiaries. It is certainly only indicative as we would take this as an 
example of muddled drafting observed all through the code. Section 507 (a) is 
superfluous because already the rules say that other relatives are excluded when there 
are children in existence1022 and the children can only share with the surviving 
spouse.1023 We must also deplore the absence of clarity in the way the term “parent” 
has so far been used. Using the term in the English text is a wrong translation of the 
word “parents” in the original French text, which would mean “relatives” rather than 
“parents”.   
                                                 
1018 Section 18. 
1019 Section 311 of the code defines adoption  as “the legal process by which a child shall sever his 
relationship with his family of origin and establish a new one with his adoptive family” and section 
312(2) adds that “adoption shall confer on the adopted child all rights of a child born legitimate.”  
1020 Section 330 provides that parentage shall be either legitimate illegitimate or adoptive. 
1021 See section 511 which makes express reference to the children of the bothers and sisters.  
1022 Section 505. 
1023 Section 504. 
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There is affinity with English laws as far as the position of the surviving 
spouse1024 is concerned. She occupies the last position in French law and does not 
normally feature in customary law. Under the code she is the first in order of priority 
as evident in section 502 quoted above. 
The influence of the received laws is evident in the categories of beneficiaries 
and like those laws the code enshrines a system of priorities whereby the other 
relatives are excluded when there is surviving spouse and issue. Only when there is no 
issue does the surviving spouse take with the other relatives. It is doubtful if this 
system is suitable for Cameroon, given the absence of a system of social security 
schemes which have made it workable in Great Britain and France.   
 
7.4.2: ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES 
 
As in French law the estate devolves on the beneficiaries jointly,1025 which 
necessitates a period of administration before distribution. The administration is 
ensured by one of the beneficiaries pursuant to section 549(1) according to which 
“The beneficiary heir is responsible for administering the property of the succession.” 
Again it is not clear what beneficiary heir means but we can only suppose that he is 
some one like the personal representative in English law, but who differs in the sense 
that he must always also be a beneficiary.   
The question is whether this is an end of an era for the Administrator-Generals 
in Anglophone Cameroon. This is certainly not the case considering section 499(1) 
according to which “Matters relating to the appointment of personal representative, to 
wit executors and administrators shall be governed by the law of wills.” This is 
                                                 
1024 We shall use the feminine gender because as we said earlier women are more likely than men to be 
found in this position, but it should be mentioned that the expression “surviving spouse” is gender 
neutral. 
1025 See section 563. 
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another case of muddled drafting as the additional words; “of wills” are superfluous. 
The “law of wills” certainly does not govern the appointment of administrators. “The 
law” simpliciter would suffice to govern the appointment of executors and 
administrators and it is the relevant law applicable in either part of the country that 
would be applied in doing so.  
What this means is that the methods for designating the administrator have not 
changed. In priority the administrator should be a beneficiary,1026 even if the code is 
silent on the order of priority to guide the designation. We cannot but assume that the 
order of succession described in sections 502 and 511would be followed and so the 
code gives the surviving spouse a greater chance than does the French and customary 
laws. In the absence of a surviving spouse the choice would fall any of the other 
beneficiaries without distinction of sex. But this is subject to the possibility of the first 
person in the order of priority being passed-over in favour of another person in an 
inferior category or the Administrator-General in Anglophone Cameroon or 
“Administrateur Judiciaire” in Francophone Cameroon.  
 An inventory is drawn up by the beneficiaries and together with a statement 
of acceptance by the designated person, is presented to the registry of the competent 
High Court.1027 This would be a welcome innovation in Anglophone Cameroon as it 
will mean the elimination of the next-of-kin declaration taken as a precondition for 
the grant of letters of administration.    
The administrator organises the funeral, pays the debts of the deceased within 
the limits of the estate1028 and is liable to render account of his administration.1029 He 
                                                 
1026 This is the purport of section 564(2): “Unless otherwise agreed the administrator shall be appointed 
by a majority of the beneficiaries, in accordance with number of undistributed shares.”   
 
1027  Section 544. 
1028  Section 548 (1). 
1029  Section 549(1). 
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shall have a free hand in the administration of the joint property,1030 meaning that he 
could without consulting the other beneficiaries lease the property for the purpose of 
administration.1031 However, he must seek and obtain the consent of the others before 
obtaining a loan on the security of the property or selling the property.1032 Against 
these rights is the obligation to render periodical accounts of his administration.1033 
 It is worthy of note that the code fails to limit the period of administration, 
meaning that it could go on indefinitely with the attendant social problems resulting 
from abuse by the so-called administrators.  
 
7.4.3: DISTRIBUTION OF THE ASSETS 
 As is the case in French law distribution is not compulsory. Section 575 
adopts the sacrosanct expression of article 815 of the French civil code which only 
confirms the facultative nature of distribution:  
“No person shall be compelled to remain in joint ownership and 
distribution may always be requested unless it was stayed by judgment 
or an agreement or stipulated by a will.” 
 
The beneficiaries might agree to maintain the property as one whole,1034 but each of 
them has an identifiable share1035 and section 601 excludes real property in the rural 
areas and farms from distribution. 
The code enshrines the hotchpot principle in article 577 which provides that 
each beneficiary who had received property from the deceased shall have to bring it 
back into the estate before distribution. There is an exception to this rule in that the 
principle is not applicable when the deceased expressly or by implication prevented 
                                                 
1030 Section  565(1). 
1031 Section  565(2). 
1032  Section 565(3) 
1033 Section 549. 
1034 Article 563(1). 
1035 Article 569. 
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its application. As in customary law therefore there would be situations under the 
code when some beneficiaries will receive more than others because of such gifts. 
However the test for ascertaining the intention of the deceased is not objective but 
subjective, given that the deceased in making the gift hardly considers all the 
circumstances including death. As a subjective test the onus is on the person who 
claims such an intention to prove it.1036 Therefore in spite of the provision the 
principle becomes applicable and what it means is that the inventory includes the 
property or its value and when the distribution is done the beneficiary’s share is 
reduced accordingly. 
It is assumed that the deceased would always be a married person; hence the 
entitlements of the beneficiaries are conditioned by this fact. Section 504 gives the 
surviving spouse one-quarter of the estate where the deceased is survived by issue, 
parents, brothers and sisters or their issue, while section 505 gives half where there 
are no issue or parents and section 506 gives the entire estate in the absence of other 
beneficiaries. 
The code provides for distribution in the case of polygamy in section 504(2) 
which stipulates: “In the case of polygamy, all the widows shall be entitled to a 
quarter share of the estate divided pro rata according to the number of years each 
widow lived with the deceased.”  One would certainly have expected the fraction of 
the estate allotted to the surviving spouse to be increased in the case of polygamy. The 
one quarter share which is also the position under the French Civil Code is intended 
for the spouse of a monogamous marriage. If the code recognises polygamous 
marriages then it ought also to realise that it will be inequitable for what is judged 
reasonable for one spouse to be shared among more spouses. One could perhaps be 
                                                 
1036 See Hardy v. Shaw [1975] 2 All E. R. 1052. 
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reading into this a tacit revulsion to polygamy, an idea which is borne out even by the 
deliberately obscure definition of marriage. Marriage according to section 218 of the 
Code is defined as the “The voluntary union of one man and one woman resulting 
from a solemn declaration with a view to creating a family.” The initial impression is 
that the code outlaws polygamy or is not applicable thereto, but for the absence of the 
standard phrase “to the exclusion of all of all others during the subsistence of the 
marriage,” which leads to the conclusion that the man is not precluded from 
contracting other marriages.  
Distribution under the code as in English law results in the beneficiaries 
obtaining absolute titles. To this effect section 621 according to which “Each co-heir 
shall be deemed to have inherited alone and directly all the property comprised in the 
share.” But the effect of this is limited by other provisions which tend to limit the 
ambit of distribution. This is the case of section 601 which stipulates that “The 
sharing of real property located in rural areas shall be an exception. This principle 
shall also apply to farms.” Such limitation betrays the desire to maintain the 
customary system of land tenure in these areas, but distribution, it must be said does 
not necessarily mean that land is broken up into smaller pieces. And in fact, it is 
recognised under section 593 that “Real property shall be presumed to have been 
distributed even where there are common shares that cannot be distributed or that are 
to remain in the joint ownership.” With such provisions the limitation with respect to 
land in the rural areas becomes unnecessary.        
 
Conclusion 
If the Code could be credited for effecting any changes at all it will be that of 
according women succession rights in the same as men and bringing the spouses in as 
beneficiaries. This will of course be effective only it the scope of the code covers the 
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customary law, given that the applicable received laws already enshrine these rights in 
line with the preamble of our basic law which declares that “the human person, 
without distinction as to race, religion, sex or belief, possesses inalienable and sacred 
rights.”  
   Apart from that the code has not but adopted the position of the English and 
French laws. Hence the weaknesses of the current law of succession, namely the 
absence of criteria for succession, principle of precedence, unrestricted period of 
administration and unclear rules of distribution have been left unscathed. The code is 
therefore victim to one of the problems of codification in Africa, where the tendency 
is to adopt the laws of the former colonial with a few cosmetic changes, failing to 
know that laws are made for a particular social and economic environment. When 
laws are relocated to a different place their success cannot be readily assured and 
Montesquieu recognizes this when he opines that only in the most exceptional cases 
will the institutions of one country serve those of another, law is “closely linked with 
its environment because of factors such as climate, fertility of the soil, the size and 
geographical position of the country, the kind of life led by the people, their wealth, 
density, trade and so on.”1037   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1037 Cited by Allan Watson, “Legal transplant and law reform”, [1976] 92 L.Q.R. 79-84, 79. 
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Chapter Eight: CONCLUSION. 
8.1: GENERAL CONCLUSION 
   
It will certainly not be an overstatement at this point of the thesis to assert that 
our law of succession is not sufficiently equipped to remove the social problems of 
which we complained at the start. True, some notable strides have been made such as 
granting women succession rights through the notion of coutumes évolués in 
Francophone Cameroon and Chibikom v. Zamcho in Anglophone Cameroon. These 
are not far reaching enough as to influence the law especially in the rural areas and 
although the family code enshrines this right, much will depend on if it is made 
applicable to persons subject to customary law.  
 Preoccupation with the succession rights of women seems to have blinded 
people on the fundamental weaknesses of our law of succession, which when 
removed would constitute a major stride towards ridding the law of its weaknesses 
and also reducing the social problems.  
The weaknesses of the law have been pointed out whenever appropriate, but 
we can here refresh our memory on the major ones. There is the absence of a general 
criterion for succession. Without specifying the basis, English and French laws set out 
a long list of family members as possible beneficiaries, but the exact impact of this is 
diminished by the principle according to which succession is by the persons closest to 
the deceased in terms of relationship. Hence the existence of a surviving spouse and 
issue automatically excludes the other relatives however needy they might be. We 
noted in this respect the pathetic case of Nforba v Nchari1038  that the 84 years old 
mother of the deceased was told that anything she would have out of the estate of a 
son she brought up and educated, depended on the benevolence of the widow. It is 
                                                 
1038  (1999)1 G.L.R. 59. 
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assumed that the only needy persons are widows and children, but this is not true as 
there are other persons who equally depended on the deceased for their livelihood. 
When these persons are excluded without an alternative means of sustenance they 
could resort to unorthodox methods such as violence and witchcraft to manifest their 
anger.  
 The situation is even more preoccupying under customary law of which the 
criterion for succession is influenced by the desire to keep land in the family. This has 
resulted in the exclusion of women generally and in the matrilineal systems this 
includes the issue of the deceased. The categories of excluded persons increase with 
the adoption by customary law, of the principle of precedence.  
Clearly women bear the full brunt of the law since apart from their wholesale 
exclusion under customary law they might also be excluded under the received laws 
by being part of the excluded remote category. This therefore lends credence to the 
view according to which the exclusion of women from succession impedes 
sustainable development. Sustainable development may be looked upon as the process 
of planned or directed social change.1039 The other way of looking at development 
seeks to redefine its processes and objectives “into the direction of rapid social change 
and redistribution of political power”.1040 Hence development is not just to be 
measured in terms of technological and economic variables but rather in terms of “the 
collective personality of the society”. The processes of development are, on this view, 
designed to foster a “collective” spirit (“a sense of belonging to a society, pride in 
national achievement, fulfillment in helping one’s distressed neighbours”), creation of 
“aspiration frontiers” (dissemination of appropriate values), generation of self reliance 
                                                 
1039 Upendra Baxi, ‘Introduction: law and “development”’ in Csaba Varga (ed) Comparative legal 
cultures (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd, 1992), 465-482 at 465. 
1040 Baxi, U. ‘Introduction’, at 465. 
 296
and “participatory-democracy”.1041 From this standpoint, the “development” resulting 
from growth model (stressing centralized planning, expression of modernized 
industrial sector and assistance from developed countries) is really 
underdevelopment.1042  Therefore, development seems to be a contextual process 
conceived to be related in time and space. Generally, it is a process that strengthens 
the human capacity to produce, create wealth and initiatives, leading to advancement 
and improvement in the mode of life.  
 If this is the meaning of sustainable development then certainly the exclusion 
of woman must impact on development as a whole. Women constitute 52 percent of 
the country’s population and yet cannot participate in the development process 
because the law of succession does not give them access to land, the main factor of 
production. 
 Even when a person qualifies as beneficiary in Cameroon there is no 
guarantee of a better life. This is because administration of estates is unlimited and 
distribution is facultative. Prolonged period of administration gives room for abuse 
since at a certain point in time the administrator starts considering himself as the 
owner. This is the period when the responsibilities towards the other beneficiaries are 
ignored and they have to resort to other means to earn a livelihood. 
 It is rather unfortunate that the draft bill on the family code contains no 
provisions aimed at righting these weaknesses, which might even have been oblivious 
to the authors. In these circumstances there is no light at the end of the tunnel for the 
weaknesses and by extension the social problems related to the law of succession, 
since the need to earn a livelihood will always send the excluded persons into the 
streets and crime. 
                                                 
1041 Baxi, U. ‘Introduction’, at 465. 
1042 Baxi, U. ‘Introduction’, at 468. 
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8.2: WHAT LAW OF SUCCESSION, THEREFORE, FOR CAMEROON? 
The problem with the code as indicated above is the feeling that laws can 
simply be transplanted from one jurisdiction to another without the necessary 
adaptation to make them workable therein. If our law of succession is in its present 
mess it is because of the existing laws and so if the code does nothing but adopt these 
same laws, there is good reason to question whether its raison d’être has ever been 
law reform or simply consolidation.  
Marcel Nguini, one time president of the Supreme Court had provided the 
following guide to law making when he stated the following as being the objective of 
law: 
« La finalité du droit est celle de garantir un monde organisé dans la paix, 
à laquelle aspirent tous les peuples de bonne volonté; celle d’être 
l’instrument principal de cohésion et de la stabilité internes nécessaires à 
l’édification de nouveaux états. »1043  
 
This would be possible if the code was preceded by ground work, but to the 
knowledge of this researcher who has been involved in the teaching of the law of 
succession since 1998, no such studies were conducted. 
 The conception must have been that the only problem confronting the law is 
succession by women and this was taken care of. If studies were conducted in the 
field, it would have been discovered there are other fundamental weaknesses in the 
                                                 
1043 “The finality of law is that of guaranteeing a society organised in peace, to which all people of 
good will aspire; that of being the principal instrument of cohesion and of internal stability necessary to 
the edification of new states,” Nguini, Marcel, “Nguini, Marcel, « Droit Moderne et Droit 
Traditionnel » (1973) 83 Penant, 1-10, 7. 
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law which need equal attention and which if they persist are likely to render 
insignificant the succession rights given to women under the code.  
The weaknesses concern the absence of a clear definition of the basis for 
succession, the unlimited period of administration, the facultative nature of 
distribution and the nature of interest obtained after distribution. These are the areas in 
which we propose reform.  
 
8.2.1: On the beneficiaries. 
The present choice of the beneficiaries leaves much to be desired mainly 
because of its exclusionary nature based on the principle of precedence. This would 
not be so if maintenance is considered to be the criterion and considering that the need 
for maintenance does not cease upon the death of the person. The family code already 
enshrines the equality of sexes but it is also necessary to increase the categories of 
beneficiaries to the members of the immediate family in accordance with Ollennu’s 
view and in line with the provision on maintenance under the code. In this way 
members of the nuclear and immediate families succeed jointly, and this would go a 
long way to alleviate the social problems attributed to the law of succession. Other 
countries have adopted such a broad-based class of beneficiaries. This is the case in 
Ghana under the Intestate Succession Law of 1985,1044 Malawi under the Wills and 
Inheritance Ordinance 1964,1045 and Odje proposes a similar system for the Mid-
Western Region of Nigeria.1046  
                                                 
1044  See Dankwa, E. V. O. “Property Rights of Widows in their deceased husband’s estate.” (1982-85) 
U. G. L. J. 1-24, 18.  
1045 See Simon Roberts, “The Malawi Law of Succession: Another Attempt at Reform.” [1968] J.A.L. 
81-88, 85.  
1046Odje, M. “Integration in the field of the law of succession in the Mid-Western Region of Nigeria” in 
Integration of customary and modern legal systems in Africa, University of Ife Press, Ile-Ife, Nigeria, 
261-292, 285-288.  
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So Cameroon would not be the only country which increases the category of 
beneficiaries to the members of the immediate family and we do not want to envisage 
the extended family, in fact our studies did not reveal any cases in which members of 
this category are claiming succession rights. In all these countries the objective has 
been to strike an acceptable balance between the demands of the customary heirs and 
those of the nuclear family. And there is no doubt that the extended category of 
beneficiaries will go a long way to reduce the social problems inherent in succession 
matters.    
The other alternative would be for the law to continue in its exclusionary form, 
and in order to eliminate the social problems the state will have to put in place social 
security schemes as is the case in England and France. If the system appears to be 
functioning well in these countries it is because of these amenities which tend to 
dissuade persons, such as parents from looking forward to succession in the estates of 
their issue. As this is impossible given the state of our economic development, there is 
need for a law of succession which would cause people not to look up to it for such 
assistance.  
 
8.2.2: On Administration 
  The administration of estates under all the systems is indefinite and most of  
the cases of abuse are when a person has managed an estate for so long that he starts 
confusing it with his own personally acquired property. A definite period of 
administration would therefore be advisable at the end of which there must be 
distribution. 
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8.2.3: On Distribution 
By extending the categories of beneficiaries it will also require adjusting the 
rules of distribution. Taking from the example of the other countries where 
beneficiaries are expanded to include the immediate family, the estate will have to be 
divided into two parts, one part for the nuclear family and the other immediate family. 
Normally the percentage allotted to the nuclear family is more than that allotted to the 
immediate family and the distribution within the group ought to be left to the 
discretion of the courts. In this way the inequalities noticed in the case of multiple 
spouses would be eliminated.   
8.2.4: On the effect of distribution 
  In order to provide beneficiaries the latitude to enjoy the full benefits of the 
property there is need to redefine the effect of distribution. Should distribution give 
rise to an absolute and alienable interest or a usufructuary interest? It is normal for 
distribution to result in absolute ownership so the beneficiaries of land could be free 
to raise loans on mortgages by using the land as security. The family code does not 
guarantee such an outcome, probably because of the fear to disrupt the customary land 
tenure system and the fear that the next generations of families might not have land if 
the beneficiaries are given unbridled powers of alienation. But we think that this 
should not be an impediment to distribution given that such lands will be subject to 
the land registration law, which we saw entitles persons with an interest in land for 
which an application for registration has been made to have such interests protected in 
the land registers.    
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